)RY OF GREECE, 



FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES 

TO 

ISTBUCTION OF COKINTH, B.C. 146; 

MAINLY BASED UPON THAT OF 

SNOP THIRLWALL, D.D., 

bishop of st. david's. 
by 

ONHARD JCHMITZ, F.R.S.E, 

m OF THE HIGH SCHOOL OF EDINBURGH. 



LONDON: 
, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS, 

PATERNOSTER-ROW ; 

AND JOHN TAYLOR, 

UPPER GOWER STREET. 

1851. 



London : 



Spottiswoodes and' Shaw, 
New- street- Square. 



PREFACE, 



Within the last fifty years more has been done by both 
English and foreign scholars to elucidate the History of 
Greece than at any former period since the revival of 
learning; and the results of all these labours are two 
English works on the History of Greece such as no 
other nation can boast of. For although the Germans 
-ossess in their literature a countless number of treatises 
\d dissertations upon almost every subject connected 
«th Greek antiquity, yet they seem to lack either the 
111 or the power to produce some one great work com- 
ning the treasures dug out by the numberless workers 
the quarries of Greek lore, and exhibiting to the 
odern student a complete picture of that remarkable 
fcion, the Hellenes. This task, requiring, perhaps, 
>re practical knowledge of free political institutions 
^n continental scholars generally can be expected to 
r x,ssess, has been left to English scholars, and has been 
executed by Bishop Thirlwall and Mr. Grote in a manner 
which throws all previous attempts of a sir nature 
completely into the shade. 

Under such circumstances, it appeared desirable that 
the results arrived at in the voluminous works of these 



PREFACE. 



authors should be made available for educational pur- 
poses. The History of Greece is taught, more or less, 
in all schools and colleges which profess to give a liberal 
education ; and as by far the greater number of young 
students want either the means to procure or the time 
to study the great works on this subject, it has been 
thought advisable to prepare a manual containing, within 
a reasonable compass, an accurate and complete outline 
of the subject, and not unworthy to serve as an intro- 
duction to the masterpieces of classical historical litera- 
ture produced in our own age and country. 

With this view the present work has been under- 
taken. It is mainly based upon Bishop ThirlwalFs 
Greek History, especially in the first part, down to the 
account of the Peloponnesian war. As this portion of 
the bishop's work enters less into the minute details of 
the subject, it was possible, and was at the same time 
thought expedient, to preserve, to a considerable extent, 
the form and diction of Dr. Thirl wall's work, of which 
part of the manual is, in every sense, an abridg- 
ment. But of the affairs of Greece from the Pelo- 
ponnesian war the bishop's work contains such a de- 
tailed account that, although the period over which it 
extends is not quite three centuries, it occupies six 
volumes out of the eight of which the whole history 
consists. Here, therefore, the process of abridging 
could not be conveniently adopted, and it became neces- 
sary to proceed more freely; especially as it was not 
requisite that the later portions of the History of Greece 
should be treated, in this manual, with that minuteness 



PREFACE. 



V 



which it seemed desirable to preserve in the accounts of 
the earlier and more brilliant period of Greek History, 
which ends at the time when the kings of Macedonia 
began to interfere in, and to exercise influence upon, 
the affairs of Greece ; for this reason, the narrative of 
events subsequent to the time of Philip is more brief 
than that which relates to the preceding period ; and as, 
moreover, the history of Macedonia and of her con- 
quests in the East does not, properly speaking, form 
part of the History of Greece, it is introduced in the 
present work only so far as is necessary to enable the 
student to understand the main subject. 

In conclusion, the author would fain indulge a hope 
that this manual may meet with the same kind and 
indulgent reception which has been accorded to his 
little work on Roman History. His most ardent desire 
is, that it may contribute towards keping alive love 
for, and admiration of, a people which, although it is 
the first we meet with at the dawn of European history, 
still stands pre-eminent in all matters connected with 
literature and the arts, and to whose spiritual influence 
all civilised nations owe a vast debt of gratitude. 

L. SCHMITZ. 



Edinburgh, Oct. 1850. 



CONTENTS. 



FACE 

Introduction l 
CHAPTER L 

Greece and its earliest Inhabitants 6 

CHAP. H. 

Foreign Settlers in Greece - - - - IS 

CHAP. IH. 

The Hellenic Nation and its Extension - - - 24 

CHAP. IV. 

The Heroic Age of Greece - - - - 39 

CHAP. V. 

The Government, Manners, Religion, Knowledge, and Arts of the 

Greeks in the Heroic Age - - - - 58 

CHAP. VI. 

The Return of the Heracleids, and Foundation of the Doric States 82 
CHAP. VIL 

The Legislation of Lycurgus - - - - 97 

CHAP. VIII. 

The Messenian Wars and Affairs of Sparta down to the Sixth 

Century before Christ - - - - -118 

CHAP. IX. 

National Institutions and Forms of Government - - - 136 

CHAP. X. 

Civil History of Attica to the Expulsion of the Pisistratids - 148 



CONTENTS. Til 

PAGE 

CHAP. XL 

The Colonies of the Greeks, and the Progress of Art and Literature 

from the Homeric Age to the Persian War - - - 188 

CHAP. xn. 

Affairs of the Asiatic Greeks to the Year b. c. 521 - -214 

CHAP. XIII. 

Prom the Accession of Darius Hystaspes, b. c. 521, to the battle of 

Marathon, b. c. 490 - - - - 225 

CHAP. XIV. 

Prom the battle of Marathon to the battle of Salamis - - 248 
CHAP. XV. 

Prom the battle of Salamis to the End of the Persian Invasion - 272 
CHAP. XVI. 

Prom the Commencement of the Athenian Maritime Ascendancy 

to the Thirty Years' Truce between Athens and Sparta - 297 

CHAP. XVIL 

Prom the Commencement of the Thirty Years' Truce to the Re- 
newal of Hostilities between Athens and Corinth, with a 
general View of the Administration of Pericles - - 317 

CHAP. XVHI. 

Causes and Occasions of the Peloponnesian War - 332 
CHAP. XIX. 

From the Commencement of the Peloponnesian War to the End of 

the Third Year - - - ~ - - 348 

CHAP. XX. 

Fourth and Fifth Years of the Peloponnesian War - - 365 

CHAP. XXL 

From the Beginning of the Sixth Year of the Peloponnesian War 

to the general Pacification of Sicily - - - - 377 

CHAP. XXII. 

From the general Pacification of Sicily to the Peace of Nicias - 391 
CHAP. XXXIIL 

From the Peace of Nicias to the Conquest of Melos - - 406 



viii 



CONTENTS. 



CHAP. XXIV. 

The Sicilian Expedition before the Arrival of Gylippus in Sicily - 417 
CHAP. XXV. 

The Sicilian Expedition, from the Arrival of Gylippus to its Close 434 
CHAP. XXVI. 

From the Close of the Sicilian Expedition to the Restoration of 

Alcibiades - - - - - - -446 

CHAP. XXVII. 
From the Return of Alcibiades to Athens to the End of the Pelo- 
ponnesian War - - - - - - 464 

CHAP. XXVIII. 

From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Re-establishment 

of Democracy at Athens ----- 473 

CHAP. XXIX. 

Retrospective Survey of the Internal Condition of Greece during the 

Peloponnesian War - - - - •• -479 

CHAP. XXX. 

From the Expedition of Cyrus the Younger to the Peace of 

Antalcidas - - - - - - - 497 

CHAP. XXXI. 

From the Peace of Antalcidas to the Death of Epaminondas - 515 
CHAP. XXXII. 

From the Death of Epaminondas to the Battle of Chaeronea - 538 
CHAP. XXXIII. 

From the Battle of Chaeronea to the Death of Alexander - - 563 

CHAP. XXXIV. 

From the Death of Alexander to the Time of the Achaean League 576 
CHAP. XXXV. 

The Achaean and Aetolian Leagues down to the Battle of Sellasia 597 
CHAP. XXXVI. 

From the Battle of Sellasia to the Destruction of Corinth - 608 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



INTRODUCTION. 

At the very threshold of European history, before any 
other nation of our continent is known even by name, we 
meet in its south-eastern portion with a people which pre- 
sents to us mankind in its beautiful and poetical infancy, 
and gradually rises to the full vigour and restless intel- 
lectual activity of early manhood. Much beyond this state 
it never proceeded, for its career was cut short by internal 
dissensions and the all-absorbing power of Rome. The 
history of Greece in her best days, therefore, is the history of 
European mankind in the age of its youth, when all its mental 
and physical powers displayed a vigour, activity, and fertility 
which will never cease to awaken the admiration of those 
who know how to appreciate the noblest attributes of hu- 
manity. To dwell upon and study such a history is as de- 
lightful, refreshing, and invigorating, as that exercise of the 
imagination when, in times of trouble and adversity, we try 
to forget the actual world by which we are surrounded, and 
betake ourselves to the fair regions of our youth, so full of 
poetry, beauty, and happiness. But it is not pleasure and 
recreation only that we seek and find in the history of Greece : 
its pages, like those of the history of all civilised nations, 
abound in wholesome and useful lessons for states as well as 
for individuals, especially in regard to every thing connected 

B 



2 



INTRODUCTION. 



with the cultivation of intellect and taste. We there hold 
communion with a people which not only was inspired with 
a glowing love of its country and its liberty, but has pro- 
duced in the arts, in poetry, in oratory, and in philosophy, 
the noblest and sublimest works to which the human mind 
has hitherto given birth, and which have ever been, and 
probably always will be, the highest models for study and 
imitation. A nation in which all these excellencies attained 
so great a degree of perfection and were so harmoniously 
blended together, has existed only once in the history of the 
world ; and the fairest flower of humanity is assuredly 
entitled to claim the deepest interest and the most earnest 
attention of those who aspire to what is highest in man, and 
do not allow the merely physical wants of our nature to engross 
their whole being. Although the Greek nation has long 
since departed from the scene of history, yet its glory is 
immortalised by the deeds of its heroes, the writings of its 
poets and sages, and by the works of its artists, which still 
excite the admiration of those who are most competent to 
judge of their beauties, and still exercise their influence upon 
the best literary and artistic productions of our own time. 

The interest inspired by the history of Greece is very 
different from that which we feel when studying the history 
of Rome. In the latter there is a unity from beginning to 
end, the city of Rome always forming the centre, as it were, 
around which all the events of Roman history are grouped, and 
upon which they always have a more or less direct bearing. 
The history of Greece presents no such unity, except in a few 
isolated cases. Greece, small as it was, consisted of almost 
as many independent states as it contained cities, so that, 
properly speaking, a history of Greece is almost an impos- 
sibility ; the history of many of its numerous little states 
having come down to us in so fragmentary a condition, that 
we catch a glimpse at their internal affairs, or hear of their 
doings, only now and then, when they come in contact with 



INTRODUCTION. 



3 



one or other of the leading states. What, therefore, is 
generally called the history of Greece, is in reality not much 
more than the history of Athens and Sparta. During a 
short period, Thebes also emerges from its condition of 
comparative obscurity ; but the other states occupy a pro- 
minent place only in proportion as they are connected with 
Athens and Sparta, between which cities the supremacy in 
Greece was divided, and on which the other states were 
more or less dependent. This want of unity, however, is 
sufficiently compensated for by the variety in social and 
political institutions, as well as in literature, to which the 
peculiar circumstances of Greece naturally gave rise ; for, each 
town or tribe being left to itself and following the bent of 
its own genius and inclination, a freedom of development 
was allowed in every particular state, of which there is no 
example in any other nation. Greece, therefore, is a little 
world by itself, in which the attentive observer has oppor- 
tunities of seeing all the varieties and shades of difference 
that exist in a great nation developed in such a manner as 
to keep each tribe distinct, and yet so far united with the 
rest as to form with them but one great family. 

Some persons believe that the history of Rome is more 
practically useful than that of Greece ; and reasons in support 
of this opinion are certainly not wanting, especially as 
Eome and her institutions may, in a more direct manner, be 
regarded as the basis upon which most of our social and poli- 
tical institutions have been reared, and of which they are, in 
fact, further developments. But in every thing that ennobles 
man — mentally, morally, and aesthetically, the history of 
Greece possesses numerous examples of the most striking 
kind ; and it may be safely asserted that human life, in 
all the variety of its manifestations, is nowhere more com- 
pletely exhibited than in the history of the Greek states. 
If, further, the importance of the history of a nation is U 
be estimated by the influence which it has exercised upon 

B 2 



4 



INTRODUCTION. 



contemporary nations and upon posterity, and if we allow 
intellectual influence a higher place than that which is 
the result of military conquest, then the history of no 
other nation can compete in usefulness and interest with 
that of Greece. Greece did not conquer the world by the 
sword, indeed ; but she subdued it by the superiority of her 
genius in art and literature, and has thereby acquired an 
empire more vast and more enduring than that which was 
established by the arms of the Romans, who, themselves, 
cheerfully owned that the Greeks were their masters in all 
the nobler achievements of the human mind. The Greeks 
extended and communicated to other nations the blessings 
of civilised life by means of peaceful colonisation along 
the shores of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, in 
Asia, Africa, Sicily, Southern Italy, and Gaul ; while the 
conquests of Alexander spread Greek culture and literature 
from the Mediterranean to the Indus : so that, about the 
beginning of the Christian era, every man of rank and edu- 
cation, from the Indus to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, 
was familiar with the language and literature of Greece. 
Providence seems to have chosen this as one of the great 
means for facilitating the extension of Christianity ; inas- 
much as the documents of the Christian religion, being 
composed in Greek, thus became accessible at once to all 
educated persons throughout the civilised world. 

In studying the history of Greece, we go back to the 
perennial spring from which all truly great men in all sub- 
sequent ages have deeply drunk. Persons unacquainted 
with the noble productions of the Greek mind may sneer at 
©ur enthusiastic admiration ; but it is more than a mere 
consolation to know that the greatest poets, philosophers, 
orators, and artists, of all ages and countries, have willingly 
and humbly acknowledged their obligations to the Greeks, 
from, whose teachings and examples they have derived such 
varied and powerful assistance in the production of their 



INTRODUCTION. 



5 



greatest and sublimest works. The history of Greece is so 
rich in every thing that can claim our admiration, esteem, 
and affection, that we cannot help approaching it with a 
feeling of joy and delight. 

The political existence of Greece ceased at the time when 
the Eomans became the rulers of the country, but its intel- 
lectual sovereignty survived even the fall of Rome in the 
fifth century of the Christian era ; nay, a faint shadow of 
Greek independence continued to exist in the Byzantine 
empire down to the middle of the fifteenth century; and 
although the real spirit of ancient Greece had disappeared 
from the trifling and dissolute capital of the eastern or 
Greek empire, still a veneration for the great minds and 
masters of antiquity was kept alive there, and, after the 
conquest of Constantinople by the Turks, was communicated 
by the exiles whom that event drove forth from their native 
land to the people of south-western Europe. There the 
seed fell upon a fertile soil : a love of the noble and beau- 
tiful in art and literature was its first fruit ; and the sources 
of learning being now thrown open, the darkness which had 
been hanging over Europe for a thousand years was soon 
dispelled. The revival of letters, which then commenced, 
was the beginning of a new era in the history of Europe, 
which is more strongly marked than any other ; the free 
spirit of Greece rose, as it were, from its tomb, drove away 
the mists of ignorance, broke the chains of superstition, 
emboldened the mind of man to assert its right of independent 
thought, and thus opened that career of intellectual life and 
activity which is the pride and glory of modern times. 



B 3 



6 



HISTOKY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. I. 



CHAPTER I. 

GREECE AND ITS EARLIEST INHABITANTS. 

Greece, whose name is so inseparably connected with the 
history of European civilisation, forms the south-eastern 
extremity of Europe. It is situated between the thirty-sixth 
and fortieth degree of northern latitude, and its whole ex- 
tent is considerably less than the small kingdom of Portugal. 
In form, Greece is distinguished among the countries of 
Europe by the same features which distinguish Europe 
itself from the other continents ; that is, by the great range of 
its coast compared with the extent of its surface, exceeding 
in the former respect the whole of Spain and Portugal. 
Greece is a peninsula, which projects from the main trunk 
of Europe, grows more and more finely articulated as it 
advances towards the south, and terminates in the peninsula 
of Peloponnesus, which resembles an outspread mulberry- 
leaf, whence its modern name Morea. * The position of 
Greece between the two neighbouring continents, and oppo- 
site one of the most fertile regions of Africa, presented to 
human activity more advantages than any other country on 
earth ; for the surrounding sea afforded the most convenient 
communication with the civilised nations of the ancient world, 
and the numerous islands scattered over it offered agreeable 
and commodious resting-places to the sailor who navigated it. 
In addition to this, Greece abounded in excellent harbours 
and spacious bays ; it was watered by numerous rivers, and, 
being in the enjoyment of a serene and delightful climate, 
though the winter was often very severe, it was a country 
no less rich than beautiful. Its productions were as various 



Mop4a signifies a mulberry tree. 



chap. I. THE COUNTRY AND ITS NAME. 7 



as its aspects, some parts being more fertile in grain, 
wine, olives, and many valuable fruits, while others afforded 
abundant pastures. In precious metals the country was, 
perhaps fortunately, poor ; but plenty of iron and copper was 
found in various districts : so that the land provided its 
inhabitants with every thing required for the perfect de- 
velopment as well of their physical as of their intellectual 
powers. 

This land was called by its own sons Hellas, for which 
we have adopted the Koman name Greece ( Graecia). The 
word Hellas, that is, the country of the Hellenes, however, 
did not at all times apply to the same extent of country ; 
according to some*, it was originally the name of a town 
or district in the south of Thessaly, which was afterwards 
called Phthiotis. From that territory the name is said to 
have gradually extended to the whole of Thessaly. But, 
according to others, the most ancient Greeks were the Selli 
(SeXXot= f EXXot="EXX77V£e), who dwelt in and about Do- 
dona f, bearing the name of Graeci (Tpaacoi). J The Greeks 
themselves traced their national name to a mythical hero, 
Hellen, just as the Graeci derived theirs from a hero, 
Graecus, who is called a son of Thessalus, while Thessalus 
is said to have founded Dodona. Another tradition repre- 
sents a son of Graecus as ruler of Thessaly, for the Graeci 
are said to have migrated from the country of the Molossians, 
in the neighbourhood of Dodona, to Thessaly, and to have 
there been called Hellenes. In later times, when the Hellenes 
spread farther south, the name Hellas embraced a wider 
extent of country, and might properly be considered to reach 
as far as the national features of the Hellenes, so as to 
include Peloponnesus, and even the islands and colonies 

* Steph. Byz., s. v. 'EAAck. f Aristot. Meteor, i. 14. 

J This name seems to have become known through Tyrrhenian navi- 
gators to the nations of the west, who transferred it to all the inhabitants 
of the country commonly called Greece, who continued to be designated 
by it even when the ancient tribe of the Tpautoi had ceased to exist. 

B 4 



8 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. I. 



occupied and founded by the Hellenes ; though, in a more 
limited sense, the ancients apply it to the region south of 
Macedonia as far as the Corinthian isthmus, the southern 
peninsula deriving its separate designation, according to 
tradition, from the Phrygian Pelops. In a somewhat loose 
acceptation, the name Hellas embraced even Macedonia and 
Epirus. After the destruction of Corinth, in b. c. 146, the 
Romans gave to the whole of Greece the name Achaia, and 
subsequently constituted it as a Roman province. If we 
understand by the term Greece merely the country between 
the Cambunian range of mountains in the north and the 
southern extremity of Peloponnesus, it denotes a land of 
small extent ; but if we include under it the adjacent islands, 
the numerous colonies established by the Greeks on the 
coasts of Thrace, Asia Minor, Africa, Southern Italy, and 
Sicily, it becomes the designation of a vast empire ; and still 
more so, if we include the conquests of Alexander in the East, 
into which, through him, the Greek language and civilisation 
were introduced. 

Greece Proper seems to have acquired its present shape 
by violent convulsions and changes of the earth's surface, 
which belong to an extremely remote period, and of which 
only very obscure and vague traditions were preserved 
among the ancients. The country lies in a volcanic zone, ex- 
tending from the Caspian to the Azores, and although history 
informs us of no volcanic eruptions in Greece, still there 
were many permanent traces of volcanic agency scattered 
over its surface, in the hot springs of Thermopylae, Troezen, 
Aedepsus, and other places. The sea between Peloponnesus 
and Crete has always been the scene of surprising changes, 
wrought by volcanic forces. Not long before the Christian 
era a new hill was thrown up on the coast, near Troezen, 
and within a short period three small islands were formed 
in the neighbourhood of Thera.* Earthquakes and inunda- 

* Plin. H.N. iv. 12. 23. ; Strab. i. p. 57. 



I 



chap. I. NATUKE OF THE COUNTRY. 9 

tions have, in all ages, been frequent in Greece, especially in 
Peloponnesus. It is said that in the earliest times the plains 
of Thessaly were covered by water, until an earthquake 
separated the mountains Ossa and Olympus, and, opening 
an outlet for the river Peneus, formed the celebrated valley 
of Tempe. Similar catastrophes seem to be implied in the 
legends about the quarrels of Poseidon with Athene, for the 
possession of Athens and Troezen, and with Hera for that 
of Argos ; as well as in the stories relating that the islands 
of Delos, Anaphe, Rhodes, and Cyprus were at one time 
covered by the sea, and rose at the bidding of some god. 
There was, lastly, a tradition that no connexion existed 
between the Euxine and the Aegean, until the Euxine, 
breaking through its barriers, formed the Hellespont and 
Propontis. Another stated that Asia was anciently con- 
nected with Greece, until the intervening country, which 
bore the name of Lycaonia or Lyctonia, being struck by 
Poseidon with his trident, formed with its scattered fragments 
the islands in the Aegean. There is nothing unreasonable 
in the" belief of such violent convulsions of the earth's sur- 
face ; but no one can say with certainty whether these 
accounts were actually ancient traditions, or mere opinions, 
arrived at by the speculations of the philosophers of a late 
period of Greek literature. All authentic information must 
be drawn from a careful examination of the geological nature 
of the country and its surrounding islands ; and this cer- 
tainly leads us to the belief that Greece owes its present 
appearance to the operation of mighty volcanic forces. 

In the earliest times, before Greece was occupied by the 
Greeks or Hellenes, we meet with the names of many races 
which were afterwards considered by the Greeks as bar- 
barous, or foreign to themselves in manners and language. 
Among them the Pelasgians were by far the most import- 
ant; they were the most widely spread, and their name 
appears in Crete and Asia Minor as late as the fourth 

b 5 



10 HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. I. 

century before the Christian era, when all the other ancient 

tribes have entirely disappeared. Their name and origin 

have been the subjects of much speculation, which, however, 

has yielded no definite results ; all that we can say with 

certainty is, that they must have immigrated into Europe 

from Asia Minor, perhaps across the Hellespont and Pro- 

pontis, and that they gradually spread, under different 

names, over nearly the whole of south-eastern Europe, and 

the west of Asia Minor. All Greece is said to have 

been inhabited by them, and to have borne the name of 

Pelasgia.* In some parts of Greece, however, they appear 

to have been mixed with other tribes ; in others, no traces 

whatever of them are found. The first distinct mention of 

the Pelasgians in Greece itself is met with in the south-east 

of Thessaly, where a district or town is called the Pelasgian 

Argos f ; and on the banks of the Peneus we find a town of 

the name of Larissa J, which is said to signify a fortress, and 

is probably a Pelasgian word. There are, however, many 

indications which seem to prove that at one time the whole 

of Thessaly was occupied by Pelasgians, though they were 

not distinguished by that appellation in all parts of that 

country, for the Perrhaebians also were Pelasgians. In 

the west of Greece we meet with Pelasgians in Epirus at 

Dodona, where Zeus was worshipped as the Pelasgian king. 

There they were called Helli or Selli, Graeci and Chaones, 

and constituted a very extensive tribe, by which nearly all 

Epirus was occupied before it came under the rule of the 

Molossians. South of Epirus, in Acarnania and -ZEtolia, we 

lose sight of the Pelasgians, and the names of other races 

occur, as Leleges, Taphians, Teleboans, and Curetes, which 

are not known to have belonged to the Pelasgian stock. So, 

* Strab. v. p. 220. Herod, ii. 56. ; viii. 44. 
f Argos signified a plain. 

j Towns or fortresses so named, as well as towns bearing the name of 
Argos, occur in many parts of Greece, and in every instance may be 
clearly traced to the Pelasgians. 



ITS EARLIEST INHABITANTS. 



II 



too, in the countries south of Thessaly, no Pelasgians present 
themselves until we come to Boeotia, where they appear as 
one of a great number of barbarous tribes, such as Aones, 
Temmices, Leleges, and Hyantes, and where they are said to 
have settled after the expulsion of the Phoenician colony of 
Cadmus. Being afterwards driven out of Boeotia, they are 
stated to have settled in Attica, though Attica had been 
peopled by Pelasgians long before that time. They were 
believed to have dwelt in Attica from time immemorial, 
without undergoing any change, except by successively 
assuming new names and adopting a new language, until 
at length they called themselves Ionians, after Ion, one of 
their chiefs.* 

In Peloponnesus, as in the north of Greece, the Pelasgians 
appear to be confined to particular districts, though, accord- 
ing to some authorities, the whole peninsula was at one time 
called Pelasgia. The parts in which their presence is 
attested by direct evidence, are Argolis, Arcadia, and 
Achaia. The plain and city of Argos, with its fortress 
Larissa, were distinguished from the Thessalian Argos by the 
epithet Achaean, and were regarded by the ancients them- 
selves as the district from which the Pelasgians spread 
northward over Greece. The first settlers in Achaia are 
called Pelasgians, and are said to have subsequently assumed 
the name of Ionians, from Ion, the son of Xuthus, who 
came among them. On the confines of Elis and Achaia, also, 
we find a town Larissa, and a river Larisus, which confirms 
the belief in Pelasgian settlements in those parts. Arcadia 
was so celebrated as a Pelasgian land, that it disputed with 
Argolis the honour of being the mother-country of the whole 
nation. 

* It must, however, be observed, that the Pelasgian wall on the Acro- 
polis of Athens was believed to be the work, not of those primitive in- 
habitants of the country, but of a Pelasgian tribe, who, at a later time, 
made only a transitory stay in Attica. 

B 6 



12 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. I. 



These are the places in Greece where the Pelasgians are 
expressly mentioned in ancient traditions, and from the 
review we have just taken, we must conclude that the name 
Pelasgians was a general one, like that of Saxons, Franks, or 
Alemannians, but that most, if not all, of the Pelasgian tribes, 
had also specific names peculiar to themselves. Hence it 
is quite probable that branches of the same race may 
have existed in countries where no tradition mentions its 
name ; and we must often look for other evidence in order, 
on the one hand, not to separate kindred races, and, on 
the other, not to confound those which were really dis- 
tinct. But here everything is so obscure that it is impos- 
sible to come to any definite and satisfactory conclusions. 
The most probable opinion, however, is, that most of the 
tribes which we find scattered among the acknowledged 
Pelasgians were connected with them, and branches of 
the same great stock. Among the most ancient inhabit- 
ants of Boeotia were the Hectenes, Temmices, Aones, and 
Hyantes, of whom we know scarcely anything beyond their 
names ; but the Caucones, who once occupied a large portion 
of the western side of Peloponnesus, were undoubtedly a 
Pelasgian race, and the Leleges, whom we meet with on the 
coasts of the Aegean and in Peloponnesus, were, no doubt, 
allied either to the Pelasgians or to the Hellenes. The 
Thracians, who occur in Phocis, and are mentioned among 
the barbarous inhabitants of Boeotia, the possession of which 
they are said to have shared with the Pelasgians, were like- 
wise a branch of the Pelasgian race ; and the relationship 
between them and the Pierians, in the north of Greece, is 
well attested. These Thracians, though the later Greeks 
style them barbarous, appear to have cultivated a certain 
kind of poetry, as is implied in the story of I'hamyris, even 
if we set aside the names of Orpheus and Musaeus, which, 
as well as the productions assigned to them, are probably 
forgeries of a later age. In Asia Minor, Pelasgians are 



CHAP. r. 



ITS EARLIEST INHABITANTS. 



13 



expressly mentioned along the western coast, and three 
ancient towns in that tract bore the name of Larissa. In 
the Trojan war Pelasgians are included among the allies of 
the Trojans, who themselves belonged to the Pelasgian race. 
In the Aegean, the islands of Lesbos, Chios, Lemnos, and 
Imbros were occupied by them. 

We have already intimated that in the earliest traditions 
we meet with the Pelasgians in Greece ; but it is quite cer- 
tain that they did not originate there, or, to use the Greek 
expression, were not Autochthones (earth-born) ; by which 
term the Greeks merely indicated that they were both un- 
able and unwilling to trace their origin any further. They 
must have come into Europe from the quarter where man- 
kind made its first appearance. We are not, however, to 
suppose that the Pelasgian race immigrated into Greece at 
once, or at one particular point ; their migration may have 
lasted for many years, nay for centuries ; and while some 
crossed over the Hellespont in the north, others may have 
sailed directly across from more southern parts of Asia, and 
at a different time ; so that there is no necessity for consider- 
ing the Pelasgians in one part of Greece as the ancestors of 
those in other parts ; and the same supposition may also 
account for the different names and other peculiarities of 
the various Pelasgian tribes, though their fundamental 
character was the same everywhere. 

The first well-established fact in the history of Greece, 
then, is, that the great bulk of the population consisted of 
Pelasgians ; and as we hear of no subsequent immigration 
of foreign tribes, nor of any convulsions or revolutions by 
which its ancient inhabitants were wholly or mostly exter- 
minated or dislodged, we must further infer that the Pelas- 
gians constituted the main body of its inhabitants during 
the whole historical period. How, then, is it that the later 
Greeks looked upon themselves as a different race, and 
speak of the language of the Pelasgians as barbarous, or 



14 



HISTOKY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. I. 



not Hellenic? And what was the difference between the 
Pelasgic and the Hellenic or Greek language ? To answer 
the latter question would not be difficult if many distinct 
remnants of the Pelasgian language had been preserved; 
but, unfortunately, almost all that have come down to us con- 
sist of names of persons and places, many of which, more- 
over, are very doubtful, it being uncertain how far they 
may have been changed and adapted to Greek ears. Hero- 
dotus, who heard a language, called Pelasgian, spoken in 
two places near the coast of the Propontis, and at a town 
which he calls Creston, the site of which is uncertain, though 
it was probably not very far from the isthmus of Mount 
Athos, says that it was barbarous*; but in discussing the 
matter further, he uses an expression which he also employs 
when comparing the language of the lonians in Lydia with 
that of the lonians in Caria.f Hence we must indeed 
infer that the Pelasgian which he heard, had something 
strange and foreign about it ; but we cannot by any means 
conclude that the two languages were as distinct as, for 
example, the German and the French, or even as the 
English and the German. If we assume this to be the 
case, which still leaves a wide field for speculation where 
all the details are so uncertain, we may easily conceive how 
the Pelasgian language passed into or became amalgamated 
with the Hellenic or Greek, without any great convulsions 
among the inhabitants of Greece; and it also becomes 
probable, that the Greek language, as it has been handed 
down to us, contains more Pelasgian elements than is com- 
monly supposed. This view is confirmed also by what 
we know of the Pelasgians in Italy, of which they oc- 
cupied the whole of the south, and both the eastern and 
western coasts ; for the languages there spoken by tl|em, 
such as the Latin and other dialeets, have the strongest 
resemblance to, and in innumerable instances a perfect 



* I. 57. 8dp§apov yAwcraav /eVres. 



f I. 142. 



chap. J. ITS EARLIEST INHABITANTS. 15 

identity with, that of the Greeks. We must therefore 
consider the Pelasgian language as the basis, or rather as 
an early phasis, of the Greek. With the knowledge of 
this general fact we must be content, for all attempts to 
define more exactly the relation between the two languages 
rest on nothing but arbitrary assumptions. 

The question which here naturally presents itself to us 
is, in what relation did the Hellenes or Greeks, who after- 
wards gave to the nation its tone and character, stand to 
the Pelasgians ? They are said to have originally occupied 
the district on and about Mount Pindus, where they took 
refuge during the flood of Deucalion ; and this would imply 
that previously to that catastrophe they had possessed a 
larger extent of country. From Mount Pindus they may 
afterwards have spread farther south, and extended their 
power; but this subject will be more fitly discussed in 
another chapter, and we shall here add only a few observa- 
tions respecting the traditions about the state of civilisation 
among the Pelasgians. 

The idea that the Pelasgians in Greece, like the Aborigines 
in Italy, were half savages, living without laws, without 
fixed habitations, and without any knowledge of agriculture, 
is merely an application of the speculative notion that man 
at first was little better than the brute creation, and only 
by degrees emerged from the savage state into any degree 
of civilisation. That they were not savages may be safely 
taken for granted ; but how their civilisation was ac- 
quired is a matter of uncertainty. According to some, it 
was of a spontaneous and gradual growth ; while, according 
to others, it was the effect of foreign influence. The testi- 
monies of ancient authors are not safe guides, as we do not 
know how far they report genuine traditions, and how far 
they give us only the results of philosophical or historical 
speculations. According to the legends of Arcadia, Pelasgus 
taught his people to build rude huts, to clothe themselves 



16 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. I. 



with skins, and to substitute the fruit of the oak for the 
leaves and wild herbs on which they had before subsisted. 
His son, Lycaon, founded the first town, Lycosura; and 
under Areas, the fourth king from Pelasgus, from whom the 
country derived its name of Arcadia, the people learned the 
use of bread, and began to exchange their skins for woollen 
garments. This account is probably nothing more than the 
result of a speculation as to the manner in which man may be 
supposed to have emerged from his primitive state, and is of 
no historical value. The legends of the earliest condition of 
Attica are of the same nature, and opposed to the more 
trustworthy traditions, which assign to the Pelasgians tillage 
and the useful arts as their proper and original pursuits. 
We are told that they loved to settle on the rich soil of 
alluvial plains ; so in Thessaly, Pelasgus hastened to take 
possession of the country formed by the withdrawal of the 
waters which had forced a passage for themselves between 
Mounts Ossa and Pelion. The oldest Pelasgian divinities, 
moreover, seem to have been those powers which preside 
over husbandry, and protect the fruits of the earth, and the 
growth of the flocks and herds.* In the plains they seem 
to have been engaged in agriculture, while in mountainous 
districts, such as Arcadia, they naturally adopted a pastoral 
life. As some portion at least of the Pelasgians had come 
to their new country by sea, we must suppose that those, at 
all events, who inhabited the coast, were acquainted with 
the rudiments of navigation, and continued to cultivate it. 
Hence we find the islands of the Aegean peopled by Pelas- 
gians (Leleges), and the Tyrrhenian Pelasgians, as pirates, 
infested the seas far and wide. It is, further, a fact beyond 
all doubt, that in many places the Pelasgians dwelt together 
in fortified towns (Larissa), had regular political and re- 

* It is, therefore, not improbable that TlzXapyoi (from 'dpyos and 7re'Aa>) 
was expressive of this national character, and described them as the in- 
habitants or cultivators of the plain. 



CHAP. I. 



ITS EARLIEST INHABITANTS. 



17 



ligious institutions, and were perhaps even acquainted with 
the art of writing. Some of the most ancient architectural 
monuments in Europe, which may probably outlast all that 
have been reared in later times, clearly appear to have been 
the works of their hands ; we allude to the huge structures 
known by the singular name of Cyclopian *, which are 
found in many parts of Greece, Asia Minor, Epirus, and 
Italy. In what remains of these buildings, we can still trace 
the progress of the art, from the rudest and most unsightly 
beginnings, to edifices like the lion-gate of Mycenae, and the 
treasury of Atreus. 

* The name Cyclopian probably expresses nothing more than the 
wonder which these gigantic works excited in the Greeks of a more 
refined age. 



18 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



chap. n. 



CHAPTER n. 

FOREIGN SETTLERS IN GREECE. 

At a comparatively late period, when an historical literature 
had sprung up in Greece, it was generally believed that in 
ages of very remote antiquity, before the name and dominion 
of the Pelasgians had given way to that of the Hellenes, 
foreigners from distant countries had landed on the shores 
of Greece, and had there planted colonies, founded dynasties, 
built cities, and introduced useful arts and social institutions, 
before unknown to the ruder natives. This belief was pre- 
valent, not only among the mass of the people, but even 
among philosophers and learned men, and has maintained its 
ground with some, even in our own days. But the current 
stories about these ancient settlements afford great room for 
distrust, not merely in the marvellous features which they 
exhibit, but in the still more surprising fact, that with the 
lapse of time their number seems to increase, and their details 
to be more accurately known ; and that the farther we go 
back the less we hear of them, till, on consulting the Homeric 
poems, our most ancient records, we lose all traces of their 
existence. These circumstances have led some historians to 
discard the traditions altogether, and to deny that any foreign 
influence was exercised upon the development of the national 
character of the Greeks. Now, although even a slight in- 
spection of these stories will show that neither the authority 
on which they rest, nor their internal evidence, is such as to 
satisfy a cautious inquirer, yet it would be rash to deny 
that, during those Pelasgian times, foreign adventurers, es- 
pecially Phoenicians, landed on the inviting coasts of Pelo- 
ponnesus for the sake of commerce, and in some instances 
planted colonies there. But the mythical stories of Cecrops, 



chap. n. FOREIGN SETTLERS IN GREECE. 



19 



Danaus, Cadmus, and Pelops, must be rejected as devoid of 
the characteristics of history, and as fictions which sprang 
up in Greece itself, although they were afterwards believed 
as history. Let us here briefly notice their leading features. 

The principal colonies brought to Greece from the east 
are said to have been planted in Argolis and Boeotia. The 
Pelasgians were still masters of the plain of Argos, when 
Danaus, driven out of Egypt by the fifty sons of Aegyptus, 
landed with his fifty daughters on the coast, was raised to 
the throne by the consent of the natives, and founded a 
town, afterwards the citadel of Argos (Larissa). He is said 
to have given his name to the warlike Danai, who were 
once so celebrated, that Homer uses this as a general appel- 
lation for the Greeks, when that of Hellenes was still con- 
fined to a narrow range. Herodotus, who relates this story 
without any distrust, even mentions the Egyptian town from 
which Danaus came ; and he recounts a Rhodian tradition, 
that Danaus, on his way to Greece, touched at Rhodes, and 
founded a temple of Athena at Lindos ; the Danaids, more- 
over, instructed the Pelasgian women of Argos in the mystic 
rites of Demeter. To them, too, was ascribed the discovery 
of the springs, or wells, which relieved the natural aridity 
of a part of the Argive soil, with the peculiar character 
of which the legend is thus intimately connected ; and 
this gives some colour to the conjecture of those critics 
who believe that the whole story of Danaus was of purely 
Argive origin, and sprang out of local circumstances and 
accidents. At Megara, also, we find a king Lelex, who, ac- 
cording to one author*, had come from Egypt, founded a 
dynasty, and given his name to the Leleges. 

In Attica we meet with reports of more than one Egyptian 
colony. The first, led by Cecrops, is said to have found 
Attica without a king, and desolated by the deluge which 
befel it, more than a century before, in the reign of Ogyges. 
* Paus. i. 3-9. § 6. 



20 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. II. 



Some of the latest Greek writers state that Cecrops also 
gave his own name to the land, and on the Cecropian rock 
founded a new city, which he called Athenae, after the 
goddess Athene. To him is ascribed the introduction, not 
only of a new religion of pure and harmless rites, but even 
of marriage, the first element of civil society. Notwith- 
standing, however, the confidence with which this story has 
been repeated in modern times, the Egyptian origin of 
Cecrops is extremely doubtful ; the early Greek poets and 
historians do not mention the tradition ; and even at the time 
when it became current, it was contradicted by some of the 
Greeks themselves, who regarded Cecrops as an autochthon, 
or earth-born being, half man, half serpent. The Egyptians, 
however, evinced such anxiety to represent the Athenians as 
their kinsmen, as to excite doubts even in the minds of the 
most credulous ; they went so far as to assert, that on one 
occasion they sent Erechtheus with a supply of corn for their 
kinsmen in Attica, and that he was rewarded there by re- 
ceiving the kingly dignity, in return for which he founded 
the mysteries of Eleusis on the model of those of the 
Egyptian Isis. A third Egyptian colony was said to have 
been led to Attica by Peteus, shortly before the Trojan war. 
The arguments by which the Egyptians supported these 
tales, were as weak as their assertions were bold ; and though 
that which is derived from the oriental character of some of 
the primitive institutions of Attica seems to be somewhat 
better entitled to a careful consideration, yet it is unaccount- 
able that early writers, who might have been expected to be 
best informed on this subject, are utterly silent about it. In 
fact, all mythological inquiries tend to show that Cecrops 
and Erechtheus are fictitious personages, and belong entirely 
to a homesprung Attic fable. 

The tradition about a foreign settlement in Boeotia is 
undoubtedly supported by much better authority., That 
Cadmus led a Phoenician colony into the heart of the 



chap. II. FOREIGN SETTLEES IN GREECE. 



21 



country, and founded a town called Cadmea, which after- 
wards became the citadel of Thebes, was a tradition which 
had been current in Boeotia long before the time of Hero- 
dotus, whose judgment was not biassed in this case by the 
Egyptian priests ; it also derives support from some colla- 
teral circumstances, which show that the Phoenicians had 
very early gained a footing on the islands and shores of 
Greece. The Thebans believed that they had received the 
art of writing from the Phoenicians, and pointed out traces 
of what was thought to be Phoenician worship. Modern 
writers, on the other hand, find in the legends of Cadmus 
and his wife Harmonia, and in their connection with Samo- 
thrace and the mysterious Cabiri, decisive marks of a Pelas- 
gian origin ; urging, further, that it is not likely that the 
Phoenicians should have founded a settlement in a place like 
Thebes, in the very heart of a country. 

A tradition, supported by the authority of Herodotus and 
Thucydides, states that Pelops crossed over from Phrygia 
to Greece with treasures which afforded him the means of 
founding a new dynasty. His descendants ruled at Argos 
for three generations ; their power was acknowledged 
throughout Greece, and the southern peninsula was called 
after him Peloponnesus, or the island of Pelops. The details 
of the story are entirely mythical, and it may be mentioned 
that Homer nowhere alludes to the Asiatic origin of the 
house of Pelops, whence there naturally arises a suspicion, 
that the connection of Pelops with the east is a mere fiction, 
which it was easy to devise at the time when Greece sent 
forth her colonies to Asia Minor.* 

All attempts to elicit out of these legends any thing de- 
serving the name of history must prove abortive, and yet 
there are points which seem to justify the belief that they 

* The name Pelops is, perhaps, connected with Pelasgus, and identical 
with it ; the Phrygians did not occupy the country from which Pelops is 
said to have come till a much later time, so that he cannot have been a 
Phrygian. 



22 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP, II. 



cannot have been wholly destitute of historical foundation. 
We have already mentioned as probable that the Pelasgians, 
in their migrations from east to west, did not all cross over 
into Europe at once, nor from the same points ; on the con- 
trary, these migrations must have continued for many gene- 
rations, and it therefore appears highly probable that the 
stories of the foreign settlers which we have just enume- 
rated, are only so many forms of the impressions which a 
dim and vague recollection of those migrations had left on 
the minds of the Greeks, and which were wrought by them 
into the poetical tales for which their natural genius so pecu- 
liarly fitted them. But at the same time, we must not 
forget that Greece, so far from being secluded from the rest 
of the world, was particularly open and inviting to foreign 
settlers ; and on examining the stories of the various colonies 
said to have been planted in Greece, we are now and then 
struck by coincidences which cannot have been the result of 
design. Thus, at the period which is commonly given as the 
date of the foundation of those colonies, we generally hear 
of some great feud or convulsion in the countries from which 
they are said to have come. But all we contend for is, that 
if Egyptian or Phoenician adventurers or fugitives did settle 
in Greece, they were not sufficiently numerous to build 
cities, still less to exert any considerable influence upon 
the development of the religious, social, or political institu- 
tions of the Greeks. Herodotus, indeed, represents the 
greater part of the religious notions and practices of his 
countrymen, the objects and forms of their worship, as de- 
rived from Egypt ; and when we consider that in Greece, 
as elsewhere, it was religion that called forth the arts, 
poetry, and even philosophy, it is clear that many of the 
most interesting questions depend upon the ascertainment 
of the degree in which the religious and intellectual cul- 
ture of the Greeks was derived from foreign sources ; but 
our knowledge of the Egyptian and Greek religion has not 



chap. n. FOREIGN SETTLERS IN GREECE. 



23 



yet arrived at such a stage, as to enable us to draw the line 
of demarcation between what was foreign and what was of 
home growth. 

With regard to Phoenician settlements in Greece, an in- 
tercourse between the two countries may have existed, even 
several centuries before the age of Homer ; we know that 
the Phoenicians were attracted by the mines of Cyprus, 
Thasos, and Euboea, and this intercourse seems to have 
been the most powerful of all the external causes that pro- 
moted the progress of civilised life in Greece. The Phoe- 
nicians must have had many stations on the coasts, and it is 
not improbable that some names we meet with in the my- 
thical stories, are their popular designations. For instance, 
one of these names is that of Telchines, whose mythical pur- 
suits and occupations seem to embody recollections of arts 
introduced or refined by foreigners. The objects of the 
Phoenicians can scarcely have been to establish permanent 
settlements in Greece, but rather to found commercial depots 
and factories, which they abandoned, as soon as their atten- 
tion was diverted to a different quarter. It is highly pro- 
bable also, that these Phoenicians not only introduced their 
arts and the products of their industry, and thus made 
themselves really useful to the districts which they visited, 
but at the same time imparted religious superstitions of a 
very injurious nature ; and many of the horrid rites which 
are described as prevailing at an early period in Greece may 
have been derived from the Phoenicians, whose religious 
ceremonies are known to have been particularly impure and 
atrocious. But whatever extent we may allow to the inter- 
course with Phoenicia or any other country, it was certainly 
not sufficient materially to alter the natural progress and 
development of the Greeks themselves, in whose history, so 
far as it is attested by authentic evidence, there is nothing 
which cannot be explained, on the supposition that their 
culture and civilisation were in all essential points of native 
growth. 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. III. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE HELLENIC NATION AND ITS EXTENSION. 

During the period when the Greeks had a literature of 
their own, they showed on all occasions an extreme prone- 
ness to create fictitious persons for the purpose of explaining 
names, the real origin of which was lost in remote antiquity. 
Thus, almost every nation, tribe, city, mountain, sea, river, 
and spring, was supposed to have been named after some 
ancient hero, of whom very often nothing but this fact is 
recorded. Such fictions were the natural growth of the 
poetical genius of the Greeks, which always endeavoured to 
embody the spiritual and to personify the indefinite. But 
clearly as we may perceive this tendency in innumerable 
instances, we should yet be going too far if we were to 
attribute to it alone all legends in which the name of a tribe 
is referred to that of an individual. Accurate discrimina- 
tion alone can guide us, and it may be regarded as a safe 
rule, that we must withhold our belief from such traditions 
whenever they are not supported by trustworthy authorities, 
and when the period or the person referred to belongs 
to remote antiquity. This remark applies with full force 
to the heroes whom the Greeks believed to have been the 
founders of their whole nation and its main branches. All 
the Greeks no doubt held the opinion that the name of 
Hellenes was derived from Hellen ; but on such a subject the 
authority of the best Greek writer is of very little weight, 
and Hellen must be regarded as a pure fiction or abstraction 
from Hellenes. But in the account of Hellenes progeny we 
may nevertheless trace the propagation of the main branches 
of the Hellenic nation, and it is for this reason that we 
cannot leave it unnoticed. 



chap. in. HELLENIC NATION — ITS EXTENSION. 25 



Hellen is commonly called a brother or a son of Deucalion, 
who, with his wife Pyrrha, escaped from the flood which 
happened in his time, and replenished the desolated earth 
with a new race, which sprang up from the stones which he 
and his wife, by the command of the Delphic oracle, threw 
behind them on Mount Parnassus. * Thence he crossed over 
with his new people into Thessaly, taking with him a host 
of Curetes, Leleges, and other tribes. This leads us to the 
belief that the people afterwards called Hellenes came from 
the west, a belief which is confirmed by the fact that we 
find names differing but slightly from that of the Hellenes 
among the most ancient tribes of Epirus ; for there, ac- 
cording to Aristotle, lay the ancient Hellas "j" ; and there also 
we meet with the Hellopes, inhabiting the country of Hel- 
lopia, perhaps only another form of Hellas. It is, there- 
fore, much more probable that the Hellenes derived their 
name from this tribe than from a hero Hellen, though the 
form Hellenes may have been first used in Thessaly. Beyond 
this we cannot go, and all that we can say with any degree of 
probability is, that the Hellenes and Hellopes were akin to 
each other and to the Pelasgians, the ancient possessors of 
all Epirus. What connection there was between the Hel- 
lenes in Epirus and those in Thessaly, it is impossible to 
ascertain ; but that there was a connection, may be inferred 
from the fact that Achilles, in the Iliad J, invokes the Pelas- 
gian Zeus of Dodona as the protector of his family. The 
Leleges and Curetes, whom Deucalion took with him to 
Thessaly, are met with among the earliest inhabitants of 
Acarnania, Euboea, Boeotia, and Laconia. The Leleges 
are said to have been called Locrians from their leader 
Locrus, and that the Locrians were Hellenes is admitted on 
all hands. 

* This legend may have arisen from an etymological speculation about 
the word \abs (people), which was connected with Aaas (a stone), 
f See above, p. 7. } xvi. 234. 

C 



26 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. III. 



The first known seats, then, of the Hellenes lay in the south 
of Thessaly, near the foot of Mount Othrys, a district which 
was called Hellas. Before the name of Hellas had extended 
beyond this limited tract of country, the Hellenes themselves 
seem to have gained a footing in almost every part of the 
land afterwards so called. This diffusion of the Hellenic race 
must have effected important changes in the condition and 
character of the inhabitants of Greece, though we have but 
scanty information as to the nature and progress of this 
revolution. But before we proceed to trace its course, we 
shall endeavour to set forth the most characteristic features 
of the Hellenes. There can be no doubt that the Hellenic 
population included some new elements, not indeed absolutely 
foreign to the Pelasgian race, but yet very slightly connected 
with it ; and it is .evident that the peculiar stamp which dis- 
tinguished the Greeks from all other nations was impressed 
upon them by the originally small tribe of the Hellenes. 
We must, therefore, look upon them not as strangers, such 
as the Phoenicians and Egyptians, but as a branch of the 
Pelasgian family, containing its best and purest blood, and 
destined to unfold the noblest faculties of the race, and 
to raise the national existence to the highest stage it was 
capable of reaching. 

The transition from the Pelasgian to the Hellenic period 
was not effected by conquests or migrations only, for it 
seems that previously to the general diffusion of the warlike 
and powerful descendants of Hellen, they were frequently 
called in as auxiliaries to other states, during the civil 
feuds which in those early times arose in all parts of Greece 
in proportion to the growth of power and opulence. Hence, 
in many parts of the country the transition was the 
result of a natural development of circumstances in the 
social state of the Pelasgians ; and it is manifest that no 
exact line can be drawn between the two periods. The 
population of Greece, must, in fact, from the very ear- 



chap. m. HELLENIC NATION — ITS EXTENSION. 27 

liest times, have been in continual, though often not unob- 
structed, progress : at first it was probably almost wholly 
engaged in struggling with the obstacles opposed by na- 
ture to the cultivation of the soil, and the separate tribes 
lived more or less isolated. But before the diffusion of the 
Hellenes, the intercourse of the tribes with one another 
must have been greatly increased, and those on the sea- 
coast had no doubt made considerable advances in civilisa- 
tion through foreign navigators and adventurers ; while 
those settled in the interior and secluded parts of the 
country remained more in their primitive condition under 
patriarchal or sacerdotal forms of government, which ex- 
ercised a severe control over their actions and mode of life. 
The wealthier class had begun to seek its chief distinction 
in the use of arms, and where a sacerdotal caste existed, a 
military one rose up by its side. We have every reason for 
believing that, when the diffusion of the Hellenes commenced, 
they were not superior in any respect to the Pelasgians, 
except in their martial qualities, their active and enterprising 
genius, their love of arms, and skill in warfare ; and these 
were the qualities most prized among their descendants for 
many generations. The ascendant which they thus gained 
among the weaker but more civilised Pelasgians, placed 
them at once in possession of all the stores, material and 
intellectual, which the latter had amassed, and in a situation 
the most favourable for increasing them. Accordingly they 
every where constituted the ruling class ; and their spirit was 
more or less communicated to all parts of Greece, throughout 
which it produced a similar state of society. It is this 
general predominance of a warlike tribe, raised above the 
need of labour, rude in its manners, impatient of inactivity, 
and eager for adventures, yet endowed with a boundless 
intellectual capacity, and, gradually softened by the arts 
and pleasures of peace, submitting to the restraints of 
religion and of social order, that seems to constitute the cha- 

C 2 



28 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. m. 



racteristic feature of the Hellenic period in its earliest 
stage. 

Of the four Hellenic tribes which traced their origin to 
Hellen, and accordingly represent the main branches that 
issued from the general stock, two, the Aeolians and Dorians, 
derived their descent from two sons of Hellen, Aeolus and 
Dorus. The third son, Xuthus, is not regarded as the 
direct representative of any tribe ; but his sons, Ion and 
Achaeus, were considered as the ancestors of the Ionian 
and Achaean tribes. The Aeolians were the most widely 
spread in Greece ; the Achaeans are most celebrated in epic 
poetry, and Homer commonly uses their name to designate 
all the Greek tribes which took part in the Trojan war. 
The Dorians and lonians rose later to celebrity ; but their 
fame and power far surpassed that of the other tribes. In 
order to understand the relations of these four branches of 
the Hellenic nation to one another and to the more ancient 
inhabitants of the country, we must not only form a clear idea 
of their geographical boundaries, but must follow them, as 
far as we can, into the localities in which we find them at 
the beginning of the historical period, when a new series 
of convulsions changed their relative condition. 

Hellen is said to have left his kingdom to Aeolus, and to 
have sent forth his other sons, Dorus and Xuthus, to make 
conquests in distants lands. The dominion of Aeolus was 
bounded by the rivers Asopus and Enipeus, and comprised 
the tract afterwards called Phthiotis, at the northern foot of 
Mount Othrys. That part of Thessaly called Aeolis, in 
Thessaliotis, between the Enipeus and the Peneus, was 
probably one of the first settlements of the Aeolians. 

In Boeotia, also, mention is made of Aeolians, who are 
traced either to Amphictyon, the son of Deucalion, or to a 
daughter of Aeolus * ; but they, did not settle in Boeotia till 



Paus. ix. 1. § 1. ; 40. § 5. Diod. iv. 67. 



CHAP. HI. HELLENIC NATION — ITS EXTENSION. 29 

sixty years after the Trojan war, when, on being driven 
from Thessaly, they proceeded to Boeotia, expelled the 
Pelasgians, and gave to their new country the name of 
Boeotia, which had belonged to the district where they 
originally dwelt. To Aeolus himself no conquests are 
ascribed ; but his sons and their descendants spread the 
Aeolian and Hellenic name far and wide, and in their history 
we must seek that of the people. The principal settlements 
of the Aeolids in Thessaly lay round the shores of the 
Pagasaean Gulf, and in the fertile plains near the coast: 
there Cretheus, the son of Aeolus, was said to have founded 
Iolcos ; and Pherae was believed to have received its name 
from Pheres, another Aeolid. The district called Magnesia, 
from Magnes, probably contained many Aeolian towns ; and 
the Athamanes, in another part of Thessaly, traced their 
origin to the Aeolid Athamas, who is said to have dwelt in 
the Thessalian town of Alos. The Aeolians on the Gulf 
of Pagasae appear inseparably blended with the Minyans, 
a race very celebrated in early times, but almost forgotten 
at the period when the real history of Greece begins. The 
adventurers of the Argonautic expedition are all called 
Minyans, though they were mostly Aeolian chieftains. 
Their fabulous progenitor Minyas is described as a descen- 
dant of Aeolus, and we find them in such places as are known 
to have been occupied by Aeolians. Whether these Minyans 
were originally a Pelasgian tribe subdued by the Aeolians, 
who afterwards assumed their name, or whether Minyes 
was only a title of honour, equivalent to heroes, is uncertain. 
The most flourishing of the Aeolian Minyans are met with 
in the north of Boeotia, where the city of Orchomenos rose to 
great power and opulence in the earliest period of which any 
tradition has been preserved. Its most ancient monument, the 
treasury of Minyas, was, in the eyes of the Greeks themselves, 
inferior to none of its kind ; and the kings of Orchomenos 
ruled over a great part of Boeotia, Thebes itself seeming to 

C 3 



30 



HISTOEY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. III. 



have been at one time subject to them. The extraordinary 
wealth of the Minyans and of their rulers arose, no doubt, 
from their dominion over a fertile country ; and their 
magnificence may have been owing to their intercourse with 
more cultivated foreigners. Their native traditions, how- 
ever, pointed to Thessaly as their mother country, where 
we also meet with a town, Minya, and with another called 
the Minyan Orchomenos. The people consisted of two tribes, 
the Eteoclean and the Cephisean : the former seems to have 
comprised the warlike chiefs ; the latter, the industrious 
people who cultivated the plain watered by the Cephisus. 
Along with them are mentioned the Phlegyans, a fierce and 
godless race, who were destroyed by the gods for their in- 
famous deeds against the Thebans and the temple of Delphi. 
This mythus appears to allude to the violent resistance made 
by the natives to the new settlers, and their final extirpation 
or expulsion. In the south of Boeotia, too, we meet with 
traces of the Aeolians ; for the towns of Tanagra and Hyria 
were Aeolian settlements, their dynasties being connected 
in the legends with Aeolus. But it is not in Hellas proper 
only that we can trace the diffusion of the Aeolian tribe ; 
we find them also at Ephyra, the city afterwards more 
celebrated under the name of Corinth, where the dynasty 
of the wily Sisyphus ruled over the Aeolians ; and his grand- 
son, Phocus, gave his name to the Phocians, which intimates 
that the Phocians too were Aeolians. Some of the more 
remote descendants of Aeolus spread his name over the 
western parts of Peloponnesus, such as Elis, where Sal- 
moneus is said to have founded Salmone, in the territory 
of Pisa. From him, again, were descended Pelias and 
Neleus, to the latter of whom was ascribed the foundation 
of the kingly dynasty at Pylos, probably the Pylos in Tri- 
phylia. During the formation of these little Hellenic king- 
doms, the ancient inhabitants of the land formed perhaps 
the bulk of the population ; but many of them, driven from 



chap. ill. HELLENIC NATION — ITS EXTENSION. 31 

the coast into the hills on the borders of Arcadia, preserved 
their independence for several centuries. What happened 
in Messenia during that early period is not quite certain ; 
but, according to one tradition, it, too, fell under the do- 
minion of Aeolian princes, the first of whom was Perieres, 
whom Hesiod calls a son of Aeolus-, while others represent 
him as a son of Lelex, king of Laconia ; however this may 
be, that Aeolians did establish themselves in Messenia is 
clear from the fact that the names of three Messenian towns, 
Oechalia, Ithome, and Tricca, are found in Thessaly also. 
One of the princes of Elis, Aetolus, is said to have been 
driven from his dominion, to have settled in Aetolia, which 
derived its name from him, and to have there founded the 
towns of Calydon and Pleuron ; while his brother Paeon 
was the progenitor of the Paeonians on the river Axius. 
In Aetolia, however, the Aeolians seem to have occupied 
only the maritime districts, the interior being possessed by 
different tribes. The Locrians claimed a higher antiquity 
than any of the other Greeks ; and Locrus, their progenitor, 
was described as a descendant of Amphictyon, a son of Deu- 
calion. The national traditions of the Locrians connect them 
with the Aeolians of Thessaly and Elis. 

The sketch we have here given of the diffusion of the 
Aeolians, shows that in the greater part of northern Greece, 
and on the western side of Peloponnesus, the beginning of a 
new period is connected more or less closely with the house 
of Aeolus, or with the tribe represented by his name. The 
legends, through which alone we can follow the gradual 
extension of this tribe, furnish indeed but scanty informa- 
tion ; yet it is worthy of notice, that most of the Aeolian 
settlements were founded in maritime districts ; places like 
lolcos, Corinth, and Orchomenos, are the luminous points 
from which rays shoot out in all directions, while Poseidon 
is the god most frequently mentioned in their fabulous gene- 
alogies. In this respect the Aeolians present a strong contrast 

C 4 



32 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



CHAP. Ill, 



to the Dorians, to whose traditions we shall now direct our 
attention. 

The Dorians are distinctly stated by Herodotus to have 
been a Hellenic race, while he describes the Ionians as 
Pelasgians.* The former, moreover, are said to have gone 
through many wanderings, whereas the Ionians never 
changed their ancient seats. In the time of Deucalion, the 
Dorians inhabited Phthiotis ; under Dorus, the son of Hellen, 
the country at the foot of Mount Ossa and Olympus, called 
Hestiaeotis ; afterwards, being expelled by the Cadmeans, 
they occupied the heights of Pindus, and assumed the name 
of Macedonians. Thence, again, they passed first into Dry- 
opis, and from Dryopis into Peloponnesus, where they were 
called Dorians. In this account, Herodotus must be mis- 
taken in stating that the Dorians originally inhabited Phthia, 
the earliest seat of the Aeolians ; for the legends present no 
traces of any such connection between the two tribes, but, on 
the contrary, the people who were the first and bitterest 
enemies of the Dorians are described as the friends and 
brothers of the Aeolians. Herodotus, however, regarding 
Aeolus and Dorus literally as brothers, could not well avoid 
representing their respective races as issuing from the same 
country. Their primitive seats must have been in Hestiae- 
otis, west of Mount Pindus, and then at the foot of Oeta, 
where we meet with Aegimius, the great hero and lawgiver 
of the Doric nation. He had to struggle against the Lapi- 
thae, and being unable to defend himself, called in the aid of 
Heracles, which he agreed to repay with a third of his king- 
dom. The invincible hero delivered him from his enemies, 
and slew their king, Coronus, whom we find mentioned among 
the chiefs of the Argonauts, and must accordingly regard as 
a Minyan or Aeolian. It seems that at a very early period 
Dorians, being expelled from Thessaly, migrated to Crete, 
where, as every where else, they lived divided into three 
* Herod, i. 56. ; comp. viii. 43. 



CHAP. m. HELLENIC NATION — ITS EXTENSION, 33 

tribes.* The statement of Herodotus, that the Dorians were 
ejected from Hestiaeotis by the Cadmeans, that is, the 
Thebans, is extremely obscure ; and it is equally difficult to 
determine his meaning, when he says that the Dorians were 
a Macednian or Macedonian race, for with the Macedo- 
nians the Dorians had nothing in common, either in their 
language, their religion, or their social institutions. Other 
convulsions of which we likewise know nothing compelled the 
Dorians to seek a home in the south of Thessaly, the country 
of the Dryopes, which now received the name of Doris. 
Some of the Dryopes submitted to their conquerors, while 
others migrated to Euboea and Peloponnesus, where they 
established themselves on the coast of Argolis, in the towns 
of Asine, Hermione, and Eion. In their newly conquered 
territory, the Dorians continued to live for a considerable 
time, and on good terms with the Heraclidae, in conjunction 
with whom they ultimately conquered Peloponnesus, an 
event of which we shall speak hereafter. 

The two remaining Hellenic tribes, the lonians and 
Achaeans, derived their origin from Ion and Achaeus, the 
sons of Xuthus ; and even from this genealogy, fabulous as it 
is, we may infer that these two tribes were more closely con- 
nected with each other than with either the Aeolians or the 
Dorians ; a presumption which is greatly strengthened by 
the traditions which have come down to us concerning them. 
Xuthus, the third son of Hellen, is said to have been ex- 
pelled from Thessaly by his brothers, because he had taken 
more than his due share of their common patrimony. He 
found shelter in Attica, where he established himself, and 
founded what was called the Attic tetrapolis, or the four 
united townships of Oenoe, Marathon, Probalinthos, and 
Tricorythos. He wedded Creusa, the daughter of Erech- 
theus, king of Attica, and became, by her, the father of 
Achaeus and Ion. Some traditions add, that on the death 
* Horn. Od. xix. 174. 
C 5 



34 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. III. 



of Erechtheus, he was chosen to decide the disputed succes- 
sion, and that the preference he gave to Cecrops provoked 
the other sons of Erechtheus to expel him from Attica. 
Thereupon, he went with his children to Peloponnesus, to 
the district then called Aegialos (the coast), but which after- 
wards received in succession the names of Ionia and Achaia. 
From this point, the story of his two sons is parted into 
separate lines. 

Achaeus, according to some accounts, was forced to quit 
Aegialos, or Athens, in consequence of accidental bloodshed, 
and led his followers to the eastern side of Peloponnesus, 
where they mingled with the Pelasgians of Argolis and 
Laconia, or subdued them ; and thus arose the Peloponnesian 
Achaeans, from whom the whole of Peloponnesus was some- 
times called the Achaean Argos, to distinguish it from the 
Pelasgian Argos of Thessaly. Others relate, that after his 
father's death, Achaeus, with a band of adventurers from 
Aegialos and Athens, went to Thessaly, and recovered the 
patrimony of which his father had been wrongfully deprived. 
Accordingly we find, that at a later period Phthia bore the 
name of Achaia also * ; and it is an established fact, that 
Achaeans existed both in the east of Peloponnesus and in 
Thessaly : the latter country seems to have been their pri- 
mitive abode, whence they spread southward, and settled in 
Peloponnesus ; for, independently of other traditions, there 
is one which states that Archander and Architeles, the 
mythical sons of Achaeus, came from Phthiotis to Argos, and 
married two daughters of Danaus, whose names, Automate 
and Scaea, are indicative of the relation of dependence into 
which the original inhabitants fell. The questions, however, 
who the Achaeans were, and whether they were con- 
nected with the Hellenic race as closely as the current gene- 

* Homer commonly uses the name of Achaeans for the Greeks in 
general, but more particularly designates by it the subjects of Achilles, 
who reigned in Phthia. 



chap. m. HELLENIC NATION — ITS EXTENSION. 35 

alogy seems to suggest, still remain to be solved. For in 
some traditions, Achaeus is called a brother of Phthius and 
Pelasgus, and a son of Larissa and Poseidon ; according to 
which, the Achaeans would seem to be the ancient Pelasgians 
of Phthia. Hence it is not surprising to find, that when 
they were expelled from the Thessalian Argos, they met with 
a kindly reception in the Pelasgian Argos, and did not attempt 
to set themselves up as rulers there, as the Aeolians did 
every where. If we take this view, the Achaeans in the 
north were no other than the Aeolians, who were sometimes 
called by the name of the people among whom they esta- 
blished their sway. Hence Strabo and Euripides call the 
Achaeans an Aeolian race.* To these Aeolian Achaeans, 
belong also the Myrmidons, the subjects of Achilles, whose 
fabulous origin from ants (juvp/xr^^c? fJLvpjioi) is transferred 
by tradition to Aegina, where Aeacus is said to have pre- 
vailed on his father Zeus to people the island with a new 
race, but where, more probably, an Aeolian or Achaean 
colony from Phthia established itself. Afterwards, however, 
Aeolian chiefs from the western side of Peloponnesus settled 
in Argolis. The manner in which the Achaean name was 
introduced into Laconia is very obscure ; according to 
some, Achaeus himself settled there, while others relate that 
Achaeans came into Peloponnesus with Pelops ; but the 
stories about intermarriages between the dynasties of Sparta 
and Argos suggest the idea that there existed an original 
natural affinity between them. At a subsequent period, the 
Achaeans being driven from Argos and Laconia by the 
Heraclidae, migrated to the north of Peloponnesus, to 
Aegialos, which was thenceforth designated by the name of 
Achaia. 

The early history of the lonians, though peculiarly in- 
teresting on account of its connection with the ancient insti- 
tutions of Attica, is, perhaps, more obscure than that of any 

* Strab. yiii. p. 333. Eurip. Ion, 64. 
c 6 



36 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. III. 



of the other tribes. In the current genealogy, Ion is repre- 
sented as a grandson of Hellen ; but the Athenians gladly 
listened to a tradition more flattering to their national 
vanity, according to which he was the son of Apollo ; a 
story which furnished Euripides with the subject of one 
of his most ingenious plays. But all the variations from 
the common story, which were devised to gratify the Athe- 
nians, tend to confirm the substance of the received tradition, 
which is never entirely suppressed in them. According to 
the most generally entertained opinion, the lonians were a 
Hellenic tribe, who took forcible possession of Attica and a 
part of Peloponnesus, and communicated their name to the 
ancient inhabitants. In Thessaly, however, to which their 
genealogy points, no trace of the Ionian name is met with ; 
Herodotus considers the lonians as Pelasgians, and distin- 
guishes them from the Hellenic Dorians. He further states 
that the inhabitants of Attica were originally Pelasgians ; 
and although we know that afterwards the Athenians formed 
a part of the Hellenic nation, yet the historian remarks, that 
the Attic lonians had never changed their seats. The only 
way of reconciling these statements seems to be, to suppose 
that a body of Hellenic settlers established themselves among 
the old Pelasgian population, and gave it a new name, and a 
new nature. The time when this great change took place 
may have been that in which the legend places the arrival of 
Ion, to whom is attributed, not only the introduction of a 
new national name, but also the institution of the four tribes 
into which the people of Attica was anciently divided. One 
of these Attic tribes consisted of warriors, and down to a 
very late period we find in Attica a powerful body of 
nobles, possessing the best part of the land, commanding the 
services of a numerous dependent class, and exercising the 
highest authority in the state. Hence we must suppose, that 
the warrior tribe and the noble class were the Hellenic con- 
querors who overpowered the native Pelasgians. By this 



chap, ill, HELLENIC NATION — ITS EXTENSION. 37 



violent revolution, an end was put to the Pelasgian line of 
kings, and the conquerors took possession of the throne : 
this is, in fact, implied in the story, that Poseidon, the 
national god of the Ionians, destroyed Erechtheus and his 
house ; and in the statement, that Ion was the founder of a 
new dynasty.* On the other hand, however, there are 
reasons for believing, that the name of the Ionians is of 
much higher antiquity than the common legend ascribes to 
it, and that it prevailed in Peloponnesus and Attica, even 
before the Hellenes made their appearance in Thessaly.f 
The name is used as synonymous with Pelasgian, and Pelo- 
ponnesus seems to have been one of the earliest Ionian seats, 
or, at least, as ancient a one as Attica. Distinct traces 
of the Ionians also occur at Troezen and Epidaurus. The 
inhabitants of the former town distinguished themselves, 
even in the historical times, as the friends and kinsmen of the 
Athenians ; and, at Epidaurus, the last king before the 
Dorian invasion was said to be a descendant of Ion, and took 
refuge with his people in Attica. On the eastern side of 
Peloponnesus, the name of the Ionians appears indeed to 
have at one time extended much further ; and Argos, before 
it bore the name of the Achaean, was designated by the 
name of the Iasian.% 

But how is this view of the Pelasgian character of the 
Ionians to be reconciled with the known state of society in 
Attica, and with the various indications which it seems to 
disclose of a foreign conquest, and of two distinct races? 
Of the four Attic tribes, one is said to have been a caste of 
priests, who may originally have had the supreme power 
in their hands. The relation between this tribe and that 
of the warriors appears to be indicated by the tradition, 
that at the death of Pandion, his twin sons, Erechtheus and 
Butes, divided their inheritance, and that the former suc- 

* Apollod. in. 15. 5. Eurip. Ion, 284. 

f Herod, vui. 73. f Horn. Od. xviii. 246. 



38 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. Ill, 



ceeded to the throne, while the latter obtained the priesthood 
of Athena and Poseidon. From this tradition we may per- 
haps infer two periods in the ancient history of Attica, one 
of which might he called the priestly, the other the heroic, 
in the former of which the priesthood was predominant, 
while in the latter the warriors gradually rose to power. 
The latter period would be the Ionian as contrasted with 
the Pelasgian, which preceded it, not indeed because the 
lonians were foreign to the Pelasgians, but because at that 
time, in consequence of migrations from Peloponnesus, the 
Ionian name became established in Attica, and the warrior 
class received additional strength from the new adventurers. 
This second period must have formed the transition to a con- 
dition which may be termed Hellenic, inasmuch as it was one 
of gradual approximation to the purely martial and heroic 
character of the genuine Hellenic states ; and also, perhaps, 
because strangers of Hellenic origin now gained some foot- 
ing in Attica. For this, at least, seems to be implied in the 
story of Xuthus and the establishment of the Attic tetra- 
polis. In later times the lonians of Attica founded nume- 
rous colonies in the island of Euboea, which, until then, had 
been occupied by Leleges, Curetes, and Abantes. The tran- 
sition by which the Pelasgian language spoken in Attica 
gradually became Hellenised was, no doubt, greatly facilitated 
by the close affinity of the two dialects, and by the growing 
intercourse between Attica and the neighbouring Hellenic 
states ; not to mention the influence which must have been 
exercised by the Attic tetrapolis, if it was Hellenic, which 
there is reason for believing. 



chap. iv. THE HEROIC AGE OF GREECE. 



39 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE HEROIC AGE OF GREECE. 

The period between the first appearance of the Hellenes in 
Thessaly and the return of the Greeks from Troy, is com- 
monly designated by the name of the heroic age or ages, 
The real chronological limits of this period cannot be de- 
fined, for the chronology of the history of Greece, previously 
to the first Olympiad, that is, the year B.C. 776, is involved 
in utter obscurity, and all the dates of events given in 
modern works being either mere guesses, or based upon 
doubtful calculations, are any thing but certain. But still, 
so far as its traditions admit of any thing like a chronolo- 
gical connection, the duration of the heroic period may be 
estimated at about two hundred years, perhaps, from about 
B.C. 1400 to b.c. 1200. We have already seen how the 
warlike race of the Hellenes spread from the north over the 
south of Greece, founding new dynasties in a number of 
small states ; and how a similar state of things arose even in 
countries which were not immediately occupied by the in- 
vaders ; so that every where a class of nobles, entirely given 
to martial pursuits, and the principal owners of the land *, 
became prominent above the mass of the people, which they 
held in various degrees of subjection. The history of that 
age is in reality the history of the most illustrious persons 
belonging to this class, who are commonly termed heroes. \ 

* Their station and character may be fitly compared to that of the 
chivalrous barons of the middle ages. 

f The real meaning of this term is doubtful ; it seems to contain the 
same root as the Latin hems, hera, the Greek "H/?a, and the German 
Herr. Homer applies it as a title to the leaders and their followers. 
Afterwards it was restricted to persons of a superhuman, though not 
divine, nature, who were honoured with sacred rites. In the course 
of time, however, it came to signify men of extraordinary strength and 
gigantic stature. 



40 



HISTORY OE GREECE. 



CHAP. IV. 



It is filled with their wars, expeditions, and adventures, 
which form the great mine from which the materials of 
Greek poetry were almost entirely drawn ; but its very rich- 
ness in poetical materials deprives it of much value to the 
historian, who can extract from it but little. For this reason 
we shall confine ourselves to those legends which are most 
worthy of notice, either for their celebrity, or for the light 
which they throw on the general character of the period, or 
for their connection with subsequent historical events. 

The most celebrated of all the heroes is Heracles ; but the 
legends about him are so varied and complicated, that the 
ancients themselves saw no way of removing the difficulties 
which they involve, except by assuming the existence of a 
number of fabulous persons of the same name ; and on exa- 
mining the exploits ascribed to him, we must agree with 
them, at least so far as to be convinced that the actions said 
to have been performed by him must be divided into two 
classes, which manifestly belong to two different periods in 
the history of Greece. The one carries us back to the 
infancy of society, when it is engaged in its first struggles 
with nature for existence and security : we see the hero cleav- 
ing rocks, turning the course of rivers, opening or stopping the 
subterraneous outlets of lakes, clearing the earth of noxious 
animals, and, in short, effecting works which belong to the 
united labours of a young community, and are accomplished 
only by the efforts of successive generations. The other 
class of Heracles 9 exploits exhibits a state of things com- 
paratively settled and mature, when the first victory has 
been gained, and the contest is between one tribe and ano- 
ther, for possession or dominion : we see him maintaining 
the cause of the weak against the strong, of the innocent 
against the oppressor, subduing tyrants, exterminating his 
enemies, and bestowing kingdoms on his friends. It would 
be an idle undertaking to inquire whether such a person as 
Heracles ever really existed, but it is interesting to investi- 



CHAP. IV. THE HEROIC AGE OF GREECE. 



41 



gate, whether the first conception of such a being was formed 
by the unassisted imagination of the Greeks themselves, or 
was suggested to them by a foreign people. A single glance 
at the fabulous adventures called the labours of Heracles 
suffices to show, that a part of them, at least, belongs to the 
Phoenicians and their wandering god, to whom they built 
temples in all their principal settlements along the coasts of 
the Mediterranean. To this god must be ascribed all the 
journeys of Heracles around the shores of western Europe, 
which did not become known to the Greeks for many cen- 
turies after they had been explored by Phoenician navigators. 
Twelve, the number of his labours, points to an astrono- 
mical period, or the course of the sun, which luminary the 
Phoenician god represented. The closing event in the 
career of the hero, who rises to immortality from the flames 
of a pile on which he lays himself, may safely be believed to 
be borrowed from eastern mythology. Such tales may, 
indeed, have been subsequently engrafted upon the Greek 
legend, but it is a remarkable coincidence, that the birth of 
Heracles is assigned to Thebes, the city of Cadmus the 
Phoenician ; and that the great works ascribed to him corre- 
spond better with the arts and industry of the Phoenicians 
than with the skill and power of a less civilised race. But 
whatever we may think of this, the legends which we have 
distinguished as belonging to the second class, clearly repre- 
sent Heracles as a Greek hero : and here it may be asked, 
did all or any part of the adventures they describe really 
happen to a single person ? 

We must, first, briefly mention the manner in which these 
adventures are linked together in the common story. Am- 
phitryon, the father of Heracles, was the son of Alcaeus, 
who is named first among the children of Perseus at My- 
cenae. The hero's mother, Alcmena, was the daughter of 
Electryon, another son of Perseus. In the reign of Elec- 
tryon, the Taphians, a piratical people, landed in Argolis, 



42 



HISTORY OF GEEECE. 



CHAP. IT. 



and carried off the king's herds. While Electryon was 
taking vengeance on the robbers, Amphitryon and Alcmena 
were forced by Sthenelus, a third son of Perseus, to quit 
their country and take refuge at Thebes. There Alcmena 
gave birth to Heracles, who thus, although the legitimate 
heir to the throne of Mycenae, was, as to his birthplace, a 
Theban. Hence Boeotia is the scene of his earliest exploits : 
he delivered Thespiae from a lion which made havoc among 
its cattle ; freed Thebes from the yoke of Orchomenos, slay- 
ing its king Erginus, and compelling the Minyans to pay 
tribute to Thebes. In the meantime Sthenelus had been 
succeeded by Eurystheus, at whose command Heracles 
undertook his famous labours, in expiation for the murder of 
his wife and children, committed by the hero in a fit of rage. 
The supposed right of Heracles to the throne of Mycenae was 
the ground on which, some generations later, the Dorians 
claimed the dominion of Peloponnesus. During the pro- 
digious and supernatural adventures which he undertook at 
the bidding of Eurystheus, the hero is also described as 
engaged in expeditions which are only accidentally con- 
nected with these marvellous labours. He appears in the 
light of an independent prince, and a powerful conqueror : 
he leads an army against Augeas, king of Elis, and, having 
slain him, bestows his kingdom on one of his sons, who had 
condemned his father's injustice. So also he invades Pylos, 
and slays Neleus, with all his children, except Nestor, who 
was absent. He further carries his conquests into Laconia, 
where he exterminates the family of king Hippocoon, and 
places Tyndareus on the throne. All this he is said to 
have done while he suffered himself to be excluded by a 
weak usurper from his own kingdom! To discover any- 
thing like history in such accounts is impossible. 

It was the fate of Heracles ' to be incessantly forced into 
arduous and dangerous enterprises; hence every part of 
Greece, in its turn, becomes the scene of his achievements. 



chap. IV. THE HEKOIC AGE OF GREECE. 



43 



Thus, in Thessaly, we. find him bringing about an alliance 
between the Dorians and his own descendants ; in Aetolia 
he appears as a friend and protector of the royal house in 
the war with the Thesprotians. These wanderings and 
sufferings are perfectly intelligible in poetry, which describes 
them as the consequence of the implacable hatred with which 
Hera persecutes him as the son of her husband Zeus by 
Alcmena ; and they might even be taken as historical, if 
the various enterprises were supposed to be quite indepen- 
dent of one another, and connected only by being referred 
to one fabulous name. The safest way will be, after reject- 
ing those features in the legend which evidently belong to 
eastern mythology, to distinguish the Theban Heracles from 
the Dorian and the Peloponnesian hero. The story of each 
of them may possibly contain some historical groundwork, 
but what that is, it is impossible to say ; poetry and the 
love of the wonderful, here, as in the early history of other 
nations, have been so busily engaged in assigning marvellous 
deeds to their favourite hero, that in the end it has become 
impossible to discern the slender foundation upon which 
the magnificent structure has been raised. 

Attica had its own Heracles in the person of Theseus, 
who was conceived as his younger contemporary, and is 
described as only second to him in renown. The exploits 
assigned to him likewise include events which were pro- 
bably the work of ages. His legend is interesting to us, 
inasmuch as it furnishes an outline of the mythical history 
of Attica. The list of the kings who are said to have 
preceded him is a fabrication upon which no reliance can 
be placed. Their reigns are as barren of events as their 
existence is questionable. Two occurrences only are men- 
tioned which may seem to bear marks of a really political 
character. One is the war with Euboea, in which Xuthus 
aided the Athenians ; the other a contest between the Attic 
king Erechtheus, and the Thracian bard Eumolpus, who 



44 



HISTORY OE GREECE. 



CHAP. IV. 



had become the priestly sovereign of Eleusis. In this war 
Erechtheus is said to have perished, and to have been suc- 
ceeded by a second Cecrops, who migrated to Euboea, leav- 
ing his hereditary throne to his son Pandion II. The latter 
was expelled from Attica and went to Megara, where he 
became the father of four sons. The eldest was Aegeus, 
who recovered his father's kingdom, and shared it with his 
brothers. A mysterious oracle afterwards brought him to 
Troezen, where he formed an intimacy with Aethra, the 
daughter of king Pittheus. At parting from her, he showed 
her a huge mass of rock, under which he had hidden a 
sword and a pair of sandals : when her child, if a boy, 
should be able to lift the stone, he was to repair to Athens 
with the tokens it concealed, and to claim Aegeus as his 
father.* 

The story of Theseus is composed of three main acts, — 
his journey from Troezen to Athens, his victory over the 
Minotaur, and the political changes which he was believed 
to have introduced in Attica. When he set out to claim the 
throne of Athens, the young hero resolved to signalise his 
journey by clearing the wild road that skirted the sea of the 
monsters and savage men who haunted it, and had thus inter- 
rupted almost all intercourse between Troezen and Athens. 
In the neighbourhood of Epidaurus he won the brazen mace 
with which Periphates had been wont to surprise the un- 
wary passenger. On the Isthmus he inflicted on Sinis the 
punishment with which he had tortured his victims, whom 
he used to rend to pieces between two pines ; and he cele- 
brated this victory by renewing the Isthmian games. Before 
leaving that district he also destroyed the wild sow of Crom- 
myon. In the territory of Megara, Sciron, who delighted 
in thrusting travellers from a rock into the sea, met with 
a similar fate from his hands, and thus the Scironian 
road was freed from the dangers and obstacles which had 

* According to other and, perhaps, more genuine legends, Theseus was 
a son of Poseidon, the great divinity of the lonians. 



chap. iv. THE HEROIC AGE OF GREECE. 



45 



beset it. Thus, struggling and conquering, he forced his 
way to the banks of the Cephisus, where he was purified 
from bloodshed by the Phytalids. Becognised by Aegeus, 
he crushed a conspiracy of his kinsmen, who treated him as 
an intruder, and then sailed to Crete, to deliver Attica from 
the thraldom of Minos, king of that island, who, every ninth 
year, exacted a tribute of Athenian youths and maidens, and 
doomed them to perish in the jaws of the monster called the 
Minotaur. With the aid of Ariadne, Minos's daughter, he 
vanquished the monster, and retraced the mazes of the 
Labyrinth. But on his way home he abandoned his fair 
guide on the coast of Naxos, where she was consoled by 
Dionysus for the loss of her mortal lover. At Delos he left 
memorials of his presence in sacred and festive rites, which 
continued ever after to be religiously observed. His arrival 
at Athens proved fatal to his father Aegeus, who was de- 
ceived by the black sail of the victim-ship, which Theseus 
had forgotten to exchange for the concerted token of victory, 
and in despair threw himself down from the Cecropian rock. 
Many cheerful festivals in after times commemorated the 
return of Theseus, and the happy state of things which was 
regarded as his work. We might mention a great many other 
adventures which adorn the legend of Theseus ; but passing 
them over, and reserving the tradition about his political 
reforms for another chapter, we shall here offer only a few 
remarks on the legends of which we have just given a sketch. 

The account of his journey from Troezen to Athens seems 
to show that the coasts of the Saronic Gulf were occupied 
by kindred tribes of the Ionian race ; hence Poseidon is 
called the father of Theseus, the national hero.* His suc- 
cessful struggles on the road are, perhaps, typical of a period 
when the union of the Ionian tribes of Attica and the oppo- 
site coast of Peloponnesus w r as cemented by the establish- 

* The name of Theseus is probably no more than an epithet of the 
great Ionian deity, Poseidon. 



46 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. IV. 



ment of periodical meetings in honour of the national god, 
not without opposition and interruption. The same legend 
seems to indicate also that at that time a change took place 
in the ruling dynasty at Athens ; for both Aegeus and The- 
seus appear as strangers to the line of Erechtheus, both 
coming from Megara to take possession of Attica. The only 
historical fact distinctly suggested by the story of the expe- 
dition to Crete, is a temporary connection between that island 
and Attica; but it is impossible to determine the nature of 
this connection, or of the tribute said to have been paid by 
the Athenians. The part assigned to Minos in these trans- 
actions, leads us to inquire a little further into the traditions 
respecting this celebrated personage, who is represented by 
the general voice of antiquity as having raised Crete to a 
higher degree of prosperity and power than it ever reached 
at any subsequent period. He appears in the twofold cha- 
racter of a victorious prince who exercises a salutary do- 
minion over the sea and the neighbouring islands, and of a 
wise and just lawgiver, who exhibits to the Greeks the first 
model of a well-ordered state. In the former character he 
unites all the tribes of Crete under one sceptre, raises a 
powerful navy, scours the Aegean, subdues the piratical 
Carians and Leleges, makes himself master of the Cyclades, 
plants various colonies, undertakes a successful expedition 
against Megara and Attica, and imposes tribute on his 
vanquished enemies. He is even said to have carried his 
arms into Sicily, where his people founded a settlement, 
which preserved his name. The leading features of this 
account are attested by the best authorities, and they may, 
perhaps, not be very greatly exaggerated ; for the situation 
of Crete is most favourable to the exercise of influence over 
Greece, and its insignificance during the historical times is, 
in reality, more surprising than the transient lustre which 
falls upon it in the mythical ages. That the Cyclades were 
subject to Minos, is confirmed by numerous traces ; and the 



CHAP. IV. THE HEROIC AGE OF GREECE. 



47 



general belief of the ancients was, that he founded colonies 
even in Lemnos and Thrace. But we need not on that 
account assume that these settlements were the work of one 
person ; for here, as in the case of Heracles and Theseus, 
that which must have been the result of the efforts of ages, 
is ascribed in the legend to a single personage. The ques- 
tion, to what race Minos and his people belonged, is a more 
interesting subject, because, according to a common opinion, 
they possessed institutions which subsequently became the 
model of those of Sparta. 

Homer calls Minos a son of Zeus, by the daughter of 
Phoenix, whom all succeeding authors name Europa ; but in 
a genealogy found only in later writers, he is likewise the 
adopted son of Aster ius, a descendant of Dorus, and is thus 
connected with a colony said to have been led into Crete by 
Teutamus or Tectamus, son of Dorus, who is stated either 
to have crossed over from Thessaly, or to have embarked at 
Malea, after having led his followers by land into Laconia. 
His son Asterius married Europa, and left his kingdom to 
her son Minos. This account of his connection w r ith the 
Dorians, though not expressly mentioned by any very 
weighty author, is apparently supported by Homer's de- 
scription of the various tribes inhabiting Crete, and would 
be entitled to consideration, if it could be shown that Minos 
left any monuments of his reign which can be ascribed only 
to a Dorian prince or people. There are indeed many points 
connected with the religion of the Dorians, especially with 
the worship of Apollo, w T hich have induced modern writers 
to look upon Minos as a Dorian, and to conclude that in his 
days a colony of Dorians was established in Crete. But, in 
the first place, the origin of all such institutions in Greece 
is extremely obscure ; and, in the second, there are some indi- 
cations which point to a different conclusion. The stories of 
Minos's birth, and of the mythical personages by whom he is 
surrounded — Europa and Pasiphae, Ariadne and the Mino- 



48 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. IV, 



taur — transport us to a region wholly foreign to the 
Dorians and their national god Apollo. Minos is described 
as a son of Zeus, from whom, and not from Apollo, he is said 
to have derived his political wisdom. If Dorians existed in 
Crete, in the days of Homer, what is there to prevent us 
from supposing that their settlement was comparatively 
recent ? If, then, Minos was not a Dorian, his political insti- 
tutions can have been but slightly connected with those 
which afterwards existed in the Dorian states of Crete ; 
and we therefore reserve our account of the latter for the 
period when they were most probably first introduced into 
the island. The Cretan Dorians, finding the fame of Minos, 
as a powerful king, a wise lawgiver, and a righteous judge, 
widely spread over their new country, may naturally have 
been inclined to attach so glorious a name to their own in- 
stitutions. Moreover, the system of government ascribed 
to Minos, his powerful navy and foreign conquests, are 
scarcely compatible with what we know of the Dorians both 
in the earlier and in the historical times. It therefore seems 
to us most probable that the maritime greatness of Crete 
was principally attributable to the Phoenicians, with whom 
Minos appears to have been much more closely connected 
than with the Dorians. What we mean, is this : it is not 
improbable that the age of Minos may represent a period, 
when the arts introduced by Phoenician settlers had raised 
one of the Cretan tribes, under an able and enterprising 
chief, to a temporary pre-eminence over its neighbours, 
which enabled it to establish a sort of maritime empire. 
The progress of the Phoenicians in the west also seems to 
be alluded to by the account of Minos's death in Sicily, 
whither he had gone in pursuit of Daedalus. The disaster 
of Minos was believed by the Cretans to have been attended 
with the complete downfal of Crete's maritime power ; and 
it would seem that it was only after this event that Crete 
was occupied by a branch of the Hellenic race. 



chap. iv. THE HEROIC AGE OF GREECE. 



49 



We might here enumerate many other wars and adven- 
tures of the heroic age, which were highly celebrated in 
Greek poetry, such as the quarrel in the royal house of 
Thebes, which terminated in the destruction of that city by 
the Argives, and the expulsion of the Cadmeans ; and the 
story of the renowned hunt of the Calydonian boar; the 
principal agents in which occurrences are not individual 
heroes, but bands of chiefs leagued together for a common 
object. But we must confine ourselves to a notice of two 
celebrated expeditions, which were conducted by confederate 
chieftains with their followers, and were directed against 
distant lands ; we mean the expedition of the Argonauts, 
and the siege and capture of Troy. 

The Argonautic expedition, as commonly related, seems to 
be of a thoroughly poetical nature, with little or no historical 
substance ; the adventure is incomprehensible in its design, 
astonishing in its execution, grounded on a peculiar form of 
religion, connected with no conceivable cause, and is attended 
with no sensible effect. The story, reduced to the form in 
which it is usually told, runs as follows: — In the generation 
before the Trojan war, Jason, a young Thessalian prince, in- 
curred the j ealousy of his kinsman Pelias, king of Iolcos. The 
latter persuaded the adventurous youth to embark in a mari- 
time expedition, full of difficulty and danger. It was to be 
directed to a point far beyond the most remote which Greek 
navigation had hitherto reached, to Colchis, on the eastern 
corner of the Black Sea, the coasts of which were inhabited 
by such ferocious barbarians, that it is said to have borne the 
name of the Inhospitable (Axeinus), before it acquired the 
opposite appellation of Euxeine (the Hospitable) from the 
civilisation which was ultimately introduced there by Greek 
settlers. From the land of the Colchians, Jason was to fetch 
the golden fleece. Having built a vessel of uncommon size, 
and manned it with a band of heroes from various parts of 
Greece, he sailed to Colchis, where he not only succeeded 

D 



50 



HISTOEY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. IV. 



in the main object of the expedition, but carried off Medea, 
the daughter of the Colchian king Aeetes. 

This is the skeleton of the story reduced to what, in an 
age of faith, might seem to be natural and probable. But 
it still contains many points which can scarcely be explained 
or believed. The period to which the undertaking is 
ascribed, was that of the infancy of navigation, and yet we 
are told that the adventurers at once went far beyond the 
boundaries attained in much later times. The story pre- 
supposes a knowledge of Colchis, and how could that have 
been obtained ? The object of the undertaking is still more 
mysterious, and can be explained only by conjectures. 
Such an explanation was attempted by some of the ancients 
themselves, who thought that the golden fleece referred to 
the particles of gold swept down by the mountain torrents 
of the country, and which the natives detained by fleeces 
dipped in the streams. But the name golden is only a 
poetical and ornamental epithet of the fleece, and indicates 
no more than the epithets white or purple, by which it is 
sometimes described. The main thing in the story is the 
fleece, and not the circumstance that it was golden. Ac- 
cording to a genuine tradition, the fleece was a sacred relic, 
and its importance arose entirely from its connection with 
the tragic story of Phrixus*, who was rescued from his 
father's vengeance by a marvellous ram, which transported 
him over the sea to Colchis. On his arrival there he 
sacrificed the ram to Zeus, who had favoured his escape ; 
and the fleece was nailed to an oak in a grove of Ares, where 
it was kept by Aeetes as a sacred treasure or palladium. 

The religious practice from which the legend seems to have 
sprung, was this : — The town of Alos, near the Gulf of Pagasae, 
in the Thessalian Achaia, was celebrated for the worship of 
the Laphystian Zeus. The eldest among the descendants of 

* See Smith's Diet of Greek and Born. Biog. under Pheixus and Jason. 



chap. iv. THE HEROIC AGE OF GREECE. 



51 



Phrixus was forbidden to enter the council-house at Alos, 
though Athamas, their ancestor had built the town. If the 
head of the family was detected on the forbidden ground, he 
was led in solemn procession, like an ordinary victim, and 
sacrificed. Many members of the family were said to have 
quitted their country to avoid this danger, and to have 
fallen into the snare on their return after a long absence. 
The origin assigned to this rite was, that after the escape of 
Phrixus, the Achaeans had been on the point of sacrificing 
Athamas himself to appease the anger of the gods ; but that 
he was rescued by the timely arrival of the son of Phrixus, 
who had returned from Colchis. Hence the curse, unfulfilled, 
was transmitted for ever to the posterity of Phrixus. It 
seems to have been from this religious belief of the people 
among whom the Argonautic legend sprung up, that it 
derived its peculiar character ; and the expedition, as far as the 
fleece is concerned, appears to have had no connection with 
piracy, commerce, or discovery. The historical foundation 
of the story was probably a series of maritime enterprises 
which may have been the employment of several generations. 
The Argonauts are Minyans, who were very early given to 
maritime pursuits ; and the form which the tradition assumed, 
was probably determined by the course of their earliest 
naval expeditions. These expeditions were certainly not 
carried so far as stated in the legend, but poetry and the 
credulity of the Greeks might, in after ages, without dif- 
ficulty extend the wonderful voyage at pleasure. As to the 
principal personages of the story, Jason and Medea, they 
are both ideal or fictitious characters, and Jason is, perhaps, 
no other than the Samothracian god or hero Jasion (whose 
name is sometimes written in the same manner), the protector 
of mariners. Medea seems to have been only another name 
for Hera, and to have descended, by a common transition, 
from the rank of a goddess to that of a heroine, when an 
epithet had been mistaken for a distinct name. A Corinthian 



52 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP, IV. 



tradition claimed her as properly belonging to Corinth, one 
of the principal seats of the Minyans, where she was honoured 
with religious rites until the city was destroyed by the 
Romans, and the murder of her children was expiated by 
annual sacrifices to Hera.* The Argonautic expedition may 
also indicate the beginning of an intercourse between the 
inhabitants of northern Greece and those of the opposite 
coast of Asia ; and in this sense it was, perhaps, not without 
some reason that the ancients stated that the expedition 
of the Argonauts gave rise to the celebrated conflict between 
Europe and Asia, or the Trojan war, which we shall now 
proceed to notice. 

Of all the enterprises of the heroic age of Greece, the 
Trojan war is the noblest and greatest, and this renown it 
owes to the immortal poetry which bears the name of 
Homer. We have already seenf how Sthenelus usurped 
the kingdom which belonged of right to Heracles. Sthenelus 
had reserved Mycenae and Tiryns for himself; but had 
bestowed the neighbouring town of Midea on Atreus and 
Thyestes, the sons of Pelops and uncles of Eurystheus. 
On the death of Heracles, Eurystheus pursued his children 
until they found a place of refuge in Attica. Theseus 
refused to surrender them, and Eurystheus then invaded 
Attica in person ; but his army was routed, and he himself 
slain by Hyllus, the eldest son of Heracles. Atreus suc- 
ceeded to the throne of his nephew, whose children had 
all perished during his unfortunate expedition. Atreus 
was followed on the throne by Agamemnon, who now ruled 
over an ample realm. Heracles had bestowed Laconia on 
Tyndareus, the father of Helen; and when Agamemnon's 
brother, Menelaus, had been preferred to all other suitors by 
this beautiful princess, Tyndareus resigned his dominions to 
his son-in-law. In the mean while a flourishing state had 

* See Smith's Diet of Greek and Rom. Biog. under Medeia. 
f See p. 42. 



chap. rv. THE HEROIC AGE OP GREECE. 



53 



risen up on the eastern side of the Hellespont. Its capital 
Troy, or Hium, had been taken by Heracles with the assist- 
ance of Telamon ; but had been restored to Priam, the son of 
its conquered king, Laomedon. Priam reigned in peace and 
prosperity over a number of little tribes, until his son Paris, 
or Alexander, attracted to Laconia by the fame of Helen's 
beauty, abused the hospitality of Menelaus by carrying off 
his queen in his absence. To avenge this outrage, all the 
chiefs of Greece combined their forces under the command 
of Agamemnon, and sailed with a great armament to Troy, 
which after a siege of ten years they took and razed to the 
ground, according to the common belief, in the year B.C. 
1184. 

Such is the brief outline of a story familiar to all. The 
reality of the seige of Troy has often been questioned, 
though without sufficient ground, and against some strong 
evidence ; and even if the story is unfounded, it must still 
have had some historical groundwork. If the legend, as 
some believe, arose out of the Greek colonies in Asia Minor, 
it would be difficult to explain its universal reception in 
Greece itself. The leaders of the earliest of these colonies, 
indeed, claimed Agamemnon as their ancestor ; but if this 
had suggested the story of his victories in Asia, those very 
colonies would probably have been made the scene of his 
glory, and not a neighbouring country. On the other hand, 
the earliest (Aeolian) colonies seem to be a natural conse- 
quence of previous conquests by the Greeks in those parts. 
We cannot, therefore, avoid admitting the reality of the 
Trojan war as a general fact, whatever we may think of the 
details which have been handed down in poetry. What is 
most unaccountable in the whole narrative, leaving the 
character of the persons out of the question, is the intercourse 
between Troy and Sparta implied in it. Helen, according to 
all appearance, is a merely mythological person ; she is classed 
by Herodotus with lo, Europa, and Medea, and all the par- 

D 3 



54 



HISTOEY OF GREECE, 



CHAP. IV. 



ticulars of her legend, such as her birth, her relation to the 
divine twins, Castor and Polydeuces (Pollux), and the religious 
honours paid to her at Sparta, — point in the same direc- 
tion. Moreover, Theseus also is said to have carried off Helen, 
and, according to a third story, the same exploit was achieved 
by Idas and Lynceus, two Messenian heroes, who answer to 
the Spartan Dioscuri. These variations of the legend seem 
to show that her abduction was a theme for poetry originally 
independent of the Trojan war, but which might easily be 
associated with that event. 

If then we must reject the traditional occasion of the war, 
we are bound to show its connection with preceding events. 
We have already observed that the Argonautic expedition 
was sometimes represented as having given rise to the 
conflict between Greece and Troy ; for, according to some 
legends, Heracles, one of the Argonauts, rendered a service 
to the Trojan king Laomedon, on the voyage to Colchis, but 
was afterwards defrauded of the promised reward, in con- 
sequence of which Troy was taken and sacked by the hero. 
Here, then, we have an event which may have provoked the 
enmity, or tempted the cupidity, of the Greeks in the next 
generation, especially if Troy, as the story relates, soon rose 
again to power and opulence. We may, perhaps, even go so 
far as to doubt whether the common legend of the Trojan 
war did not arise out of that of Heracles against Troy ; for 
there is a singular resemblance in the two accounts ; and the 
Historical groundwork of the legend may have been a series 
of attacks made by the Greeks on the coast of Asia, either 
merely for the sake of plunder, or with a view to permanent 
settlements. 

All the details of the expedition which ended in the fall of 
Troy, are so uncertain, that it is quite hopeless to form any 
distinct conception of them ; ' even those which appear to 
involve no impossibility cannot be considered to be more 
historical than the most marvellous incidents, for all are 



CHAP. IV. THE HEROIC AGE OF GREECE. 



55 



alike the products of the poet's imagination. Thus the 
expedition is said to have consisted of 1200 ships, and 
100,000 men, headed by the flower of the Greek heroes ; 
the siege lasted for ten years, and the besiegers were often 
ready to abandon the enterprise in despair, until in the end 
they were indebted for victory to an unforeseen favourable 
turn of affairs. And yet we are told that, one generation 
before, Heracles achieved the same thing with no more than 
six ships and a few men. This contrast cannot be explained 
by any supposed prosperity and power which Troy might 
have acquired in the interval ; on the other hand, it is 
credible enough that, whatever were the motives of the 
expedition, the spirit of adventure may have drawn war- 
riors together from most parts of Greece, among whom 
the southern and northern Achaeans, under Pelopid and 
Aeacid princes, took the lead, and that it may thus have 
deserved the character of a national enterprise. There is 
no doubt that the expedition accomplished its immediate 
object : but it is nevertheless clear, that a Trojan state sur- 
vived for a time the fall of Ilium ; for we have it on good 
authority that Troy was finally destroyed by an invasion of 
the Phrygians, a Thracian tribe which crossed over from 
Europe to Asia after the Trojan war.* This statement is 
confirmed by Homer himself, who introduces Poseidon pre- 
dicting that the posterity of Aeneas should long continue 
to reign over the Trojans after the race of Priam should be 
extinct. 

To the conquerors the war is represented as no less 
disastrous in its consequences than to the vanquished; for 
the returning heroes found their thrones occupied by usurpers, 
or their dominions in a state of anarchy. Many did not 
return at all, but perished on their way homeward. f This 

* Xanthus in Strab. xiv. p. 680. Comp. xil p. 572. 

f The returns of the heroes formed a distinct circle of epic poetry 
called v6(ttoi, of which the Odyssey includes only a small part ; they were 
generally full of tragic adventures. 

D 4 



56 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



cflip, rv # 



calamitous result of a successful enterprise seems to have 
been an essential feature in the Trojan legends ; for Heracles 
also on his return was persecuted by the wrath of Hera, and 
driven out of his course by a tempest. It appeared as if the 
jealousy of the gods had been roused by the greatest achieve- 
ment of the Achaeans, to afflict and humble them. The 
question as to the antiquity and original form of the poems 
which contain the earliest memorials of these events, does not 
affect the opinions here advanced, and may, therefore, for 
the present, be left untouched. The poet, if he was a single 
one, evidently did not allow himself to be fettered by his 
knowledge of the facts. For aught we know, he may have 
been a contemporary of Achilles, whom he nevertheless 
describes as the son of a marine divinity. His poem must 
have had a popular tradition for its basis, without which it 
would have been hollow and insipid ; but his work was not 
chiefly valued as a recital of real events, the main object 
being to exalt the glory of his heroes. But, although in 
regard to persons and events, we can allow very little 
weight to the authority of Homer, yet his accounts of the 
state of society, of institutions, manners, and opinions must, 
as in all similar kinds of national poetry, be founded on 
truth, since otherwise they could not have excited any 
interest in his hearers, who were competent and unbiassed 
judges in these matters. For the age in which he sang, 
cannot have been parted from that which he described by 
any wide break in thoughts, feelings, or social relations. 
He may, perhaps, be supposed to have sometimes transferred 
to an earlier age, that which was peculiar to his own, and 
he no doubt still oftener heightened and embellished the 
objects which he touched; but there is no ground^ for 
believing that he anywhere endeavoured artificially to 
revive an image of obsolete simplicity, or suppressed any 
superior knowledge or refinement which he and his con- 
temporaries possessed. Hence we must suppose that he 



chap. IV. THE HEROIC AGE OF GREECE. 



57 



gives a true picture of the society of Greece near to his 
own time, if we make due allowance for the privilege he 
enjoyed as a poet. With the help of his productions, 
examined by the light of historical analogy, and compared 
with other accounts and vestiges, we shall now endeavour 
to give some idea of the main features of the heroic age, its 
manners, religion, knowledge, and arts. 



58 



HISTORY OP GREECE, 



CHAP. V. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE GOVERNMENT, MANNERS, RELIGION, KNOWLEDGE, AND ARTS OF 
THE GREEKS IN THE HEROIC AGE. 

The political condition of the Pelasgians is unknown to us, 
having been thrown into the shade by the lustre of the 
heroic age. There are only a few allusions from which we 
may infer that, in the earliest times which we call Pelasgian, 
the government was of a patriarchal nature ; and in some 
cases seems to have been in the hands of priests ; in others, 
in those of chieftains or kings. In the heroic age, the 
institutions of which did not owe their origin to legislators, 
but grew spontaneously out of natural causes, we must not 
expect to find the same state of things everywhere. How 
the transition from the Pelasgian to the Hellenic period was 
made, we have no means of ascertaining ; in what relation the 
warlike and adventurous race of the Hellenes stood to the 
former inhabitants, and what changes they introduced, are 
matters only to be conjectured from the social institutions 
which we find subsisting in the later period. These do not 
generally present traces of violent revolutions and conquests ; 
yet it is natural to suppose that such events occasionally 
occurred, and now and then we meet with facts confirming 
this suspicion. 

The distinction between slaves and freemen seems to 
have obtained generally, though not universally, and in the 
age described in the Homeric poems, slaves seem to have 
been used only in the houses of the great; but there is no 
evidence that the servile condition anywhere owed its origin 
to an invasion which deprived the natives of their liberty. 
Slaves were generally persons taken prisoners either in war 
or by pirates, or they were bought. They were employed 



chap. v. GOVERNMENT IN THE HEROIC AGE. 59 

in the house and about the person of their master or mistress. 
Husbandry was carried on by free labourers (Srjreg) who 
did not disdain to serve the wealthier for hire. A broad 
distinction, however, was drawn between the common free- 
men and the chiefs, who formed two distinct classes. The 
essential quality of persons belonging to the higher order 
was noble birth, that is, a pedigree connecting their ancestors 
with the gods themselves, to whom every princely family 
seems to have traced its origin; but, in addition to this, a 
legitimate chief was distinguished from ordinary mortals 
by a robust frame, a lofty stature, a majestic bearing, a 
sonorous voice, and still more by skill in warlike exercises, 
patience under hardship, contempt of danger, and love of 
glorious adventures. Prudence in council, readiness in 
invention, and fluency of speech were likewise highly valued. 
The great wealth by which the nobles were distinguished 
from the rest of the people, furnished them with the means 
of undertaking their adventures, and was increased by the 
booty which rewarded a successful expedition. 

The kingly form of government appears to have been the 
only one known in the heroic age, and probably arose from 
the patriarchal, with and out of the warlike and adventurous 
character of the period. Where the people were almost 
always in arms, the office of leader naturally became perma- 
nent, though sometimes royal houses may have been founded 
by wealthy and powerful strangers. Divisions, answering to 
the Roman gentes and the Scottish clans, seem to have 
existed in every Greek community ; and not to be a member 
of such a community was the mark of an outlaw or vagrant. 
These clans (ytVr?) were bound together by certain sacrifices 
which were probably performed on behalf of the body by 
the chief of the principal family ; and these priestly functions 
afterwards became one of the important branches of the 
kingly office. But the relation of these clans to one another, 
and their political character, lie beyond the reach of history. 

P 6 



y 

60 HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. Y, 

Obscure, however, as is the origin of regal power, the 
prerogatives of the sovereigns in the heroic age are tolerably 
well known. Their principal functions were the command 
in war, the performance of those sacrifices which did not 
belong to particular priests, and the administration of justice. 
From the first of these they must have derived the greatest 
part of their power. In the division of the spoil their share 
was usually increased by a present previously selected from 
the common mass. The sacrifices performed by the kings were 
those offered to the gods in behalf of the whole people ; and 
their jurisdiction was shared either with a council of assessors 
or elders, or even with a popular assembly ; so that the kings 
would seem to have occupied only the most distinguished 
seat in the courts of justice, as well as in the assemblies of 
the people. The kingly power accordingly was not un- 
limited ; for the sovereign took no measures, and transacted 
no business in an official capacity, without the assistance 
and sanction of the chiefs of the people. The kings were 
the first among their equals, rather than men of a higher 
order, and many of the nobles, if not all, bore the name of 
king, and in case of a vacancy of the throne, might aspire 
to the supreme dignity. But as the kingly power was not 
accurately determined or circumscribed by custom or law, 
it must have varied in particular cases according to the 
personal character of the ruler and other circumstances. 
One of the principal advantages connected with the dignity 
of a king, consisted in the facility with which he might 
enrich himself and his house ; he was the possessor of the 
domain land, which was originally the gift of the people, and 
seems to have been, not the private property of the person, 
but attached to the station. Another part of the royal 
revenue consisted of presents ; but it is uncertain whether 
they were stated and periodical, or merely voluntary and oc- 
casional. The administration of justice, however, appears 
to have always been requited with a present from the parties- 



chap. v. GOVERNMENT IN THE HEROIC AGE. 



61 



The kingly power appears to have been everywhere 
hereditary, according to general usage ; which is confirmed 
by the cases in which an aged parent resigns the reins of 
government to his son, as Odysseus reigned over Ithaca in 
the lifetime of Laertes, and Achilles over the kingdom of his 
father Peleus ; but when the legitimate heir did not possess 
the requisite qualities of a ruler, he might be reduced to a 
state of dependence on the nobles, or even deprived of his 
exalted station. Most of the nobles seem to have resided 
in the town containing the royal palace, though we also find 
mention of their lonely rural habitations. 

In the state of society described in the Homeric poems, 
the word answering to law in the language of the later 
Greeks, does not occur ; nor did laws in our sense of the 
term exist ; for all rights, human and divine, were fixed 
only by immemorial usage, confirmed and expounded by 
judicial decisions ; but it is clear, that where the king was 
unable to afford protection and redress, the rich and power- 
ful could not always be restrained, and were checked only 
by the fear of divine wrath or of public opinion. The 
state does not appear to have interfered in private quarrels 
and disputes, unless the parties agreed to submit their cause 
to a public tribunal. But among a people of quick and 
strong passions, there would have been an endless succession 
of bloodshed, had there not existed, by common agreement, 
a more peaceful mode of atoning for crimes committed against 
persons. Thus, if a member of a family had been injured 
or even slain, the offender might be redeemed, or redeem 
himself, by a stipulated price, and thus appease the vindictive 
spirit of his victim's kinsmen. A religious feeling also 
assisted in maintaining this custom, it being believed that 
bloodshed was loathsome to the gods themselves. Hence a 
manslayer usually withdrew into a foreign land, and did not 
return to his country, till he had been purified by some ex- 
piatory rites. The person of such an exile even seems to 



62 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. V. 



have been looked upon with a kind of reverence, and it was 
deemed almost sacrilegious to refuse him shelter. Offences 
against the community were probably of rare occurrence, 
and it was only in extraordinary cases that they were visited 
with capital punishment, which in such instances seems to 
have generally been inflicted by stoning criminals to death, 
burying them alive, or hurling them down a precipice, — all 
modes of punishment suggested by the dread entertained by 
the ancients of polluting their hands with the blood of man. 

The mutual dealings of independent states were regulated 
by principles not more fixed than those which applied to the 
intercourse of individuals. Consciousness of a distinct na- 
tional existence, and of certain rights and duties incident to 
it, showed itself only on particular occasions, and does not 
seem to have restrained members of one community from at- 
tacking those of another, even though there existed no hosti- 
lity between their respective states. But when two states 
were in alliance, or on terms of intimate friendship, the case 
was different. Piracy was everywhere an honourable 
occupation: and although in some cases restitution was 
demanded, in the name of the state, for piratical aggressions, 
yet, when the injured parties were not persons of high rank 
or station, they were usually left to right themselves as they 
could. Communication between hostile states was carried 
on by heralds, whose persons were considered sacred and 
inviolable. 

In the earliest times there existed no national bond of 
unity among the several tribes and numerous little inde- 
pendent states of which Greece was composed, though there 
were partial associations, for religious and also for political 
purposes, among neighbouring states. In the legend of the 
Trojan war we have the first trace of a national enterprise ; 
and that legend, no doubt, greatly contributed to awaken the 
feeling of a distinct nationality among the Greeks. The 
name Hellenes does not occur in the Homeric poems, as a 



chap. v. SOCIAL LIFE IN THE HEROIC AGE. 63 



designation of all the Greeks ; its place is generally supplied 
by that of Achaeans. 

We shall now proceed to touch on a few of the social 
relations of the Greeks, in which their national character 
is most clearly unfolded. 

The intercourse between the sexes, though not as free as 
in modern European society, appears to have been less re- 
stricted in the heroic age than in later times. The conduct of 
the stronger sex towards the weaker displays great truth and 
simplicity, though it is entirely destitute of the chivalrous 
devotion which characterises the history of the middle ages, 
and the influence of which upon modern manners is still visible. 
Maidens, even of the highest rank, not unfrequently had to 
discharge various household duties, which in later times were 
performed by slaves ; thus we find them spinning, weaving, 
embroidering, fetching water, washing, and even attending 
upon male visitors while bathing and dressing ; and these 
things were no more degrading to them than it was for a 
prince to tend his father's flocks. A father disposed of his 
daughter's hand with absolute authority ; at the marriage, 
presents were interchanged by both parties, according to 
their means ; and if a wife was obliged without her fault to 
return to her father's house, she was entitled to carry her 
portion back with her. In this age of heroic enterprise, 
however, wealth, and even noble birth, did not recommend 
a suitor more powerfully than strength, courage, and skill 
in manly sports and martial exercises. In many parts of 
Greece, as among the Eomans, the nuptial ceremony was a 
symbolic representation of a forcible abduction of the bride, 
— probably an allusion to the fact that, in the earliest times, 
the suitor had to win his bride by some deed of skill or 
courage. Many of the female characters delineated in the 
Homeric poems command our respect and admiration, and 
must be reckoned among the noblest conceptions of the poet ; 
but if we were to conclude that Nausicaa, Penelope, Arete, 



64 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. V. 



or Andromache, is a representative of the average class of 
women in that age, we should be estimating it too favour- 
ably. The numerous stories of the loves of gods, and the 
adventures of a crowd of heroines, indicate that the later 
Greeks did not think very highly of female purity in the 
heroic age ; the faithlessness of a wife does not seem to have 
been an event of rare occurrence, or to have been regarded 
as an enormous offence. Witness the manner in which 
Helen is treated by all parties in the Iliad, and still more so 
in the Odyssey. 

It was a natural consequence of the unsettled state of 
society, that every stranger was looked upon as either an 
enemy or a guest. If he threw himself with confidence on 
those among whom he came, he was sure to meet with a 
hospitable reception. No question was asked as to who he 
was, until he had partaken of the best cheer which the 
house could furnish ; and then the inquiries addressed to him 
implied friendly curiosity rather than suspicion or distrust. 
When the stranger came in the character of a suppliant, he 
commanded still greater respect ; Zeus himself was regarded 
as the protector of all strangers, and of the rights of hospi- 
tality ; and the gods were believed to visit occasionally the 
abodes of mortals in the garb of strangers, for the purpose 
of seeing how the laws of hospitality, which applied to the 
lowest as well as to the highest classes, were observed. The 
convivial usages of the Greeks appear in a much more 
favourable light than those of our ancestors during the 
middle ages. The wine was always diluted with water; 
the guests had their places ranged along the walls of the 
banqueting-room, and a separate table was set before each. 
The fare, even in the noblest houses, was of the simplest 
kind ; and although after the wants of nature were satisfied, 
the bowls were replenished with wine, from which liba- 
tions were made in honour of the gods, yet the glory of 
the feast was not held to depend on a lengthened carouse. 



chap. v. SOCIAL LIFE IN THE HEROIC AGE. 65 



The song and the dance were regarded as its appropriate 
ornaments, and the presence of the minstrel was almost in- 
dispensable at every great entertainment. After the repast, 
the guests frequently amused themselves with trying their 
strength in gymnastic exercises, and with the dance. Drink- 
ing to excess is hardly ever mentioned. 

In their conduct towards inferiors the Greeks appear to 
have been kind and amiable. This we must infer from the 
many instances of the noblest friendship subsisting between 
the heroes and their personal attendants, and also from the 
kindness with which the aged Laertes and his wife treated 
their slaves. Severity towards slaves was never wanton, but 
seemed rather to imply that their condition still left them a 
title to a certain degree of respect, which they could forfeit 
only by their own misconduct. It is necessary for the sake 
of justice, to bear in mind this kindly disposition of the 
Greeks, as it must be owned that if their friendship was 
warm and their hospitality large, their anger was fierce and 
their enmity ruthless. At the same time they were not 
vindictive, but were usually willing to accept a pecuniary 
compensation for any wrong which had been done to them. 
In war, on the other hand, we find them indulging in the 
most ferocious cruelties, which seem hardly consistent with 
what we know of their social conduct in times of peace. In 
battle, quarter was never given, except with a view to get 
a large ransom for a prisoner. The armour of the slain was 
regarded as a valuable part of the spoil, and was always 
stript off by the conqueror. Even the naked corpse some- 
times became the object of an obstinate struggle ; if it re- 
mained in the power of the enemy, it was deprived of burial 
and exposed to the vultures and ravenous beasts, and was 
not unfrequently mutilated. Usually, however, an armistice 
was granted to the defeated, for the purpose of enabling 
them to give an honourable burial to the slain. The fate of 
a captured city was generally decided in a merciless spirit ; all 



66 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. V. 



the males capable of bearing arms were put to death ; the 
women and children were dragged away, to be divided among 
the victors as the most valuable part of the spoil : by this 
means the members of a family were often torn asunder, and 
scattered over distant quarters of a foreign land, and thus 
separated for ever. The temples of the gods, however, 
sometimes afforded an asylum to the conquered who escaped 
into them, and were then respected as suppliants. 

In regard to religion we have reason to believe that the 
Greeks of the heroic age were not very different from their 
descendants. The Greek was formed to sympathise strongly 
with the outward world: nothing was to him absolutely 
passive and inert ; in all the objects around him he found 
life, or readily imparted it to them out of the fulness of his 
own imagination. This was, in fact, the popular mode of 
thinking and feeling, cherished, no doubt, by the bold forms, 
abrupt contrasts, and all the natural wonders, of a moun- 
tainous and sea-broken land. The teeming earth, the quick- 
ening sun, the restless sea, the rushing stream, the irresistible 
storm — every display of superhuman power which the Greek 
beheld, roused a distinct sentiment of religious awe. Every- 
where he found deities, which, however, may not for a long 
time have been distinguished by name from the objects in 
which their presence was manifested. Thus in the Iliad we 
find Agamemnon calling upon the gods, but naming among the 
Olympians Zeus only, after whom he invokes the all-seeing 
and all-hearing sun, the rivers, the earth, and lastly the gods 
below. In like manner we may suppose the Pelasgians to 
have worshipped the powers, which, according to the primi- 
tive belief, animated the various forms of the visible world. 
Herodotus attempts to trace the steps by which this simple 
belief in the divine powers of nature, was transformed into 
the complicated system of the Greek mythology. He seems 
to assume two great causes of the change : first, the intro- 
duction of foreign divinities and rites; and secondly, the 



chap. v. RELIGION IN THE HEROIC AGE. 



67 



inventive imagination of the Greek poets. His belief on the 
first point is, that nearly all the names of the Greek gods 
had been brought into Greece from Egypt ; but this suppo- 
sition, which was formerly adopted without scruple, and was 
believed in as firmly as the establishment of Egyptian 
colonies in Greece, has in modern times been the subject of 
very earnest controversies ; and, although it is not to be 
denied that eastern nations, and even Egypt, present some 
striking coincidences with the religion and rites of the 
Greeks, yet the accounts contained in Herodotus and others 
who followed him, are little more than dreams. As to the 
second point, Herodotus states that Homer and Hesiod were 
the authors of the Greek theogony, gave titles to the gods, 
distinguished their attributes and functions, and described 
their forms. From this it is evident that he considered 
those poets to have effected an important change in the re- 
ligious belief of their countrymen ; but this opinion can be 
regarded as reasonable only on the supposition that Homer 
and Hesiod were viewed by Herodotus as the representatives 
of a whole line of poets who were the organs and interpreters 
of the popular creed, and thus gradually determined its per- 
manent form ; for all that we find in those poets, seems to 
be founded on conceptions of the divine nature which had 
long been familiar to the people. The religion of the Greeks 
was, in the main, purely home-sprung ; but the mythology 
which has come down to us, must have had two impor- 
tant phases in its formation. The one was that by which 
the invisible powers of nature were invested with human 
forms — the process of personification; the other, that by 
which the local deities of the several tribes were reconciled 
and united in one family. Each of these steps must have 
occupied a very long period ; and it is not necessary to sup- 
pose that the one began only after the other had ended. The 
Greek religion, then, may in general be correctly described 
as a worship of the powers of nature, and most of its deities 



68 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. V. 



corresponded either to certain parts of the outward world, 
or to certain classes of objects comprehended under abstract 
notions ; but it is at the same time clear, that several tribes 
worshipped tutelary gods of their own, who were neither 
embodied powers of nature, nor personified abstractions, but 
represented the general consciousness of dependence on 
superior beings. Yet the conception of the gods as beings 
with human forms led to a belief also that they were subject 
to the same passions and frailties as mortal beings, that they 
were sensible to pleasure and pain, that they needed the 
refreshment of ambrosial food, and inhaled with delight the 
savour from the sacrifices of their worshippers. But with 
all this, they were believed to punish men for their negli- 
gence and offences, both in this world and in the world to 
come ; and, in this respect, religion exercised a salutary moral 
influence. The idea of retribution, however, was not gene- 
rally associated with that of a future state. The soul and the 
body were viewed as distinct, though not wholly dissimilar, 
substances ; the latter had no life without the former ; the 
former, no strength without the latter. The souls of the 
heroes descended into the realm of Hades (the Invisible), 
while they themselves, that is, their bodies, became a prey 
to dogs and birds. The soul could enjoy no rest in the 
nether world, until the funeral rites had been duly performed : 
it was regarded as a mere shadow of its former self, and 
as pursuing only the empty image of its former enjoyments 
and occupations. 

The favour of the gods was believed to be obtained by 
worship and sacrifices. The simple feeling of dependence 
on the divine bounty was naturally expressed in the form of 
an offering, which, however trifling in itself, might be an 
adequate symbol of the religious sentiment. But in the 
course of time the notion arose that the efficacy of a sacrifice 
depended upon its value; and that the feeling which 
prompted the offering, was not merely to be expressed, but 



CHAP. V. 



RELIGION IN THE HEROIC AGE. 



69 



also to be measured by it. Accordingly, the greater the 
guilt for which a mortal wished to atone, the more sump- 
tuous was the sacrifice offered to the gods ; and this natu- 
rally led to the belief that, on extraordinary occasions, the 
divine wrath could be appeased by no oblation less precious 
than the life of man. Human sacrifices, accordingly, are 
met with in the legends of the earliest times, and traces of 
this dreadful practice occur even in the most brilliant period 
of Greek history. 

Besides the temples in which they were worshipped, some 
gods had territories or domains (K\fjpoi) on earth, where they 
sometimes loved to sojourn ; a piece of land assigned to a 
divinity (rifiepog), was rarely cultivated ; but if any portion 
of it was tilled, its produce seems always to have been 
applied to some purpose connected with the worship of the 
deity to whom it belonged. All the sacred functions pre- 
scribed by religion, were performed by priests ; but we must 
beware of being misled by this name; for the ordinary 
worship of the gods, consisting of sacrifices and prayers, and 
all other domestic religious rites, were celebrated by the 
father of the family ; and in the Homeric poems the heroes 
and kings perform priestly offices, without being priests in 
the proper sense, their sacerdotal character being merely 
incidental to their public station. A priest, strictly speaking, 
was a person whose functions were connected with the wor- 
ship of one particular god, and who was attached to a 
certain temple or locality ; such priestly offices were 
often hereditary in the same family. In some cases the 
power of divination also was believed to be transmitted 
from father to son in these priestly families. The offices of 
elective priests were bestowed sometimes for life, sometimes 
for a very short term. The priestly office involved no civil 
exemptions or disabilities, and was not thought to unfit a 
person for discharging the duties of a senator, a judge, or 
a warrior ; but where the continual residence and presence 



70 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. V. 



of a priest were required at a temple, he was in effect ex- 
cluded from every other employment, and from the ordinary 
pursuits of his fellow-citizens. The Greek priests never 
formed one organised body or hierarchy, for which they 
had neither the means nor the motives ; nor are there any 
traces of a party-spirit or fellow-feeling among them, 
although there were times when such a feeling might have 
been called forth by the attacks of philosophy on the popular 
religion. But every individual priest, as well as every local 
corporation of priests, had the greatest interest in main- 
taining their influence and authority. Priestcraft had in- 
ducements as effectual, and a field as large, in Greece as else- 
where, and it was not less fertile in profitable devices, such 
as the invention of legends and other modes of imposture. 
The qualifications required for the priesthood varied accord- 
ing to circumstances; female ministers of religion were 
as numerous, perhaps, as those of the other sex: in some 
cases boys or maidens of a certain age were appointed to the 
priesthood, in others only persons advanced in years; in 
some cases they were allowed to marry, in others obliged to 
live in celibacy. It was no part of a priest's duties to ex- 
pound theological dogmas, or to deliver moral precepts ; nor 
was his conduct viewed as a model for others, though 
the gods were supposed to demand clean hands and in some 
degree a pure heart. 

The most important branch of the Greek religion grew 
out of the belief that, through the divine favour, man might 
obtain a knowledge of the future, which his natural faculties 
could not reach. The means by which this knowledge was 
commuxiicated were very different : sometimes the prophetic 
power was thought to be conferred upon a certain favoured 
person or family ; sometimes it was attached to a particular 
locality where a god was believed to be ever present. Such 
places were termed oracles. All prophetic power emanated 
from Zeus, of whose will, however, Apollo was considered to 



chap. v f RELIGION IN THE HEROIC AGE. 



71 



be the general interpreter, and hence the latter possessed the 
greatest number of oracles. The most ancient and renowned of 
these oracles were that of Zeus at Dodona in Epirus, and that of 
Apollo at Delphi in Phocis. The shades of the dead also were 
consulted in some places, but they were seldom resorted to. 
The interpretation of casual sights and sounds was likewise 
employed as a means of ascertaining the future ; and this 
superstition was all the more readily believed because it 
offered ample food for the excited imagination. Every 
variation from the ordinary tenor of life was regarded as 
an omen denoting some remarkable event about to happen. 
The interpretation of innumerable occurrences of this kind 
afforded, in later times, employment for a large class of 
soothsayers. Dreams were believed to be sent by Zeus, and 
the art of interpreting them gave a name to a distinct class 
of diviners (SveipoTroXoi). 

The worship of heroes, which was so common in later 
times, is not mentioned in the Homeric poems. It was an 
expression of religions veneration for departed excellence, 
whereby the deceased mortal was exalted above the level 
of his kind. Some such heroes as Heracles were believed 
to have been raised into the society of the gods ; and the 
piety of surviving friends and kinsmen displayed itself, at 
an early period, in costly offerings at the funeral pile. The 
tomb of such a mortal gradually became the site of an altar 
or of a temple (jtpwov). This reverence and awe for departed 
greatness were enhanced by the belief that many thousand 
spirits of heroes were continually walking over the earth, 
watching the deeds of men, and dispensing weal or woe. 
These were termed demons, a name which afterwards also 
comprised a variety of personifications of abstract ideas and 
relations. The belief in demons, in the sense of spirits of 
departed heroes, approaches very nearly to that in fairies 
and goblins, which we meet with in the mythology of other 
nations. 



72 



HISTOET OF GREECE. 



CHAP. V 



The character of the Greek religion remained essentially 
the same at all times, the changes which took place affecting 
its outward aspect, rather than its real nature. Commerce 
with foreign regions occasionally introduced new divinities 
and forms of worship ; the progress of wealth and art mul- 
tiplied and refined religious rites ; but the substance and 
character of every important religious principle and in- 
stitution is found in the Homeric poems. 

These poems also furnish us with a pretty complete view 
of the state of knowledge and the arts in the heroic age ; 
but we must confine ourselves to selecting a few of the most 
striking features, which mark the limits of the progress 
which the Greeks of this period had made in intellectual 
acquirements, and in their application to the purposes of life. 

Their geographical knowledge, so far as we can trace it in 
the poems of Homer, was almost confined to Greece, the 
Aegean, and the north western portion of Asia Minor; 
beyond this circle all is foreign and more or less obscure, 
in treating of which the poet evidently depended on vague 
rumours and reports, which he moulded according to his 
pleasure. His descriptions of distant countries in the east 
and south, though full of marvellous circumstances, yet al- 
ways have some truth for their foundation, and are well 
fitted to excite curiosity in his hearers. The northern and 
western parts of the world, on the other hand, are wrapped 
in obscurity, or presented under a forbidding aspect, as 
approachable only through the midst of perils which made 
the courage of even the hardiest quail. Homer seems to 
have known so little about the Black Sea, that he imagined 
it formed the northern boundary of Greece and Italy, and 
was connected with the Adriatic, nay, even with the Atlantic 
Ocean ; so that the northern part of the world was occupied by 
one vast sea. Sicily and the south of Italy appear to have been 
known to him only from reports, and he accordingly describes 
them with all the licence of a poet, though his marvellous 



chap. v. KNOWLEDGE IN THE HEROIC AGE. 73 

accounts were, perhaps, suggested by some real features in 
the nature of the scenes described, as the dangers of the 
straits dividing Italy and Sicily, and the volcanic islands in 
the neighbourhood. The part of the earth exposed to the 
rays of the sun, was considered to be a plane surface, only 
varied by its heights and hollows, and its form was thought 
to be determined by that of the visible horizon. This whole 
orb was girt by the ocean, a deep and broad river, circulating 
with constant but gentle flux, and separating the world of 
light and life from the realms of darkness, dreams, and death. 
All the other rivers, all springs and wells, and the Medi- 
terranean itself, are described as issuing from the ocean 
stream, which may have been supposed to feed them by 
subterraneous channels. Within the earth the poet conceives 
a vast hollow which is a receptacle for departed spirits, 
and perhaps the proper abode of Hades. Beneath this, 
and as far below the earth as heaven was above it, lay the 
still more murky pit of Tartarus, secured by its iron gates 
and brazen floor; the dungeon reserved by Zeus for his 
implacable enemies. 

In the eastern part the ocean river formed a large lake, 
out of which the sun rose every morning ; and, after having 
performed his journey across the vault of heaven, he de- 
scended into the same river in the west ; and the belief 
probably was, that he floated in a golden bowl along the 
river to the east, where he found another chariot and fresh 
steeds ready to receive him and again to transport him 
across the heavens.* The regions in the extreme east and 
west are described as shores or islands blessed with a double 
portion of light and heat, and as teeming with inexhaustible 
fertility. The people who inhabit these two parts of the 

* This idea of the golden bowl is not mentioned in Homer. It first 
occurs in a fragment of Mimnermus, who lived between the seventh and 
sixth century before Christ ; but it may have been a popular notion of a 
much earlier period. 



74 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. V. 



world are (as their name, Ethiopians, denotes) of a swarthy 
complexion, from their neighbourhood to the sun ; they are 
the favourites of the gods, and are sometimes honoured by 
visits from the celestials. The extreme north likewise was 
believed to be inhabited by a happy and long-lived race, 
which was sheltered from the blasts of Boreas by a barrier 
of mountains. Mount Olympus was regarded as the highest 
point on the earth ; but it is not always carefully distinguished 
from heaven or the aerial region above it, both being often 
blended in the poet's mind. The vault of heaven seems to 
have been considered by him as a solid vault of metal, 
supported by Atlas, who kept heaven and earth asunder. 

Navigation in the heroic age was in its very infancy ; even 
small distances in the Aegean are spoken of with dread, and 
were avoided as much as possible by coasting. It is stated 
that the largest ships which sailed against Troy, contained 
120 men ; but it seems more probable that they did not ac- 
commodate more than fifty. These vessels were half-decked 
boats with a moveable mast ; at night they usually put into 
port, or were hauled up on the beach. Engagements at sea 
are never mentioned by Homer, though he frequently 
alludes to piratical excursions. In winter all navigation 
ceased. Astronomy, as a science, can hardly be said to have 
existed in the heroic age of Greece : the regular succession 
of light and darkness, the recurring phases of the moon, and 
the vicissitudes of the seasons naturally forced themselves 
upon the attention of every one, and were observed for 
agricultural and religious purposes, as well as by seamen. 
The Greeks, from the earliest times down to the age of 
Solon, divided their year into twelve lunar months ; and 
the defect of the lunar year, as compared with the duration 
of the annual course of the sun, seems to have been com- 
pensated for by the occasional addition of an intercalary 
month. In the division of the seasons Homer makes no 
distinction between summer and autumn ; and the different 



chap. v. THE ARTS, ETC. IN THE HEROIC AGE. 75 



parts of the day are named from the civil occupations belong- 
ing to them. 

Commerce was carried on indeed, but was not held in 
great esteem ; it was deemed more honourable for a person to 
enrich himself by war and piracy than by the peaceful pur- 
suits of commerce. Homer does not allude to any thing like 
money, and hence we must infer that commerce was carried 
on by barter. The precious metals are mentioned only as 
commodities, the value of which was always determined by 
weight. The Phoenicians appear to have carried on a con- 
siderable trade with the Greek ports. In regard to the arts 
which contribute to the comforts and the refinement of life, 
it would seem that the opulent lived, not only in rude plenty, 
but in a high degree of luxury and splendour ; their dwell- 
ings, furniture, clothing, armour, and other such property, 
are commonly described as magnificent, costly, and elegant, 
as to both the materials and the workmanship. We must 
not, however, suppose that in these descriptions Homer 
represented what he had actually seen ; for he, as a poet, 
had the inexhaustible stores of his imagination to draw 
from ; a very rude and simple reality might in his mind 
assume a stately and magnificent appearance. The most 
distinguished works of art he mentions, are the productions 
of the divine artist Hephaestus, or importations from the 
East, especially from Phoenicia. Homer, moreover, being 
in all probability an Asiatic Greek, may have been familiar 
with many things which were little known to his European 
countrymen before the Trojan war ; the arts of Europe were 
evidently in a state of infancy when compared with the skill 
and ingenuity of some eastern nations. We need not, how- 
ever, conclude that in these points the Greeks were alto- 
gether dependent upon foreigners. Homer may have highly 
coloured his pictures of the heroic style of living, but the 
main features must have been drawn from life; he may 
have been somewhat too lavish of the precious metals, but 

E 2 



76 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. V. 



copper, iron, steel, and tin were, no doubt, extensively used ; 
and the industry of the Greeks had long been employed upon 
these materials. The ruins of Mycenae and other ancient 
cities present us with specimens of architecture which were 
probably contemporary with the events which the poet de- 
scribes ; they also sufficiently attest that, in general, we may 
rely on the accuracy with which he represents the character 
of the heroic age ; and they show that Greek buildings, even 
of that early age, bore the stamp of the national genius. 
Yet such arts had not then been long familiar to the Greeks, 
nor were they very commonly practised ; hence a skilful 
artificer, such as a carpenter, was viewed with great admi- 
ration and occupied a high rank in society ; nay, the heroes 
themselves did not disdain to be admired for their skill in 
the crafts of artificers. 

Although war was the chief business and delight of the 
heroic ages, it appears to have been very far from being 
reduced to any form deserving the name of an art. In the 
Iliad we hear much of the combats of the chiefs, but little 
or nothing about the engagements of the armies ; the common 
warriors serve only as figures in the background to fill up 
the picture ; for the contests are invariably decided, either by 
the interposition of the gods, or by the valour of the heroes, 
who sometimes put a whole army to flight. The principal 
chiefs always used chariots or cars, the drawing of which 
w r as the only purpose for which horses were employed ; the 
warrior stood in his chariot by the side of his charioter, and 
sometimes fought in that position, but he more commonly 
alighted from it to attack his opponent, and mounted it 
again for pursuit or flight. No traces occur of the art of 
besieging towns ; if besiegers could not venture to scale 
the walls, they usually waited for an opportunity of effecting 
an entrance by surprise or stratagem. The skill of a chief 
appears to have consisted more in concerting ambuscades 
and other stratagems and surprises, than in providing against 



chap. v. THE ARTS, ETC. IN THE HEROIC AGE. 77 

them. The contest before Troy frequently offered oppor- 
tunities to the surgeon for the practice of his art, which con- 
sisted chiefly in extracting arrows, applying herbs or charms 
to stop the blood and ease the pain of wounds. The principal 
physicians were sons of Asclepius ; Achilles, too, is said to 
have been instructed in the healing art by Chiron. The 
south of Thessaly, the territory of Ephyra, and Egypt, were 
supposed to be the countries particularly favourable to the 
growth of medicinal herbs. The healing art itself was 
practised by women as well as by men, but it does not 
appear to have been in a more advanced condition among 
the Greeks than among the savage tribes of the American 
Indians. 

It is the more interesting to trace the gradual develop- 
ment of poetry and the fine arts, as in later times they 
became the highest glory of Greece, and raised her to a 
position demanding the admiration of all civilised nations. 
The poems bearing the name of Homer are the most ancient 
specimens of poetry in Europe ; and from them we may 
collect some hints as to its earlier condition. It was held in 
the highest honour among the heroes, and the bard was one 
of those persons who were sent for from very distant parts ; 
his presence was welcome at every feast; and it would 
seem that a bard was attached to every great family, and 
treated with almost religious respect. Nay, one might 
almost infer that poetry and music formed an essential part 
of a princely education ; for both Achilles and Paris were 
skilled in them. Most of the poetry to which allusion is 
made in Homer, is, like that which bears his name, of the 
narrative kind, and its materials are the exploits of renowned 
men. Another species of poetry which was cultivated at the 
same period, was of a religious nature, and consisted of 
hymns intended to soothe the anger of the gods. Music, 
as in later times, was inseparably connected with poetry, 
though subservient to it, being employed to prepare the 

E 3 



78 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. V. 



audience and Lighten the inspiration of the bard. Dancing 
also was frequently united with poetry and music, and seems 
to have been carefully cultivated, in order that the youths 
of both sexes might, on festive occasions, delight the be- 
holders with their agility in graceful and harmonious move- 
ments. The pleasure which the Greeks took in the dance, 
no doubt greatly contributed to their subsequent excellence 
in statuary, as it made them familiar with the most beautiful 
forms and attitudes of the human body. 

The Homeric poems hardly enable us to arrive at a 
distinct notion of the general state of architecture in the age 
of their author. The temples of the gods and the palaces 
of the chiefs afforded ample room for the display of archi- 
tectural skill ; though in the latter, strength and convenience 
were probably more aimed at than beauty or elegance. The 
temples probably did not materially differ from the princely 
mansions ; they were, in general at least, partially roofed ; 
some contained great treasures which had been presented as 
offerings, consisting of robes, vessels, and other valuable 
productions of art, which required safe custody and shelter, 
and must accordingly have contributed to determine the 
form of the building. Representations of the human form, 
though on a small scale, are frequently mentioned by the 
poet, both in embroideries and in relief ; but throughout the 
Homeric poems there is only one distinct allusion to a 
statue as a work of human art * ; for all the other statues, 
such as those in the palace of Alcinous, must be regarded as 
works of the artist-god Hephaestus, and as purely imaginary ; 
they prove, however, that the poet was not a stranger to such 
objects. Statuary in the most ancient times was applied 
exclusively to the service of religion ; the earliest objects of 
adoration were not imitative, but symbolical ; not idols, but 
either rude stones, or wooden staffs or beams, bearing no 



* Horn. 27. vi. 303. 



chap. v. THE ARTS, ETC. IN THE HEROIC AGE. 79 

resemblance whatever to the human form. Such symbols 
were held in high esteem even in the most brilliant period 
of Grecian history. The transition from the worship of 
symbols to that of idols is traditionally ascribed to the 
influence of Egyptian settlers ; but it is not improbable that 
the custom of making rude images for devotional purposes 
sprang up in Greece itself, during the period of transition 
from the Pelasgic to the Hellenic age. As religion itself 
was stationary, admitting fewer changes than any other part 
of either public or private life, it was thought necessary that 
the forms of old idols should remain unaltered, so that they 
might retain their original sanctity in the eyes of the people. 
Thus it happened that, although in the course of centuries 
statuary made great progress, there was no improvement 
in temple statues. These ancient idols appear to have been 
all clothed, and the drapery and symbolical ornaments natu- 
rally occupied the artist's attention more than the features. 
The earliest statues were made of clay ; the first one of 
bronze was probably much later than the age of Homer. 
Pictures, in the proper sense of the word, are not mentioned 
in Homer, though, if we may judge from the descriptions 
which the poet gives of embroidered works, the art of design 
must have been known and practised. 

The most important of all the arts is that of writing, and 
it is, therefore, highly interesting to inquire whether the 
Greeks in the age of Homer were acquainted with it. The 
names of most of the Greek letters, their order, and the 
forms which they exhibit in the most ancient monuments, 
leave no doubt of the truth of the tradition, that the Greek 
alphabet was derived from Phoenicia. Considerable modi- 
fications must of course have taken place to adapt the foreign 
signs to the native sounds. At what time the Greeks 
adopted the Phoenician alphabet is a question to which no 
certain answer can be given. Herodotus connects the event 
with the settlement of Cadmus at Thebes. The Homeric 

E 4 



80 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. V* 



poems suggest that commerce between Phoenicia and Greece 
had been established for some generations ; but this com- 
merce was a passive one on the part of the Greeks, so that 
it might have been carried on by them without a knowledge 
of the art of writing. Still it is possible that they became ac- 
quainted with it through their intercourse with the Phoeni- 
cians. But let us see what we can learn from the Homeric 
poems on this subject. The first question is, Does Homer in 
any way mention or allude to the art of writing ? for the 
fact that later poets speak of written documents in the heroic 
age, is of no historical value whatever. There is one 
passage in the Iliad * which can hardly be explained without 
supposing that it alludes to alphabetical writing ; but this 
only proves that the poet knew of the existence of the art, 
which is no more than might be naturally conjectured, 
seeing that intercourse between Greece and Phoenicia had 
already existed for a long time. But if we consider that, in 
the whole range of the two great Homeric poems, the art of 
writing is alluded to only once, and that very obscurely, we 
must necessarily conclude that, although known, it was yet 
in its infancy and very little practised. Whether the 
Homeric poems themselves were originally composed in 
writing is a question of considerable literary interest and 
instruction. The early Greeks never doubted that Homer 
was the author of both the Iliad and the Odyssey ; and, 
although there was much dispute about his birthplace, yet it 
was commonly believed that he was an Asiatic Greek ; and 
the ancients generally seem. to have taken it for granted that 
his poems were written from the first. Many reasons, how* 
ever, may be adduced for the contrary opinion ; and the 
difficulty which we experience in conceiving such long 
poems to have been composed without the aid of writing, 
had no existence for the ancients, whose memory, unsup- 



* vi. 168, foil. 



chap. v. THE ARTS, ETC. IN THE HEROIC AGE. 81 



ported by books, was much stronger and far more tenacious 
than that of the moderns. Some critics have endeavoured 
to show that each poem is an aggregate of several poems 
composed by different authors, and afterwards more or less 
skilfully put together in the way in which they have come 
down to us. That both poems are the productions of one 
mind is not now very generally maintained, and was 
denied by some even of the ancient critics ; but the original 
unity of each poem is recognised by most persons competent 
to form an opinion upon the question. It is said that, after 
these poems had been created by their author, they were 
perpetuated by the rhapsodists, a class of men who recited 
parts of them on festive occasions, and transmitted them 
orally to their descendants, until at last they were fixed by 
writing. But this, as well as the origin of the Homeric 
poetry, are questions which we cannot discuss here. It may 
seem wonderful that the earliest poems are models of perfec- 
tion in so many respects ; but this will cease to surprise us, 
if we recollect that, although they are the oldest productions 
with which we are acquainted, they were preceded by 
others, which were eclipsed and thrown into the shade by 
the magnificent and sublime compositions which bear the 
name of Homer. 



2B 5 



82 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE RETURN OF THE HERACLEIDS, AND FOUNDATION OF THE DORIC 

STATES. 

After the return of the Greek heroes from Troy, which 
forms the conclusion of the heroic age, Greece might have 
continued as before and without experiencing any material 
influence resulting from the great national expedition. But 
the heroes, who in the war against Troy had been aided and 
protected by the gods, had in the end incurred their wrath, 
in consequence of which some perished at sea, and others 
did not reach their homes till they had encountered many 
perils during a long course of wanderings. In some in- 
stances they are said to have found their thrones occupied 
by usurpers, or their dominions distracted by revolutions, 
and in other cases the royal or noble families are stated to 
have emigrated. But, though it may be justly doubted 
whether any of the numerous stories connected with the 
return from Troy have an historical foundation, this much 
seems certain, that the expedition must have diffused among 
the Greeks a more general knowledge of the isles and 
coasts of the Aegean, and left in their minds a lively re- 
collection of the beauty and fertility of the country which 
was the scene of the protracted contest. This would natu- 
rally direct the attention of future emigrants towards the 
same quarter ; and the fact that the first tide of emigration 
actually set in this direction, may seem to confirm the truth 
of the story of the Trojan war. 

For sixty years after the fall of Troy no great change 
appears to have taken place in Greece ; but about the end of 
that period there began a long succession of wars and 
migrations, which finally introduced a new order of things in 



CHAP. VI. RETURN OF THE HERACLEIDS. 



83 



Greece and the surrounding countries. The detail of these 
migrations may be altogether of a mythical nature ; but the 
great fact that, about half a century after the Trojan war, 
there commenced a revolution, arising out of a series of mi- 
grations, cannot be doubted. The first of these occurrences 
is the migration of the Thessalians from Epirus into the 
plains on the banks of the Peneus, where they began the con- 
quest of the country which finally derived its name from them ; 
before that time it had been called Haemonia. It seems 
probable that these Thessalians were Pelasgians ; for, though 
they never rose to a degree of civilisation equal to that of 
the other Greeks, they spoke the same language. Their suc- 
cess in Thessaly was very gradual and slow, as the Achae- 
ans, Perrhaebians, and Magnetes offered a long resistance. 
The Boeotians, in the territory of Aeolis, were the first to 
give way before the invaders, in consequence of which a 
general emigration of the freemen from Aeolis took place ; all 
who remained became the serfs of the conquerors, under the 
name of penests {jzviaraiy labourers). The emigrants took 
forcible possession of the country afterwards called Boeotia. 
Here again many were driven from their homes ; and being 
joined by bands of adventurers from Peloponnesus, led by 
descendants of Agamemnon, they embarked for Asia. These 
expeditions are called the Aeolian migration, from the race 
which took the principal part in it. Many families also 
sought refuge in Attica and Peloponnesus. In Athens they 
are said to have fortified the Acropolis. The Thracians, the 
allies of the Boeotians, settled in the neighbourhood of mount 
Parnassus, and afterwards entirely disappear from history. 

A far more important migration is that of the Dorians, 
from their seats at the northern foot of Parnassus, to Pelo- 
ponnesus. It is said to have happened twenty years later 
than the expulsion of the Boeotians from Thessaly ; but how 
far the Dorian migration was connected with the earlier 
event is uncertain. The migration itself is historical, but 

e 6 



84 



HISTORY OF GBEECE. 



CHAP. VI. 



the manner in which it is interwoven with the return of the 
Heracleids is altogether fabulous. The whole of Pelopon- 
nesus changed its character and population, with the excep- 
tion of the Pelasgians in Arcadia, w^ho retained their political 
independence, though they were unable to resist the Hel- 
lenising influence of the language and manners of their 
neighbours. The little country known in later times by the 
name of Doris, probably formed only a part of the district 
occupied by the Dorians, and as we do not hear of its having 
been exposed to hostile inroads, it seems probable that those 
Dorians who migrated southward, were the inhabitants of 
other parts of Doris. Our authorities, however, unanimously 
connect the Doric migration with the story about Heracles. 
After that hero's death, his children, it is said, being perse- 
cuted by Eurystheus, took refuge in Attica, whither they were 
pursued by the tyrant, whom they there defeated and slew ; 
after which they resumed possession of their birthright in 
Peloponnesus. But not long afterwards a pestilence, in 
which they recognised the finger of Heaven, drove them 
again into exile ; and Attica once more afforded them a 
refuge. Some years later, by the advice of an oracle, they 
attempted to return to Peloponnesus by the Isthmus of 
Corinth ; but were met by the united forces of the Achaeans ? 
lonians, and Arcadians. Their leader Hyllus, the eldest 
son of Heracles, proposed to decide the quarrel by single 
combat. The proposal was accepted ; and as Hyllus fell by 
the hand of Echemus, king of Tegea, the Heracleids were 
bound by the terms of the agreement to abandon their en- 
terprise for a hundred years. Nevertheless, attempts con- 
tinued to be made from time to time by the son and grandson 
of Hyllus ; but with no better fortune, until his great- 
grandsons, Aristodemus, Temenus, and Cresphontes, were 
assured that the time alluded to in the oracle for recovering 
their lawful inheritance had come. They were to enter Pelo- 
ponnesus, however, not by the Isthmus^ but across the mouth 



chap, Vf. FOUXDATIOH 0# THE DORIC STATES. 



85 



of the western gulf. Thus encouraged, and aided by the 
Dorians, Aetolians, and Locrians, they crossed the straits at 
Naupactus, vanquished Tisamenus, the son of Orestes, and 
divided the fairest portions of Peloponnesus among them. 

It was the belief of all antiquity, that the Dorians were 
led into Peloponnesus by princes of Achaean blood ; this was 
the current tradition as early as the age of Hesiod, and was 
universally received ; at Athens poets and orators, down to 
the latest times, boasted that their ancestors had given pro- 
tection to the exiled Heracleids. There is nothing incredible 
in this story ; but it may nevertheless be a mere invention 
made up at a time when the true history was forgotten ; a pro- 
cess which occurs so frequently in Greek history, that in this 
case, where there are sufficient motives to account for such 
a fabrication, there can be little doubt as to the real origin 
of the story. That the royal family of Sparta, though of 
Dorian blood, should claim Heracles for their ancestor, 
cannot surprise us, if we admit that there was a Dorian, as 
well as an Achaean and a Theban, Heracles. But leaving 
the discussion of this doubtful point, we proceed to relate 
the issue of the expedition. The invaders arrived at 
Naupactus, where they were perhaps strengthened by the 
Aetolians, Hyllus being the son of an Aetolian princess, 
Deianira. According to the common legend, the Heracleids 
were guided into Peloponnesus by Oxylus, an Aetolian chief 
and their kinsman, who alleged a title to Elis, and claimed 
that kingdom as the price of his guidance, which an oracle 
had declared to be indispensable to the success of the Hera- 
cleids. Oxylus became master of Elis by the successful 
issue of a single combat between one of his Aetolian followers 
and Degmenus, an Epean chief. Oxylus is said to have 
used his victory wisely and mildly ; to have permitted the 
ancient inhabitants, after resigning a share of their lands to 
his Aetolian companions, to retain the remainder as inde- 
pendent owners ; and to have treated the deposed king Dius 



86 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. VI. 



with generosity. A friendly union between the followers of 
Oxylus and the subdued Epeans may indeed have been 
established ; but the new settlement was, no doubt, the cause 
of emigrations here as elsewhere. But no other revolution 
was produced in the peninsula by this conquest, and even 
the kingdom of Pisa, though attacked by the conquerors, 
maintained its independance for several centuries. 

Oxylus, wishing to divert the attention of the Heracleids 
from the fertile land which he himself desired to retain, led 
them through Arcadia into the country subject to the house 
of Atreus, which was then governed by Tisamenus, the son 
of Orestes. This prince, with those of the Achaeans who 
were unwilling to submit to the conquerors, went to the 
northern coast of Peloponnesus, inhabited by the Ionians, 
and offered to settle among them, if they would cede to him 
a fair share of their land ; but fear and jealousy prevented 
the realisation of this scheme. The question was decided 
by arms, and victory was on the side of the Achaeans. The 
Ionians, besieged in Helice, at length capitualated, and ob- 
tained leave to quit their country, which henceforth received 
the name of Achaia. The dislodged Ionians sought and 
found shelter among their kinsmen in Attica ; but as the 
land was too narrow for them, they followed the example of 
the Aeolians, and being joined by swarms of adventurers of 
various races, sailed to the coast of Asia Minor. After the 
death or retreat of Tisamenus, the Heracleids, according to the 
legend, were busied only with the partition of his kingdom. 
Aristodemus, as was believed everywhere, except at Sparta, 
had not entered Peloponnesus, but had been killed at Delphi : 
his twin sons, Procles and Eurysthenes, claimed, as his 
successors, an equal share with Temenus and Cresphontes. 
The dispute which thus arose, was decided in the following 
manner : — Three lots were cast into an urn filled with water ; 
they were to be of stone, and the first drawn was to give 
possession of Argos, the second of Lacedaemon, the third of 



chap. vi. FOUNDATION OF THE DORIC STATES. 87 

Messenia. Cresphontes, to secure the fairest portion, threw 
into the vessel a clod of earth, which, being dissolved, 
remained at the bottom while his competitors were drawing 
their lots. The descendants of Heracles accordingly took 
quiet possession of their alloted shares. 

The poetical legend, of which the above is only an outline, 
combines events which probably occupied many generations. 
The revolution, by which a foreign yoke was imposed upon 
the brave Achaeans, was certainly not effected by a mo- 
mentary struggle. The Dorian conquerors, of whom there 
cannot well have been more than about 20,000, were inferior 
in numbers to their enemies ; the issue of the contest, however, 
does not appear to have been decided by pitched battles or 
sieges ; but the invaders occupied a strong position near the 
enemy's city, and wore them out by a series of harassing 
excursions. That Argos was gradually subdued in this 
manner is confirmed by the story about the monument of 
Temenus, which was situated on a hill near the city*, 
against which his attacks are said to have been directed 
from the hill in question. At the time of the Trojan war, 
Messenia was subject to the house of Atreus, and formed a 
part of the dominions of Menelaus ; but after his death it came 
under the rule of the kings of Pylos. At the period of the 
Dorian invasion it was governed by Melanthus, a foreigner, 
towards whom the people were disaffected, so that they offered 
no resistance to the Dorians. Melanthus withdrew to Attica, 
where he became the founder of an illustrious family. The 
Messenian Pylos, however, seems to have remained inde- 
pendent of the Dorians, and to have been ruled for several 
centuries later, by a branch of the family of Xeleus, while 
the rest of the country submitted to Cresphontes, though 
probably not as quietly as is commonly related. 

According to some accounts, the conquest of Laconia was 



* Paus. ii. 38. § 1. 



88 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



CHAP. VI. 



as easy as that of Messenia. The Aehaeans, it is said, were 
collected at Amyclae, which was besieged and obliged to ca- 
pitulate ; Eurysthenes and Procles divided the country into 
six districts, over which they set governors with the title of 
kings, while they themselves fixed their residence at Sparta. 
During the reign of Eurysthenes, the conquered Achaean s 
were admitted to an equality of political rights with the 
Dorians ; but his successor Agis deprived them of this 
privilege, and reduced them to the condition of subjects of 
the Spartans. All submitted without resistance, except the 
inhabitants of the town of Helos, who however were com- 
pelled to yield, and lost, not only their political independ- 
ence, but their personal liberty, giving rise and name to the 
class of serfs called Helots. This story, which no doubt 
pleased the later Spartans, contains several points which are 
contradicted by more trust-worthy authorities, though they 
allow us only a glimpse at the real state of affairs. It is 
in the highest degree probable, that the Dorians became 
masters of Laconia only gradually and after a long struggle. 
Amyclae, which in the legend is said to have been given to 
Philonomus, appears to have formed an independent state 
for nearly 300 years after the invasion. It was not con- 
quered till towards the close of the ninth century B.C., and 
had probably never before submitted to Sparta.* Now, what 
happened at Amyclae, must have happened also in other 
parts of Laconia, which were more remote from Sparta. 
Helos, in particular, seems to have preserved its independ- 
ence down to the reign of Alcamenes. the son of the con- 
queror of Amyclae. f It would appear that the Dorians 
invading Laconia were accompanied by a clan of Cad- 
means, who had been driven from Thebes by the Boeotians.^ 
Minyans, also, are said to have been settled for a time at 

* Pans. in. 2. § f>, 9. § 12. 
+ Ibid. in. 2. § 7. 

% Herod iv. 149. Schol. ad Find. Pytk v. 101., Isthm. vu. 18. 



chap. VI. FOUNDATION OF THE DORIC STATES. 89 

Sparta, until, owing to the haughtiness of the Spartans, 
they emigrated to the country henceforth called Triphylia, 
where they formed six independent little states or towns. 

The sons of Temenus, the Dorian ruler of Argos, plotted 
against his life ; and Ceisus, the eldest, succeeded him on 
the throne. Deiphontes, the son-in-law of Temenus, who 
had entertained hopes of the crown, now drew a part of the 
Dorians over to his side, and with their aid undertook the 
conquest of Epidaurus. The invader met with no resist- 
ance ; the principal families withdrew to Athens, and Epi- 
daurus at once became a Dorian state. At Troezen, Agraeus, 
the youngest son of Temenus, established himself without 
opposition from the natives. Phalces, another son of 
Temenus, subjected Sicyon to the Dorian sway ; but shared 
the government of the place with its lawful king, because 
the latter traced his origin to Heracles. In the next gene- 
ration, the Dorian arms were carried against Phlius, by 
Rhegnidas, a son of Phalces. The town is said to have sub- 
mitted without a struggle ; but a party headed by Hippasus, 
animated by a spirit of independence, quitted the place and 
joined the Ionian emigrants who were embarking for Asia 
Minor. 

The more important conquest of Corinth was reserved for 
another dynasty of Heracleids. When the Dorians were on 
the point of embarking at Naupactus, a pestilence had broken 
out ; and Hippotes, a descendant of Heracles, being believed 
to be the cause of the divine wrath, was forced to quit the 
camp, and accordingly took no part in the conquest of 
Peloponnesus ; but his son Aletes collected a band of 
Dorian adventurers, and attacked Corinth. How he became 
master of the place is variously related; but the race of 
Sisyphus was dethroned, and some of the Aeolian inhabitants 
of the place are said to have migrated to foreign lands. 
The fall of Corinth brought the Dorians into conflict with 
Attica. When the Boeotians had completed their conquest, 



90 



HISTORY OF GKEECE. 



CHAP. VI. 



they began to threaten their southern neighbours, and made 
inroads upon the Attic border, claiming some towns as 
belonging to their territory. The Boeotian leader pro- 
posed to decide the dispute by a single combat ; but as the 
Athenian king, Thymoetes, shrank from it, Melanthus, the 
late king of Messenia, came forward to accept the enemy's 
challenge, and by a stratagem was enabled to slay his oppo- 
nent. The victor was rewarded with the kingdom of the 
cowardly Thymoetes, the last in the line of Erechtheus. 
Melanthus was succeeded by his son Codrus, who was still 
reigning, though at an advanced age, when some Dorian 
states, impelled by a general scarcity, the natural conse- 
quence of long-protracted wars, united their forces for the 
invasion of Attica. Aletes was the chief mover of the ex- 
pedition, in which the Messenians also, actuated by jealousy 
of the Neleids, joined. The Dorian army encamped under 
the walls of Athens. The Dephic oracle had promised 
Aletes success, provided he spared the life of the Athenian 
king. This oracle had been disclosed to the Athenians, and 
Codrus resolved to devote himself for his country's welfare. 
Disguised in a woodman's garb, he went out of the city, and 
falling in with two Dorians, he killed one with his bill, and 
was himself killed by the other. When the Athenians sent 
heralds to claim the body of their king, the Dorian chiefs, 
deeming the war hopeless, withdrew their forces from 
Attica. 

Such is the story which continued for centuries to warm 
the patriotism of the Athenians ; its details, however, though 
there is nothing impossible in them, cannot be vouched for. 
Another, though less credible, tradition is, that the Dorians 
found their way into the city by night ; but being surrounded 
by their enemies, they took refuge at the altars of the Eu- 
menid.es, and were spared by the piety of the Athenians.* 



* Paus. vii. 25. § 2. 



chap. vi. FOUNDATION OF THE DORIC STATES. 91 



About this time Megara was finally separated from Attica, 
being occupied by a Dorian colony from Corinth, with which 
it remained long closely connected, or rather was held in 
subjection by it. Aegina, which had hitherto been the seat 
of an Aeolian population, was likewise transformed into a 
Dorian island by a colony from Epidaurus. The most im- 
portant Dorian colonies were those which, in the third gene- 
ration after the conquest, were established in the island of 
Crete. These colonies, though they may not have been the 
first Dorian settlements in that island, deserve our special 
attention, because to them the influence which Crete is com- 
monly believed to have exercised on the institutions and 
destinies of the mother country, may, so far as it really ex- 
isted, be most justly ascribed. It is only to be regretted 
that our information about those colonies is so scanty and 
unsatisfactory. One of them came from Laconia, under the 
following circumstances : — The Minyans established at Amy- 
clae are said to have revolted against the Dorians, and in 
consequence to have migrated anew from Laconia to Crete, 
but accompanied by many Spartans. In Crete they made 
themselves masters of Gortyna or Lyctus, and other cities. 
The leaders in this expedition are called Pollis and Delphus, 
or Crataidas. The fact that Sparta was looked upon as the 
mother city shows, that either the number of Spartan emi- 
grants was considerable, or that the emigration took place 
with the sanction of Sparta. A second expedition to Crete 
proceeded from Argos, in consequence of domestic feuds in 
the family of Temenus. It was conducted by Althaemenes, 
and consisted chiefly of those Dorian adventurers who, after 
the failure of their enterprise against Attica, found them- 
selves without a home and without employment. Althae- 
menes is said to have been invited by the emigrants from 
Laconia under Pollis to join them ; but he determined to 
pursue the course marked out by an oracle, which com- 
manded him to seek the land of Zeus and the Sun. Rhodes 



92 



HISTOEY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. VI. 



was the land of the Sun, Crete the land of Zeus ; and 
accordingly Althaemenes, while bending his course to Rhodes, 
left a part of his followers in Crete, where they made con- 
siderable conquests, probably on the western side of the 
island. 

The general fact that Dorian colonies w r ere established in 
Crete cannot be doubted, though the number of Dorians 
who took part in them must have been very small compared 
with the extent of the island : but the state in which they 
found the country enabled them to gain a firm footing and 
make steady progress ; for Crete is said to have been desolated 
by plague and famine during the period subsequent to the 
Trojan war, and to have remained in that condition until it 
was replenished by the race which finally retained possession 
of it. Nevertheless, the conquest there, as in Pelopon- 
nesus, must have been gradual ; and a long time must have 
elapsed before the Dorians spread over the whole island, if 
no part of it was previously inhabited by a kindred race. 

Some authors represent the Spartan institutions as bor- 
rowed from those of Crete, while others maintain that the 
Cretan towns, some of which were colonies of Sparta, 
derived their political institutions from the mother city: 
in the accounts of the former kind Minos is described 
as the original author of those institutions. This belief may 
have arisen from the ambition of the Dorian settlers, who 
wished to hallow their own usages by the revered name of 
Minos ; but it may, at the same time, have been erroneous 
only in extending to the whole system that which was true 
of no more than a few of its parts, in which vestiges might 
be preserved of a more ancient polity. It can hardly be 
believed, however, that the whole social fabric of Crete, 
which so closely resembled that of Sparta, was already 
standing in the time of Minos. The Cretan institutions are 
described as being so similar to those of Sparta, that it will 
be sufficient here to give a brief outline of the former. 



CHAP. VI. 



DORIANS IN CRETE. 



93 



The inhabitants of Crete were divided into three ranks, — 
slaves, freemen, and an intermediate class, nearly equally re- 
moved from the degradation of the one and from the privi- 
leges of the other. This class probably consisted chiefly of 
the old proprietors of the land, who had submitted without 
a struggle to the invaders. They were called perioeci 
(7T£ptoiKoi), a name indicating a rural population dwelling in 
open towns or villages, in contrast with the citizens who re- 
sided in the capital of each district. Their lands were 
subject to a peculiar tax ; but their persons were free and 
their industry unrestricted. The privileges reserved for the 
citizens, that is, the members of the superior class, consisted 
in the power of making legal enactments, the administration 
of justice, the government of the state, the exclusive use of 
certain arms, and the exercises in the public schools by 
which the citizens were trained to use them. The bow was 
the ordinary weapon of the perioeci, who in all ages sup- 
plied the Greek armies with their best archers. They re- 
tained most of their ancient usages, and their condition was, 
on the whole, not very oppressive. 

The slaves were probably divided into two classes, namely 
those who were already in a state of servitude at the time of 
the conquest, and those of the ancient free inhabitants who 
were taken with arms in their hands, and who purchased 
their lives by the sacrifice of their liberty. Besides the 
lands which were left to their former owners, and those 
which were occupied by the citizens, each state reserved a 
domain for itself, which was cultivated by public slaves, who 
constituted a separate body called mnoa (jiu'wa, probably 
connected with $/jitog). Every individual freeman had his 
own slaves, who tilled his land, and whom he might sell, but 
not carry out of the country. A third class of slaves em- 
ployed for the most menial labours, was purchased from 
abroad, as is indicated by their name xP V(T ^ vr i' r0L (bought 
with gold). The Dorian citizen or freeman had no occupa- 



94 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. VI. 



tion save warlike exercises ; he lived upon the toil of his 
subjects and slaves ; he knew no care but the defence of his 
station, and to secure to himself the enjoyment of its 
privileges. 

The form of government was very nearly the same in all 
the Dorian colonies in Crete ; a circumstance which shows 
that it everywhere sprang out of the character of the age 
and of the people, and was not the result of accident or 
design. The state of things closely resembles that de- 
scribed in the Homeric poems, the only great difference 
being that the royal dignity seems to have been unknown 
in any of the Cretan states. The place of kings was occu- 
pied by magistrates, who bore the title of cosmos (kogjjloq), 
and were ten in number ; the first in rank, the proto-cosmos, 
gave his name to the year. They were elected by the whole 
body of citizens from certain privileged families, and held 
office for only one year, at the end of which those whose 
conduct seemed worthy of it, might aspire to fill up vacancies 
in the council or senate (yepuvia or [3ov\r]). The number 
of this senate seems to have been limited to thirty; its 
members were elected by the people from among those who 
had filled the supreme magistracy, and they retained their 
office for life. They formed the council of the ten magis- 
trates, and administered the internal affairs of the state. 

This brief outline shows that the Cretan constitution was 
strictly aristocratic, like those of Greece in the heroic ages. 
The assembly of the people, consisting of the Dorian con- 
querors and their fellow-adventurers, might be convoked by 
the magistrates, whenever they had any measures to lay 
before it ; but the individual members of the assembly were 
not allowed to discuss these measures ; they could only 
accept or reject them as a body ; nay, it is even doubtful 
whether they really did possess the right of rejecting a 
measure brought before them. The principal duties of the 
citizen were to be discharged in the field of battle. 



CHAP. VI. 



DORIANS IN CEETE. 



95 



The most important feature in the Cretan mode of life is the 
usage of the syssitia (owo-trta), or public meals, of which all 
the citizens partook, without distinction of rank or age. The 
origin of this institution is commonly ascribed to Minos ; 
but its prevalence in all the Dorian colonies of Crete renders 
it probable that they did not adopt it from the conquered 
people, but brought it with them from the mother country. 
In most Cretan cities, the expense of these syssitia was 
defrayed by the state out of the revenues of the domain- 
lands, and the tribute paid by their subjects. Each citizen 
received his share, out of which he paid his contribution to 
one of the public tables, and provided for the females of his 
household. These public meals derived their Cretan name 
from the men (avdpeg), who partook of them, being called 
dvSptia or dvlpla. There is another regulation peculiar to 
the Cretans, and characteristic of the friendly intercourse 
among the Dorian cities of the island : in every town there 
was a public building for the reception of strangers ; and 
in every banqueting-room two tables were set apart for 
foreign guests. These syssitia, whatever their origin may 
have been, answered several important ends ; they main- 
tained a strict separation between the ruling and the subject 
classes ; they kept alive in the former the full consciousness 
of their superior station and their national character ; they 
bound together the citizens by ties of the most endearing 
intimacy ; taught them to look on one another as members 
of the same family ; and gave an efficacy to the power of 
public opinion, which must have almost superseded the 
necessity of any penal laws. We may add, that they pro- 
vided a main part of the education of the young. Till the 
boys had reached their eighteenth year, they accompanied 
their fathers to the public board, with the orphans of the 
deceased. The younger waited at the table. All the young 
people might thus listen to the conversations of their elders, 
and were under the eye of an officer appointed by the state 



96 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. VI. 



to superintend them, and who seems to have watched over 
their conduct. On other occasions, also, they were early 
inured to hardship and laborious exercises, and their strength 
and spirit were tried by frequent combats between rival 
companies. The intervals between these occupations were 
filled up with simple lessons in poetry and music, and in 
later times, in the rudiments of letters. From their eigh- 
teenth year, they were placed under stricter rules ; they 
were now divided into troops, headed by some youth of 
noble family, who was himself placed under the control of 
an elder person, generally his father, who directed the exer- 
cises of the troop in the chase, the course, and the wrestling 
school. When the youths entered into the society of men, 
they were compelled by law to choose a bride, who, how- 
ever, seems to have continued to live with her parents until 
she was found capable of discharging the duties of a wife 
and mother. A comparison of these institutions with those 
which we afterwards find at Sparta, cannot fail to show 
their common origin, and to convince us that they were 
devised neither by Minos in Crete, nor by Lycurgus at 
Sparta, but that in both cases they were the offspring of the 
characteristics of the Doric nation. 



r3HP. vir. THE LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS. 



97 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS. 

The history of the Dorian states of Peloponnesus during 
the first centuries after the conquest, is extremely obscure ; 
and the little information we possess, is so mixed up with 
fable, that it is almost impossible to discern truth from false- 
hood. This much, however, is certain, that Sparta was from 
the beginning the chief Dorian state in the peninsula, and 
that there the national character of the Dorian race assumed 
the most permanent forms in all the relations of public and 
private life. These circumstances, and the conquest of 
Messenia, ultimately raised Sparta to the supremacy not 
only of Peloponnesus, but of the whole of Greece. The 
gradual development of Spartan power and influence, and 
of the social and political institutions by which that power 
was maintained, sheds, down to a certain time, a lustre over 
the history of Sparta, which has dazzled both ancient and 
modern historians, and filled them with an admiration which, 
in many instances, is not very well deserved. The chief 
feature in the Spartan constitution was a rigid conservatism, 
which, clinging to ancient forms, even when their soul had 
departed, could not avoid frequently coming in conflict with 
existing realities, made the people hypocritical, and gradu- 
ally undermined the foundations of the political and social 
fabric. 

It has been usual, both in ancient and in modern times, 
to consider the Spartan constitution as the work of a single 
man, Lycurgus, who is generally supposed to have had the 
merit, if not of inventing, at least of introducing and esta- 
blishing it among his countrymen. According to an opposite 

F 



98 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. vn. 



view, it was not an artificial fabric, but the spontaneous 
growth of the national character of the Dorians, which re- 
quired at the utmost only a few slight touches from the hand 
of an individual ; and in this view of the subject, the agency 
of Lycurgus shrinks into so narrow a compass, that even his 
personal existence becomes a question of much doubt and 
of little moment. Our safest course will probably be to 
steer between these two extreme opinions, and to admit that 
there is some, but not the whole, truth on each side. 

The discrepancies in the statements respecting the time at 
which Lycurgus lived are so great, that while some make him 
a contemporary of the Heracleids and the Doric invasion of 
Peloponnesus (about B.C. 1104), others place him only 108 
years before the beginning of the Olympiads, that is, b. c. 
884, a date which has been adopted by most modern writers. 
Similar disagreement prevails in the accounts of his parent- 
age ; but all these differences afford no satisfactory reason 
for doubting the historical existence of a Spartan lawgiver. 
We have already seen that, after the death of Aristodemus, 
the throne of Sparta was shared by his two sons, Eury- 
sthenes and Procles, in whose line the kingdom remained 
hereditary. The royal families of Sparta, however, did not 
derive their distinguishing appellations from these twin- 
kings ; the elder house was called the Agids, from Agis, a 
son of Eurysthenes ; and the younger, Eurypontids, from 
Eurypon, a grandson of Procles. Agis was followed by 
Echestratus and Labotas ; and according to some, it was 
during the minority of the latter, that Lycurgus, as his 
guardian, employed the power thus placed in his hands to 
establish his institutions.* This tradition, however, does not 
agree with the received chronology, nor with another better 
authenticated statement that Lycurgus belonged to the family 
of the Eurypontids ; for he was commonly believed to have 



* Others call Lycurgus's ward Eunomus. — Dionys. Hal. n. 49. 



chap. VII. THE LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS. 99 

been a son of Eunomus, a grandson of Eurypon. Eunomus 
being killed in a fray, was succeeded by his eldest son Poly- 
dectes. As the latter died childless, Lycurgus was appa- 
rently entitled to the crown; but soon afterwards his 
brother's widow gave birth to a son, and Lycurgus, who had 
directed that the child should be brought to him the 
moment it was born, at once proclaimed it king of Sparta, 
and called it Charilaus, that is, the joy of the people, as its 
birth was hailed with universal delight. Hereupon Lycurgus 
is said to have left his country, from fear of being plotted 
against by the young king's mother, whose proposal to 
give him her hand and to kill the child he had skilfully 
evaded. Thus the future lawgiver spent the best part of 
his life in voluntary exile, notwithstanding the repeated 
invitations of his countrymen to return. But he employed 
his time, it is said, in maturing a plan for remedying the 
evils under which Sparta had long laboured, by a funda- 
mental change in its constitution and laws. With this view 
he visited many foreign lands, observed their institutions 
and manners, and conversed with their sages. Crete and 
the laws of Minos are said to have been studied with 
particular care, the Egyptians also claimed him as their 
disciple, and the later Spartans even fabled that he had sat 
at the feet of the wise Bramins of India. On his return to 
his country, he found the disorders of the state worse than 
they had been before, and the need of a reform more gene- 
rally felt. Having strengthened himself by an oracle of 
the Delphic god, who declared his wisdom to be above that 
of ordinary mortals, and having secured the aid of a large 
body of the leading men, who were ready to support him in 
all his undertakings, he successively procured the enactment 
of a series of solemn ordinances or compacts (joijrpat), by 
which the civil and military constitution of the state, the 
distribution of property, the education of the citizens, the 
rules of their daily intercourse, and of their domestic life, 



100 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



were to be fixed on a hallowed and immutable basis. He 
carried his measures against violent opposition, and finally 
triumphed over all obstacles, living to see his great idea 
developed in all its beauty. His last act was to sacrifice 
himself to secure the perpetuity of his work. He set out on 
a journey to Delphi, having previously bound his countrymen 
by a solemn oath to make no change in his laws before his 
return. From this expedition he never returned ; but he 
transmitted to the Spartans an oracle which delared that 
Sparta should flourish as long as she adhered to his laws. 
The place and manner of his death are veiled in an obsurity 
befitting the character of the hero : Delphi, Crete, and Elis, 
claimed his tomb, and the Spartans, down to the latest times, 
honoured him with a temple and yearly sacrifices as a god. 

Such are the outlines of the story of the most renowned 
lawgiver of antiquity ; a renown which he would certainly 
deserve if he had devised the constitution which is ascribed 
to him, or if he had collected the materials for it during his 
travels. But such a belief cannot be maintained, for there is 
no doubt that every important part of the institutions ascribed 
to him, was in existence long before his birth. This was the 
case especially with those regulations which were common to 
Crete and Sparta : these were the property and characteristics 
of the Doric race, and are found with more or less modification 
in all parts of Greece occupied by the Dorians, What then 
becomes of Lycurgus on this view of the subject ? If the 
institutions bearing his name are not the work of a single 
man, there scarcely remains room for the intervention of 
Lycurgus, and this was perhaps the reason why one Greek 
author*, passing over Lycurgus altogether, ascribed the 
Spartan institutions to the founders of the state, Eurysthenes 
and Procles. But the concurrent testimony of all other 
writers prevents us from concluding that Lycurgus was only 
an imaginary or symbolical person. One fact seems to be 



* Hellanicus in Strabo, viii. p. 366. 



chap. Vli. THE LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS. 



101 



supported by all accounts, however discrepant they may 
otherwise be, namely, that by him Sparta was delivered 
from the evils of anarchy or misrule, and that from this 
date she began a long period of tranquillity and order ; but 
what was the nature of these evils, or the precise aim of his 
remedies is nowhere distinctly stated. Our authorities do 
not agree in their descriptions of the condition of Sparta 
which Lycurgus is said to have so successfully remedied ; 
but a reform of some kind must have been effected by him, 
and this reform must have determined, not merely the rela- 
tions of the Dorians among themselves, or to their kings, but 
also that in which they stood to their subjects, the provincials 
of Laconia. This supposition is supported by the tradition 
that the legislator extended his agrarian regulations over 
the whole country. We have already intimated that the 
conquest of Laconia by the Dorians proceeded very gra- 
dually, and it seems to have been reserved for Lycurgus 
finally to settle the relative position of the several classes 
of its inhabitants. The difficulty of this task will appear to 
have been very great, if we recollect that besides having 
to deal with the conquered Achaeans, the Dorians had 
also to satisfy the claims of those foreigners who had 
aided them in their enterprise, and who perhaps demanded 
equal political rights. The legends of Eurypon, Euno- 
mus, and Charilaus seem to support the belief that one of 
the royal houses favoured those claims. The inequality 
of property said to have existed among the Dorians, may 
have been the natural result of the gradual conquest of 
the country, of encroachment and usurpation, some of the 
leading men availing themselves of the successive subjuga- 
tion of Achaean towns for the purpose of enriching them- 
selves at the expense of the ancient proprietors, and to the 
exclusion of their less fortunate brethren. 

If these suppositions are correct, it will not be difficult to 
understand the double aspect which the legislation of Lycur- 

F 3 



102 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. Til. 



gus presents. His objects must have been to maintain the 
sovereignty of Sparta over the rest of Laconia, and to unite 
the Spartans among themselves by the closest ties. It seems 
that all that it was necessary for him to do was to lead Sparta 
back into the ancient track, from which she appears to have 
been drawn partially aside ; to induce his fellow-citizens to 
resume the habits of their forefathers, to sacrifice all artificial 
distinctions, and to live together as brothers in arms, under 
the rigid but equal discipline of a camp. To effect this, it 
was requisite that that which until then had been only an 
undefined usage, should henceforth assume the character of 
strict law, solemnly sanctioned and consecrated by religion. 
In this view of the matter, which we give as a mere hypo- 
thesis, Lycurgus loses a portion of the glory commonly 
attached to his name ; but he still retains the honour of 
having judiciously and successfully employed the simplest and 
most efficacious means which the circumstances of the case 
afforded, for the attainment of a great and arduous object. 
The occasion, then, which called forth his legislation, was, 
in all probability, the danger which threatened the Spartan 
Dorians, while divided among themselves, of losing the pri- 
vileges which raised them above their subjects, the common 
freemen of Laconia ; so that the basis of all his regulations 
was a new distribution of property, to remove the causes of 
discord, and to facilitate the reform of other abuses. This was 
accompanied by an exact determination of political rights, and 
by regulations to bind the higher classes more firmly together. 

According to Plutarch, Lycurgus divided the whole of 
Laconia into 39,000 parcels, of which 9000 were assigned to 
as many Spartan families, and 30,000 to their free subjects. 
In this account, all the shares are supposed to be equal, but 
such a division would have been impracticable, owing to the 
nature of the ground, not to mention that all Laconia was 
not subject to Sparta in the days of Lycurgus. Another 
account stated, that he assigned only 6000 lots to the 



chap. vii. THE LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS. 



103 



Spartans, and that 3000 more were added at the end of the 
first Messenian war; while a third asserts that Lycurgus 
assigned only 4000, and that this number was afterwards 
doubled. The last of these statements seems, for several 
reasons, the most probable ; for it is not likely that the 
number of free Spartan families was much greater than 
4000. It is probable also that the lots assigned to the 
Laconians did not amount to more than 15,000. There is 
reason, moreover, for supposing that the shares were not all 
of equal extent or value ; Aristotle * expressly states that 
the greater part of Laconia belonged to the Spartans, and 
their portion no doubt contained the most fertile and valu- 
able lands. And this, indeed, they required for the mainte- 
nance of their families and numerous slaves. The whole of 
the country, however, was not in private hands ; the state 
remained in possession of a considerable domain, while ano- 
ther part was reserved for the service of the numerous tem- 
ples. It is uncertain how far, in making these agrarian 
regulations, Lycurgus was obliged actually to undertake a 
new division of property, and whether in many places he 
might not retain the ancient land marks which had been 
established by the conquerors immediately after their occu- 
pation of the country. 

The inhabitants of Laconia must be divided into three 
classes : the Dorians of Sparta ; their serfs, the Helots ; and 
the subject people of the provincial districts. The last were 
a mixed race, consisting partly of the conquered Achaeans, 
partly of strangers who had accompanied the Dorians dur- 
ing their invasion, or had been invited by them to supply 
the place of the old inhabitants ; some of them may have 
been Dorians, but their number must have been very small. 
Sparta's policy towards these subjects was to weaken them 
by dispersing them over a great many small townships, 
the number of which is said to have amounted to one 

* Polit. II. 6. 
P 4 



104 HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. vh. 

hundred. They were always viewed with peculiar jealousy 
by the ruling city, and were not permitted to attain any high 
degree of strength or opulence. The provincial land was 
tributary to the state, and its occupants were subjects, 
sharing in none of the political privileges of the Spartans ; 
yet they bore the heaviest share of the public burdens, and 
had to fight the battles, the principal object of which was 
to gratify the pride and ambition of the Spartans. Beyond 
this, they had not much reason to complain ; and, on the 
whole, they may have seen little ground for envying the 
Spartans themselves. Their political dependence was com- 
pensated by their exemption from many irksome restraints 
to which the ruling class was forced to submit. They en- 
joyed undivided possession of the trade and manufacturer of 
the country. It is true, the Spartan constitution being 
adverse to luxuries of every kind, did not allow much scope 
to artificers ; but the public buildings and the festivals of the 
gods must have furnished ample employment. The higher 
as well as the lower arts, which were looked upon as alike de- 
grading to a Spartan, were left to the provincials, many of 
whom distinguished themselves in the annals of Grecian art. 

Very different was the condition of the Helots * ; they 
were persons who had lost their personal liberty, and were 
in all probability the descendants of those Achaeans, who, 
in consequence of their obstinate resistance to the Dorians, 
were reduced by them to slavery. Their lot was the most 
wretched and degrading kind of servitude. They were 
always viewed with suspicion by their masters, as enemies 
who only waited for an opportunity to revolt ; they were 
accordingly placed under the inspection of a vigilant police ; 
and it cannot be denied that atrocious violence was some- 
times used to reduce their strength or to break their spirit. 

* Their name was believed by some to be derived from Helos ("E\os), 
a town in the south of Laconia, which held out resolutely and for a long 
time against the Dorian conquerors (see p. 88.) ; it is more probably, 
however, connected with cup ecu, eAeiV, and signifies men taken in war. 



chap. vii. THE LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS. 105 

They were bound to the soil, and could not be torn from it, 
or sold into another country ; a regulation which must have 
made their lot, hard as it was, bearable in comparison with 
that of the slaves in other parts of Greece, who might be 
sold or dragged from their homes at the pleasure of their 
masters. Some were employed in public works ; others in 
domestic service ; and by zeal and industry they might ob- 
tain their freedom. Their compulsory attendance in the 
camp, and their share in the dangers of war, were sweetened 
by the opportunities of enriching themselves with booty. 
But in all other respects, the treatment of these slaves seems 
to have been adopted with a view to render the distinction 
between the freemen and the Helots as conspicuous and as 
deeply felt by each party as possible. The members of the 
ruling class were held to be profaned by the touch of the 
unfortunate outcasts ; the latter are said to have sometimes 
been forced to make" themselves drunk, that in this state 
they might be exposed to the derision and insults of their 
young lords, as a practical lesson of sobriety. This and 
similar stories may be much exaggerated ; but there can be 
no doubt that the account of the famous Cryptia is, in the 
main, correct. It consisted in this : a commission was given 
every year to a select number of young Spartans to range the 
country in certain directions, secretly and armed with daggers, 
for the purpose of assassinating those Helots, wherever they 
might be found, who by eminent qualities of body or mind 
had excited the jealousy or fear of the government. That 
no scruples of justice or humanity influenced the Spartans in 
their conduct towards the Helots is but too evident, from 
that deed of blood over which Thucydides draws a veil of 
mystery, which only serves to heighten its horror. On one 
occasion, he says, when the weakness of Sparta gave reason 
to dread an insurrection of the Helots, all those whose past 
services seemed to entitle them to claim their emancipation, 
were publicly invited to come forward and receive their 

F 5 



106 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. VII. 



reward. Tne bravest and most deserving presented them- 
selves, and 2000 were selected as the worthiest. They 
joyfully crowned themselves, and went round the temples to 
offer their thanks to the gods ; they were then secretly de- 
spatched, so that the historian could not learn the exact man- 
ner in which the horrible crime was committed. Sometimes, 
however, the government restored Helots to freedom ; but 
it would seem that there were several degrees between 
bondage and the freedom of a Spartan citizen. The treat- 
ment of Helots, moreover, seems to have been different at 
different periods ; and there can be little doubt that, in later 
times, the Spartans were more cruel to their slaves than in 
the earlier ages. 

The servitude of the Helots was the basis on which the 
existence of the Spartans, as a body, rested ; for the districts 
cultivated by the slaves, and their services in the field and 
in the city, afforded the ruling class that leisure which was 
the essential condition of all the Spartan institutions : the 
Helot had to work and toil, while the fruits of his labours 
were enjoyed by the Spartan, and used by him in the service 
of the commonwealth. Among themselves the Spartans 
were all equal, and formed a class which we may term 
noble. In later times, indeed, we find a disparity of rank 
among them, which it is difficult to trace to its origin ; for 
it is uncertain how far the ancient division of the ruling 
class into tribes implied any distinction of rank or privi- 
leges. Wherever the Doric race was established, we find 
them divided into three tribes, just as the Ionian s were 
always divided into four. Thus, three Dorian tribes are 
mentioned, even at the time of the conquest. The tribe of 
the Hylleans (from Hyllus) to which the royal families 
belonged, may have had some precedence in dignity over the 
tribes of the Dymanes and Pamphylians. Besides this 
political division into three tribes, there appears to have 
been a division into four local tribes, probably according to 



chap. VII. THE LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS. 



107 



the villages or hamlets of which the capital was composed. 
As Sparta itself is not mentioned among these four, it per- 
haps constituted the fifth tribe or region. The next sub- 
division of the tribes was that into thirty obae (w€cu), vil- 
lages or districts, though it is uncertain whether these obae 
were a subdivision of the three political, or of the five local 
tribes. The fact that all free Spartans, with the exception 
of the two kings, had equal rights and privileges, constitutes 
Sparta itself a democracy, with two hereditary magistrates 
at its head; but in its relation to the subject towns and 
country it was a rigid aristocracy. 

At Sparta, as in all the ancient republics, the sovereign 
power resided in the assembly of the people, where a de- 
scendant of Heracles had no advantage over a common 
Dorian.* According to a regulation ascribed to Lycurgus, 
though it was no doubt an ancient custom, the assemblies 
were held periodically in a field near the city. The magis- 
trates who convened the people, had the right of proposing 
measures, and the people might either adopt or reject them ; 
but no one, except persons in office, was allowed to express 
an opinion, or propose an amendment, though the latter 
right was for a time assumed by the people, until it was 
formally abolished. The subjects brought before the assem- 
bly must have been few ; its business was probably con- 
fined to the election of magistrates and priests, to questions 
of war and peace, to imposts, treaties, and the like. Other 
subjects must have come before the people very rarely. 

As it cannot be doubted that assemblies of the people had 
been held at Sparta long before the time of Lycurgus, so 
there is the strongest reason to believe, that there, as in all 
the ancient republics, a council of elders, or senate (yepovvia), 
had existed from time immemorial, and that in regard 
to this council, as to the assembly of the people, Lycurgus 
only regulated and defined more accurately that which had 

* In later times we find two assemblies, a greater and a lesser. 
F 6 



108 



HISTORY OP GREECE, chap, vm 



long been customary. The Spartan senate consisted of 
thirty members, corresponding to the thirty obae, two of the 
obae being represented by the two kings, whose twenty- 
eight colleagues were elected by the people, without regard 
to any qualification except age and personal merit. The 
age, before which no one could aspire to obtain a seat in 
the senate, was sixty years; and the senators held their 
office for life, no provision being made to supply their places 
even when they were in a state of decrepitude or dotage. 
They were not subject to any regular responsibility, but 
were liable to punishment if convicted of misconduct. They 
had to prepare the measures which were to be laid before 
the assembly of the people ; and exercised a criminal juris- 
diction, in which, without being confined by any written 
laws, they had power over the lives of their fellow-citizens. 
The exact limits of the power of the senate in the days of 
Lycurgus, cannot be ascertained ; but it must have been more 
extensive than at a later period, when part of the functions 
of the senate were assumed by the ephors, a magistracy 
which reduced the influence of both the senate and the kings 
to comparative insignificance. 

The twenty-eight senators were the colleagues of the 
kings. The royal dignity of Sparta is the more remarkable, 
because it continued to exist at a time when royalty had 
been abolished in all other parts of Greece, and because, 
though resembling the kingly dignity in the heroic ages, 
its power was more tempered and restrained. Most of 
these restrictions, however, seem to have been the conse- 
quences of the growing powers of the ephors, and in the 
time of Lycurgus things may have been very different. 
The origin of the institution of two kings was ascribed in 
the Spartan tradition to the accidental circumstance of 
Aristodemus having left twin sons ; but design had probably 
as great a share in this arrangement as accident, for diarchies 
appear to have been rather common during the latter period 



chap. vn. THE LEGISLATION OF LYCUKGUS. 



109 



of the heroic ages ; and the two kings at Sparta, like the two 
consuls at Rome, may have been instituted in order that the 
one might be a check upon the other. Their power can 
never have been very great. In the senate the voice of a 
king was of no more weight than that of any other senator. 
They had some kind of jurisdiction, which was afterwards 
confined to certain questions of inheritance and legal forms, 
connected with the patriarchal character of the kings. As 
in most ancient states, they also were the high priests of the 
nation, both being priests of Zeus. But the most important 
of all their prerogatives was the command of the armies, 
whence the royal majesty was seen in its greatest lustre in 
times of war. The people, indeed, had the power of decree- 
ing war and peace ; but the kings seem originally to have 
had the uncontrolled direction of all military operations, only 
assisted by a council of war. It was long before any incon- 
venience was felt to arise from their taking the field together 
and sharing the supreme command between them. The 
honours attached to the royal dignity, however, were greater 
than its powers, and the former suffered little diminution 
even after the latter had been considerably reduced. They 
were revered, not only as the chief magistrates, but as con- 
nected with the gods by their descent. They were not dis- 
tinguished from their subjects by pomp and ceremonies, or 
by their dress and mode of living ; but ample provision was 
made for the maintenance of their household, and for a 
species of hospitality which they exercised rather in their 
character of priests than as kings. Besides their demesnes in 
various districts of the country, they received certain pay- 
ments in kind, which enabled them to offer rich sacrifices to 
the gods, and to entertain their friends. At every public 
sacrifice the kings were the most honoured guests ; they 
occupied the foremost place in every assembly, and all rose 
at their approach. In the camp they were guarded by a 
band of a hundred men, and no officer was allowed to enter 



110 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. VII. 



on any undertaking without their express command. Both 
the accession and the decease of a king were celebrated with 
solemn rites and observances, some of which resemble 
Oriental rather than Hellenic customs. 

Little is known of the functions of the inferior magistrates, 
the most important of whom were the ephors, whose name 
and office also occur in other Doric states, and were there- 
fore probably more ancient than Lycurgus, though some 
referred their origin to him, and others even to a later 
period. Their number, five, was perhaps connected with the 
five local tribes or quarters of Sparta. They were elected 
annually, and from the first exercised superintendence and 
jurisdiction over the civil affairs of the Spartans. In the 
institutions of Lycurgus their power seems to have remained 
what it originally was ; their political importance, at all 
events, belongs to a later period, and arose out of the peculiar 
circumstances of the times, which we shall have to relate 
hereafter. 

In the institutions hitherto mentioned, Lycurgus probably 
did no more than modify and correct that which had existed 
among the Dorians from time immemorial ; but there can be 
no doubt that he added much that was new, though it would 
be difficult to draw a line between the two kinds of institu- 
tions. The principle which pervaded the whole Spartan 
constitution — that a citizen was born and lived only for the 
state, that his substance, time, strength, faculties and affec- 
tions were to be dedicated to its service, and that its welfare 
and glory should be his happiness and honour— was certainly 
not introduced by Lycurgus ; it was the necessary result of 
circumstances by which a handful of men were placed in a 
country of which they occupied only a single point, sur- 
rounded by enemies far more numerous than themselves, 
over whom they were nevertheless determined to rule as 
masters. It is probable, however, that Lycurgus may have 
been the first really to comprehend this position of his 



chap. vii. THE LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS. 1 1 1 



countrymen, and to adopt it as a principle of legislation ; 
and that thus he made the Spartans conscious of what they 
had before followed by a kind of instinct. 

The allotment of landed property assigned to every 
Spartan, was an indivisible and inalienable patrimony which 
descended to the eldest son, and, in default of a male heir, 
apparently to the eldest daughter. This fixed number of 
allotments rendered it necessary to prevent the increase of 
the heads of families ; but how this was effected is altogether 
unknown. Notwithstanding the penalties inflicted on celi- 
bacy, and the rewards offered to fathers of numerous families, 
we find the number of Spartans continually decreasing, so 
that the stock of property always remained sufficient for 
the community, and only required to be regulated from time 
to time, so as to prevent excessive wealth on the one hand, 
and extreme poverty on the other. 

The restraint put upon every kind of profitable industry, 
obliged the Spartan to depend entirely upon the produce of 
his land and of the chase, so that he needed little money for 
the support of his household. Hence, when money had long 
been coined in the other parts of Greece, the want of it was 
not felt by the Spartans in the affairs of ordinary life. The 
precious metals were regarded as dangerous, and the posses- 
sion of them was forbidden. Iron, the native produce of 
Laconia, at first in little bars, afterwards in a more con- 
venient form, continued, down to the latest times, to be the 
only legal currency at Sparta.* This restriction, which has 
often been ascribed to Lycurgus, must have been introduced at 
a later time, as the coinage of silver money appears to have 
been unknown to the Greeks for more than a century after 
him. Gold was altogether out of the question, as there was 
extremely little of it in Greece down to the Persian wars. 
It must, however, be observed, that the prohibition of the 

* Some authors relate that leather was applied to the same use. Seneca, 
De Bene/, v. 14. 



112 



HISTOEY OP GREECE. chap, vh. 



precious metals applied only to the Spartans, for the provin- 
cials were not debarred from commerce, nor can such a 
restriction have affected the state itself. This regulation 
must certainly have contributed to preserve the simplicity 
of the ancient manners; but it was unable to check the 
tendency of human nature to hanker after everything which 
is forbidden. Hence, although outward forms were scru- 
pulously observed, it is notorious that in no other Greek 
state were men so avaricious as at Sparta ; and money, for 
which a Spartan had scarcely any use, became to him an 
almost irresistible bait. 

The character of the Spartan system is nowhere more 
conspicuous than in its mode of determining the relations of 
the sexes. The freedom which women enjoyed, and the 
deference paid to them at Sparta, while in other parts of 
Greece they were confined by strict regulations, were 
remnants of the ancient customs described in the Homeric 
poems. The education of young women was conducted with 
a view, not so much to the discharge of domestic and house- 
hold duties, as to the citizens they were to give to the state. 
They were to be the mothers of a robust race, and hence were 
subjected to the same athletic exercises as the harder sex. 
Notwithstanding the freedom enjoyed by women, and their 
exposure in their exercises in a manner which would 
shock the feelings of a modern, we do not find that in 
the sexual relations the Spartans were less pure than any 
other ancient or modern people. The bride was considered 
as a prize to be gained by courage and address, and was 
always supposed to be carried off from the parental roof by 
force or stratagem. After marriage, the women appeared 
much less in public than before ; but, although they were not 
allowed to enjoy much of the society of ^ their husbands, 
they were treated with a respect, and exercised an influence 
which to the rest of Greece seemed extravagant and per- 
nicious. In the latter period of Spartan history, they alone 



chap. vn. THE LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS. 113 



among the Greek women show a dignity of character which 
renders them worthy rivals of the noblest of the Roman 
matrons. 

From his birth every Spartan belonged to the state, which 
decided whether he was likely to prove a useful member of 
the community, and extinguished the life of the sickly or 
deformed infant, which was exposed in a glen of mount 
Taygetus. Up to the age of seven, a boy was left to the 
care of his natural guardians, though not without some 
control to prevent mischievous parental indulgence. At 
the end of his seventh year, he began a long course of public 
discipline, which grew more and more severe as the boy 
approached manhood. Though the elders exercised a more 
or less direct influence over him, his training was under 
the special superintendence of an officer (-aicovoiJLoc) se- 
lected from the men of most approved worth. He divided 
the boys into classes, which were commanded by the most 
distinguished among them. All offences were rigorously 
punished. The whole system of education aimed at nothing 
beyond training men who were to live in the midst of 
difficulty and danger, and who could be safe themselves only 
while they held rule over others. The citizen was to be 
equally ready to command and to obey ; and this system, 
narrow as it was, was carried to such perfection, that it is 
impossible not to admire it. A young Spartan might not 
be able to read or write, nor be possessed of any of those 
qualifications which we deem essential to the character of 
a man ; yet he could run, leap, wrestle, hurl the disc or the 
javelin, and wield every other weapon with vigour, agility, 
and grace. But above all things, he was distinguished for 
the firmness and perseverance with which he endured hard- 
ships and sufferings ; for from his infancy his life was one 
continued trial of patience. One test of this passive forti- 
tude, the CictjuaoTtywctc, was particularly celebrated among 
the ancients. The origin of this is explained as follows : 



114 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



chap. vn. 



from the earliest times human sacrifices had been offered in 
Laconia to Artemis, whose image Orestes was believed to have 
brought from Scythia. These bloody rites, it is said, were 
abolished by Lycurgus, who substituted for it a contest 
little less ferocious, in which the most generous youths, 
standing on the altar, presented themselves to the lash, 
and were sometimes seen to expire under it without a groan. 
This and similar usages, such as the cryptia, prepared the 
Spartan youths for all the hardships of a military life. 

But, although bred in this manner, the Spartan warrior 
was not a stranger to music and poetry. He was taught to 
sing and to play on the flute or lyre ; but the strains to which 
his voice was formed, were either sacred hymns or breathed 
a martial spirit ; and it was because they cherished such 
sentiments that the Homeric poems, if not introduced by 
Lycurgus, became popular among the Spartans at an early 
period. For the same reason, Tyrtaeus was held in high 
honour, while Archilochus was banished because he had 
not been ashamed to record his own flight from the field of 
battle. The mental training of boys consisted chiefly in 
cultivating a moral taste and imparting to them presence 
of mind and promptness of decision ; and hence the Spartans 
became proverbial for ready, pointed, and sententious brevity 
in their ordinary conversation. Modesty, obedience, and 
reverence for age and rank were inculcated more by example 
than by precept, and upon these qualities above all others 
the stability of the commonwealth reposed ; since that respect 
for the laws of his country, which rendered the Spartan 
averse to innovation, was little more than another form of 
the reverence and awe with which in earlier years he had 
regarded the magistrates and the aged. During the interval 
between the age of twenty and thirty, the Spartan was not 
yet permitted to appear in the public assembly, and seems 
to have been chiefly employed in military service in the 
camp or on the frontier. When he had attained the age of 



chap. vii. THE LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS. 115 



full maturity, he was a soldier in time of war, and in 
time of peace enjoyed the leisure which was believed to be 
essential to the dignity of a freeman ; but, in order that he 
might not become unfitted for war, his amusements were the 
palaestra and the chase, from which he rested only at the 
public meals. These public meals, (owcr/na), like many 
other institutions, Sparta had in common with Crete *, though 
they were not entirely the same in the two countries. The 
sixtieth year closed the military age, and the period which 
followed was one of peaceful repose, though not of wearisome 
inaction : it was cheered by respect and authority, and was 
employed either in the direction of public affairs, or in the 
superintendence of the young. 

The institutions of Sparta had all more or less a warlike 
tendency, and this one-sidedness is justly censured even by 
their admirers. A prominent feature of the Spartan cha- 
racter was caution ; and this, together with their observance 
of the maxim not to pursue a routed enemy farther than 
was necessary for securing the victory, may sometimes have 
supplied the place of humanity and softened the ferocity of 
warfare. The same end was gained by the regulation that, 
during certain religious festivals, there should be a cessation 
from all hostilities. War seems to have been the element in 
which a Spartan breathed most freely and enjoyed the 
fullest consciousness of his existence ; he dressed his hair and 
crowned himself for a battle as others did for a feast ; and 
advanced to the mortal struggle with a mind as calm and 
cheerful as that with which he commenced a contest for a 
prize at the public games. 

The warlike spirit of the Spartans was maintained by their 
ancient system of tactics. The main strength of the army 
consisted in its heavy-armed infantry, the only mode of 
service which was thought worthy of a free Spartan. Hence 



* Comp. p. 95. 



116 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. Vii. 



little value was set upon the cavalry, which in fact never 
acquired any great efficacy. Three hundred picked young 
men indeed who served as the king's body-guard, bore the 
name of horsemen as a title of honour ; but in battle they 
fought on foot, using their horses only on the march and in 
executing the king's commands. The Spartans, moreover, 
always shrank from besieging a fortified town, and the sea 
was never a congenial element to the spirit of their warfare. 
At sea the Helots were mostly employed, as on land they 
formed the light-armed infantry or followed their masters in 
the capacity of menial servants. Promptness and punctu- 
ality in the execution of the various evolutions and move- 
ments and in their harmonious combinations, distinguished 
the Spartan armies at all times ; and these movements were 
greatly facilitated by the warlike dance, called the Pyrrhic, 
in which the Spartan youths were habitually exercised. 
The tidings of an important victory were celebrated with 
the sacrifice of a cock, and their bearer was rewarded with 
a dish of meat from the table of the ephors. During the 
most brilliant period of Spartan history, the warrior's watch- 
word was " victory or death ; " and the coward who saved 
his life by flight, was degraded from all the privileges of 
society, and became a butt for public scorn and insult* 

It was no doubt felt from an early period, that the security 
of the Spartan constitution depended, not on its being written 
on stone or parchment, but on the national feeling in which 
it lived ; and hence Lycurgus is said to have forbidden the 
use of written laws. It was, perhaps, chiefly with the view 
of preserving this feeling in its full strength and purity, that 
citizens were not allowed to go abroad without leave of the 
magistrates, and that the presence of foreigners at Sparta 
was discouraged; but, previously to the rivalry between 
Athens and Sparta, this latter regulation appears to have 
been rarely enforced, and distinguished foreigners were not 
only permitted, but even invited, to sojourn at Sparta. 



chap. vn. THE LEGISLATION OF LYCURGUS. 



117 



From all that lias been said about the Spartan institutions 
it is clear, that the greater part of them were only a con- 
tinuation of the Hellenic, and especially the Doric, institu- 
tions, such as they existed in the heroic ages. Among the 
Dorians this Hellenic character maintained itself in com- 
parative purity, in consequence of the circumstances by 
which they were surrounded in Peloponnesus after the 
conquest ; nay, in many points it may even have become 
more marked and developed, and all that a legislator like 
Lycurgus had to do, was to arrange and regulate that which 
previously had been only customary. 



118 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



chap. vni. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

THE MESSENIAN WARS AND AFFAIRS OF SPARTA DOWN TO THE SIXTH 
CENTURY BEFORE CHRIST. 

About the first Olympiad, b. c. 77 6, all Laconia was subdued 
and tranquil. The Spartans, united and made strong by the 
institutions of Lycurgus, and long accustomed to war, were 
perhaps impatient for fresh enterprises. Their first under- 
taking seems to have been directed against Arcadia ; but the 
account of the expedition of king Sous against the Arcadian 
town of Cleitor*, is not supported by sufficient authority. 
Jealousy appears to have soon sprung up between Sparta and 
Argos. Originally, the whole of the eastern coast of Laconia, 
as far as Cape Malea, belonged to Argos, and bore the name of 
Cynuria. Of this district the Spartans had made themselves 
masters in the reign of Echestratus, the son of Agis, and 
this led to a series of hostilities between the two states. 
Charilaus and Meander, joined by the Dryopes of Asine, 
made inroads into the Argive territory; and Charilaus, 
deceived by an oracle which seemed to promise the conquest 
of the important town of Tegea, marched into Arcadia also ; 
but he was defeated, and the captured Spartans were 
obliged to serve as slaves in the chains which they had 
brought with them for the Tegeatans.f The struggle with 
them was often renewed, but always with ill success. 

An easier and more inviting conquest, however, offered 
itself to them in the west. It was probably not without 
ealousy and envy that the Dorians of Laconia observed that 
Messenia, which had fallen to the lot of Cresphontes and his 
followers, was a much fairer, country than their own, and 



* Plut. Lycurg. 2. 



f Herod, i. 65. &c. ; Paus. in. 3. §. 5. 



CHAP, vra, 



THE MESSENIAN WARS. 



119 



under the influence of such feelings a pretext for war is 
easily found. The Dorians in Messenia, moreover, had 
become a very different people from their kinsmen in Laconia. 
The Achaeans in Messenia seem to have submitted without 
much resistance to their new sovereigns, and the kings 
appear to have adopted a wise and moderate policy towards 
the vanquished. Cresphontes himself, who made Steny- 
cleros his capital, was thwarted in his plan to amalgamate 
the Dorians and Achaeans into one people, by a conspiracy 
among the Dorians, who are said to have cut him off with 
his whole family except one son. This son Aepytus fled 
into Arcadia ; but at a riper age, with the assistance of other 
Heracleid princes, he recovered his hereditary throne, and 
now carried out the generous policy of his father with better 
success. He seems to have abolished all distinctions between 
the Dorians and the Messenian commonalty, and to have 
maintained the ancient religious and political institutions of 
the country, whereby he attached the original population to 
himself and his house. His successors, the Aepytids, followed 
the same policy ; thus the country prospered, the arts of 
peace flourished, and no class of the people aimed at ruling 
over the others, whence, perhaps, in military skill the 
Messenians were inferior to the Spartans. 

In the struggle which soon ensued, the Spartans charged 
the Messenians with having been the aggressors, and the 
Messenians retorted the charge ; but it is probable that the 
Spartans were only too anxious to obtain a fair pretence for 
directing their arms against their neighbours. The story of 
the origin of the quarrel runs thus : — In the reign of Teleclus, 
the seventh king from Agis, the Spartans sent a company of 
virgins to celebrate a festival at the temple of Artemis 
Limnatis, on the confines of the two countries. The 
temple was a sanctuary common to both nations, and 
Teleclus accompanied the procession. Some Messenians 
offered violence to the maidens, and a fray arose, in which 



120 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. VIII. 



the king himself was slain. Such is the Spartan tale; 
whereas the Messenians related, that Teleclus had laid a plot 
to assassinate some of the noblest Messenian citizens at the 
festival, and that for this purpose he had disguised a band 
of Spartans as maidens with daggers hidden under their 
dresses ; but the plot being detected, both the king and his 
followers fell by the hands of their intended victims. The 
Spartans, conscious of their king's guilt, made no demand of 
reparation. 

The grudge arising from this affair was scarcely healed, 
when the wrongs and the revenge of a private man kindled 
a fatal war between the two nations. Polychares, a Messe- 
nian of great note, possessed some cattle for which he had 
no pasture, and contracted with a Spartan, named Euaephnus, 
to feed them on the land of the latter. Euaephnus sold 
both the cattle and the herdsmen in one of the Laconian 
ports, and went to Polychares with a plausible tale of pirates 
who had landed and carried them all off. At this very mo- 
ment, however, one of the herdsmen who had made his escape, 
came back to his master and related the truth. Euaephnus, 
overwhelmed with shame, entreated Polychares to be satisfied 
with the price of the oxen, and to send his son along with him 
to receive it. The Messenian good-naturedly consented, and 
the youth went with Euaephnus ; but when they had crossed 
the Laconian frontier, the Spartan, instead of making resti- 
tution, killed his companion. The injured father first sought 
redress at Sparta ; but, finding the kings and ephors deaf to 
his complaints, he took his revenge into his own hands, way- 
laid passengers on the border, and spared no Lacedaemonian 
that fell into his power. The Spartans now demanded the 
surrender of Polychares. Androcles, one of the Messenian 
kings, was willing to give up Polychares ; but Antiochus, 
the other, refused to comply with the demand. A bloody 
contest ensued in Messenia between the two opposite parties ; 
Androcles was slain, and his children fled to Sparta. An- 



chap. viii. THE MESSENIAN WARS. 



121 



tiochus, now sole king, sent envoys to Sparta proposing to 
have the dispute decided by some impartial tribunal. The 
Spartans made no reply, but silently determined to settle 
the matter by force. Meantime Antiochus died ; and, in the 
beginning of the reign of his successor Euphaes, b. c. 743, 
the Spartans bound themselves by an oath not to cease war- 
ring against Messenia until the country should be made their 
own by the right of conquest. Soon afterwards they crossed 
the border without having declared war, and under the 
command of Alcamenes marched against the fortified town of 
Amphea. The Messenians were taken by surprise, and the 
invaders massacred the defenceless inhabitants. There the 
Spartans established themselves, as in a strong post from 
which they might at all times attack their enemies. 

Such is the story about the beginning of the first Messenian 
war, which is said to have lasted for nineteen years, from 
B.C. 743 to 724, and of which we have a tolerably minute 
accouL -t in Pausanias. This author seems to have derived 
his information mainly from Myron of Priene, who probably 
lived after the time of Alexander the Great, and wrote 
a history of the first Messenian war, which does not appear, 
however, to be very trustworthy. That the first, as well as 
the second, Messenian war is a real historical event cannot 
be doubted, though the simple facts have been embellished 
by ancient popular poetry, which kept alive in the conquered 
race the hope of better days. The account of the second 
Messenian war in Pausanias is based upon the poetical 
history of Phianus, of Bene in Crete, and in its details is 
certainly not more authentic than that of the first. 

When Euphaes, the king of the Messenians, heard of 
the surprise of Amphea, he trained his people in military 
exercises ; but, not venturing to take the field against the 
enemy, the Messenians sheltered themselves behind the 
walls of their towns, which the Spartans were unable to 
force. But while the Spartans, in their sallies from Amphea 



122 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAF. VIII; 



into the heart of the country, carried away the fruit, corn, 
cattle, and slaves, the Messenians were not inactive, but 
made incursions into Laconia and infested its coasts. At 
length, in the fourth year of the war, when Euphaes thought 
his men sufficiently trained in arms, he took the field. The 
indignation of the Messenians had risen to the highest pitch, 
but still the king did not venture to meet the Spartans on 
even ground, and after a few skirmishes, the armies parted 
as they had met. The next year, a great battle is said to 
have been fought, in which the Spartans were assisted by 
Cretan archers and by the Dryopes whom the Argives had ex- 
pelled from Asine. But the victory again remained undecided. 
The Messenians, exhausted by the necessity of keeping their 
towns constantly garrisoned, whereby the husbandmen were 
drawn away from their occupations, were also afflicted by 
diseases such as commonly attend upon war and scarcity ; 
and they now resolved to collect their forces in an impreg- 
nable hold, where they might keep the enemy in check and 
cover the country which lay behind them. With this view 
they enlarged the small town on the summit of the lofty rock 
of Ithome on the river Pamisus, which commanded the plain 
of Stenycleros. While the work of extension and fortifica- 
tion was going on, the king sent to Delphi to consult the 
oracle. The god declared that an unsullied virgin of the 
blood of Aepytus, selected by lot, must be sacrificed to the 
gods below. When the oracle became known, all the 
maidens of the royal family immediately drew lots, and the 
result was that a daughter of Lyciscus was to be the victim. 
But during an investigation to ascertain whether she was 
really a descendant of Aepytus, her father fled with her to 
Sparta. Hereupon Aristodemus, an Aepytid also, freely 
offered his own daughter, although she was already betrothed 
and the day for her marriage fixed. Her lover, after many 
useless remonstrances, alleged that the maid would not be 
an unsullied victim, for that she was about to become a 



CHAP. YIIT. 



THE MESSEXIAN WARS. 



123 



mother. Aristodemus, enraged at this information; killed his 
daughter with his own hand and proved her innocence. 
But the soothsayer declared that a murder was not a sacri- 
fice, and that a fresh victim must be sought. The king, 
however, who was a friend of the lover, persuaded the 
people that the oracle had been duly obeyed, and the event 
was celebrated with joy and feasting. 

The report of this awful deed discouraged the Spartans, 
and it was not till the sixth year after Ithome had been 
fortified that their king Theopompus led an army against it. 
Without waiting for the arrival of his allies, he offered 
battle ; but as before, although the fight lasted till nightfall, 
no victory was gained. Euphaes himself fell while attacking 
Theopompus, and died soon after of his wounds, without 
leaving an heir to the throne. Aristodemus, who was now 
elected by the people to succeed him, won the hearts of all 
by his wise government, and gained over the Arcadians as 
his allies. The war was continued with petty inroads and 
ravages which were made every year at the harvest season. 

In the fifth year of the reign of Aristodemus a pitched 
battle was again fought at the foot of mount Ithome, in 
which the Lacedaemonians and the Corinthians, their allies, 
were defeated by the Messenians. Their spirit now began 
to sink, and they sought advice from Delphi. The god pro- 
mised success to stratagems, and Sparta tried many in vain. 
Aristodemus, on the other hand, was warned to beware of 
Spartan cunning ; other advice brought from Delphi was so 
obscure that it could not be understood. Meantime the 
twentieth year of the war had commenced when Apollo 
declared to the Messenians, that their land should belong to 
the nation which should first dedicate a hundred tripods at 
the altar of Zeus in Ithome. While they were preparing the 
offering, a Spartan, who had heard of the oracle, stole into 
the temple by night and placed a hundred small earthen 
tripods round the altar. Aristodemus himself was dismayed 

g 2 



124 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. VIII. 



by many visible signs of impending ruin, and at length 
understood the obscure expressions of the oracle. His 
daughter, too, appeared to him in a dream ; and, showing her 
wounds, took away his arms and adorned him, as for his 
obsequies, with a golden crown and a white robe. Thus 
certain that his end was near at hand, and that he could not 
avert the fate of his country, he slew himself at his daughters 
tomb. The Messenians, who had now lost their hopes, but 
not their courage, chose Damis for their commander in the 
war, and some time afterwards made a vigorous sally from 
Ithome ; but their bravest leaders fell, and at length they fled 
from the fortress, leaving their rich fields in the possession 
of the conquerors. Thus ended the first Messenian war, in 
b. c. 724. 

Many of the unfortunate Messenians sought and found 
refuge in foreign lands, and the priestly families withdrew 
to Eleusis ; but the bulk of the people dispersed from Ithome 
to the districts whence they had come. Ithome was razed 
to the ground, and the Spartans soon made themselves 
masters of all the other Messenian towns and disposed of 
the country at their pleasure. The Dryopes were rewarded 
for their assistance with a portion of the coast of Messenia, 
where they founded a new A sine. The condition of the 
subject Messenians, who were allowed to dwell on their 
former estates as labourers of their new lords, was that of 
serfs ; like the Helots in Laconia, they were obliged to pay 
to their masters half the produce of their fields. Tyrtaeus, 
in the third generation after these events, reminds the Spartans 
that their ancestors had forced the Messenians to stoop like 
asses under wearisome burdens. 

The conquest of Messenia contributed more than any other 
event towards determining the character and subsequent 
history of Sparta. The additional territory was divided 
among the Spartans ; but it would seem that those who re- 
ceived lands were not the old Spartan citizens, but Laconians 



CHAP. VIII. 



THE MESSENIAN WARS. 



125 



who were now for the first time admitted to the franchise, 
since it would appear that, during the war, marriages between 
Spartans and Laconians had, contrary to earlier usage, been 
legalised. These new citizens, however, were probably not 
raised to a footing of equality with the old ones, and hence 
their discontent, which led many of them to emigrate and 
found the colony of Tarentum in southern Italy, b. c. 708.* 
In later times we find all the Spartan citizens divided into 
two classes, the Equals (ojiolol) and the Inferiors (Wo- 
fxetoveg) ; and it is not impossible, that this distinction arose 
at the time when Laconian subjects were admitted to the 
franchise, which seems to have entitled them to vote in the 
general assembly, but not in the election of the senate, which 
appears to have been reserved for a more select assembly 
(37 fXLKpa eKKXrjala). 

This supposition of the enlargement and consequent 
graduation of the franchise, may also serve to reconcile the 
different accounts of the origin of the ephoralty, which is 
ascribed by some to Lycurgus, whom later generations 
naturally loved to regard as the founder of all their political 
institutions, while others, apparently with better reason, 
describe the ephoralty as an innovation introduced by king 
Theopompus, the colleague of Polydorus. The Spartan 
kings from motives of policy were always favourable to an 
extension of the franchise, and this was apparently the 
natural tendency of the ephoralty also. Theopompus, there- 
fore, not being able to foresee the character which the new 
magistracy afterwards assumed, may have regarded it at 

* According to the common story, the founders of Tarentum were the 
offspring of an illicit connection between the wives of the soldiers engaged 
in Messenia and young Spartans who had remained at home. After the 
conquest of Messenia, the youths thus born out of legal wedlock are said 
to have threatened the safety of Sparta by conspiring with the Helots, in 
consequence of which the government induced them to emigrate and seek 
a new home. They are called Parthenii, and, under the guidance of Pha- 
lanthus, founded Tarentum. Strab. vi. p. 278. foil. ; Athen. vi. p. 271. 

G 3 



126 



HISTOEY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. VIIL 



first as a useful ally, though, by instituting it he sacrificed 
a considerable part of the royal prerogative. The college of 
the ephors (overseers) consisted at all times of five members, 
and exercised the civil jurisdiction, while the senate was the 
supreme court in criminal cases. Their general super- 
intendence over the execution of the laws must have brought 
them into frequent collision with the kings, and might easily 
enable a dexterous and enterprising ephor to raise his 
power above that of the kings themselves. It may have 
been by virtue of this that the college exacted an oath from 
the kings that they would govern according to law, while 
they bound themselves and the nation only to a conditional 
obedience. Another prerogative of the ephors was that, at 
the end of every eight years, they might suspend the func- 
tions of the kings. The ceremonies observed on such occa- 
sions, however, show that this was a religious, rather than a 
political measure, and that on such occasions the ephors 
acted merely as the executors of the divine will, being 
guided by the suggestions of certain heavenly signs. If the 
gods were found to be displeased with a king, the ephors 
forthwith interdicted him from the discharge of his office, 
and he could be restored only by the intervention of an 
oracle. In later times the ephors also acquired the right of 
convoking the assembly of the people, of laying measures 
before it, and of acting in its name ; and this character of 
representatives of the people enabled them in many ways to 
encroach on the royal prerogatives, and to draw the whole 
government of the state into their hands. Whether they 
acquired this power during an accidental absence of the 
kings in time of war, or whether the admission of new 
citizens to the franchise brought about the change in their 
relation to the senate and kings, cannot be decided with any 
degree of certainty. The power of the ephors was demo- 
cratical in its form, and tyrannical in extent, never having 
been accurately defined ; whence its limits probably varied 



CHAP. VIII. 



THE MESSENIAN WARS. 



127 



with the character of the men who held it and with the cir- 
cumstances of the times. The ephors, moreover, not only 
possessed the substance of supreme power, but also assumed 
its outward signs ; thus the royal dignity was forced on all 
occasions to bow to them ; and as they could control the pro- 
ceedings of the kings, could fine them for slight offences at 
their discretion, and could even throw them into prison, so 
they alone among the Spartans kept their seats while the 
kings were passing. But notwithstanding all this, the 
kingly station, even when the power of the ephors was at 
its height, continued to confer important prerogatives and 
means of extensive influence. 

During the first Messenian war, Argos seized the oppor- 
tunity of recovering the country of Cynuria from Sparta. 
The plan succeeded, and Argos became the mistress, not only 
of the eastern coast of Laconia as far as cape Malea, but 
even of the island of Cythera. These conquests seem to 
have been made in the reign of Pheidon, a Heracleid king of 
Argos, who broke through all the restraints which had been 
put upon his power, and deprived the Eleans of their pre- 
sidency at the Olympic games. His brother Caranus is said 
to have founded a little kingdom in the north of Greece, 
which became the nucleus of the Macedonian monarchy. 
Pheidon introduced a new system of weights and measures, 
and established a mint in Aegina., which formed part of his 
dominions. After his death, Argos seems to have been 
deserted by its good fortune ; for his conquests were lost, and 
Sparta ruled over the south of Peloponnesus from the eastern 
to the western coast. 

But in the mean time a new generation sprang up in 
Messenia, which, while groaning under a degrading yoke., 
remembered nothing of the evils of the war which their 
fathers had waged, but heard of their heroic deeds. Many 
also who had been born in exile, longed to recover their 
patrimony. While all hearts were thus full, and all spirits 



128 



HISTORY OF GEEECE. 



CHAP. Till. 



roused, it only required one man to come forward as the 
champion of the oppressed, and this man appeared in the 
person of Aristomenes. He was of noble descent, like 
Aristodemus the hero of the first Messenian war, whom in 
strength and courage he even surpassed. He cheered the 
hopes of the exiles, fanned the indignation of his enslaved 
countrymen, and solicited the aid of foreign cities. Argos 
and Arcadia were more than ever hostile to Sparta, and Elis 
too was willing to assist in the deliverance of Messenia. 
Under these circumstances the second Messenian war broke 
out, in b. c. 685. 

From Andania, his birthplace in the Messenian highlands, 
Aristomenes began his attacks, penetrating as far as the 
plains of Stenycleros, and the first battle was fought before 
any succours had come from abroad. Although he did not 
gain a decisive victory, yet his valour struck fear into his 
enemies. His countrymen offered him the crown ; but he 
declined the honour, and contented himself with the supreme 
command of the Messenians. In order to terrify the Lace- 
daemonians, he one night crossed the mountains, went to 
Sparta, and fixed a shield which he had taken in battle, 
against the temple of Athena Chalcioecos, with an inscrip- 
tion stating that Aristomenes dedicated it to the goddess as 
a sign of his victory over the Spartans. Such an adventure 
is not altogether impossible, considering that Sparta was an 
open city, and that it was forbidden by law to light the city 
at night.* The Spartans seeing that they had no common 
enemy to contend with, sent to Delphi for advice. The god 
bade them seek an Athenian counsellor. No connection 
appears to have existed between Athens and Sparta from 
the most ancient times ; but the town of Aphidnae in the 
north of Attica, whence the Dioscuri are said to have carried 
back their sister Helen, now sent Tyrtaeus, a martial poet. 



* Hut Lycurg. 1 2 ; Inst. Lac. 3. 



CHAP. VIII. 



THE MESSEXIAN WARS. 



129 



to the aid of Sparta.* Contradictory as the statements about 
Tyrtaeus are, it is nevertheless certain, that by his poetry he 
revived the spirit of the Spartans, and that he came from 
Attica. But what led him to devote his muse to the service 
of Sparta is doubtful ; though it may possibly have been 
owing to the mythical connection between the Spartan 
Dioscuri and Aphidnae ; for Aphidnus, the founder of the 
town, was said to have adopted Helen's brothers as his sons ; 
hence the Aphidnaeans, induced by a feeling of kindred, 
may have sent Tyrtaeus to aid the Spartans either with his 
arm or with his voice. 

The Spartans were also joined by auxiliaries from Corinth 
and Lepreum in Triphylia, and by a few ships from the 
island of Samos. The Messenians, on the other hand, were 
re-inforced by their exiled countrymen, and by allies from 
Sicyon, Argos, Arcadia, and Elis ; and as a counterpoise to 
the influence exercised by Tyrtaeus on the Spartans, the 
Messenians were cheered by the prophecies of their sooth- 
sayer Theocles. A great battle was fought in the plain of 
Stenycleros, where Aristomenes broke the Spartan forces 
and routed the enemy. Unmindful of the warnings of 
the soothsayer, he pursued the fugitives too far and 
lost his shield, which was carried off by an invisible 
hand. But Messenia was freed for a time from her enemies, 
and Aristomenes on his return to Andania was received with 
unbounded enthusiasm as the deliverer of his country. His 
shield he afterwards recovered in the cave of Trophonius at 
Lebadea, into which he descended by the command of Apollo. 
On his return from Lebadea, he again acted on the offensive, 
and with the suddenness of lightning fell upon the towns 
and villages of the Laconians. With a chosen band of com- 

* Others call Tyrtaeus a Milesian or Spartan. The witty Athenians 
ridiculed the Spartans, by saying that they had sent them a lame school- 
master as a counsellor. Paus. vm. 15. § 3. The story about Tyrtaeus is 
almost as mythical as that of Aristomenes. 

G 5 



130 



HISTOKY OF GREECE. 



chap, vim 



panions lie plundered Pharae, put to flight the Spartan king 
Anaxander who came to its relief, and was only stopped in 
his progress by an accidental wound. After this was cured, 
he planned an attack on Sparta itself, from which however 
he was deterred by the Dioscuri and their sister Helen, who 
appeared to him in a dream. But he did not allow himself 
to be prevented from making inroads into Laconia. On one 
occasion he carried off a number of maidens who were cele- 
brating with festive dances a solemnity of Artemis at 
Caryae. He protected them, however, from the violence of 
his companions, and retored them for a heavy ransom to 
their kinsmen. At Aegila he himself fell into the hands of 
the women who were celebrating the rites of Demeter ; but 
in the night he escaped, either by his own courage and 
strength, or through the compassion of the priestess. 

In the third year of the war, Sparta again prepared for 
battle, but she now had recourse to treacherous means. Gn 
this occasion the Messenians were assisted only by the 
Arcadian Aristocrates, who was induced by Spartan bribes 
to draw off his men in the heat of the battle, and leave his 
allies to their fate. On his retreat the Messenians found 
themselves surrounded on all sides by a superior force, and 
many of them were slain. Aristomenes assembled the 
survivors at Andania, and advised them to concentrate their 
strength in one place, as their ancestors had done. As 
Ithome was probably in the hands of the enemy, they chose 
Mount Eira, on the frontiers of Triphylia. There they forti- 
fied themselves, while the Spartans, masters of nearly the 
whole country, lay encamped at the foot of Eira, hoping 
soon to reduce it by force or famine. But Aristomenes 
continued to sally forth in defiance of the besiegers, and 
brought back booty into the fortress. The Laconians now 
determined to change the surrounding country into a desert, 
until the enemy should be compelled to surrender by famine. 
The opposition of the owners of the land, who by this 



CHAP. VIII, 



THE MESSENIAN WARS. 



131 



measure became themselves impoverished, was overcome by 
Tyrtaeus, who impressed on their minds the blessings of 
concord and of obedience to the laws. 

Aristomenes, emboldened by his success, one night went 
as far as Amyclae, and returned laden with booty before 
sunrise. In a second inroad he was less successful ; the 
Spartans were better prepared, and his little band was surr 
rounded by their army commanded by both kings. Aris- 
tomenes long kept his enemies at bay, until he was stunned 
by a stone and taken prisoner with fifty of his companions. 
All were condemned, like the vilest malefactors, to be thrown 
down from a high rock into a pit called the Ceadas. Aris- 
tomenes alone came to the ground unhurt ; the rest were 
dashed to pieces by the fall. He saw no means of escape, 
however, and prepared himself for death ; but on the third 
day a sound caught his ear, and, uncovering his face, he 
perceived that a fox had found its way into the pit through a 
passage by which he might escape. He awaited the animal's 
approach, caught hold of its tail, and, guided by it as it 
struggled to escape, he crept on till he came to an opening 
in the rock. The next day he was again at Eira. * It would 
lead us too far to relate in detail the many other wonderful 
adventures which are assigned to the hero ; how he cut to 
pieces a Corinthian army on its march to join the Spartans ; 
how, being taken by a band of Cretan archers, he broke his 
bonds and escaped. Thrice he offered to Zeus Ithomates 
the sacrifice called Hecatomphonia, because it was reserved 
for the warrior who had slain a hecatomb of foes. But he 
had provoked, it is said, the anger of the Dioscuri by coun- 
terfeiting their appearance and disturbing with bloodshed 
a festival celebrated by the Spartans in their honour. The 
gods accordingly turned against Messenia. The siege of 
Eira lasted till the eleventh year, when a portent indicated 

* The fox, it must be observed, was the symbol of Messenia. Pans. iv. 
6. § 4, 32. §. 5. 

G 6 



132 



HISTOKY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. VIII. 



that the end of the contest was approaching and that the 
Messenians were about to be conquered. An oracle had 
declared that, when a goat or a wild fig-tree* should 
drink the water of the Neda, the destruction of Messenia 
would be at hand. The Messenians tried to prevent their 
goats from approaching the Neda ; but a wild fig-tree, which 
overhung the stream, at length stretched its boughs down to 
the water, and when Theocles saw this, he knew that the 
oracle was accomplished, and that the end of Messenia was 
approaching. 

The will of the gods was accomplished by treachery and 
female weakness. A Spartan herdsman had gone over to 
the enemy with his master's cattle ; and one day while 
feeding his flocks on the banks of the Neda, he was seen by 
a Messenian woman who admitted him into her house while 
her husband was guarding the citadel. One night the 
husband returned home and was overheard by the herdsman, 
while he was relating to his wife the cause of his coming 
home. The herdsman immediately determined to make the 
best use of his information, and, as a means of obtaining 
forgiveness and favour, communicate it to his master, who 
happened to command the Spartan army at Eira. Aris- 
tomenes was ill of his wounds, and being unable to make his 
usual rounds at night, the sentinels neglected their duty, 
and left their stations. The Spartans now under the herds- 
man's guidance scaled the walls of the fortress, and before 
the alarm was gi ven were already within. The Messenians 
with Aristomenes at their head made the assailants pay 
dearly for every inch of ground they gained. Even the 
women took part in the conflict. But it was useless to fight 
against destiny. A thunderstorm raging during the contest 
sounded to the Messenians like the voice of the angry deity. 
The struggle was nevertheless continued for three days and 

* The Greek work is rpdyos, which, in the Messenian dialect, signified 
a goat and a wild fig-tree. 



CHAP. VIII. 



THE MESSENIAN WAKS. 



133 



nights in the streets and open places of Eira, until Theocles, 
after having advised Aristomenes to desist from the hopeless 
struggle, rushed into the thickest of the fight that he might 
not survive his country's fall. Aristomenes rallied his men 
around him, bade them form themselves into a hollow square 
inclosing their wives and children, and advancing towards 
the enemy, by his gestures demanded a free passage. The 
Spartans, fearing to drive their enemy to extremities, opened 
a road through their ranks and allowed the Messenians to 
depart. The unfortunate men turned their steps towards 
Arcadia, where they were hospitably received. The faithful 
Arcadians were willing even to share their lands with the 
exiles ; but Aristomenes was bent on a new enterprise and 
meditated an expedition against Sparta itself, with 500 
Messenians and 300 Arcadians. This design, however, 
was betrayed by the faithless Aristocrates, whose cowardly 
conduct was now proved by an intercepted letter from the 
Spartan king, who thanked him for his past and present 
services. When the assembly of the Arcadian people learned 
this, they stoned the traitor to death. After this disappoint- 
ment, fifty of the exiles, with a kinsman of Aristomenes at 
their head, crossed the border, fell upon the Spartans, and 
died sword in hand in the land of their fathers. 

Thus ended the second Messenian war, which had lasted for 
seventeen years, from B.C. 685 to 668 ; on the termination of 
it, all the Messenians who remained in their country were 
degraded to the rank of Helots ; but most of the people pro- 
bably emigrated. The inhabitants of Pylos and Methone 
sailed to Cyllene the Elean port, and Methone was given by 
the Spartans to the Nauplians, whom the Argives had expelled 
from their own town. The Messenians, on their arrival in 
Elis, begged Aristomenes to lead them to a new country ; 
but his mind being bent upon continuing the war against 
Sparta, he sent them his two sons. Under these guides a 
band of Messenians sailed to Rhegium in Italy, where they 



134 



HISTORY OF GKEECE. chap. vin. 



found some of their kinsmen who had settled there at the 
end of the former war. Afterwards they made themselves 
masters of the town of Zancle, and named it Messene (the 
modern Messina). 

Aristomenes is said to have gone to Delphi, where the 
Pythia was at that very time advising Damagetus, the ruler 
of lalysos in Rhodes, to marry the daughter of the most 
illustrious among the Greeks. He accordingly became the 
son-in-law of Aristomenes, who was taken by him to Rhodes, 
where, after his death, he was honoured with a splendid 
monument and heroic honours. According to another tra- 
dition, Aristomenes was captured by the Lacedaemonians, 
who on opening his breast found his heart covered with 
hair.* 

The yoke appeared now to be fixed on the neck of Messenia 
for ever, and henceforth Sparta continued to rise towards 
undisputed pre-eminence in Peloponnesus and throughout 
Greece. She was now in a position to reward her friends, 
humble her rivals, and punish her enemies. Soon after- 
wards she stepped in to decide an ancient quarrel between 
Elis and Pisa respecting the presidency at the Olympic 
games, and decided in favour of the former. The old contest 
between Sparta and Tegea, from which Sparta had hitherto 
reaped only shame, was now brought to a successful termi- 
nation. About the middle of the sixth century B.C., an 
oracle bade the Spartans bring the bones of Orestes, the son 
of Agamemnon, to Sparta ; and another oracle directed them 
to search for the relics at Tegea. Some gigantic remains 
were accordingly dug up there and carried away. Tegea, 
having thus lost its palladium, fell and became a dependent 
ally of Sparta. Argos was a more formidable rival, and 
could ill brook the loss of Cynuria ; but the submission of 
that district was finally secured by Sparta, about the same 



* Plut. Be Herod. Malig. 2. ; Plin. Hist. Nat. xi. 70. 



CHAP. VIII. 



THE MESSENIAN WARS. 



135 



time that Tegea was compelled to yield. The fame of 
Sparta now spread so far, that even Croesus, the great king 
of Lydia, sent ambassadors to court her alliance. Sparta 
willingly entered into an alliance with him, and would, per- 
haps, have assisted him against Cyrus, had not his sudden 
ruin frustrated her intentions. 



136 HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. ix. 



CHAPTER IX. 

NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 

The migrations and conquests which we have hitherto de- 
scribed, produced a variety of changes in Greece itself and 
led to the establishment of numerous colonies abroad. The 
changes brought about in Greece, consisted partly of modi- 
fications of ancient national institutions, and partly of politi- 
cal reforms or revolutions. 

The Greeks were at all times united by the bonds of their 
common language and religion; in the Trojan expedition 
alone they are said to have been also united under one com- 
mander and in a common enterprise; but this was only 
transitory, and was not followed by any political conse- 
quences, the several tribes being enabled to balance one an- 
other and to preserve their independence. There existed, 
however, partial associations for religious and political pur- 
poses, some of which, in the course of time, assumed the ap- 
pearance of national associations or confederacies. Of these 
associations, the principal class was that designated by the 
Greek term Amphictiony.* It was believed to have derived 
its name from Amphictyon, the son of Deucalion, who founded 
the most celebrated confederacy of this kind ; but this ac- 
count is as mythical as a hundred others of the same nature, 
and the name probably signifies a local union among a num- 
ber of places or tribes, with a common centre, which was 
always a religious one, such as a temple, at which the peri- 
odical meetings for the celebration of a common worship 
were held. National affinity may have drawn neighbouring 

* The name is also, though incorrectly, spelt Amphictyony. 



CHAP. IX. 



NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. 



137 



tribes into such associations, though it does not seem to have 
formed an essential requisite. Many such amphictionies 
probably existed in Greece, but few of them are known ; one 
is mentioned as having held its meetings at Onchestos, in 
Boeotia, another met in the island of Calaurea, a third had 
Delos for its centre ; but the most celebrated and important 
amphictiony, which is known by the name of the amphictionic 
league or council, was that which held its meetings, in the 
spring at Delphi, and in the autumn near the town of An- 
thela within the pass of Thermopylae, at a temple of De- 
meter. The council was composed of the deputies sent by 
the several states, according to very ancient rules. The two 
places of meeting seem to suggest that this amphictiony 
was formed out of two originally independent associations, 
one perhaps consisting of inland, the other of maritime 
tribes. The council is said to have originally consisted of 
deputies sent by twelve tribes, each of which might include 
several independent states. The names of these tribes are not 
the same in all accounts, but the most probable list contains the 
following names : — Thessalians, Boeotians, Dorians, lonians, 
Perrhaebians, Magnetes, Locrians, Oetaeans (or Aenianians), 
Phthiots, Malians (Melians), and Phocians, to which must be 
added either the Dolopians or the Delphians. This list 
comprises no nation south of the Corinthian isthmus, and 
seems to take us back to a period previous to the return of 
the Heracleids. After this event the number of tribes re- 
mained the same; but the extent of the league was increased 
by that part of Peloponnesus which was occupied by the 
Dorians, so that the confederacy included most of the states 
of Greece : and thus exercising its influence over the whole 
country, it might be looked upon as a true national confe- 
deration ; but the nature of its constitution and the range of 
its functions did not allow it ever to assume that character. 
The tribes represented in the council stood to one another in 
a relation of perfect equality, each having two votes in the 



138 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. IX. 



congress. If the subjects discussed and decided upon by such 
an assembly had affected any important political interest, 
it is evident that the league could not have existed long. 
But it was not commonly viewed as a national congress 
for such purposes. Its ordinary duties were chiefly con- 
nected with religion, and it was only by accident that it was 
ever made subservient to political ends. Its two main func- 
tions were to guard the temple of the Delphic god, and to 
restrain mutual violence among the states belonging to the 
league. There is nothing to suggest that the object of the 
confederacy was protection against foreign enemies. Even 
the chief objects of the institution were at no time strictly 
carried into effect ; for we find members of the confederacy 
inflicting the worst evils of war upon one another, without re- 
monstrance being made on the ground of the oath which bound 
them together. The league was, in fact, powerless for good, 
and active only for purposes which were either unimportant 
or pernicious. Its most important sphere of action was in 
cases where the honour and safety of the Delphic sanctuary 
were concerned ; in which it might safely reckon on general 
co-operation from all the Greeks. One of the most cele- 
brated instances of such intervention is that which gave rise 
to the Crissaean or first sacred war, in B.C. 594. The inha- 
bitants of Crissa (also called Cirrha) were charged with ex- 
tortion and violence towards the strangers who landed at 
their port, or passed through their territory, on their way to 
Delphi. The Amphictions decreed war against the city, and 
it was carried on vigorously by the Thessalians and Clei- 
sthenes tyrant of Sicyon. By the advice of Apollo, the 
Amphictions resolved to dedicate the Crissaeans and their 
territory to the god, by enslaving them and making their 
land a waste for ever. The war is said to have lasted for 
ten years, till b. c. 585, and was at length terminated by a 
stratagem ascribed to Solon, who is said to have poisoned the 
waters of the Pleistos from which the city was supplied. 



CHAP. IX. 



NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. 



139 



When the town was taken, the vow of its enemies was literally 
fulfilled. Crissa was razed to the ground, its harbour 
choked up, and its fertile plain changed into a wilderness. 
This success is said to have given rise to the institution of the 
Pythian games, which thenceforth supplanted a more ancient 
and simple festival. 

The Delphic oracle, through which the Amphictions might 
have exercised an extensive influence over the affairs of 
Greece, was not under their management, but under that of 
the leading citizens of Delphi, who had constant and more 
efficacious access to the persons employed in revealing the 
supposed will of the god. 

Another class of national institutions consisted of the great 
festivals, which were celebrated at certain places and at fixed 
intervals of time, and were open to all who could prove their 
Hellenic blood. The most important of these festivals was 
that solemnised every fifth year on the banks of the Alpheus, 
in Elis. It lasted four days, and was called the Olympic 
contest or games, from the place of its celebration ; the period 
which intervened between its returns was called an Olympiad. 
The origin of this institution is involved in great obscurity ; 
it was believed to have been founded, and at various periods 
renewed, by gods and heroes long before the Trojan war. In 
the time of Lycurgus, Iphitus, it was said, in concert with 
the Spartan lawgiver, and with the sanction of the Delphic 
oracle, revived the solemnity, and ordained a periodical sus- 
pension of hostilities throughout Greece, to enable all tribes 
to attend without hindrance or danger. There had, no doubt, 
existed at Olympia from very early times an oracle and wor- 
ship of Zeus, and festivals had undoubtedly been celebrated 
there from time to time. The Dorian conquest of the pen- 
insula must long have interrupted the celebration of the 
solemnity, and its renewal, which is ascribed to Iphitus 
and Lycurgus, may have been suggested by political as 
w ell as religious motives. It was not till b. c. 776, however, 



140 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. IX. 



that the Olympic contest began to be used as a chronological 
era, and it may have been long before the institution came 
to be regarded as a real national festival. The Eleans pre- 
sided at the games, and their territory was regarded as sacred 
and inviolable during the period of the contests, which at a 
very early time were frequented by spectators, not only from 
all parts of Greece itself, but also from the Greek colonies in 
Europe, Asia, and Africa ; this assemblage, however, was not 
brought together by the mere fortuitous impulse of private 
interest or curiosity, but was in part composed of deputations, 
which were sent by most cities as to a religious solemnity, 
and were considered as guests of the Olympian god. The 
contests carried on at these games consisted of exhibitions 
displaying almost every mode of bodily activity ; they in- 
cluded races on foot, and with horses and chariots ; contests 
in leaping, throwing, wrestling, and boxing, and some in 
which several of these exercises were combined; but no 
combats with any kind of weapon. The contests in the 
chariot race were naturally confined to the wealthy, but the 
greatest part were open to all Greeks without distinction. 
Towns and families regarded it as the highest honour for 
one or more of their members to gain a victory in any of the 
contests at Olympia. In the earliest times, valuable prizes 
appear to have been given to the victors in all the public 
games ; but after the seventh Olympiad, the prize at Olympia 
consisted of a simple garland of the leaves of the wild olive. 
Other honours, however, were frequently bestowed upon the 
victor ; he was sometimes honoured with the franchise of a 
foreign city, and in his own with statues and other distinc- 
tions. By a law of Solon, every Athenian who gained an 
Olympic prize was rewarded with 500 drachmas, and with 
the right to a place at the table of the magistrates in the 
prytaneum ; the Spartan law or custom honoured the victor 
with a conspicuous place on the field of battle. The Altis, 
the place where the games were carried on at Olympia, 



chap. ix. NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. 



141 



was adorned with numberless statues of the victors, erected 
by themselves, their families, or at the expense of their fellow- 
citizens. The joyful event, moreover, was celebrated both at 
Olympia and in the victor's native place, by a triumphal 
procession, in which his praises were sung and were com- 
monly associated with the glory of his ancestors and his 
country. Thus sports, originally as simple as any in our 
villages, gave birth to masterpieces of sculpture, and to the 
sublimest strains of the lyric muse. 

The celebrity of the Olympic games led to the institution 
of several other festivals of a similar nature, such as the 
Pythian, which were celebrated in every third Olympic year ; 
the Nemean and Isthmian, which were celebrated each twice in 
every Olympiad, the former in the plain of Nemea, in Argolis, 
and the latter on the Corinthian isthmus. These four contests, 
which in various degrees rose to the dignity of national festi- 
vals, were distinguished from other similar institutions chiefly 
by the nature of the prize, which was in all cases a simple 
garland. The importance of such solemnities depended partly 
upon the degree in which they answered the purpose of a bond 
of national union, and partly on the share they had in form- 
ing the national character. In the former point of view, it 
is clear that the Olympian games were of very little efficacy. 
The short periodical cessation of hostilities hardly diminished 
the effusion of blood. The Greeks must, indeed, on such 
occasions, have become conscious of their distinction from all 
foreigners, whom they called barbarians ; but they did not 
find in them the means of merging their local and domestic 
patriotism in the more comprehensive sentiment of a common 
country and nationality. The business of the festival, in 
fact, rather nourished the selfish passions of rival cities and 
states, each of which felt its own honour concerned in the 
success or failure of the individual competitors ; and at every 
step there was as much to recal to their remembrance the po- 
litical disunion of the Greeks, as their national union. The 



142 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. IX. 



accidental and contingent effects produced by these meetings 
were probably much more important. The scene of the 
Olympic festival was a mart of busy commerce, where pro- 
ductions, not only of manual, but of intellectual labour, were 
exhibited and exchanged. Thoughts, inventions, and dis- 
coveries were thus communicated, and produced an equable 
diffusion of knowledge among the Greeks. Literary pro- 
ductions were read and published there, and poetry and sculp- 
ture in particular received a great impulse from the events 
of the contests. It may be said, that at those solemnities 
the animal powers were the chief instruments by which a 
Greek was raised so far above his countrymen and rose almost 
to heroic honours. The exercises which were held in such 
high esteem, consisted indeed principally in the development 
of the bodily faculties ; but it cannot be denied that they at 
the same time contributed to the healthiness, freshness, and 
vigour of the Greek intellect. All public amusements in the 
Eoman amphitheatres, and in the tournaments of our an- 
cestors, appear little better than barbarous and bloody shows 
when compared with the Grecian spectacles. 

Each of the institutions which we have been considering, 
might have become instrumental in uniting the Greeks into 
a political confederacy, but they do not seem to have even 
suggested the idea of such a thing. Mutual jealousy stifled 
this natural thought, and was early heightened by the great 
diversity of the forms of government, which rose up in the 
several states of Greece. The same cause, indeed, at a later 
period led to partial alliances ; but such combinations, as 
they widened the breach out of which they arose, only served 
to render a general union more hopeless, and war the habitual 
state of Greece. The form of government universally pre- 
valent in the Homeric age appears to have been a monarchy, 
limited by ancient custom as well as by a body of powerful 
chiefs who were almost the king's equals ; it was in fact an 
aristocracy, with an hereditary prince at its head. But 



GHAP. IX. 



"FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 



143 



during the first two or three centuries after the Trojan war, 
various causes were at work, which tended to reduce the 
power, and abolish the title of royalty, in almost every part 
of Greece. Military expeditions or violent internal revolu- 
tions often displaced a dynasty, leaving its place unoccupied ; 
and in all cases the power of the nobles increased at the 
expense of that of the kings. The great migrations of the 
Thessalians, Boeotians, and Dorians, contributed greatly to 
the same end ; for in most parts of Greece they dislodged or 
destroyed the lines of ancient kings ; and the migrating 
tribes themselves, though accustomed to monarchy, naturally 
tended to reduce the regal power, by constantly reminding 
those who held it that they were dependent upon the people, 
and owed every thing to the men in arms. But all such 
things were the occasion, rather than the cause, of the de- 
cline of monarchical power ; that result was attributable to 
the energy and versatility of the Greek mind, which pre- 
vented it from ever stiffening in the mould of Oriental insti- 
tutions, and from stopping short in any career which it had 
once opened, before it had passed through every stage. 

Koyalty, however, was very rarely, if ever, abolished by a 
sudden and violent revolution ; the title often long survived 
the substance, and the latter was extinguished only by 
slow successive steps, which consisted in abolishing its 
hereditary character, and making it elective, first in one 
family, then in more — first for life, then for a certain 
number of years, and lastly, in separating its functions 
and distributing them into several hands. In the course 
of these changes the king became more and more re- 
sponsible to the nobles, and the title itself was frequently 
exchanged for one simply signifying a ruler or chief ma- 
gistrate.* The form of government thus substituted for 
monarchy, might be termed either an aristocracy, or an oli- 

* Such as archon (fyxw) or piytanis (irovravis, connected with irpwros). 



144 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAF it* 



garchy ; that is, the government of the nobles distinguished 
from the multitude by birth, military valour and skill, and 
by such personal merits as in a simple age will gain for their 
possessor the esteem of his fellow-men. These nobles were 
in most cases the descendants of the warlike conquerors, who 
had subdued the original inhabitants of the country, and dis- 
tributed their landed property among themselves. In the 
course of time, while the ruling body remained stationary 
or was even losing strength, the commonalty — the class 
which, though personally free, was at first excluded from all 
share in the government — was constantly growing in num- 
bers and wealth, was becoming more united in itself, more 
conscious of its resources, and more disposed to put forward 
new claims. This was the case especially in the larger cities, 
which were at all times the most formidable opponents of 
oligarchies. Various means were devised by the nobles to 
prevent the overthrow of their power ; such as restraints 
upon the sale of landed property, and regulations guarding 
against any material increase or decrease in the numbers of 
the privileged body. But the utmost that an oligarchy 
could effect by such means, was to keep itself stationary ; it 
could neither prevent the continr al growth of the commonalty, 
nor keep pace with it by a corresponding expansion of its 
own frame. Under such circumstances, it often became 
necessary to make a compromise between the nobles and the 
commonalty ; the former appeasing the latter by allowing 
them some small share in the management of affairs, or by 
altering the basis of the constitution in such a way that 
wealth was substituted for birth as a qualification for the 
higher privileges of citizenship. A constitution in which 
property was the standard of civic rights and duties, was 
called a timocracy. As the nobles were generally the wealthi- 
est also, such a reform might produce little or no real 
change. When, however, the property standard was low, so 
that members of the middle classes also might participate in 



CHAP. IX. 



FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 



145 



the administration of affairs, the constitution became what 
the Greeks called a polity, and was considered the best and 
most durable democracy. In the feuds between the two par- 
ties in a state, recourse was often had to the appointment of 
an individual with unlimited power, to restore order and tran- 
quillity. This, however, was only a temporary measure, an£ 
rarely produced lasting effects. 

The Greek oligarchies were sometimes overthrown by a 
disastrous war, but more frequently by revolutions or dissen- 
sions within their own body ; and then it not rarely hap- 
pened that one of the nobles, who by superior skill or pru- 
dence had conciliated the commonalty, raised himself with 
its assistance above his brother nobles. Such a usurper was 
designated by the name of tyrant (rvpavvog). Most of the 
tyrannies which we meet with in Greek history, down to the 
time of the Persian wars, owed their origin to feuds between 
the ruling class and the commonalty, or among the rulers 
themselves. Some of the tyrants abused the power thus 
acquired, while others acted with caution and prudence, and 
thus kept their subjects in quiet submission, though they 
had a watchful eye upon whatever might prove dangerous 
to their power. Partly to keep the lowest classes in good 
humour, and partly to gratify their taste and magnificence, 
the tyrants often adorned their cities with costly build- 
ings, which required years of labour from numerous hands. 
For the same reason they were not reluctant to engage 
in wars, which afforded them opportunities of relieving 
themselves both from troublesome friends and from dan- 
gerous enemies, as well as of strengthening their dominion 
by conquest. By these and similar means, many a tyrant 
contrived to reign in peace, and transmit his power to his 
descendants, as if he had possessed an hereditary right to 
the sovereignty. But still scarcely one instance is known 
in which a tyrannical dynasty lasted beyond the third gene- 
ration ; for the sons of a tyrant rarely possessed the pru- 

H 



146 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. IX. 



dence necessary to keep them in their usurped position ; and 
even if they did possess it, they did not think it necessary to 
exercise it. A variety of impolitic steps generally obliged 
the ruler to have recourse to foreign troops, by whose aid he 
destroyed or exiled the most illustrious among his subjects. 
By such means he made himself universally odious and de- 
spised ; and one cruel act leading to another, he at length 
fell a victim to a conspiracy which his own deeds had in- 
stigated and matured. Whenever Spartan aid was sought 
against a tyranny it was readily granted ; partly because 
Sparta dreaded evil consequences to her own constitution 
from such examples, and partly because she was always glad 
of an opportunity to extend her own influence by taking an 
active part in the revolutions of other states, which would 
afterwards naturally look upon her as their defender and 
protector. Accordingly most of the tyrannies which existed 
in Greece previously to the Persian wars, are said to have 
been overthrown by the exertions of Sparta ; and this, no 
doubt, greatly contributed to the acquisition by her of that 
paramount influence which is commonly called the supre- 
macy of Sparta in the affairs of Greece. 

Sparta, however, was not generally satisfied with simply 
overthrowing tyrannical power ; where circumstances per- 
mitted it, her object was to establish a constitution as similar 
as possible to her own ; but she was sometimes unintentionally 
instrumental in promoting the triumph of principles more 
adverse to her own views than those of tyranny itself ; for 
when, after the temporary usurpation, the struggle between 
the nobles and the commonalty was renewed, the two parties 
were usually no longer in the same relative position as before, 
the commonalty having gained in strength and spirit even 
more than the oligarchy had lost ; and consequently there 
was always a strong leaning towards democracy, which in 
many cases succeeded in establishing a timocracy, substituting 
wealth for birth. The standard of property was then graclu- 



CHAP. IX. 



FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 



147 



ally lowered until it was wholly abolished, and the constitution 
became truly democratic. An instance of this process will be 
seen in the history of Attica. It would lead us too far to 
enter here into a description of the various shades of the 
republican and democratic forms of government which were 
established in the different states of Greece. What happened 
at Athens and Sparta was repeated in the other states, with 
more or fewer modifications according to local and political 
circumstances. Suffice it to say that, in all the states of 
Greece, with the exception of Sparta, royalty was abolished 
about the same time, and this change was everywhere brought 
about by similar causes. 



h 2 



148 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. X. 



CHAPTER X. 

CIVIL HISTORY OF ATTICA TO THE EXPULSION OF THE PISISTRATIDS. 

The early history of Attica is much less attractive than that 
of the Doric nations, being almost entirely destitute of those 
grand poetical stories which are interwoven with the tradi- 
tions of the Doric tribes. 

The territory of Attica is said to have been originally 
divided into a number of little states, each of which was 
governed by a chief bearing the title of king. Cecrops is 
described as the first who established a confederacy among 
these petty states, for the purpose of defending them against 
the Carian pirates and the Boeotians. For this purpose he 
divided the country into twelve districts *, a number which 
we .find predominating in the Ionian institutions. Athens, 
under the name of Cecropia, appears to have been at the head 
of the confederacy, whose council probably held its periodical 
meetings in the temple of Athena, the tutelary divinity of Attica 
and Athens. Other accounts state, that the whole country or 
people was divided into four tribes, which changed their 
names under several successive kings ; thus under Cecrops 
their names are said to have been Cecropis, Autocthon, 
Actaea, and Paralia; under Cranaus, Cranais, Atthis, Me- 
soga'ea, and Diacris ; while under Erichthonius we find the 
names Dias, Athenais, Posidonias and Hephaestias,. — all of 
which are derived from names of divinities ; whereas some 
of the names in the two preceding lists refer to the natural 
features of the country, and others to the origin or political 
relations of its inhabitants. But these divisions, whatever 

* Or he is represented as sovereign of Attica, and as the founder of 
twelve townships. 



chap. x. CIVIL HISTOEY OF ATTICA. 149 

historical value we may attribute to them, were superseded 
by one much more celebrated and lasting, which is said to 
have been instituted by Ion, the founder of the Ionian race, 
and to have derived the names of its tribes from his four 
sons, namely, the Teleontes (G-eleontes or Gedeontes), Hople- 
tes, Aegicores, and Argades. These names, however, are 
evidently descriptive of certain occupations ; and hence the 
tribes have been regarded by some modern writers as castes, 
and their names as indicative of their respective employments. 
The second, no doubt, denotes a class of warriors ; and the 
third those inhabitants of the country who tended their flocks 
on the Attic hills. From this alone we might infer, that the 
names of the first and fourth tribes, likewise, had reference 
to the occupations of their members ; but their precise 
meaning is still the subject of controversy. The name 
Argades seems to denote labourers in general, and must 
have been applied either to a class of husbandmen, or to one 
employed in other laborious occupations. Which of these 
is the correct explanation might be easily decided, if the 
meaning of the name of the first tribe were ascertained. But 
that name, which appears in three different forms, admits 
of different explanations. Some consider the Teleontes or 
Geleontes as a sacerdotal caste ; while, according to others, 
they were peasants who tilled the lands of their lords, and 
paid a tribute or rent for the use of them. If they were a 
priestly caste, they would probably occupy the hallowed 
territory of Eleusis, and this notion seems to be confirmed 
by the fact, that their name stands first in the list. The 
country of Attica would thus be divided into four geographi- 
cal districts, one of which belonged to the warriors, who may 
be conceived as the descendants of a conquering race. The 
opinion that the Geleontes were a class of dependent hus- 
bandmen is incompatible with the idea of a geographical 
division of the country, which cannot be well set aside ; for 
how could these husbandmen have inhabited a distinct dis- 

h 3 



150 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. X. 



trict of Attica, if they had to till the lands of their lords on 
whose estates they must have lived ? 

If we designate these four divisions by the name of castes, 
we must be careful what meaning we attach to it. Cer- 
tain occupations may at one time have been hereditary 
in the same families; but we are nowhere informed that 
such a separation and exclusion were ever sanctioned or 
enforced by either a religious or a civil ordinance. Such 
castes, if they existed at all, were only the result of circum- 
stances, and were certainly not denned and constituted like 
the castes of India or Egypt. On the contrary, it is probable, 
that as they became more closely united into one body, the 
primitive distinctions, to which they owed their names, were 
gradually obliterated by mutual intercourse. It still, how- 
ever, remains difficult to say by what circumstances a priestly 
caste could have lost its sacred character, and become so 
diffused among the nation, that every trace of its having once 
formed a caste was completely effaced, as we find it to have 
been in the earliest history of Attica. A great revolution 
might have effected the change, but of such a revolution there 
is no vestige in the history of Attica. 

The four tribes of Ion were, perhaps, originally not members 
of one body, but distinct communities, long kept apart by 
differences of descent, of situation, of pursuits, and of re- 
ligion, yet still connected by neighbourhood, by affinities of 
blood and language, and by the occasional need of mutual 
assistance. Their gradual union was thus prepared and 
promoted; and the superiority of the race which occupied 
Athens, naturally disposed all to look upon that city as the 
natural head and centre of political union. The effect of all 
these causes is commonly described as the work of Theseus, 
who is said to have consolidated the national unity, and thus 
to have laid the foundations of the future greatness of Athens. 
The legend represents him as having collected the inhabitants 
of Attica into one city, and as having thus for ever put an 



chap. x. CIVIL HISTORY OF ATTICA. 



151 



end to the discord and hostility which until then had pre- 
vented them from considering themselves as one people. It 
cannot, indeed, be conceived that the whole population of 
Attica, or even any considerable portion of it, should have 
migrated to Athens ; all that appears to be meant is, that 
Attica was united into one state, of which Athens became 
the head and the seat of the government, all the other towns 
sinking from the rank of sovereign states into that of subjects. 
This union was cemented by religion, perhaps by the mutual 
recognition of deities which had hitherto been honoured only 
in particular localities, and was certainly celebrated by public 
festivals, at which the whole people paid their homage to the 
tutelary goddess of Athens.* The city is said to have been 
enlarged on that occasion, and the lower city was added to 
the ancient one, which had covered little more than the rock 
of the acropolis, j The families, which by this new order of 
things were induced to take up their abode at Athens, were, 
no doubt, chiefly those of the highest rank, whose members 
had formed the ruling class in their respective states, and 
who were admitted to a similar station under the new con- 
stitution. 

Theseus is described by the ancients as the founder of the 
political institutions of Athens, and later orators and poets 
went so far as to hold him up as the parent of Athenian de- 
mocracy. This, however, arose only from their natural desire 
to represent that form of government, which was dear to all, 
as venerable by its antiquity, just as at Rome the plebeians 
were always inclined to look upon Servius Tullius as the 
author of all their political rights and privileges. The con- 
stitution of which Theseus is called the founder, remained, 
for many centuries after him, rigidly aristocratical. Theseus 

* Such at least is said to have been the origin of the ^wotiaa, of the 
Panathenaea, and of the festival of Aphrodite Pandemos. 

f Hence perhaps the plural name 3 A6r}i/ai, which Theseus is said to 
have given to the sovereign city. 

h 4 



152 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP, X. 



is said to have accomplished his object by a promise made to 
the nobles (for with the lower classes he found no difficulty) 
that all of them should be admitted to an equal share in the 
government, and that he would resign his royal prerogatives, 
except the command in war and the administration of justice. 
To guard, on the other hand, against democratical confusion, 
he instituted a gradation of ranks and a proportionate dis- 
tribution of power. Accordingly he divided the people into 
three classes, nobles (evTrarp/^cu), husbandmen (yecjjjiopoi), and 
artisans (Sfifiiovpyoi) ; to the first of which he reserved all 
the offices of the state, with the privilege of regulating the 
affairs of religion, and of interpreting the laws, human and 
divine. These privileges were no doubt the same as the 
nobles had enjoyed in their respective states before the union ; 
but by concentrating that class, its powers were in fact in- 
creased. The king himself was only the first among his 
equals, the four kings of the tribes (tyvXo&aGiXeig) were his 
constant assessors, and his colleagues rather than his coun- 
sellors, the chief difference being that they did not, like the 
king, hold their office for life. 

In one sense, the constitution ascribed to Theseus had a 
democratic tendency, inasmuch as a number of isolated town- 
ships were by it united into a single body, and made to feel 
their strength more than before ; so that they might thus 
begin more effectually to resist the encroachments of the 
nobles. In later times we meet with subdivisions of the 
tribes, which, although not attributed to Theseus, must have 
originated at the time when Attica was formed into one 
state. Each tribe contained three phratriae * or fraternities, 
and each phratria was subdivided into thirty sections, called 
yivrj, equivalent to the Latin gens, and nearly so to our word 
clan. The members of each yivog were called yewfjrai, and 
are said to have been thirty in number. That these gennetae 

* fypaTpia. or (pp'fjrprj, etymologically connected with frater and brother. 



CHAP. X. 



CIVIL HISTORY OF ATTICA. 



153 



cannot have been heads of families is clear from the simple 
fact, that families cannot be limited in their number, but are 
constantly either increasing or decreasing; unless, indeed, 
care was taken to regulate the number, by excluding certain 
families and admitting them only when vacancies occurred. 

It is evident that the change of the Attic constitution 
which is ascribed to Theseus, cannot have been the work of 
one man, but must be regarded as the gradual result of 
circumstances which may have required more than a cen- 
tury for fully working out their consequences, though we do 
not mean to deny that a particular person, perhaps called 
Theseus *, may have done much to bring about the reform, 
and establish it on a firm basis. 

We are not informed in what relation the three classes of 
Athenians stood to one another. The name of the second 
may signify that it consisted of free landowners, or peasants 
who cultivated the land of their masters ; but it is probable 
that it contained neither class of men exclusively. The 
third class consisted of all those who subsisted on any kind 
of industry besides that connected with agriculture. It ac- 
cordingly included a great variety of occupations, which 
were held in very different degrees of esteem. Whether 
there existed any political distinction between the second 
and third class, is uncertain ; it is possible that there was 
none at all, the distance which separated both from the first 
class being so great that all minor gradations may have been 
lost in it. 

Notwithstanding the absolute power of the nobles, there 
probably existed at Athens, as in most ancient states, an 
assembly of the people, though it may have exercised as 
little influence as that of Sparta. The first contests of the 
nobles were not waged with the people, but with the king. 

* The etymology of the name Theseus, however, seems to justify the 
inference that it is a mere fiction, invented to describe a man who arranged 
and settled the affairs of the state. 

H 5 



154 



HISTORY OF GREECE, 



CHAP. X. 



The legend represents the kingly power as on the decline 
even in the time of Theseus ; for that hero himself is said to 
have been compelled, by a conspiracy of the nobles, to go 
into exile with his family, and to leave the throne to Mene- 
stheus, a descendant of the ancient kings. At a subsequent 
period, Thymoetes was forced to abdicate in favour of Me- 
lanthus, a stranger, who had no claim but his superior merit. 
After the death of Codrus, the nobles, taking advantage, 
perhaps, of the opportunity afforded by the dispute between 
his sons, are said to have abolished the title of king, and 
to have substituted for it that of archon (apyuv, ruler). 
This change does not seem to have affected the nature or 
extent of the royal prerogatives, except that the office be- 
came a responsible one. It was still held for life ; and 
Medon, the son of Codrus, was the first archon. The office 
continued hereditary in his family ; but it would appear 
that within the family of the Medontids, the succession was 
determined by the choice of the nobles. The responsible 
character of the archonship implies that those who elected, 
had also the power of deposing the chief magistrate. This 
power, however, did not satisfy the more ambitious spirits 
among the nobles, and they gradually but steadily advanced 
towards the accomplishment of their final object — a com- 
plete and equal participation in the sovereignty. After 
twelve reigns, ending with that of Alcmaeon, in b. c. 752, 
the duration of the archonship was limited to ten years ; but 
it still continued to be held by the descendants of Medon, until, 
through the guilt or misfortune of Hippomenes, the fourth 
decennial archon, they were deprived of the privilege. This 
change was soon followed by one of much greater importance, 
for in b. c. 682, the term of the archonship was reduced to a 
single year, and at the same time the various powers 
which had hitherto been possessed by one, were distributed 
among nine new magistrates. The first of these bore the 
distinguishing title of the archon, and the year was marked 



CHAP. X. 



CIVIL HISTORY OF ATTICA. 



155 



by his name.* He represented the majesty of the state, and 
exercised that kind of jurisdiction which had formerly be- 
longed to the king, as the common parent of his people, the 
protector of families, the guardian of orphans and heiresses, 
and of the general rights of inheritance. The second archon 
received the title of king (apywv fiaaiXevg)^, because he repre- 
sented the king in his capacity of high priest of the nation. 
He regulated the celebration of the most solemn festivals, 
decided all causes connected with religion, and protected 
the state from the pollution which it might incur through 
the heedlessness or impiety of individuals. The third 
archon bore the title of polemarchus (jroXe^aoxoc, com- 
mander in war), and supplied the place of the king as the 
leader of the people in war, and the guardian of its security 
in time of peace. He had jurisdiction over strangers who 
settled in Attica and over freedmen. The remaining six 
archons received the common title of thesmothetae (Secr- 
fioderai, legislators) |, not because they made the laws, but 
because, in the absence of any written laws, they, by their 
decisions as judges, established precedents equivalent to 
laws in a variety of cases, which did not fall under the 
cognizance of their colleagues. 

This gradual increase of the power of the nobles, and their 
final triumph are almost the only events which fill the 
meagre annals of Attica, for several centuries. That period, 
however, was not, as might be supposed, one of peace and 
happiness for the people of Attica ; on the contrary, when- 
ever we catch a glimpse of what was going on, we perceive 
a very different state of things. The reign of Hippomenes, 

* Whence he was also called 'apxcuv 4ttwvv}xos, or b iirdouv/xos. 

f In like manner, the title of rex sacrorum was retained at Rome after 
the abolition of the kingly power; probably because in matters relating to 
the gods it was thought impious to make any important change, even if 
it should be merely a matter of form. 

X Before the time of Solon laws are said to have been called fteo-^ol, or 
statutes; whereas Solon called his laws vdjxoi. 



156 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. X. 



the last archon of the family of Codrus, was made memorable 
by the shame of his daughter, and by the extraordinary 
punishment which he inflicted on her and her seducer ; he 
is said to have shut her up to perish of hunger or by 
the fury of a wild horse, the companion of her confinement ; 
while the seducer was put to death by being yoked to a 
chariot. The nobles seized the opportunity, deposed Hip- 
pomenes, and razed his house to the ground. This story 
might seem to indicate austerity and purity of manners 
in that age, but we are at the same time informed that 
Hippomenes was urged to this severity by the extreme dis- 
soluteness prevailing in his family. Another event which 
breaks through the obscurity of that period, is the legisla- 
tion of Draco, the accounts of which do not lead us to sup- 
pose that the people enjoyed any great degree of happiness 
under the government of the nobles, or that their manners 
were particularly innocent and mild. 

The immediate occasion which led to Draco's legislation in 
B.C. 624 is not recorded, nor are we informed of the motives 
which induced him to give to it that character of severity 
to which it owes its chief celebrity. We know, however, 
that he was the author of the first written laws of Athens ; 
and as such a measure necessarily limited the authority of 
the nobles, the sole expositors and administrators of the 
customary law, we may reasonably conclude that the inno- 
vation was extorted from them by the growing discontent of 
the people. On the other hand, Draco no doubt framed his 
code as much as possible in conformity with established usage 
and with the wishes of the ruling class, to which he himself 
belonged; and the extreme rigour of his laws, which, as 
Demades said, were written in blood, was probably designed 
to overawe and repress the popular movement. The sub- 
stitution of a written law for fluctuating and flexible cus- 
toms, however, was an important step. Draco made no 
change in the constitution but he transferred cases of murder 



CHAP. X. 



CONSPIRACY OF CYLOjST. 



157 



or accidental homicide from the cognizance of the archons 
to magistrates called ephetae (tyircn). Although Draco him- 
self is reported to have said, that in his opinion all offences, 
even the smallest, deserved to be punished with death, still 
there were some for which he provided a milder sentence. 
Thus an attempt to change his laws was to be punished with 
the loss of franchise ; and on another occasion, we hear of a 
fine of the value of ten oxen. Hence we may perhaps infer, 
that the accounts of the extreme severity of his legislation 
have been somewhat exaggerated ; but the obscurity in 
which the subject is involved precludes us from forming a 
correct opinion respecting it. Draco is said to have made 
himself so odious to the people of Athens, that he was obliged 
to quit the city and go to Aegina, where he died. 

The power of the aristocracy had thus received a shock 
instead of a support from the legislation of Draco, and the 
discontent of the people rose to such a height, that it would 
willingly have submitted to a tyrant in order to get rid of the 
intolerable rule of the nobles, who were now threatened from 
a quarter where they probably thought themselves most 
secure. In b.c. 612, twelve years after Draco's legislation, 
a conspiracy was formed by one of their own order for over- 
throwing the government. It was headed by the eupatrid 
Cylon, distinguished by his wealth and by a victory at the 
Olympic games. He was married to a daughter of Thea- 
genes, the tyrant of Megara, and conceived the design of 
making himself master of Athens. In this dangerous under- 
taking he relied on the general dissatisfaction of the people 
with the rule of the nobles, which in other cities of Greece also 
had led to the establishment of tyrannies. At this period 
scarcely any great enterprise was undertaken in Greece 
without the sanction of an oracle, and accordingly Cylon con- 
sulted the Delphic god, who answered, that he must seize 
the citadel of Athens during the principal festival of Zeus. 
Cylon having gained a prize at Olympia, naturally interpreted 



158 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



CHAP. X. 



this to mean the Olympic games, forgetting that the great 
Attic festival in honour of Zeus, the Diasia, occurred at a 
different period; and he proceeded to carry his plan into 
effect in accordance with this incorrect notion of the meaning 
of the oracle. With the aid of a body of troops furnished by 
Theagenes and of his partisans, he made himself master of 
the acropolis. But Cylon, who seems to have lost the confi- 
dence and support of the people by employing foreign auxili- 
aries, soon found himself besieged by the forces which the 
government had called in from all parts of the country. 
During the blockade Cylon and his brother made their escape, 
but their adherents were not so fortunate. When their pro- 
visions w^ere all spent and some had died of hunger, the re- 
mainder abandoned the defence of the walls and withdrew 
into the temple of Athena. The archon Megacles (the son of 
Alcmaeon) and his colleagues induced them to surrender, on 
condition that their lives should be spared, for it was ap- 
prehended that they might die in the temple and thus pol- 
lute the sanctuary. But the archons disregarding their pro- 
mise, put their prisoners to death when they had quitted their 
asylum, and some were even killed at the altars of the Eu- 
menides or Furies, at which they had taken refuge.* As 
this crime was committed with the sanction of Megacles, 
who had thereby become guilty of a gross act of sacrilege, 
he and his whole family were looked upon as accursed per- 
sons, whose lives were forfeited to the gods. All public 
disasters were thenceforth attributed to them and inter- 
preted as signs of the divine wrath. The surviving par- 
tisans of Cylon did not fail to foster such a belief, and urged 
that the gods would never be appeased until vengeance 
should have been taken on the offenders. The excitement 

* The account of this affair is not the same in all authors. We have 
adopted that of Thucydides, i. 126.: but comp. Plut. Solon, 12. ; Herod, v. 
71. ; and Paus. vii. 25. § 1. 



CHAP. X. 



SOLON. 



159 



thus produced was another ingredient in the ferment which 
the conflict of political parties had called forth, and some 
extraordinary remedy for the evils of the state had now be- 
come absolutely necessary. 

To soothe this excitement, to conciliate the hostile elements 
of society, and to apply a thorough cure for all the evils from 
which Athens was suffering, required a man, who by his 
birth as well as by mental superiority, by calm wisdom and 
freedom from prejudice, could raise himself above the strife 
of parties and secure respect for the reforms which he might 
think it necessary to introduce. That man was Solon, the 
son of Execestides, a descendant of the house of Codrus. 
In his youth he is said to have embarked in commercial ad- 
ventures in order to repair his fortunes, which had been 
reduced by his father's imprudent liberality. It was, how- 
ever, probably not more the desire of affluence than the 
thirst of knowledge, that impelled him to seek distant shores : 
and the most valuable fruit of his travels was the experience 
he collected of men, manners, and institutions. He had 
become acquainted and formed friendships with the most 
illustrious men of the age, such as Thales of Miletus, and 
Anacharsis the Scythian. On his return to Athens, pro- 
bably not long after the Cylonian conspiracy, he found his 
country in a deplorable condition, distracted by exasperated 
parties, and scarcely able to resist the attacks of its least 
powerful neighbours. An old enmity existed between the 
Dorians of Megara and the Athenians, and the former had 
succeeded in wresting the island of Salamis from the latter, 
who had been repeatedly baffled in their attempts to recover 
their rightful possession of the island. These losses had 
broken the spirit of the Athenians, and had induced them 
to pass a decree which forbade any one, under penalty of 
death, to propose the renewal of so desperate an undertaking. 
Solon, who was himself a native of Salamis, was indignant 
at this pusillanimous policy, and is said to have devised an 



160 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. X. 



extraordinary plan for rousing Iris countrymen from their 
despondency. He was endowed with considerable poetical 
talent, and now composed a poem on the loss of Salamis. 
To elude the prohibition, he assumed the demeanour of a 
madman, and rushing into the market-place recited his poem 
to a crowd of bystanders.* It contained vehement censure 
of the disgrace which the Athenians had incurred, and a 
summons to take the field again and vindicate their right to 
the lovely island. The people, stirred up by his enthusiasm, 
which was seconded by the applause of his friends, and es- 
pecially by the eloquence of his young kinsman Pisistratus, 
immediately repealed the law, and it was resolved once more 
to try the fortune of arms. 

Solon was entrusted with the command of the expedition, 
in which he was assisted by Pisistratus. In a single cam- 
paign he recovered Salamis by a stratagem, and drove the 
Megarians from the island, B.C. 604 ; Nisaea also appears 
to have fallen into the hands of the Athenians at that time. 
The Megarians, however, did not give up their pretensions, 
but while the Athenians were occupied with their internal 
troubles, recovered Nisaea and Salamis, where 500 Athenian 
colonists had formed settlements. Both parties now agreed 
to refer the matter in dispute to the arbitration of the Lace- 
daemonians. Solon, who acted as spokesman for the Athe- 
nians, satisfied the Lacedaemonian commissioners by his 
arguments, and by a reference to a passage in the Iliad f, 
that the claim of his countrymen was just. Athens thence- 
forth remained in undisturbed possession of Salamis, for 
Megara was soon eclipsed by the vast rising power of her 
old rival. Solon's fame rose still higher in consequence of 

* The beginning of this poem, and many other fragments of his nu- 
merous works, are still extant. See Bach, Solonis Atheniensis quae super- 
sunt, Bonn, 1825. 

f He is said to have committed the patriotic fraud of forging the line 
in the Illiad, ii. 558, to which he appealed, 



CHAP. X. 



EPIMENIDES. 



16! 



the part which he afterwards took in the sacred war against 
Cirrha, which began in B.C. 594.* 

Athens continued to be the scene of feuds between Me- 
gacles and his associates on the one hand, and the friends of 
Cylon on the other. Solon now, with the assistance of the 
moderate nobles, prevailed on the party of Megacles to sub- 
mit their cause to the decision of a court of 300 men of their 
own order. The court pronounced them guilty; all the 
survivors were sent into exile, and even the bones of the 
deceased were taken out of their graves and carried beyond 
the frontier. This happened in B.C. 597. Party feuds how- 
ever continued to rage with unabated fury at Athens ; for 
the evil from which the state was suffering lay deeper and 
required a very different remedy, which was to be found 
only in a new organisation of the state. But before this 
could be undertaken, it was necessary to purify the city by 
religious ceremonies, and to allay the fears of the super- 
stitious people, who thought that enough had not yet been 
done to propitiate the anger of the gods. For this purpose 
Solon, by the advice of the Pythia, invited Epimenides of 
Crete, who was renowned far and wide for his wisdom and 
magic powers, to come to Athens. This venerated person was 
received with a reverence which insured his success. He 
performed certain religious rites which soothed the fears of 
the people, and among which a human sacrifice is mentioned; 
he founded a temple to the Eumenides on the Areopagus, 
and two altars to Hybris and Anaideia, the two malignant 
powers under whose influence Athens had been suffering 
for years. He further imposed restraints on the profuse 
expense with which private persons celebrated the worship of 
the gods, and on the extravagant signs of grief which 
women used to display at funerals. When he had accom- 
plished his great work, he was dismissed wdth tokens of the 



* See above, p. 138. 



162 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. X. 



warmest gratitude ; but lie declined all the honours which 
the Athenians were ready to shower upon him, and the only 
boon he requested was, for himself, a branch from the sacred 
olive-tree, which was believed to have been planted on the 
acropolis by Athena, and for his country, perpetual friend- 
ship between Athens and Cnossos. 

By this preliminary process the minds of the Athenians 
were tranquillised, and they were enabled to consider their 
affairs with calmness and without angry passions. It had 
removed the imaginary evils, but the real ones yet remained 
to be remedied. The nobles, who wielded all the powers of 
government, had reduced a great part of the class engaged 
in agriculture to a state of abject dependence; the political 
rights of this class were little more than nominal ; they held 
even their personal freedom by a precarious tenure, and 
were frequently reduced to actual slavery. The smaller 
proprietors, impoverished by bad times or casual disasters, 
were compelled to borrow money at high interest, and to 
mortgage their lands to the rich, or to receive them back as 
tenants upon hard terms. A noble was enabled by law to 
seize the person of his insolvent debtor and to sell him as a 
slave. Numbers had thus been torn from their homes and 
families and condemned to end their days in the service of a 
foreign master. Others were even obliged to sell their own 
children. This state of things must have affected Solon in 
the same way as, at a later period, a similar condition of so- 
ciety at Rome did the elder Gracchus, who was thus aroused 
to take his stand against the insatiable avarice of the Roman 
grandees. Those who groaned under this tyranny were 
eager only for a change, and unconcerned about the means 
by which it might be effected. But the population of Attica 
was not simply composed of these two classes. The eupa- 
tridae or noble landowners, who as a faction were called 
Trediaioi or TredielQ, because their estates lay mostly in the 
fertile plains, were anxious to keep things in their existing 



zr-r 



CHAP. X. 



solon's legislation. 



163 



state. The hilly districts in the north and east of Attica 
were occupied by shepherds and poor peasants (diaicpioi or 
v7repaKpioi) who, though they do not seem to have suffered 
any of those evils which the rapacity and hard-heartedness 
of the powerful had inflicted on the lowland peasantry, were 
of a more democratic temper, and wished for a revolution 
which should place them on a level with the rich. The men 
of the coast (wapaXoi), in the port towns from Piraeus to 
Cape Sunion, who probably consisted mainly of those who 
subsisted by commerce and by the exercise of the me- 
chanical arts, were averse to violent measures, but were 
desirous of a reform in the constitution, which should remove 
all reasonable grounds of complaint, and should admit a 
larger number to the enjoyment of those rights which were 
now engrossed and abused by a few. 

Solon's reputation pointed him out as the man most capable 
of remedying the disorders of the state. He was therefore 
chosen, with the unanimous consent of all parties, to mediate 
between them; and under the legal title of archon he was 
invested with full authority to frame a new constitution 
and code of laws, B.C. 594. Such an office under such 
circumstances conferred almost unlimited power, and an 
ambitious man might easily have abused it to make himself 
tyrant of the state. His friends are said to have suggested 
this plan to him, but he was not tempted to betray the sacred 
trust reposed in him ; instead of harbouring any selfish 
scheme, he bent all his thoughts and energies to the exe- 
cution of the great task he had undertaken. 

This task consisted of two parts : the first and most press- 
ing business was to relieve the present distress of the com- 
monalty ; the second, to provide against the recurrence of the 
same or similar evils, by regulating the rights and duties of 
all the citizens according to just principles. In regard to the 
first, he adopted a middle course between the revolutionary 
schemes of the people and the selfish views of the privileged 



164 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. X. 



class, who wished to retain all that they had hitherto enjoyed. 
His first measure was a disburdening ordinance (cac-a^Gaia), 
which relieved the debtor, partly by a reduction of the rate 
of interest, and partly by lowering the standard of the silver 
coinage, whereby a debtor saved more than one-fourth in 
every payment.* He also released the pledged lands from 
their incumbrances, and restored them in full property to 
their owners. Finally, he abolished the cruel law by which 
a creditor might enslave his debtor, and restored those who 
were pining at home in such bondage, to freedom. Those 
who had sold their debtors into foreign countries, seem to 
have been compelled to ransom them at their own expense. 
If any one should think that in these regulations Solon did 
not pay sufficient regard to the rights of property, he must 
remember that Solon had been chosen as an arbitrator, to 
whom all parties had voluntarily submitted their claims, and 
to whom they had given full power to act in the manner 
which he thought best for the good of the state. 

After this Solon entered upon his second and more difficult 
task. He began by repealing the laws of Draco, except those 
which concerned the repression of bloodshed and murder. 
It was, perhaps, in consequence of this abolition, that he 
published an amnesty, which restored those citizens who had 
been deprived of their franchise for lighter offences, and re- 
called those who had been sent into exile. This act of grace 
seems to have included the members of the family of Megacles, 
or the Alcmaeonids, as they are more commonly called. The 
four ancient tribes were retained with all their subdivisions ; 
but it would appear that Solon admitted as new citizens such 
foreigners as had settled in the country with their whole 
family and substance, and had given up all connection with 
their native land. But the distinguishing feature of his con- 

* Plut. Sol 15, states that he made the mina, which before contained 
73 drachms, to contain 100 ; that is, that he made 73 old drachms to be 
worth 100 new ones. 



CHAP. X. 



solon's legislation. 



165 



stitution was the substitution of property for birth, as the 
standard to determine the rights and duties of the citizens. 
This change, though its consequences were most important, 
probably produced little alteration at the time, as wealth and 
birth generally concurred in the same person. According to 
their property then, Solon divided all Athenian citizens into 
four classes. The first consisted of persons whose estates 
yielded a net yearly income or rent of 500 measures of dry 
or liquid produce {irevraKocFLOjieliixvoi^ ; the second class 
contained those whose income amounted to 300 measures, 
and who were called knights (linrrjQ or iTnreig), as being 
accounted able to keep a war-horse. The members of the 
third class had an annual revenue of 200, or more probably 
150 measures, and were termed %£vy~irai, because they were 
supposed to keep a yoke of oxen for the plough. The fourth 
class, called Srjreg, comprehended all whose incomes fell below 
that of the third, and appears to have consisted of hired la- 
bourers in husbandry. The highest offices of the state were 
accessible only to members of the first class ; some lower 
offices were no doubt left open to the second and third classes ; 
but it is uncertain whether the second had any rights or pri- 
vileges not belonging to the third. These classes, however, 
were distinguished from each other by the mode of their 
military service ; the second class furnished the cavalry, and 
the third the heavy- armed infantry. As their rights were 
inferior to those of the first class, so their burdens were 
lighter ; for they were assessed, not in exact proportion to the 
amount of their incomes, but at a much lower rate, the 
nominal value of their property being for this purpose reduced 
below the truth, that of the knights by one-sixth, and that 
of the third class by one-third. The fourth class was ex- 
cluded from all public offices, and served in the army only 
as light troops ; in later times they were employed in manning 

* The measure, fj.&i(Avos, here spoken of, is about six pints more than 
a bushel. 



166 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. X. 



the fleets. They paid no direct contributions, but were 
allowed to take part in the popular assembly as well as in 
the courts in which justice was administered by the people. 

This classification takes no notice of any other than landed 
property; and it is probable that all those whose wealth con- 
sisted in capital, were placed on a level with the members of 
the fourth class. In this manner, every class of citizens had 
its place assigned to it, the object of the legislator being to 
give to the commonalty such a share of power as would enable 
it to protect itself, and to the wealthy as much as was ne- 
cessary for maintaining their dignity, or for ruling the people 
without oppressing it. The magistrates retained their ancient 
powers, but became responsible for the exercise of them, not 
to their own body, but to the governed. The judicial 
functions of the archons were, perhaps, preserved in their 
full extent, but appeals were allowed from their jurisdiction 
to popular courts, numerously composed, and filled indis- 
criminately from all classes. The democratic element which 
was powerful in the assembly and in the judicial courts, and 
which in the end overruled every other power in the state, 
was, in the legislator's opinion, to be checked by two great 
councils, that of the Four Hundred, and that of the Areopagus. 

The institution of the senate (joovXri) of Four Hundred is 
uniformly assigned to Solon ; but there can be no doubt that 
before his time a senate or council of nobles existed, though 
we do not know its number, nor whether it represented the 
four tribes ; Solon increased this council to the number of 
four hundred, and gave it a more popular constitution by or- 
daining that its members were to be taken from the first 
three classes, each tribe furnishing one hundred. As the 
members of this council were in all probability elected, and 
as a large portion of the population was excluded from it, the 
body must have been of an aristocratic, rather than of a de- 
mocratic temper. Besides the fitness for their office, as in- 
ferred from their property, age also was taken into con- 



CHAP. X. 



solon's legislation. 



167 



sideration, none being eligible under thirty. They held their 
dignity for only one year, at the end of which they were 
liable to render a general account of their conduct, and to 
meet the charges which might be brought against them. As 
the senate was mainly designed to restrain and guide the 
enlarged powers of the popular assembly, the principal part 
of its business was to prepare the measures which were to be 
submitted to the votes of the people, and to preside over its 
deliberations. The senate was divided into sections called 
prytanes (ttpvtclvelq), succeeding one another throughout the 
year, as the representatives of the whole body. Each section 
during its term assembled daily in its session-house (irpvTa- 
velov) to attend to its duties. The members were entertained 
at a common table, together with the guests of the state, who 
enjoyed that privilege either by virtue of some office, or as a 
reward of merit. Besides the functions above mentioned, the 
senate also possessed powers connected with the finances and 
other subjects of administration. Thus it had the power of 
issuing ordinances or edicts,, which continued in force for the 
current year, and of inflicting fines to a certain amount at 
discretion. 

The Areopagus likewise is said to have been founded by 
Solon, though it is certain that he only made some changes 
in its constitution ; but of this we shall speak hereafter. Ac- 
cording to Solon's theory, the people in its assembly was 
little more than the organ of the senate, as it could act only 
upon propositions {jrpot>ov\EVjiaTa) laid before it by the latter. 
But, unlike the Spartan assembly, that of Athens had not 
only the right of adopting and rejecting, but also of modify- 
ing or amending the measures proposed, without sending 
them back for the acceptance of the senate in their altered 
form. The ordinary assemblies seem to have been held at 
most once in every month, and certainly did not at first 
excite as lively an interest as in later times ; it was even 
found necessary to punish those citizens who neglected the 



188 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



CHAP. X, 



duty of attending the meetings. The votes were taken by 
show of hands {ye^orovia) an( ^ without any distinction of 
classes ; the vote of the humblest Athenian being of as much 
weight as that of the wealthiest noble, and every voter was 
allowed to speak. The exercise of the right of taking part 
in the assembly began at the age of twenty ; but those who 
were passed fifty, were called upon to express their opinion 
first. No fixed number of voters appears to have been ne- 
cessary, except in a few cases which required the presence of 
at least 6000 citizens. 

For the purpose of exercising the judicial power which 
Solon gave to the people, a body of 6000 citizens was every 
year created by lot to form a supreme court, called heliaea 
(/jXia/a), which was divided into several smaller ones, not 
limited to any precise number of persons. Every citizen who 
had the right to take a part in the popular assembly, and had 
attained the age of thirty, might become a member of this 
court. It was thus a select portion of the larger body, and 
Solon seems to have viewed it rather as the guardian of the 
constitution, than as the minister of the laws, as we must 
infer from the oath prescribed to the heliastae. The peculiar 
sphere of action of these popular courts, as representatives of 
the people, lay in questions relating to political offences, es- 
pecially in prosecutions instituted against authors of illegal 
measures. For any one who had caused a decree to be 
passed, which was afterwards found to be inconsistent with 
existing laws or with the public interest, was held responsible 
for his conduct, and if convicted within a year after the 
passing of his measure, was liable to punishment. A decree 
of the popular assembly might thus be reversed by the 
heliaea. 

Solon was too wise a man to believe that the laws which i 
he enacted could remain in force at all times, and under 
altered circumstances ; accordingly he made regulations 
subjecting them to perpetual revision. At the first popular 



CHAP. X. 



solon's legislation. 



169 



assembly in every year, proposals were received from any 
person for a change in the existing laws. If such a proposal 
seemed to be useful or desirable, the third ordinary meeting of 
the year might appoint a committee of legislation (vofioderai), 
drawn by lot from the heliaea, to examine the merits of the 
proposal. This committee then proceeded according to the 
forms of a legal trial ; and if the proposal was approved of, it 
came immediately into force, but its author was still re- 
sponsible for it. The thesmothetae also were enjoined con- 
stantly to keep a watchful eye on the laws, and to bring 
before the committee of legislation any imperfections which 
they might discover. 

Solon's legislation was of so simple a nature, that he thought 
every man endowed with the ordinary degree of intelligence, 
qualified to sit in judgment on his fellow-men. Lawyers in 
our sense, therefore, did not exist at Athens, nor was there 
any distinction between the province of the judge and that of 
the jury. Solon considered that every citizen ought to be 
interested in the maintenance of order and justice ; and hence 
he encouraged every one to come forward as prosecutor in 
cases affecting the interest of the state ; but that he did not 
intend to promote a spirit of litigation in general, is clear 
from his institution of the public arbitrators (^tour^rou), a 
body of persons past the age of sixty, who were annually 
appointed by lot. Before them all private causes might be 
brought, and from them, when they were chosen with the 
consent of both parties, no appeal was allowed. 

The council of the Areopagus, or the Hill of Ares, so 
called from an eminence on the western side of the acropolis, 
where its sittings were held # , had from time immemorial 
been a highly revered court of criminal justice, which took 
cognizance of cases of wilful murder, maiming, poisoning, and 
arson. It was held in the open air. Its forms and modes of 

* Hence it is sometimes called fj foco (BovX-fj, " the upper council, to 
distinguish it from the senate, or council of four hundred. 



170 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. X, 



proceeding were peculiarly rigid and solemn ; and the de- 
fendant was kept closely to the point at issue. Both parties 
were obliged to affirm the truth of their allegations with the 
most awful oaths ; but before sentence was passed the culprit 
might evade its consequences by going into voluntary exile. 
It is not certain whether the constitution of the Areopagus, 
such as we find it subsequently, is the work of Solon, or 
whether he only retained the ancient regulations. Hence- 
forth the vacancies occurring in the council were filled by 
the archons who had discharged their office with approved 
fidelity, and they held their seats for life. Solon, moreover, 
extended the powers of this venerable body, by erecting it 
into a supreme council, with a superintending and controlling 
authority over almost every part of the social system. Thus 
it became the guardian of the public morals and religion, and 
kept watch over the education and conduct of the citizens. 
It is, however, extremely difficult precisely to define the limits 
of its powers, and it was probably Solon's intention to leave 
them in that obscure and undefined state, with a view to 
magnify its authority in the eyes of the people ; for its strength 
rested on public opinion, not on any written law. When the 
votes of the council were equally divided in any case, the 
herald cast a white stone into the urn in favour of the accused, 
just as Athena was believed to have procured the acquittal 
of Orestes ; and hence this vote was called the vote of Athena 
(6 'AQrjvag \l>rj<pog). 

Our knowledge of the civil and penal codes which Solon 
introduced, is very scanty and fragmentary, arid we shall draw 
attention to a few points only, connected with education and 
the state of manners at Athens. He did not think it de- 
sirable to exercise that minute control over the citizens 
which Lycurgus had established at Sparta. Up to the age 
of sixteen, the education of the Athenian youth was left en- 
tirely to his parents or guardians. During the next two years 
he was obliged to be trained in gymnastic exercises, under 



CHAP. X 



SOLON S LEGISLATION. 



171 



publicly appointed masters, who kept him subject to a dis- 
cipline little less severe than that of Sparta. At eighteen he 
might become master of his patrimony, and entered upon his 
apprenticeship in arms ; he had to keep watch in the towns 
and fortresses on the frontier and the coast, and perform any 
task which might be imposed upon him for the protection of 
his country. It appears that at this stage his name was 
entered in the list of citizens {X-qliap^acbv ypafifiareiov), and 
he had to take the military oath, by which he pledged him- 
self never to disgrace his arms, nor to desert his comrade; 
to fight to the last in defence of Attica, its altars, and its 
hearths ; to leave his country not in worse, but in better, plight 
than he found it ; to obey the magistrates and the laws, and 
resist all attempts to subvert them ; and to respect the re- 
ligion of his ancestors. At the end of these two years he was 
admitted to all the rights and duties of a citizen for which 
the law did not prescribe a more advanced age. Till the end 
of his sixtieth year he was liable to be called out to perform 
military service. The general object of Solon's regulations 
regarding the female sex was to restrain the licence it had 
hitherto enjoyed, and often abused; and officers were appointed 
to enforce the observance of them. Women were forbidden 
to go abroad with more than three changes of apparel and a 
certain quantity of provisions, to pass through the street by 
night, otherwise than in a carriage and with a light carried 
before them, and to wail with frantic or studied vehemence 
at funerals. These regulations seem to show, that in the time 
of Solon women were not subject to that jealous seclusion 
with which, in later ages, they are generally believed to have 
been confined to their homes. 

Solon appears to have been the first to perceive the ad- 
vantageous position of Athens for becoming a maritime power, 
and to have laid the foundation of the Attic navy. He charged 
the forty-eight sections, called naucrariae (vavKpapiai), into 
which the tribes had been divided for financial purposes, each 

i 2 



172 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



CHAP. X. 



with the equipment of a galley, as well as with the mounting 
of two horsemen. He also gave active encouragement to trade 
and manufactures, and with this view invited foreigners to 
settle in Attica, by the assurance of protection and large 
privileges. These resident aliens (jjietoikoi), however, were 
still kept distinct from the citizens ; they were not allowed 
to acquire landed property in Attica ; their burdens were 
heavier, and some of them were peculiar. Each had to pay 
a small alien-tax (/jLerotKiov), and to place himself under the 
guardianship of a citizen, who was his representative in the 
courts of justice. Certain duties, also, were imposed upon 
them, which seem to have been devised to remind them of 
their position. Many, however, were admitted to the fran- 
chise, and others, who had gained the favour of the people, 
were exempted from their peculiar burdens as aliens. 

The condition of slaves in Attica was, at least in later times, 
less wretched than in other parts of Greece ; but it is un- 
known how far Solon may have contributed to this state of 
things. It is certain, however, that at an early age a slave 
was entitled to claim the protection of the law against the 
cruelty of a brutal master, who might be compelled to transfer 
him to another owner. But there can be little doubt that 
Solon sanctioned the atrocious abuse to which a slave was 
subject in the Athenian courts, where, at the discretion of 
either party, evidence might be wrung from him by torture ; 
and his evidence, even when offered freely, was deemed 
worthless until it had been sifted by the rack. On this point 
Solon did not rise above his age and country, for even aliens 
were exposed to the same treatment. 

The laws of Solon were inscribed on wooden tablets, 
arranged in pyramidal blocks, turning on an axis*: at first 
they were kept in the acropolis ;. but afterwards, for greater 
convenience of inspection, were brought down to the Pry- 

* y A|oi>€s, Kvpgeis. According to some, the &{oves- contained the civil 
laws, and the Kvpgeis the religious ones. 



CHAP. X. 



PISISTRATUS. 



173 



taneum. It is said that, after the completion of his legis- 
lation, Solon, to escape from over curious inquirers and 
cavillers, withdrew from Athens for a period of ten years, 
and visited Asia Minor, Cyprus, and Egypt. During his 
travels he is reported to have become acquainted with 
Croesus, king of Lydia, and Amasis, the ruler of Egypt ; but 
as neither of these princes can have ascended the throne 
before B.C. 572, Solon's travels, if they are an historical fact, 
must be assigned to a much later date ; and it is, in fact, far 
more likely that, after the completion of his work, the legislator 
remained at Athens for some years, to watch its working and 
to see its principles gaining hold of the popular mind, than 
that he immediately quitted his country. 

On his return to Athens, about B.C. 562, he found that 
faction had been actively engaged in attempting to pervert 
and undo his work. The three parties of the Plain, the Coast, 
and the Highlands, had revived their ancient feuds. The first 
of them was now headed by Lycurgus, the second by Megacles 
(a grandson of the archon who had brought the curse upon his 
house), and the third by Pisistratus, Solon's kinsman and the 
friend of his youth. Solon had early detected the designs of 
Pisistratus, but in vain endeavoured to avert the danger by 
attempting to reconcile the chiefs of the factions ; and Pisis- 
tratus waited only for an opportunity to carry out his plans. 
He had resolved to renew the enterprise of Cylon, in which 
his noble birth, his eloquence, and munificence towards the 
poorer citizens, promised him better success. When his 
scheme appeared to be ripe for action, he was one day drawn 
in a chariot into the public place, his own person and his 
mules disfigured by recent wounds, inflicted, as the sequel 
showed, by his own hands ; these he displayed to the mul- 
titude, telling them that he had narrowly escaped a band of 
assassins, who had been employed to murder the friend of the 
people. While the indignation of the multitude was fresh, 
an assembly was called by his partisans, in which one of them 



174 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. X, 



brought forward the motion, that a guard of fifty citizens, 
armed with clubs, should be appointed to protect the person of 
Pisistratus. Solon was the only man who ventured to oppose 
this proposal ; but as all who thought like him did not dare to 
brave the danger of expressing their opinion, the body-guard 
was decreed. As the people did not pay much attention to 
the manner in which Pisistratus made use of the means thus 
placed at his disposal, he raised a force and made himself 
master of the acropolis. Megacles and the Alcmaeonids left 
the city. Solon, after an ineffectual effort to rouse the people 
against the tyrant, laid his arms before his door, as a sign 
that he had made his last exertion in behalf of liberty and 
the laws. Lycurgus and his party seem for a time to have 
quietly submitted to the authority of Pisistratus, waiting only 
for a favourable opportunity of overthrowing him. This 
happened in B.C. 560. 

Like most of the Greek tyrants, Pisistratus was satisfied 
with the substance of power, avoiding all display of it. He 
made no visible changes in the constitution, affected in his 
own person the demeanour of a private citizen, and submitted 
to the laws by appearing before the Areopagus to answer a 
charge of murder, which, however, the accuser did not think 
fit to prosecute. He even continued to court the friendship 
and to ask the advice of Solon, who seems to have endured 
the usurpation, because he saw no alternative between tyranny 
and anarchy. According to the most authentic account, Solon 
died in b. c. 559, the very year after this revolution. In the 
mean time, Lycurgus formed a coalition with Megacles, and 
their united efforts compelled Pisistratus to quit Athens. 
How long his first tyrannis lasted is uncertain, though it 
was probably not much more than one year. 

How little the coalition could depend upon the people, 
however, soon became evident ; for when the property of the 
exiled tyrant was exposed to public sale, no one could be 
found to bid for it, but Callias, an ancestor of Alcibiades. The 



CHAP. X. 



PISISTRATUS. 



175 



union between Lycurgus and Megacles, moreover, could not 
last long ; and at the end of five years, Megacles, finding him- 
self unable to secure all the advantages he had expected, made 
overtures of reconciliation to Pisistratus, and offered to bestow 
on him the hand of his daughter and to assist him in re- 
covering the station which he had lost. Pisistratus accepted 
the proposal, though he was long past the prime of life, and 
the^ father of three sons and a daughter by a former marriage. 
A plan was now concerted for the restoration of Pisistratus, 
which struck even Herodotus by its childish simplicity. A 
tall comely woman, named Phya, was arrayed in a complete 
suit of armour, and riding in the same chariot with Pisis- 
tratus, brought him back to Athens, where she was believed 
to be the goddess Athena, conducting her favourite to her own 
citadel. This spectacle, however, was probably devised only 
to add unusual solemnity to the entrance of Pisistratus, and 
to suggest the reflection that he was restored by the especial 
favour of heaven. But the probability of the story is dimi- 
nished by the addition, that Pisistratus rewarded the woman, 
who is said to have been a garland-seller, for her services, 
by giving her in marriage to one of his sons. Pisistratus 
himself, according to the compact, married the daughter of 
Megacles ; but it was soon discovered that he did not treat her 
as his wife, and that he had no intention of really uniting his 
blood with that of a family which was believed to lie under a 
curse. The Alcmaeonids were indignant at the affront, and 
determined once more to make common cause with Lycurgus. 
Pisistratus, unable to resist the combined power of his enemies, 
was again driven into exile, and went to Eretria in Euboea. 
The second tyrannis had probably lasted not more than two 
years, and he now deliberated with his sons whether he should 
not abandon all thoughts of returning to Attica. But Hippias, 
the eldest, prevailed on his father again to make head against 
his enemies. He had large possessions in Thrace, and had 
great interest in various parts of Greece, especially at Argos 

14 



176 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. X. 



and Thebes, which latter distinguished itself by the liberality 
of its subsidies. By the end of ten years he had completed 
his preparations ; a body of mercenaries was brought to him 
from Argos, and Lygdamis, one of the most powerful men in 
the island of Naxos, came to his aid with all the troops and 
money he could raise. With these he sailed from Eretria, 
and landed on the plain of Marathon. The government of 
his enemies had not been popular at Athens during his 
absence, and his numerous friends in the city and country 
flocked to his camp as soon as he arrived. Megacles and 
Lycurgus hastily collected their forces, but at noon they were 
taken by surprise on their road from Athens to Marathon, for 
they showed as little of watchfulness in the field, as of fore- 
thought in their counsels. Pisistratus, instead of following 
up his victory and slaughtering his flying enemies, proclaimed 
a general amnesty on condition of their dispersing quietly to 
their homes. The leaders of the hostile factions finding 
themselves deserted by nearly all, abandoned the city, and 
left their opponent undisputed master of Athens. 

What he had so hardly won he determined to hold hence- 
forth with a firm grasp : he no longer relied on the affections 
of the people ; but surrounded himself with a body of foreign 
mercenaries, and seizing the children of some of the nobles 
who had opposed him, he sent them to Naxos, to be kept as 
hostages. By these means, and by the great popularity 
which he contrived to gain at Athens, he succeeded in 
maintaining his position for fourteen years, until his death, 
in b. c. 527. The fact that he is said to have raised his 
friend Lygdamis to the tyrannis in Naxos, presupposes the 
existence of a naval force ; and this force he also employed 
in the recovery of Sigeum on the Hellespont, which was then 
in the possession of the Mytilenaeans, and about which 
Athens and Mytilene had been at war nearly half a century 
before, when it is related the sage Pittacus gained a memorable 
victory over the Athenians, having come into the field armed 



CHAP. X. 



PISISTRATUS. 



177 



with a casting-net, a trident, and a dagger ; and having first 
entangled the Athenian general Phrynon with the net, he then 
despatched him with the dagger. In a later battle of the 
same war the poet Alcaeus lost his shield. At length the 
war had been brought to a close, through the mediation of 
Periander of Corinth, who awarded Sigeum to Athens. The 
Mytilenaeans, however, refused to surrender the town, and 
Pisistratus now took it from them by force, entrusting it to 
the keeping of his bastard son, Hegesistratus, who success- 
fully defended it against long-continued attacks. By this con- 
quest he not only increased his reputation at home, but secured 
a place for himself, if fortune should again turn against him. 

Pisistratus, as the ruler of the chief city of the Ionian 
name, undertook the purification of the island of Delos, 
which an oracle had commanded, and which was effected 
by the removal of all the dead bodies that had been buried 
within sight of the temple of Apollo. At home, he still 
maintained the institutions of Solon, and courted popularity 
by munificent largesses, and by throwing open his gardens 
to the poorer citizens. The law of Solon, which required 
every citizen to give an account of his means of gaining a 
subsistence, enabled him to remove from the city a great 
number of the poorer class, and to compel them to engage 
in rural occupations, in which, however, he is said to have 
assisted them with money, cattle, and seed. By this means 
he got rid of his most restless subjects, and gained the praise 
of a benefactor of the poor. He also adorned Athens with 
many useful and magnificent works. Among the latter was 
a temple of Apollo, and one dedicated to the Olympian Zeus, 
of which, however, he lived to complete the substructions 
only, and which was not finished till 700 years later, in the 
reign of the emperor Hadrian. Among the monuments in 
which splendour and usefulness were combined, was the 
Lyceum, a garden at a short distance from Athens, sacred to 
the Lycian Apollo, where stately buildings for the exercises 

i 5 



178 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



chap. Xi 



of the Athenian youth rose amid shady groves ; and the 
fountain of Callirhoe, which, from the new channels in which 
Pisistratus distributed its waters, received the name of the 
Nine Springs ^JLvveaKpowoq). The expenses of these works 
were defrayed out of the revived tithe on the produce of the 
lands, which was thus a tax levied on the rich for the pur- 
pose of employing the poor, and with which the former were 
naturally not a little discontented. Pisistratus is also believed 
to have been the author of a wise and beneficent law for sup- 
porting, at the public expense, citizens disabled in war. 

According to a tradition once very generally received, 
posterity has been indebted to him for a benefit greater 
than any which he conferred on his contemporaries, in the 
preservation of the Homeric poems, which until then are 
said to have been scattered in unconnected rhapsodies. He 
was probably not the first collector, but his collection was 
no doubt superior in extent and accuracy to all that had 
preceded it. His taste for literature appears to have been 
genuine ; he was the first Greek who formed a library, and 
he imparted its contents to the public with great liberality. 
On the whole, it must be owned that he made princely use of 
the power he had usurped ; and Athens was indebted to him 
for a season of repose, during which she gained much of that 
strength, which she finally unfolded. He died at an advanced 
age, b. c. 527, thirty-three years after his first usurpation. 

His power was so firmly rooted, that his sons, Hippias, 
Hipparchus, and Thessalus^ succeeded him in the government 
without any opposition. Hippias, as the eldest, took his 
father's place at the head of affairs ; but the three brothers 
seem to have lived in great unanimity, and to have worked 
together with little or no show of outward distinction, Hip- 
pias seems to have been distinguished as a statesman ; Hip- 
parchus inherited his father's literary taste, but was addicted 
to pleasure ; of Thessalus we hear only that he was a spirited 
youth. For some years the Pisistratids followed the footsteps 



CHAP. X. 



THE PISISTRATIDS. 



179 



of their father, and seem to have directed their attention to 
promote the internal prosperity of the country and the culti- 
vation of letters and arts. To Hipparchus is attributed the 
merit of having erected a number of Hermae, or stone busts 
of Hermes, along the roads leading from the capital, inscribed 
on one side with an account of the distance which it marked, 
and on the other with some moral sentence in verse. These 
verses were either the compositions of Hipparchus himself, 
or of one of the many distinguished poets whom he hos- 
pitably entertained in his house. He is also said to have es- 
tablished the order in which the Homeric poems continued 
in after times to be recited at the Panathenaic festival. Al- 
though the three brothers, like their father, made no display 
of power, yet they were not always scrupulous about the 
means which they employed to get rid of persons who had 
incurred their hatred or their jealousy. Thus they hired the 
assassins who murdered Cimon, the father of Miltiades. They 
kept up a standing force of mercenaries ; they made no 
change in the constitution indeed, but took care that the 
most important offices were filled by their own friends. The 
wealthy citizens were conciliated by the reduction of the 
tithe imposed by Pisistratus, to one twentieth. JSTo new taxes 
were levied, although the great works commenced by their 
father were continued. The sober-minded Thucydides states 
that these tyrants cultivated virtue and wisdom, w T hence we 
cannot wonder that later writers describe their reign as a 
sort of golden age. There seems, in fact, to have been no 
discontent in the country, and the Pisistratids might have 
maintained their ascendancy for many generations, had not 
an event occurred which led to their overthrow and to a com- 
plete change in the government. 

This revolution was brought about by two young men, 
Harmodius and Aristogeiton, who were connected by inti- 
mate friendship. Harmodius was grossly insulted by Hip- 
parchus, and instigated by his friend, he meditated revenge. 

i 6 



180 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP, X. 



Hipparchus then tried to cast dishonour upon the family of 
Harmodius, which stung the youth to the quick. The two 
friends resolved, not only to wash out the disgrace in the 
blood of the offender, but to overthrow the ruling dynasty, 
a plan which Aristogeiton had formed even before these oc- 
currences. They were secretly joined by many friends, and 
the conspirators fixed on the day of the great Panathenaea 
for effecting their purpose. It was intended to kill Hippias 
during the procession, in which the citizens took part in arms ; 
but the conspirators/ imagining from some circumstances that 
their scheme was betrayed, hastened back from the Cera- 
micus to the city, with their daggers concealed under branches 
of myrtle. On meeting with Hipparchus, they killed him 
before his guards could come up to his assistance. Har- 
modius, however, fell in the fray. Aristogeiton escaped for 
the moment among the crowd, but was afterwards taken. 
When Hippias was informed of the event, he commanded the 
armed men who formed the procession, and who were yet 
ignorant of what had happened, to lay aside their arms, and 
meet him at an appointed place. His guards then searched 
all persons, and those who were found with daggers, or were 
otherwise suspected, were arrested on the spot. This oc- 
curred in the year b. c. 514. 

Aristogeiton was put to death, perhaps even with cruel tor- 
ture ; but before he died he revenged himself by accusing the 
truest friends of Hippias. Hippias had hitherto acted as a 
wise and good ruler ; but fear and suspicion now turned him 
into a stern and cruel tyrant ; and instead of conciliating his 
subjects, he aimed only at cowing them by rigour. Execu- 
tions were things of common occurrence, extraordinary taxes 
were levied, and various artifices were resorted to for the 
purpose of filling the tyrant's coffers at the expense of all 
classes of the people. At the same time, seeing that he was 
hated and detested at home, he ent red into a foreign alliance 
in order to provide for himself a place of retreat^ whenever 



CHAP. X. 



HIPPIAS' EXILE. 



181 



he should be compelled to seek it. He gave hisj daughter in 
marriage to a son of Hippoclus, the tyrant of Lampsacus, 
who stood high in the favour of Darius, king of Persia. 

While Hippias was thus surrounded by dangers at home, 
he was also threatened from without by the machinations of 
the banished Alcmaeonids, who were in a position to com- 
mand any aid that money could purchase. They were 
encouraged by the unpopularity of Hippias to renew their 
attempts at revolution, but his vigilance repulsed them, 
although they had taken possession of a frontier town. They 
now secured the services of the Delphic oracle, by rebuilding 
the temple which had been accidentally burnt, in a style far 
more magnificent than was stipulated in the agreement 
which they had made with the Amphictions. Thus Clei- 
sthenes, now at the head of the Alcmaeonids, made the Py- 
thian priestess the instrument of his designs. Henceforth 
whenever Spartans came to consult the oracle, they received 
but one answer bidding them restore Athens to freedom. 
Owing to these repeated exhortations, the Spartans at length 
resolved to send an army into Attica to expel Hippias and 
his family. Anchimolius led the Spartan forces, and landed 
at Phalerum. The Thessalians, being allied with Hippias, 
sent him 1000 horse under Cineas, who routed the Spartans, 
slew their commander, and drove them to their ships. A 
greater force, under King Cleomenes, now invaded Attica by 
land. This time the Thessalians were defeated, and though 
their loss was small, they returned home. Hippias might 
still have maintained himself ; but he was so alarmed that he 
ordered his children to be sent out of the country ; on their 
way they fell into the hands of the enemy, and he could re- 
deem them only on condition of quitting Attica within five 
days. Accordingly in B.C. 510, he set sail for Asia, where 
for a time he took up his residence in his hereditary princi- 
pality of Sigeum. 

After his departure, severe measures were taken against 



182 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP* X. 



bis adherents : some were put to death, others sent into exile, 
and others deprived of their political privileges. The tyrant 
and his family were condemned to perpetual banishment. 
The fortunate tyrannicides^ Harmodius and Aristogeiton, on 
the other hand, received almost heroic honours : statues were 
erected to them, and their names never ceased to be repeated 
with affectionate admiration. Much of this enthusiasm was 
evidently misplaced ; for their crime had not been committed 
in the service of freedom, but at the suggestion of private 
vengeance ; the latter years of Hippias' government, however, 
seemed to the Athenians to justify all the praise bestowed 
upon those who had first, though unsuccessfully, attempted 
to deliver the country from his tyranny. 

After the expulsion of the Pisistratids, the democratic 
party at Athens was without a leader. The Alcmaeonids 
had always been regarded as its opponents, though they 
were no less hostile to the faction of the nobles, which seems 
at this time to have been headed by Isagoras. It was still 
so powerful, that Cleisthenes and his party were unable to 
cope with it. He accordingly shifted his ground, and at- 
tached himself to the popular cause, which Pisistratus had 
used as his stepping-stone ; and to secure for himself a 
lasting advantage over his rivals, he planned an important 
change in the constitution, which should for ever break the 
power of his own order. With this view, having gained the 
confidence of the commonalty, and obtained the sanction of 
the Delphic oracle, he abolished the four ancient tribes, and 
made a fresh geographical division into ten local tribes 
(0iAcu), each of which bore a name derived from some Attic 
hero. The ten tribes were subdivided into ten districts of 
different extent called demi (tirjfxoi), each of which contained 
some town or village as its centre. At a later time, we find 
the number of demi increased to 174, some of the earlier 
demi having perhaps been subdivided for the sake of con- 
venience. The phratriae continued to exist, but lost all poli- 



chap. x. REFOEMS OF CLEISTHENES. 



183 



tical importance, and retained no power but that of watching 
over the legitimate succession of their members, and regis- 
tering their title to their hereditary civil rights. Each 
township was governed by its local magistrate called demar- 
chus (Srifiapxpo), who held its assemblies for the transaction 
of its own affairs, and for ascertaining and recording the 
number of its members* Every citizen was obliged to be a 
member of a demos, without which he could exercise no 
political rights. Cleisthenes at the same time increased his 
strength by making a great many new citizens ; and is said 
to have admitted not only aliens, but even slaves. If this 
account is true, it shows that there was still a considerable 
portion of the people on whom he could not rely, and that 
he was compelled to adopt that measure for the purpose of 
strengthening his own party among the commonalty. 

We are too little acquainted with the machinery which 
the new system of Cleisthenes broke up, to form an accurate 
notion of the importance of the latter, which however was 
certainly not suggested by the mere love of novelty or inno- 
vation : it transformed the commonalty into a new body, 
furnished with new organs and breathing a new spirit, 
which was no longer subject to the slightest control of the 
old nobility. The whole reorganisation of the state was 
made to correspond with the new geographical division of 
the country. Accordingly, the senate also was increased 
from 400 to 500 : so that fifty were drawn from each of the 
ten tribes ; and the rotation of the presidency was adapted 
to this change, the fifty representatives of each tribe filling 
that office for thirty-five or thirty-six days in rotation ; 
and nine senators were elected, one from each of the other 
tribes, to preside in the council and the assembly of the peo- 
ple, which was now called regularly four times in every 
month, certain business being assigned to each meeting. 
The heliaea, also, was distributed into ten courts, and the 
same division prevailed in most other public offices, though 



184 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP, X# 



the number of the arehons remained unchanged. To Clei- 
sthenes is also ascribed the institution of the ostracism; a 
summary process, enabling the people to rid itself of any 
citizen who had made himself formidable, or an object of 
suspicion, without any proof or even imputation of guilt. 
This is another proof of the weakness of the government ; 
but at the same time it proved a useful check upon ambitious 
and aspiring individuals, and allayed the public fear when- 
ever the ascendancy of one man threatened to endanger the 
liberty of the people. 

These reforms so much increased the power and influence 
of their author, and reduced the party of Isagoras to such 
utter weakness, that the latter had no hope except in foreign 
aid. They accordingly solicited the assistance of Sparta, whose 
king, Cleomenes, had received some very equivocal favours 
from Isagoras, and who now sent heralds to Athens, re- 
quiring the expulsion of the accursed race of the Alcmae- 
onids. Cleisthenes, either dreading the cry which had so 
often been disastrous to his family, or unwilling to expose 
his country to a hostile invasion, withdrew from Athens. 
But this concession did not satisfy Cleomenes, who was bent 
upon reducing Athens under the dominion of Isagoras. He 
came with only a small force ; but, during the dismay of the 
people at the absence of their leader, was allowed to act as 
if he were absolute master. He banished 700 families 
marked out by Isagoras, and then took steps to abolish the 
senate of 500, and to place the government in the hands of 
300 of his friend's partisans. This measure roused the peo- 
ple ; and Isagoras and Cleomenes, having taken refuge on 
the acropolis, were besieged by the people. On the third 
day, however, they capitulated ; Cleomenes and Isagoras 
were permitted to depart with the Lacedaemonian troops, but 
were compelled to leave their adherents to the mercy of their 
enemies. All were put to death ; and Cleisthenes, with the 



chap. X. CLEOMENES INVADES ATTICA. 



185 



700 exiled families, triumphantly returned to Athens, in 
b. c. 508. 

As it soon became known that Cleomenes was preparing 
to avenge his humiliating defeat, the Athenians in their 
alarm, sent envoys to Sardis, to seek the protection of Persia. 
This embassy had no immediate effect ; and while Cleomenes, 
accompanied by his colleague Demaratus, invaded Attica on 
the side of Eleusis, the Thebans, who had promised to join 
him, took the towns of Oenoe and Hysiae ; and the Chalci- 
dians from Euboea ravaged the eastern coast. The Athe- 
nians directed all their forces against the Spartans ; but 
before battle was joined, the Corinthians, who with other 
Peloponnesians served in the Spartan army, ashamed of 
being used as tools to crush the liberty of Athens, returned 
home ; and Demaratus, for some unknown reason, also re- 
fused to co-operate. The rest of the Peloponnesians then 
followed the example of the Corinthians, and Cleomenes was 
obliged to abandon his enterprise. The dispute between the 
two kings on that occasion, led the Spartans to enact a law 
that both kings should never in future take the field together. 

The Athenians, on being delivered from their most for- 
midable enemy, marched towards the Euripus to chastise 
Chalcis. In Boeotia they met the Thebans, whom they de- 
feated and took 700 prisoners. The same day they crossed 
the straits, and gained a victory over the Chalcidians, from 
which they derived great advantages ; for they were enabled 
to distribute the estates of the great Chalcidian landowners 
among 4000 Attic colonists, who settled there, but retained 
their Attic franchise. This acquisition gave the means of 
subsistence to many poor families ; and enabled Athens to 
raise a body of cavalry, the force in which Attica was most 
deficient. All the captive Chalcidians, and the 700 Thebans, 
were put in chains, but were afterwards ransomed for two 
minas a head. The chains with which they had been fet- 



186 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. X. 



tered were hung up on the walls of a temple on the acro- 
polis ; and a brazen chariot was dedicated to Athena as a 
tenth of the ransom, with an inscription recording this first 
achievement of the liberated commonwealth. 

In the enjoyment of civil freedom Athens now became 
strong and powerful; under her noble rulers she had surpassed 
none of her neighbours in feats of arms, but now got far 
ahead of them all. This is the best proof that Cleisthenes, 
though he no doubt acted from selfish motives, yet under- 
stood the temper and character of the people, and saw that 
the half measures of the Solonian constitution satisfied neither 
the nobles nor the people, and might become dangerous to 
the safety of Athens, which under an aristocracy or a tyrant 
would undoubtedly have become a Persian province. 

The Thebans, burning to revenge their disgrace, but unable 
to do any thing, allied themselves, by the advice of an oracle, 
with the Aeginetans, who bore an ancient grudge against 
Athens and were then at the height of their power. While 
the Thebans invaded Attica from the north, the Aeginetans 
with their fleet plundered many of the maritime towns. The 
Athenians were preparing to retaliate on Aegina, when they 
perceived that they were threatened from another quarter. 
The Spartans had in the mean time learned, that Cleisthenes 
and the Delphic oracle had imposed upon them in inducing 
them to ruin the Pisistratids. The resentment thus roused, 
and the conviction that the growing power of Athens would 
become a match for Sparta, led them to invite Hippias to 
come from Sigeum to Sparta. A congress of deputies from 
the Peloponnesian allies was at the same time summoned to 
consider a plan for restoring Hippias. The greater part of 
the allies, however, appear to have perceived, that, though it 
might suit the interest of Sparta to keep Athens subject to a 
creature of her own, they should reap nothing but shame 
from such an act of injustice. No one, however, ventured to 
declare his opinion, till the Corinthian Sosicles vehemently 



CHAP. X. 



HIPPIAS GOES TO PERSIA. 



187 



remonstrated with the Spartans for wishing to set up a 
tyrant in direct opposition to the spirit of their own consti- 
tution. Encouraged by his eloquence, all the other deputies 
declared with one accord against the proposal of Sparta. 
The design was thus abandoned ; Hippias soon afterwards 
returned to Sigeum, and thence proceeded to the court of 
Darius. The war with Aegina was continued up to the time 
of the Persian war. during which the Aeginetans joined the 
common enemy of Greece, until in b. c. 457, the Athenians 
succeeded in destroying their fleet and making themselves 
masters of the island. 



188 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP, XI. 



CHAPTER XL 

THE COLONIES OF THE GREEKS, AND THE PROGRESS OF ART AND LITE- 
RATURE FROM THE HOMERIC AGE TO THE PERSIAN WAR. 

The history of Greece would be incomplete without some 
account of her colonies ; but we must in this place content 
ourselves with a brief sketch of their general character, and 
of the influence which they exercised upon the ancient world 
at large. It is one of the most pleasing spectacles in the 
history of antiquity to behold the establishment of the Greek 
colonies on all the coasts of the three ancient continents, by 
means of which the Greek language, manners, and culture, 
were spread among barbarous nations. The Greeks seem to 
have been destined by Providence to become the civilisers of 
the ancient world, and this destiny they fulfilled by their 
wide- spread colonial settlements, which exercised an in- 
fluence upon mankind far greater than any they could have 
acquired, had they confined themselves to the narrow boun- 
daries of their mother country. 

We need not dwell upon the mythical colonies said to 
have been founded by the Greeks on or after their return 
from the siege of Troy ; the most ancient historically attested 
colonies are those connected with the Aeolian migration; 
that is, with the first of the great movements produced by 
the eruption of the Aeolians into Boeotia, and of the Dorians 
into Peloponnesus. Achaeans, driven from their homes, and 
seeking new seats in the east, are believed to have been 
joined in Boeotia by a part both of its ancient inhabitants 
and of their Aeolian conquerors. From the latter, who were 
probably predominant in influence, the migration is called 
the Aeolian, but sometimes also the Boeotian. The emigrants 
were headed by chiefs claiming descent from Agamemnon, 



chap. xi. THE AEOLIAN COLONIES. 189 

and their main body embarked at Aulis. Their first settle- 
ments were in Lesbos, where they founded six cities. Other 
detachments occupied the opposite coast of Asia Minor, from 
the foot of Mount Ida to the mouth of the river Hermus. 
This is the real origin of the greater part of the Aeolian 
colonies ; but there is reason for believing that the Achaeans 
had begun to migrate from Peloponnesus eastward, even be- 
fore the time of the Dorian conquest. The countries of 
which they took possession were still in the hands of the 
Pelasgians ; who, however, were in a state of great weakness. 
Cuma became the principal of the Aeolian cities in Asia. 
It is highly probable, that the current of emigration towards 
those beautiful and fertile countries continued for more than 
a century ; the results of this were eleven Aeolian cities on 
the mainland of Asia ; and Cuma and Lesbos founded thirty 
others in the territory of Priam. 

The country to the south of Aeolis, from the river Hermus 
to the Maeander, which enjoyed a still happier climate, fell 
to the lot of the adventurers who embarked in the Ionian 
migration. They were mostly Ionianj, who, when dislodged 
by the Achaeans from their seats on the Corinthian gulf, took 
refuge in Attica, and probably assisted in repelling that in- 
vasion of the Dorians in which Codrus is said to have devoted 
himself for his country. Here they were joined by other 
fugitives and adventurers, especially Phocians ; and as Attica 
could not afford permanent abodes for them, Neleus, the son 
of Codrus, with several of his brothers and clansmen, put 
himself at their head and emigrated. On their passage across 
the Aegean, many formed settlements in the Cyclades and 
other islands ; and in process of time Delos became a common 
sanctuary of the Ionian race. The Asiatic coast, henceforth 
called Ionia, and the neighbouring islands of Chios and 
Samos, were at this time inhabited by various tribes, such as 
Carians, Leleges, descendants of Cretan colonists, and adven- 
turers from various parts of Greece. The new invaders 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XT. 



readily united with ail except the Carians and Leleges, who 
were expelled or exterminated. Twelve independent states 
were gradually formed, all of which assumed the Ionian 
name, and were regarded as parts of the same nation, although 
they were composed of very different elements and spoke 
different dialects. At Miletus the settlers might boast of the 
purest Ionian blood, and Neleus chose that place for his resi- 
dence. All its male inhabitants, Carians and perhaps 
Cretans, were massacred, and the women were forced to 
marry the invaders. My us and Priene were likewise wrested 
from the Carians. Androclus, a son of Codrus, led his fol- 
lowers to Ephesus, which was inhabited chiefly by Leleges 
and Lydians, who were expelled by the Ionians; but the 
temple of the Asiatic Artemis afforded an asylum to a con- 
siderable number of suppliants, among whom were women 
said to have been descended from the Amazons, its reputed 
founders. Colophon was inhabited by Cretans, with whom 
the Ionians, under two sons of Codrus, agreed to dwell on 
terms of equality. Andraemon or Andropompus, another 
son of Codrus, drove the Carians out of Lebedos. Teos had 
been previously occupied by Minyans from Orchomenos, in- 
termingled with Carians; and the Ionians were peaceably 
admitted to a share in the colony, which soon afterwards 
received a fresh band of adventurers from Attica and Boeotia. 
Erythrae seems to have become a member of the Ionian body 
at a later period, being colonised by settlers from all the 
Ionian cities, who found there Cretans, Carians, Lycians, and 
Pamphylians, with whom an amicable union was formed. 

All the cities here enumerated were in existence before the 
Ionian migration, but Clazomenae and Phocaea owed their 
origin to that event. The former was founded by Ionians, 
mixed with a larger body of emigrants who had quitted 
Cleonae and Phlius after the Dorian invasion. Phocaea was 
built on ground obtained from Cuma, by a colony of Phocians. 
The island of Chios most probably received its colonists from 



chap, xio THE IONIAN AND DORIAN COLONIES. 191 

Erythrae, it having previously been inhabited by Abantes 
and Carians from Euboea, and by Cretans; the Erythraeans 
and Chians were distinguished from all the other Ionians by 
a peculiar dialect. Samos had received an Ionian colony 
originally sprung from Epidaurus, which shared it with its 
ancient inhabitant s, the Leleges. The Ephesians made war 
on the new settlers, and drove them out of the island. A 
part of them crossed over to Sainothrace,' and there united 
with the Tyrrhenian Pelasgians ; but another body seized 
Anaea, on the opposite coast of Asia, and there waited for 
an opportunity of returning to Samos. Ten years later they 
succeeded in this, and ejected the Ephesians. After this 
event they must have become members of the Ionian con- 
federacy. The dialect of Samos was peculiar to itself. To 
these twelve cities Smyrna was afterwards added. It is said 
to have been at first occupied by Aeolians, and to have been 
treacherously seized by a body of exiles from Colophon ; but 
another, and more probable account represents it as having 
been founded by Ionians from Ephesus. There a part of the 
ancient town once bore the name of Smyrna. Smyrna is 
stated to have succeeded to the place of a town called Melite, 
the thirteenth in the list, which was destroyed by the common 
consent of the other twelve. 

The south-western corner of the peninsula of Asia Minor, 
and the neighbouring islands, were occupied nearly at the 
same period by colonists of the Doric race. Some of the 
Dorian conquerors themselves were drawn into the tide of 
migration, and led bands of their own countrymen, and of 
the conquered Achaeans to the coast of Asia. The most 
celebrated of these expeditions was that of the Argive Althae- 
menes, who leaving one division of his followers in Crete, 
proceeded with the rest to Ehodes, where the Heracleid Tle- 
polemus was believed to have founded the towns of Lindos, 
Ialysos, and Cameiros, before the Trojan war. About the 
same time Halicarnassos was founded by Dorians from Troe- 



192 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XI* 



zen, and Cnidus by others from Laconia. A third band from 
Epidaurus took possession of the island of Cos. These six 
colonies formed an association, from which several others in 
their neighbourhood were excluded, and which, after Hali- 
carnassos had been obliged to withdraw from it, was called 
by the name of the Dorian pentapolis. Rhodes was probably 
the parent of most of the Greek colonies on the south coast 
of Asia Minor. She may also have contributed to the Greek 
population of Lycia, though it was unquestionably of Cretan 
origin. Traces of Greek adventurers occur even far inland, 
for Selge, a great Pisidian town, and Sagalassos, boasted a 
Laconian origin. 

The Greek colonies in Cyprus may likewise be referred to 
the century following the Dorian conquest, though most of 
them claimed a higher antiquity, and ascribed their founda- 
tion to some of the heroes who fought at Troy. 

A long interval seems to have elapsed after this before the 
state of Greece gave occasion to new migrations ; for it was 
not till the century following the beginning of the Olympiads 
that the Greeks established themselves on the coast of Sicily, 
and spread so far over the south of Italy, that it acquired the 
name of Great Greece (Magna Graecia). These colonies, 
like those of Asia, were of various origin, some Aeolian or 
Achaean, some Dorian, some Ionian. The Ionians led the 
way, and the city of Chalcis in Euboea, sent out, if not the 
first adventurers who explored the Italian and Sicilian coasts, 
yet the first who gained a permanent footing there; for, 
according to a generally received tradition, Cuma in Cam- 
pania was founded by a Chalcidian colony, about the middle 
of the century following the return of the Heracleids. Some 
accounts even make it an earlier settlement than the Aeolian 
Cuma, from which it was erroneously believed to have de- 
rived its name and a part of its population ; but in these its 
antiquity was, no doubt, greatly exaggerated. It is singular, 
however, that for three centuries no adventurers followed in 



CIIAP. XI. 



THE WESTERN COLONIES. 



193 



the same track ; and that, even at the end of that time, the 
first Greek settlement in Sicily was the result of a fortunate 
chance, which revealed the richness of the island and the 
weakness of its inhabitants to Theocles, an Athenian, who 
was driven upon its coast. On his return to Greece, he per- 
suaded the Chalcidians, after having tried his fellow-citizens 
in vain, to send out a colony to Sicily. The great landowners 
of Chalcis seem to have had political motives for encouraging 
emigration among the poorer citizens ; and Chalcis had pro- 
bably already planted colonies in the Thracian peninsula, 
which hence acquired its name of Chalcidice, though a great 
part of its Greek population was derived from Eretria, the 
neighbour and rival of Chalcis. In the colony which 
Theocles led to Sicily in b. c. 735, the island of Naxos took 
so important a part, that the name of Naxos was given to the 
town which it founded, though Chalcis was always recognised 
as its parent. Sicily was at that time inhabited by various 
tribes, Sicanians, Sicels, Phoenicians, Elymians. The Sicels 
and Phoenicians gradually retreated before the Greeks, whose 
colonies, in the course of a century, covered the eastern and 
southern coasts of the island. The Chalcidians of Naxos 
soon afterwards planted the colonies of Leontium and Catana ; 
Messana and Rhegium likewise, the two cities which com- 
mand the straits, were of Chalcidian origin. 

But the Greek cities in Sicily which rose to the highest 
renown were of Dorian foundation. Of these Syracuse was 
founded in b. c. 734, by Corinthians under a leader named 
Archias, a Heracleid, who seems to have been obliged to quit 
his country in consequence of an outrage which he had com- 
mitted on a humble family. His companion, Chersicrates, 
was left with a division of his followers in Corcyra, from 
which the inhabitants were expelled. Corcyra was the most 
important of a series of Corinthian colonies on the eastern 
coast of the Adriatic and the Ionian sea ; and Syracuse be- 
came the parent of other Sicilian cities, of which Camarina 

K 



194 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XI.^ 



was the greatest. Megara, now independent of Corinth, 
followed her ancient sovereign in this field of enterprise, 
though her most flourishing colonies lay on the coasts of the 
Propontis and Bosporus, where, about a century after the 
foundation of Rome, b. c. 658, she planted Byzantium, the 
future rival of the eternal city. In Sicily, Megarian adven- 
turers succeeded in establishing themselves at Hybla, which 
became the parent of Selinus, b. c. 629. Gela w 7 as founded 
in b. c. 690, by a band collected from Crete and Khodes ; and 
about a century later, b. c. 582, it sent forth settlers, who 
built Agrigentum (Acragas), on the banks of the Acragas. 
Himera, on the north side of the island, was peopled by a 
colony from Messana and by Dorians, who had been banished 
from Syracuse. 

Within half a century after the Greeks first set foot in 
Sicily, they founded most of the great cities in southern 
Italy. The rivals Sybaris and Croton were both of Achaean 
origin, though in the foundation of the former Troezenians 
also took part ; and in the latter, Dorians from Laconia may 
have had a share. Such seems also to have been the origin of 
Locri, which was founded either by the Locrians of Opus or 
by those on the Crissaean gulf, who were joined by Achaeans, 
and perhaps by Dorians from Laconia. Tarentum was 
founded by Laconian settlers (Parthenii), at the end of the 
first Messenian war, though it appears to have been occu- 
pied by Greeks even before that event. Metapontum, said 
to have been colonised by followers of Nestor after the return 
from Troy, seems to have been subsequently in the possession 
of Greeks from Crissa. These great cities extended and 
secured the dominion of the Greeks in Italy, by a number of 
new colonies, among which we need only mention Posidonia 
(Paestum), the ruins of which still attest its former greatness. 

Another field of enterprise was opened to the Greeks on 
the north coast of Africa. The island of Calliste had in early 
times received a colony from Laconia, chiefly consisting of 



chap. XI. THE ITALIAN AND AFRICAN COLONIES. 195 



Minyans, from whose leader, Theras, the island is said to 
have been named Thera. Many centuries later, Battus, a 
leading citizen of Thera, undertook an expedition to the coast 
of Africa, the fertility of which had long been known to the 
Greeks. The Theraeans formed a settlement there on the 
table-land which arises on the western border of the Great 
Syrtis, at the distance of ten miles from the coast. This was 
Cyrene, so called from the gushing spring of Cyre in the 
neighbourhood. The country was one of inexhaustible 
wealth, and possessed a most salubrious climate. Cyrene 
itself founded four colonies in the adjoining district, with 
which it formed the Cyrenaic Pentapolis. The barbarians 
who inhabited the country before the arrival of the Greeks, 
seem to have made room for them without a struggle. At a 
later period, about b. c. 637, adventurers from various parts 
of Greece were invited by the Cyrenaeans to share the fertile 
soil. The Libyans seeing themselves thus threatened with 
the complete loss of their country, sought aid from Egypt, 
whose king, Apries, sent them succours, which, however, 
were repulsed with terrible slaughter, and the dominion of 
the Greeks became firmly established in Cyrenaica. 

The colonies which we have enumerated were not by any 
means all that were founded by the Greeks during that 
period ; we shall afterwards have occasion to mention others, 
and here confine ourselves to pointing out certain general 
features of the Greek colonies. As regards the relation sub- 
sisting between a colony and its parent city it must be 
observed, that colonies were commonly established with the 
approbation and encouragement of the states from which they 
issued, the latter often finding it expedient to rid themselves 
of superfluous bands or discontented and turbulent spirits. 
There was in most cases, however, nothing to suggest the 
feeling of dependence on the one side, or a claim of authority 
on the other ; a claim which it would generally have been 
impossible to enforce, on account of the great distance between 



196 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XI. 



the mother-country and the colony. Hence the only con- 
nection which continued to exist, was one of filial affection 
and religious reverence. Except in the few cases where the 
emigrants were forced as outcasts from their native land, 
they cherished the remembrance of it as a duty prescribed by 
religion as well as by nature. The tutelary deities of the 
mother-city were invited to share the newly conquered land, 
and temples were commonly dedicated to them in the new 
acropolis, resembling as nearly as possible those with which 
they were honoured in the mother-country ; their images 
were made after the old models, and it would seem that the 
priests who ministered to them were sometimes brought from 
their ancient seats. The sacred fire which was kept con- 
stantly burning on the public hearth of the colony, was taken 
from the altar of Hestia, in the senate-house of the elder 
state. The founder of a colony, as the representative of the 
parent city, was after his death honoured as a being of a 
higher order ; and when the colony, in its turn, became a 
parent, it usually sought a leader from the original mother 
country. The same reverential feeling manifested itself more 
regularly in embassies and offerings sent by the colony to 
honour the festivals of the parent city, and in the marks of 
respect shown to its citizens who represented it on similar 
occasions in the colony. The natural result of all this was 
a disposition to mutual good offices in seasons of danger and 
distress. 

In most cases the colonists established themselves as con- 
querors in lands already inhabited and cultivated, and dis- 
possessed either partially or entirely the ancient owners of 
the soil. The condition to which the latter were reduced 
varied, according to circumstances, between absolute slavery 
and an equality of political rights, though the conquerors 
scarcely ever admitted the vanquished to perfect equality 
with themselves. Subsequent adventurers, settling in the 
same place, generally enjoyed an inferior franchise to that of 



chap. XI. GOVERNMENT OF THE COLONIES. 197 



the original colonists. As ftiost of the colonies, however, 
were planted on the coast, and in spots favourable to 
commercial enterprise, an aristocracy rarely maintained its 
ascendancy, and powerful commonalties soon sprang up in 
them, so that the tendency towards a complete democracy 
could seldom be restrained. 

As during the period of the return of the Heracleids the 
monarchical form of government prevailed almost every 
where in Greece, it was probably established in the colonies 
founded at that time. But circumstances generally contri- 
buted to restrict the power of the hereditary chiefs, until it 
finally disappeared altogether. A striking instance of this 
gradual change is exhibited in the history of Cyrene, where 
the royal authority was maintained for a long time without 
any diminution; but after the increase of the colony, in 
B.C. 637, the people seem to have become dissatisfied with 
their institutions. A pretext for a change was soon found, 
and, with the sanction of the Delphic oracle, Demonax 
of Mantinea was invited to frame a new constitution. He 
defined the respective rights of the old and the new colonists, 
and distributed them into three tribes, of which the descen- 
dants of the original settlers formed the first. He then de- 
prived the king of all his substantial prerogatives. After- 
wards, a counter-revolution being brought about by foreign 
aid, the government became a tyrannis. 

The Greek colonies in Asia Minor, as we have seen, were 
divided into three great masses, each bearing a name in- 
dicating its supposed unity of descent. The Ionians recog- 
nised Athens as their common parent, a relation which could 
not be claimed in so strict a sense either by Thebes in regard 
to the Aeolians, or by Argos or Sparta in regard to the 
Dorians. Each of these three divisions, strengthened by an 
unbroken geographical connection, might at the same time 
have formed a compact political body ; but causes similar to 
those which tended to keep the Greeks in Europe asunder,, 

K 3 



198 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



chap, xt 



also operated in Asia, and at first there was no enemy in the 
neighbourhood powerful enough to induce them to combine 
their forces. The nearest approach to any thing like a con- 
federacy consisted in periodical meetings for the celebration 
of festivals in honour of a tutelary god, which afforded an 
opportunity for discussing political matters in case of need. 
The Aeolians, perhaps, did not even possess such a religious 
centre of union. The meetings of the Dorians took place near 
the temple of Apollo, on the Triopian head-land, and were 
celebrated with games, the victors in which dedicated their 
prizes, bronze tripods, to the god. Halicarnassos was ex- 
cluded from the league, because she had not observed the 
rules customary at the games; a proof how loose the con- 
nection must have been. The meetings of the Ionians were 
held at the foot of Mount Mycale, on a spot called Panionium, 
and sacred to the national god Poseidon. There, also, re- 
ligious ceremonies were the predominant feature ; yet there 
seems to have existed in early times among the Ionians a 
tendency to a closer union than prevailed among either the 
Dorians or the Aeolians. All the Ionian cities, except 
Samos, were ruled by princes of the house of Codrus, and 
this appears to have been an indispensable condition of ad- 
mission into the confederacy ; there is, moreover, some ground 
for believing that the eldest prince of this house enjoyed a 
sort of supremacy over the rest, and resided at Ephesus. But 
there can be no doubt that the Ionian cities soon became 
completely isolated, without any provision being made either 
for defence againt foreign enemies or for the maintenance 
of internal tranquillity; there was no common treasure, 
tribunal, magistrate, or laws. The only Greeks in Asia 
who lived in a regularly organised confederacy were those 
inhabiting the twenty-three cities in Lycia ; their union was 
so framed that, although there was a common government, 
yet each city felt itself independent. Had all the Asiatic 
Greeks followed this example, their history, and even that of 



CHAP. XI. 



THE MILESIAN COLONIES. 



199 



the mother-country, might have been very different from 
what it actually was. 

But this want of union did not affect the prosperity of the 
several cities ; on the contrary, they seem to have shot up all 
the more vigorously and luxuriantly from the entire absence 
of restraint. The monarchical government was abolished 
within a few generations after the first settlement ; we hear 
of severe struggles between political parties and of civil 
wars, from which we may conclude that their history was 
nearly the same as that of the cities in the mother-country. 
During those convulsions Miletus rose to the summit of her 
greatness as a maritime state ; her colonies and commerce 
extended the limits of the Grecian world, and opened an 
intercourse between its most distant regions. The Aeolians 
and Dorians did not possess the enterprising spirit of the 
lonians, but remained comparatively stationary ; while the 
progress of commerce and maritime discovery among the 
lonians was coupled with the cultivation of the nobler arts, 
and with the opening of new intellectual fields, in which 
they not only outshone the mother-country, but have never 
been equalled, except perhaps in our own times. 

Soon after the the middle of the seventh century B.C. when 
considerable improvements in the art of shipbuilding had been 
introduced among the lonians by the Corinthians, the Mi- 
lesians began to plant a series of colonies on the eastern coast 
of the Propontis, though Cyzicus, the most important of them, 
is referred to an earlier date. The rivalry of the Phocaeans, 
who founded Lampsacus, and that of the Megarians, who oc- 
cupied the most advantageous positions on the European 
shore, seem to have urged them to explore the coasts of the 
Euxine, which was now first opened for ordinary navigation 
by the Milesians. There they planted the greater part of 
their numerous colonies, which are said to have amounted to 
no less than eighty. These settlements, unlike most of those 
hitherto mentioned, were no doubt founded with a distinct 

K 4 



200 



HISTOKT OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XI. 



view to commercial advantages. During that period the 
power of Miletus rendered her the common protectress of all 
the Greeks settled in those regions. Sinope, probably the 
earliest Milesian colony on the Euxine, became, in its turn, 
the mother of many flourishing cities. 

The Euxine, or " the Hospitable Sea," formerly called the 
' Inhospitable," had, through the enterprises of the Mile- 
sians, lost a part of its terrors, before the recesses of the 
Adriatic and the sea west of Sicily were explored. The 
glory of having opened these new tracks of commerce be- 
longs to the Phoenicians ; but they were soon followed by 
bold and active rivals. The beginning of the seventh cen- 
tury B.C. seems to be the date of their first adventures in the 
Adriatic. They themselves, or other and still bolder ad- 
venturers, reached Tartessus, a town on the southern coast 
of Spain. The Rhodians appear at an early period to have 
pursued the same direction ; for there is no doubt that they 
founded Parthenope, and we may readily believe that they 
established themselves at Rhode, or Rhodes (the modern Rosas 
in Catalonia), before the Phocaeans had gained a footing at 
Emporiae (Ampurias); it is even possible, that the river 
Rhone (Rhodanus) may have derived its name from them. If 
so, they there also preceded the Phocaeans, who about B.C. 
600, founded their most celebrated colony of Massilia (Mar- 
seilles) in Gaul, where they maintained themselves with the 
aid of the Celtic tribes, whose good will they gained and 
requited by diffusing among them the arts of civilised life 
and Grecian usages and letters. Miletus likewise carried on 
considerable commerce with southern Italy, especially with 
Sybaris. 

About the year b. c, 650, Egypt, which until then had been 
jealously closed against foreign settlers, was thrown open for 
permanent and friendly intercourse to the Greeks. For 
Psammetichus, having raised himself to the throne by the 
aid of a band of Ionians and Carians, who had by chance 



CHAP. xi. PROGRESS OF ART AND LITERATURE. 201 



landed on the coast of Egypt, induced them to enter into his 
service. He not only rewarded them with grants of land on 
the Nile, but gave their countrymen free access to his do- 
minions. A number of Egyptian boys, moreover, were con- 
signed to their care, to learn the Greek language, and to form 
a permanent class of interpreters between the two nations. 
The successors of Psammetichus adhered to the same policy ; 
and thus Greeks of various classes were drawn to Egypt, in 
the pursuit of knowledge as well as of gain. To this inter- 
course with Egypt Greece was indebted for the more general 
use of the papyrus, which must have become much cheaper 
than it had previously been, and thus supplied the Greeks 
with a commodious writing-material, the influence of which 
on the literature of Greece was no doubt considerable. 

We shall, in the following Chapter, give an outline of the 
history of the Asiatic colonies, previously to the period of 
the Persian war, and here add a succinct view of the progress 
of art and literature, which is intimately connected with the 
rise of those colonies. 

The arts, which had been cultivated before the time of 
Homer, no doubt kept pace with the advance of public and 
private prosperity. Among the Asiatic Greeks, wealth and 
refinement made more rapid progress than in the mother- 
country where circumstances were less favourable ; and the 
Ionian cities were early distinguishd by a degree of luxury 
before unknown to the Greeks ; accordingly the fall of 
Magnesia, on the Maeander, about the beginning of the 
Olympiads, is ascribed to the prevalence of effeminate habits. 
But the Ionians generally did not abandon themselves to 
indolence ; the same spirit which led them to commercial 
enterprises in distant lands, found employment at home in 
the cultivation of the arts, which cheered and adorned their 
private and public life. In Greece itself, Corinth was per- 
haps the only city that can be compared to them ; for the 
first steps in the arts of drawing, painting, and moulding 

k 5 



202 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XI. 



figures in clay, are commonly attributed to the Corinthians. 
Other Dorian cities also had their schools of art, at a time 
when Athens seems to have been barren in great works, as 
well as in illustrious artists. But the Ionians in Asia were 
not behind hand, either in the richness of their productions, 
or in the glory of new inventions. They began early to vie 
with one another in the grandeur and splendour of their 
sacred buildings, and in all the arts which served to adorn 
them. The temple of Hera at Samos, the largest of all that 
Herodotus had seen, appears to have been begun in the 
eighth century B.C. Of the arts dedicated to the service of 
the gods the most important, next to architecture, was that 
of casting metal statues, which is ascribed to Theodorus of 
Samos. The same artist laid the foundation of the splendid 
temple of Artemis at Ephesus. Statuary during this period 
rose nearly to the summit of perfection. The fact that this 
art made such extraordinary strides, just at the time when 
Egypt was thrown open to the Greeks, proves no more than 
that the Greek artists perhaps became acquainted there with 
various technical processes, with which the Egyptians had 
long been familiar, and that, by this fortunate assistance, 
Greek art at once advanced from a state of comparative 
rudeness to a level with that of Egypt. But even this is very 
doubtful, since great works of art are spoken of in Greece at 
a period when Egypt was yet inaccessible to Greek artists.* 
The progress of the arts must, therefore, probably be ascribed 
to other causes than the intercourse with Egypt. Among 
these causes may be mentioned the preference which was 
generally given to brass and marble over the ancient material, 
wood, which henceforth, when employed, was commonly 
overlaid with ivory or gold. The use of marble is said to 
have been introduced by two Cretan artists, Dipoenus and 
Scyllis, but was probably promoted by the closer connection 



* See, for example, Herod, iv. 152. ; and Paus. v. 17. § 5. 



chap. xi. PROGRESS OF ART AND LITERATURE. 203 

into which statuary was brought with architecture, and by 
the increased sumptuousness of the temples, inw r hich marble 
frequently took the place of ordinary stone. Statuary received 
another great impulse from the enlargement in the range of 
its subjects, and the consequent multiplicity of its produc- 
tions. So long as statues were confined to the interior of 
temples, and no more were seen in each sanctuary than the 
idol of its worship, there was little or no room for innova- 
tion, and the general practice was rather to adhere strictly 
to the traditionary forms hallowed by ancient custom. But 
insensibly piety grew ostentatious, and began to fill the 
temples with groups of gods and heroes ; the pediments of 
the temples were peopled with colossal forms, exhibiting 
legendary scenes connected with the stories of the god wor- 
shipped within. The custom of honouring victors at the 
public games and other illustrious personages, contributed 
perhaps still more to the same effect. For here all restraints 
confining the artist in making statues destined for worship, 
were removed. With the extension of the range of subjects 
the number of artists also increased ; their industry was sharp- 
ened by competition and rich rewards ; the sense of beauty 
grew steadier and quicker ; and the progress made w T as so 
rapid, that the last vestiges of arbitrary or conventional forms 
had not yet everywhere disappeared, when the final union 
of truth and beauty was accomplished in the school of 
Phidias. 

The observant and inquisitive spirit which was the inmost 
spring of this new life in the world of art, gave birth about 
the same time to new branches and forms of poetry. The 
first period in Greek literature is represented by the names 
of Homer and Hesiod, the former marking its beginning, the 
latter its close. In their dialect and forms of versification* 
they resemble each other, but in every other respect they 
move in different spheres. These two poets, however, repre- 
sent only a very small part of the poetical produce of their 

k 6 



204 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XI, 



age ; for the names of many contemporary bards have pro- 
bably been lost in the lustre of Homer's ; and as their works, 
no doubt, often served as a basis for celebrated labours of 
subsequent poets, they were soon neglected and forgotten. 
Hesiod appears to have been a poet who exercised an influ- 
ence similar to that of Homer, and the works which have 
come down to us under his name probably belong to different 
authors ; for he was the founder of a poetical school, and 
among the works bearing his name the inhabitants of his 
birthplace recognised only one as genuine.* He was a 
native of the village of Ascra, at the foot of Mount Helicon, 
in Boeotia, to which his father had migrated from the Aeo- 
lian Cuma ; and from the manner in which the poet speaks 
of himself, we must infer that at one time he was engaged 
in pastoral and rural occupations. The time at which he 
lived is nearly as uncertain as that of Homer, though it is 
generally supposed that he flourished after Homer, about 
b. c. 850. If the other works which bear his name, the 
Theogony and the Shield of Heracles, are not really his, 
we must at least believe that they correctly represent the 
themes of his song, since otherwise they would scarcely have 
been attributed to him. As Homer had been the poet of a 
conquering race of warriors, so Hesiod was the poet of the 
peaceful peasantry of Boeotia. He is a teacher of divine and 
human wisdom, and his name represents the whole poetical 
growth of the Boeotian and Locrian schools. 

The two centuries which followed the beginning of the 
Olympiads were still very rich in epic song, though this 
period formed the close of that poetry which had reached its 
culminating point in Homer and Hesiod. Most of the epic 
poets of this period are usually comprehended under the name 
of the cyclics (kvkXlkol), or poets of the cycle, a term which 
denoted a collection of epic poems, the subjects of which were 



* Namely, the "E/rya koI 'Hfxepcu. See Paus. ix. 31. §4. 



CHAP. XI. PROGRESS OF ART AND LITERATURE. 205 



confined to a certain period of time, and which were so 
arranged as to form one compact body, though such a design 
probably never entered the head of any one of the poets 
themselves. The period over which their subjects extended 
began with the union of heaven and earth, or the origin of 
all things, and ended with the latest adventures of Odysseus 
in Ithaca, that is, with the close of the heroic age. The 
poems forming the cycle are all lost, and we know little 
more than the titles of some of them. Several were designed 
to fill up the blanks left by the Iliad and Odyssey in the 
story of Troy. The poetical interest, which in Homer's 
works is predominant, was, in the poems of the cycle, 
subordinate to that interest which concerned the succession 
of events. But while they were thus necessarily inferior to 
Homer in poetical merit, we must regard them as a prelude 
to history, which made its first appearance about the close 
of this period. 

Lyric poetry, the expression of human feelings and emo- 
tions, is, no doubt, as ancient as epic poetry ; but so long as the 
national taste inclined more towards the latter, lyric poetry 
was probably not much cultivated, and it was carried to its 
highest perfection during the last stage in the career of the 
epic muse. Thenceforth for more than three centuries a 
series of great masters of lyric song were continually en- 
larging and enriching the sphere of their art. The names of 
these masters were not obscured, like those of the cyclic 
poets, by the lustre of Homer's ; yet of their works, those of 
Pindar excepted, only a few fragments remain to justify the 
admiration which they excited. These fragments are suffi- 
cient to show that the loss of the works of the lyric poets is 
not inferior to any that we have to deplore in the whole 
range of ancient literature ; the extant works of Pindar, great 
and wonderful as they are, neither compensate for this loss, 
nor enable us to estimate its full extent. In the Dorian states, 
poetry and music were generally looked upon as instrument^ 



206 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xl 



of education, whence their character was watched over and 
guarded by the magistrate or the law. The themes of the poets 
were chiefly religious, martial, and political : in Crete and at 
Sparta the spirit of the laws and the maxims of the consti- 
tution were expressed in verse. Though the Spartans them- 
selves, perhaps, disdained the labour of poetical composition, 
they were keenly sensible of the charms of both music and 
poetry, and greatly encouraged such foreign poets as were 
willing to adapt their strains to Spartan principles. Thus 
Tyrtaeus was honoured, and Alcman, though a Lydian by 
birth, earned by his genius a rank next to that of a 
Spartan citizen. The tyrants also cherished the lyric muse, 
which cheered their banquets, applauded their success, and 
extolled their magnificence. The Olympic and other public 
games afforded constant themes for poetical panegyrics, 
which delicately interwove the praises of the victor with 
those of his ancestors, his country, its gods and heroes. In 
short, all the great events of human life in Greece were 
deemed to need the aid of song to enliven and adorn them : 
the war-march, the religious and convivial procession, the 
nuptial ceremony, the feast and the funeral, would have ap- 
peared spiritless and unmeaning without this accompaniment. 

A particular and indeed the grandest species of lyric com- 
position were the great choral odes, which were brought to 
perfection by Arion and Stesichorus. They combined the 
attractions of music and action with those of the loftiest 
poetry, and formed the favourite entertainment of the 
Dorian cities. They were the elements out of which Thespis 
and his successors unfolded the Attic tragedy by the in- 
troduction of recitation by a performer who, perhaps, re- 
lated some simple story in a few scenes, interrupted by the 
intervening song of the chorus. In the Aeolian and Ionian 
states, sentimential lyric poetry was more cultivated ; in this 
the resentment of Archilochus, Hipponax, and Alcaeus found 
vent in bitter sarcasm or open invective ; Anacreon and 



chap. xi. PROGRESS OF ART AND LITERATURE. 207 

Ibjcus sang of the delights of the senses, while Mimnermus 
was melted into sadness by the thought of their fugitive 
nature,, and Sappho's tenderness was as pure as it was glow- 
ing. The insight which these poems would have given us 
into the private and social life of the Greeks, makes their 
loss all the more deplorable. 

All the early poetry of the Greeks was designed for exhi- 
bition, more or less public ; and it was not till a late period 
that poets began to think of writing for the satisfaction of 
individual readers. This was the case when instruction in- 
stead of pleasure became the immediate object, and hence 
the rise of a prose literature coincides with that of historical 
inquiry and philosophical speculation. Pherecydes, of Syros, 
who flourished about b. c. 550, is said to have been the first 
prose-writer in Greece ; and Cadmus, of Miletus, to have 
first applied prose to historical subjects. The first essays in 
history which we meet with before the Persian war seem to 
have been professedly mythological, and to have contained 
the substance of a large portion of the epic cycle. Many of 
the first historical works included descriptions of countries 
or cities, which served as a thread to connect their mythical 
traditions. Historical criticism, which never rose to any 
high degree of vigour and independence among the Greeks, 
was then almost entirely dormant ; and the writers of this 
period, whom we can hardly call historians, probably had no 
higher aim than the desire of gratifying patriotic vanity or 
the popular taste for the marvellous. How far they carried 
their histories down is uncertain, but it is clear that before 
the Persian war the Greeks had no idea of the importance of 
their own history ; and its practical uses were not understood 
till considerably later. 

Philosophy, or the investigation of causes and effects, may 
be discerned in Greece in the very earliest period to which 
its legends go back ; but it was not till the sixth century 
B.C. that it began to be separated from poetry and religion, 



208 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. xr. 



with which it had before been blended ; thenceforward it 
continued a steady and uninterrupted progress. The charac- 
ter of this age, in its relation to philosophy, is marked by 
the fame of the Seven Sages, the list of whom was variously 
made up, but who were all actively engaged in the affairs of 
public life, as statesmen, magistrates, or legislators. Their 
wisdom seems to have been of a purely practical nature, and 
to have been derived from their intercourse with the world 
rather than from any deep meditation or speculation. 

The activity and inquisitiveness of the Greek mind led 
a few of the bolder spirits, at this period, to grapple with 
some of the great questions which are suggested by the con- 
templation of the visible universe. There is no necessity 
whatever for believing that this spirit was called forth or 
strengthened by intercourse with foreign countries ; it is, on 
the contrary, much more probable that the first speculators 
were led to their researches by the ancient cosmogonies and 
theogonies of their own countrymen. The oldest school of 
philosophy, called the Ionian, was founded by Thales, of 
Miletus, a contemporary of Solon. He and all his followers 
attempted to account for the present order of nature, by 
tracing it back to its primeval state by such steps as they 
could find. Thus Thales maintained, that water or some 
liquid was the origin of all things ; half a century later, 
Anaximenes, of Miletus, arrived at the conclusion that air 
was the universal source of life ; and Heraclitus, of Ephesus, 
attributed the same elementary power to fire or heat. The 
boldness of these fathers of philosophy, who at once applied 
themselves to the highest problems, cannot but fill us with 
amazement ; yet the direction which their speculations took 
towards the objects of outward nature was perfectly in ac- 
cordance with the natural tendency of the human mind, and 
with the peculiar character and genius of the Ionians. These 
speculations, however, gradually led to the recognition of one 



chap. xi. EARLY SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY. 



209 



supreme mind, distinct from the visible world to which it 
imparted motion, form, and order. 

Nearly simultaneously with the Ionian school sprang up 
in the western colonies the Eleatic school, so called from the 
town of Elea or Yelia, on the western coast of southern 
Italy, a colony of the Phocaeans. Xenophanes, its founder, 
is said to have migrated about b. c. 536 from his birthplace, 
Colophon, to Elea. It began where the Ionian ended, with 
the admission of a supreme intelligence which was believed 
to be one with the world. Parmenides, the follower of 
Xenophanes, pursued the same direction, but set out from 
the idea of being, not from that of deity ; he expressly 
grounded his system on the distinction between sense and 
reason, as means of arriving at truth. His disciples, Zeno 
and Melissus, exercised their dialectic subtlety chiefly in 
combating the dogmas of other philosophers, and the opinions 
of the vulgar ; a mode of intellectual occupation which not 
unfrequently led them to sophistical paradoxes. 

Whether Thales wrote an exposition of his doctrines is un- 
certain ; but his disciple, Anaximander, unfolded his theory 
in a prose work ; and his example appears to have been 
followed by all the philosophers of the same school. Their 
works are lost, but it seems that the simplicity of their 
style was sometimes relieved by bold poetical imagery, in 
which their thoughts were veiled. Xenophanes and Parme- 
nides, on the other hand, explained their systems in verse, 
w r hich appears, however, scarcely to have deserved the name 
of poetry. The remains of these productions breathe a strain 
of oracular solemnity and obscurity. Zeno expounded his 
views in the form of dialogues in prose, which were probably 
dry and unattractive. About the middle of the fifth century 
B.C., Empedocles, of Agrigentum, unfolded in a poetical form 
his system, which seems to have been suggested by the Eleatic. 

The second and most celebrated of the western schools of 
philosophy, which, perhaps, was a few years older than the 



210 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XI./ 



Eleatic, was founded by Pythagoras of Samos, who was^born 
about b. c. 570. His history is obscured by a cloud of legends, 
through which we can scarcely distinguish the leading out- 
lines of his life and character. There can, however, be no 
doubt that he travelled in the East, or at least in Egypt, and 
derived some instruction from Pherecydes of Syros, and 
perhaps also from Anaximander. To Egypt he was pro- 
bably indebted for his opinion about the importance of con- 
necting political with religious institutions. "Whether he 
derived his doctrine of the immortality of the soul (which he 
taught in the form of a transmigration of souls) from some 
foreign country, or from the mysteries in which he had been 
initiated, cannot now be determined. He is said to have 
been the first Greek who assumed the title of philosopher, 
thereby describing himself as a man devoted to the pursuit 
of wisdom. He was distinguished by his strong bent for 
mathematical studies; and some great discoveries in geometry, 
music, and astronomy are attributed to him. He himself 
probably never committed his doctrines to writing, so that it 
is extremely difficult to decide what belongs to him, and what 
to his disciples and their followers. He appears to have con- 
sidered numbers as representing the essence and properties 
of all things, a doctrine which has not yet been satisfactorily 
explained, and which in later times gave rise to a variety of 
fancies and chimeras. 

After his return from the East, Pythagoras, unable to 
endure the tyrannical government then exercised in Samos 
by Polycrates, is said to have quitted his native island ; 
seeing, no doubt, that a tyrannis would oppose insuperable 
obstacles to his own political designs. The fame of his 
travels, wisdom, and sanctity, had probably gone before 
him into Greece, where he staid some time, and where he 
seems to have increased his reputation by various circum- 
stances. From Greece he proceeded to Italy, and fixed his 
residence at Croton, whose political and social condition 



chap. xi. INSTITUTIONS OF PYTHAGORAS. 



211 



perhaps appeared to him to present the best prospects for his 
exertions. Causes of discord were at work there, similar 
to those which produced the struggles between patricians and 
plebeians at Rome. The power of the oligarchy, with its senate 
of 1000 members, was preponderant, but not so secure as to 
render all assistance superfluous ; so that the arrival of a 
stranger like Pythagoras could not but be hailed with great 
joy by the privileged class. The nature of his designs has 
often been discussed, and various conclusions have been 
arrived at ; but his leading thought seems to have been, that 
the state and the individual ought, each in its way, to reflect 
the image of that order and harmony by which he believed 
the universe to be sustained and regulated ; but at the same 
time he was content with slowly approaching this unattainable 
mark, and with adapting his exertions to the circumstances 
in which he was placed. He does not appear ever to have 
assumed any public office, nor to have drawn up a constitution, 
such as Lycurgus, Zaleucus, and Charondas had done in other 
places before him ; but he formed a society, or order, of which 
he became the general. It consisted of young men selected 
from the noblest families of several Italiot cities. Their 
number was confined to 300, and through them he probably 
hoped to exercise a powerful influence over all the Greek 
states of Italy. This society was at once a philosophical 
school, a religious brotherhood, and a political association ; 
all which characters were inseparably united in the founder's 
mind. The utmost cultivation of the intellectual faculties in 
his disciples was a necessary preparation for the work to 
which he destined them ; it was indispensable that those who 
were to govern the world should first comprehend the place 
which they filled in it. Religion was probably the centre of 
the Pythagorean institutions, and the main bond of union 
among his followers ; but what kind of religion it was, is by 
no means clear, as all the proceedings of the fraternity, and 
more especially the religious ones, were enveloped in great 



212 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XI. 



secrecy. Pythagoras, however, professed the highest re- 
verence for the objects of popular superstition ; and the chief 
mystery which he inculcated on his disciples was, perhaps, 
the doctrine of the migration of souls. In politics his senti^ 
ments were, there is every reason to believe, rigidly aristo- 
cratic ; and his plan seems to have been to exercise a moral 
influence through his disciples, rather than that they should 
come forward as lawgivers or magistrates. Any one seeking 
admission into his society had to pass through a period of 
probation and discipline, during which his mode of life was 
most minutely regulated by the will of Pythagoras ; the re- 
strictions which he is said to have put upon the diet of his 
followers were probably intended to impress some moral or 
religious truths, or were the results of his medical knowledge. 
It is stated that all his disciples brought their possessions into 
a common stock, and that their union was more intimate than 
that of kindred : many anecdotes are related of the purity and 
constancy of their friendship. 

The failure of Pythagoras's undertaking seems to have been 
owing not more to the violence of the passions with which he 
had to contend, than to the rudeness of the instruments which 
he was obliged to employ. He became a party in a contest 
in which the right certainly did not lie all on one side ; for, 
having acquired unbounded influence over all classes at 
Croton and in other cities, he endeavoured to support or re- 
store the aristocratic government. The ascendancy gained 
by his order of 300 excited the hostility of the party whose 
interests they opposed, and probably the jealousy of that 
which they espoused. They were charged with attempting 
to abolish the popular assembly ; but the main cause of their 
overthrow was probably an overweening confidence in their 
own strength. The civil feud at Sybaris, which had lasted 
for some time, at length broke out in a general insurrection 
against the oligarchs. The democratic party, guided by one 
Telys, compelled their lords, to the number of 500, to quit 



CHAP. XI. 



INSTITUTIONS OF PYTHAGORAS. 



213 



the city ; and when the latter took refuge at Croton, their 
surrender was insolently demanded. By the advice of Py- 
thagoras, the senate of Croton refused to comply, and pre- 
pared to defend itself by arms. The forces of Sybaris far 
outnumbered those of Croton ; but the latter were com- 
manded by Milo, a disciple of Pythagoras, and an able general, 
who in bodily strength surpassed all his contemporaries. The 
two armies met on the banks of the Trionto, and victory de- 
clared itself for Croton. A reaction at Sybaris, in which 
Telys and the leading democrats were massacred, came too 
late to save Sybaris from its doom. The city was swept 
from the face of the earth, and the river Crathis was turned 
through its ruins to obliterate all traces of its departed 
greatness, b. c. 510. 

The senate of Croton, elated by this victory, ascribed the 
whole success to itself, and claimed the spoil and the con- 
quered land as the property of the state, refusing any share 
to those who had won the victory by their toil and blood. 
The commonalty, which felt itself particularly endangered 
at this crisis, directed its fury mainly against the Pythagorean 
society, and fire was set to the house in which the members 
were assembled, b. c. 504. Many perished, and the rest found 
safety only in exile. Pythagoras himself is generally be- 
lieved to have died soon after at Metapontum. The rise of 
the commonalty at Croton seems to have been followed by 
similar events in several other Italian cities, and everywhere 
the Pythagoreans were expelled; but civil bloodshed con- 
tinued to prevail for many years wherever the society had 
had its seats. Tranquillity was at length restored by the 
mediation of the Achaeans of the mother country, when sixty 
Pythagoreans were allowed to return from exile. But where- 
ever they reappeared, new troubles seem to have arisen 
from their opposition to the democratical institutions which 
Croton and other cities had adopted from Achaia. 



214 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. XK. 



CHAPTER XII. 

AFFAIRS OF THE ASIATIC GREEKS TO THE YEAR B.C. 521. 

While the Asiatic colonies were flourishing in freedom, com- 
merce, wealth, arts, and arms, the kingdom of Lydia, which 
was growing by their side, gradually encroached on their 
territory, and in the end crushed their independence. Lydia 
seems anciently to have been inhabited by Pelasgians, and 
the Lydian monarchy to have been founded on a conquest 
by which the original inhabitants were either expelled or 
subdued. This must have happened after the time of Homer, 
for he nowhere mentions the Lydians. It is stated that the 
kingdom was governed by two successive dynasties, first by 
the Heracleids, and afterwards by the Mermnadae. With the 
commencement of the latter dynasty a new period opened for 
the Asiatic Greeks. Hitherto the inland districts, bordering 
on the territory of the Greek colonies, had been constantly 
disturbed by the irruption of barbarous hordes, the fiercest of 
which were the Treres and Cimmerians ; the former de- 
stroyed Magnesia, on the Maeander, and their cruelty made 
the calamity of the ruined city proverbial ; but their inroad 
was only transient. The Cimmerians disturbed the peninsula 
of Asia Minor during a longer period, and, issuing from their 
strongholds in Paphlagonia, more than once overran the fer- 
tile plains of the south ; but Alyattes, who succeeded to the 
throne of Lydia in b. c. 617, was powerful enough to&e^ 
liver Asia from their ravages. About the same time it was 
freed by the Medes from the Scythians, who are said to have 
invaded Asia Minor in pursuit of the Cimmerians. 

But while the Lydians pushed their conquests far into the 
interior of Asia, they naturally grew impatient at being 
separated from the sea, and ambitious of subjecting the cities 



chap, xil WARS BETWEEN LYDIA AND IONIA. 215 



on the coast to their own empire. Accordingly, when they 
had got rid of the Cimmerians, they at once set about 
this task. Gyges is said to have taken Colophon, and to 
have invaded the territories of Smyrna and Miletus. His 
son Ardys prosecuted the war, and made himself master of 
Priene. His successors, Sadyattes and Alyattes, directed 
their hostilities chiefly against Miletus. From b.c. 623, the 
war was continued for eleven years ; the Lydian army 
marched every summer into the Milesian territory, and de- 
stroyed the crops, but left the houses standing, that the 
enemy might not be deterred from tilling the land. Beyond 
this the Milesians suffered little harm : their city was secure 
from attack, and the sea supplied them with abundance of 
provisions. In the twelfth of these yearly campaigns a 
temple of Athena was burnt down ; soon afterwards the king 
was taken ill, and, ascribing his sickness to the sacrilege com- 
mitted by his troops, he consulted the Delphic oracle, whose 
answer seems to have inclined him to peace ; accordingly, he 
concluded a treaty of peace and alliance with Miletus, in b. c. 
dT2. Alyattes left two sons, Croesus and Pantaleon, the 
former of whom, in accordance with his father's wish, suc- 
ceeded to the throne in b. c. 560, and accomplished all that 
his father had desired or undertaken. 

He began by laying siege to Ephesus, which was then 
ruled by the tyrant Pindarus, and when the city had fallen 
into his hands he treated it very leniently, but compelled 
Pindarus to resign his power. With the same success he 
attacked, one after another, all the Greek cities on the con- 
tinent. The mildness of the terms he offered, and the cha- 
racter of his government, probably facilitated his conquest. 
The tribute which the towns had to pay was a sign of sub- 
mission rather than a sensible burden, and in every other 
respect Croesus appears to have permitted his new subjects 
to regulate their own concerns. Where tyrants had before 
existed, they continued to exercise their power under the 



216 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxr. 



safeguard of a mighty prince. Afterwards, Croesus began 
to cast a longing eye on the adjacent islands ; but a wise 
Greek is said to have diverted him from the design of at- 
tacking them, by reminding him that he was about to expose 
his Lydians to the chances of an unequal conflict, on an 
element to which they were strangers. He accordingly con- 
fined himself to extending his empire towards the east, in 
which direction he proceeded triumphantly as far as the 
river Halys ; so that, with the exception of Lycia and Cilicia, 
all Asia Minor west of the Halys obeyed his commands. 
The fame of Croesus resounded throughout Greece, and his 
kingdom was believed to be a sort of paradise. He loved 
the Greeks, received them at his court, and respected their 
oracles, which he enriched with the most munificent offer- 
ings. The Spartans sent to purchase gold of him to adorn 
an image, but Croesus made them a present of as much as 
they required. The Athenian Alcmaeon, who had once done 
the king a service, was invited to Sardis, and allowed to 
take as much gold as he could carry. The wise also were 
drawxl to his court by curiosity, and a desire to learn and 
see as well as to teach. Thus it was believed that Solon, 
in the course of his travels, went to Sardis, and was hos- 
pitably entertained by the king ; but that he gazed without 
admiration or envy on the wonders of the palace, and re- 
fused to declare the king a happy man so long as he was 
subject to the smiles and frowns of fortune. The event 
showed that the Athenian legislator was right, for not long 
afterwards the kingdom of Croesus became a province of 
Persia. 

In the reign of Astyages, king of the Medes, the Median 
kingdom was overthrown by the Persians, a hardy race of 
mountaineers, under their leader Cyrus. The immediate oc- 
casion of this conflict between the Medes and Persians, and 
the history of the birth of Cyrus, are concealed under a heap 
of fabulous traditions. The dethroned Astyages was con- 
It 



chap. xii. FALL OF THE LYDIAN MONARCHY. 217 



nected with Croesus by marriage ; but, independently of this 
connection, Croesus had other reasons for wishing to avenge 
the injury done to his kinsman. By a prompt and resolute 
mode of acting he hoped to make himself master of all Asia, 
while if he remained quiet his own kingdom might soon 
become endangered by the upstart race of Persian shepherds. 
After having, as he thought, convinced himself of the trust- 
worthy character of the oracle of Delphi, he consulted the 
god about the result of his meditated undertaking. The 
answer seemed to encourage him to prosecute his designs 
with the assurance of success. Grateful for the advice, 
Croesus filled the treasury of the god with gold and silver, 
and even showered munificent presents on the Delphians. 
He then collected an army from his subject provinces, and 
marched against Cyrus. 

Croesus crossed the Halys, challenging Cyrus to a contest, 
and waiting for his approach. Cyrus advanced with a supe- 
rior force, but before he tried the strength of Croesus he sent 
envoys to the Ionian cities, inviting them to throw off the 
Lydian yoke. But they had found it too light to wish for a 
change, and turned a deaf ear to his summons. A battle 
was fought between the two armies, but with no decisive 
result; and Croesus, believing that his forces were not 
powerful enough to accomplish the decree of fate, returned 
to Sardis to reinforce his army, intending to renew the 
war in the following spring. He then sent to the kings of 
Babylon and Egypt for support, and even solicited the aid 
of Sparta. Croesus was leisurely pursuing this course, and 
had disbanded his army for the winter, when Cyrus en- 
camped before the walls of Sardis. Croesus, with scarcely 
any means of defence, tried his fortune in a battle ; but lost 
it, and was closely besieged by the Persians in his citadel. 
The fortress was taken by surprise, in B.C. 546, and the 
king with all his treasures fell into the hands of the con- 
queror. According to a legend, Croesus was at first con- 



218 



HISTORY OP GREECE. chap. xii. 



demned to the flames, but finally spared ; it is more probable, 
however, that he was conveyed to Ecbatana, and there closed 
his chequered life. 

The conqueror of Lydia soon afterwards found it necessary 
to deprive the people of their arms, and compel them to con- 
fine themselves to the arts of peace and luxury. But being 
anxious to secure and extend his eastern possessions, Cyrus 
left the subjugation of the Asiatic Greeks to his lieutenants. 
The Aeolians and Ionians, even before he left Sardis, 
offered to submit on the terms which had been granted to 
them by Croesus. Cyrus, however, gave them to understand 
that they must submit unconditionally ; but exempted Mi- 
letus, from which city he was content with the tribute which 
it had paid to Croesus. The Greeks now began to prepare 
for resistance. The Ionians assembled at their common sanc- 
tuary, the Panionian temple, to consult for the general weal, 
and sent ambassadors to beg assistance from Sparta. The 
Spartans, not feeling sufficient sympathy with the Ionians, 
refused to engage in a war with Persia on their behalf; but 
still they were bold enough to send an envoy to Cyrus, re- 
questing him to refrain from doing harm to any Greek city. 
Cyrus, who had never before heard of Sparta, sent them a 
taunting and contemptuous answer. In the mean time, Ma- 
zares, a Median general in the service of Cyrus, proceeded to 
subdue the Ionians who had aided the Lydians in an attempt 
to shake off the Persian yoke. But after the capture of 
Priene and Magnesia, he died. His successor, Harpagus, 
vigorously pressed the Ionian cities. The first he attacked 
was Phocaea, whose citizens, seeing that resistance was 
hopeless, availed themselves of a truce to embark with their 
wives and children, and steered for Chios. The Persians, 
on their return, found the city empty. The Phocaeans, 
being unable to obtain a settlement from the Chians in the 
neighbouring islands, determined to seek a new home in the 
western parts of the Mediterranean, where they had already 



chap. xil. PERSIAN CONQUEST OF IONIA. 



219 



planted several flourishing colonies. But before they did so, 
they once more sailed home and slew as many of the Persian 
garrison as they could. They then swore never to return to 
Phocaea, and sailed westward. Some, however, repenting 
of their vow, remained behind, while all the rest steered for 
Corsica, and settled among their kinsmen at Alalia, which 
had been founded twenty years before. But being attacked 
there by the Carthaginians and the Tyrrhenians of Agylla, 
they again embarked with their families, some sailing to 
their countrymen in Massilia, others to Rhegium in southern 
Italy. In the latter country they founded Elea, a celebrated 
seat of arts and learning, which long preserved the inde- 
pendence which its founders had bought so dearly. 

The example of the Phocaeans was followed by the in- 
habitants of Teos, who, seeing no prospect of a successful 
defence, took to their ships and sailed to the coast of 
Thrace. There they took possession of a district from 
which a band of Ionian settlers had, some time before, been 
driven by the Thracians, and founded the city of Abdera. 
In this manner all the Ionian cities fell under the successive 
attacks of Harpagus, and even the islanders thought it pru- 
dent to disarm the irresistible conqueror by voluntary sub- 
mission. The Persian rule was, perhaps, not much more 
oppressive than that of Croesus had been, but the misfortune 
was, that the Greeks might in future be commanded by their 
foreign masters to fight against their countrymen, and to 
assist in reducing them to the same foreign yoke. 

After the conquest of Aeolis and Ionia, Harpagus pushed his 
conquests along the southern coast. The Carians submitted 
without a struggle, except Pedasa, which held out even after 
all around had yielded. Cnidos, which had at first medi- 
tated resistance, surrendered at the first summons. In Lycia, 
the spirit of freedom was more resolute. Xanthos, with its 
women and children, was burnt by the Xanthians themselves, 
and while the flames were raging the men sallied forth and 

L 2 



220 



HISTOKY OF GrKEECE. 



CHAP. XII. 



died sword in hand. Caunos made a like display of un- 
availing courage. Whatever did not bend to the will of the 
conqueror, was broken and ground to dust ; and, after a few 
struggles, the sovereignty of Persia was acknowledged 
throughout the whole of Asia Minor. 

In the mean time Cyrus himself carried out his designs in 
the interior of Asia. His conquest of the effeminate city of 
Babylon probably contributed more than any other cause to 
corrupt the simple and virtuous manners for which the Per- 
sians had at first been distinguished. Cyrus' protection of 
the Jews was probably connected with his designs upon Egypt. 
But soon after the fall of Babylon, he undertook an expe- 
dition against the Massagetae, who dwelt to the east of 
the Caspian ; and after gaining a victory over them by a 
stratagem, he was defeated and slain in a great battle, and 
was succeeded, in B.C. 529, by his son Cambyses. The first 
important measure of this prince was the invasion of Egypt, 
whose monarchy had long been ripe for destruction, and ready 
to fall at the first blow struck by a vigorous hand. It was 
then governed by the usurper Amasis, who had overpowered 
the Greek troops kept by his predecessor, Apries, but yet 
knew their value. He removed their quarters from Pelu- 
sium to Memphis, that they might guard his person, bestowed 
many favours upon them, and assigned the city of Naucratis 
to Greek settlers. He contributed towards the building of 
temples in Greece, cultivated the friendship of Sparta, and 
honoured her with presents. Against this prince, Cambyses, 
in the fifth year of his reign, conducted an expedition in 
person, and thus carried out the design which his father had 
meditated. The manner in which the conquest of Egypt was 
accomplished is variously related, though the account of 
Herodotus, that Cambyses was aided by a Greek who had 
deserted the service of Amasis, is the most probable. But 
before Cambyses reached Egypt, Amasis died, and his son 
Psammenitus (Amyrtaeus) awaited the approach of the Per- 



chap. xii. POLYCRATES TYRANT OF SAMOS. 221 

sians with a large army. The Egyptians were defeated 
with great slaughter, and their king, who threw himself 
into Memphis, was besieged and taken, but treated with the 
respect usually shown by the Persians to fallen greatness. 

Cambyses was one of those rulers who aim at every thing 
and accomplish little. Expeditions to the south and west 
of Egypt completely failed ; but some of the Libyan tribes 
in the west of Egypt acknowledged his sovereignty, and 
their example was followed by the Greeks of Barce and 
Cyrene. The Phoenicians having furnished him with a 
fleet to second his invasion of Egypt, he even contemplated 
making himself master of Carthage. But the Phoenicians 
refused to lend their aid for the destruction of their own 
colony, and Cambyses was obliged to accept the plea with 
which the Phoenicians covered their refusal. In his conduct 
towards Egypt he showed no regard for national customs 
and institutions, which, in fact, he treated with scorn and 
contempt, and his wanton and sacrilegious acts aroused in the 
Egyptians feelings which afterwards vented themselves in 
several attempts to shake off the Persian yoke. 

During the reign of Cambyses, the Greek cities of Asia 
remained quietly subject to their Persian governors. The 
adjacent islands, though they had made professions of obe- 
dience and paid tribute to Persia, were almost independent, 
as the satraps had no navy at their command, Samos, the 
most prosperous of these islands, was then governed by the 
tyrant Polycrates, who maintained himself by the aid of a 
thousand bowmen, forming his body-guard, and protected 
the Samian commerce by a fleet of 100 galleys. He made 
war on Miletus, and, in a sea-fight, defeated a Lesbian arma- 
ment sent to its relief. This involved him in hostilities with 
Persia, which he could safely defy on his own element, for 
his navy was the most powerful that had ever ridden on the 
Aegean since the fabulous maritime empire of Minos. He 
adorned Samos with many useful and ornamental works, 

l 3 



222 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



lived in regal splendour and luxury, but seems, nevertheless, 
to have been a wise and active ruler. He cherished the arts ; 
and poets, such as Ibycus and Anacreon, whose muse was 
devoted to love and wine, were the most welcome guests at 
his court, and companions of his leisure. His ambition sug- 
gested to him the design of uniting under his dominion all 
the Ionian cities, both in the islands and on the continent of 
Asia. 

But being a tyrant, his power was based on a feeble found- 
ation, and there was, moreover, a party in Samos which only 
waited for a favourable opportunity to revolt. To get rid of 
these malcontents, Polycrates offered to Cambyses, during his 
preparations for the invasion of Egypt, to assist him with a 
squadron of ships. Cambyses accepted the offer, and Poly- 
crates equipped forty galleys, in which he embarked all the 
persons who had incurred his suspicion, and requested the 
Persian king to take care that they should never return. 
But the malcontents resolved to turn the force, which Poly- 
crates had put into their hands, against himself. They sailed 
back, but found him on his guard, and were defeated, though 
not without the greatest exertions on the part of the tyrant. 
They did not, however, give up their designs, but addressed 
themselves to Sparta, which, from its general hostility to the 
tyrannical form of government, was ready on every occasion 
to establish an oligarchy in its room. The request of the 
exiles for assistance was accordingly granted. The Co- 
rinthians also lent their aid, and the Samians, thus reinforced, 
renewed their attempt to overthrow the tyrant ; but after a 
sharp battle, and sustaining a siege for forty days, he was 
still so strong that the Peloponnesians abandoned the under- 
taking, and their friends were obliged to resign themselves 
to the loss of their country, and seek a new home elsewhere. 
After ranging for some time as pirates over the Aegean sea, 
they took possession of Cydonia in Crete, and flourished there, 
until they were conquered and enslaved by the Aeginetans. 



chap. xn. REVOLUTIONS AT THE PERSIAN COURT. 223 

\ After the removal of this danger, the power of Polycrates 
seemed to be more firmly established than ever, and he again 
turned his views to the enlargement of his dominions. But 
his downfall was suddenly brought about by Oroetes, the 
satrap of Sardis, who by a cunning stratagem enticed him 
to come to Sardis, where he was arrested and hung upon a 
cross. The Samians who had followed in his train were 
dismissed, and the satrap made no attempt to gain possession 
of Samos. This occurred in b. c. 522. 

Next year Cambyses died on his march against an im- 
postor who had usurped the Persian throne. The usurper 
belonged to the sacerdotal caste, and was supported by the 
Magi. But a counter-revolution, headed by the Persians of 
the highest rank, put an end to the Magian rule, and raised 
Darius, son of Hystaspes, of the royal house of the Achae- 
menids, to the throne. Darius was the greatest and most 
powerful king that ever ruled over Persia, and his wisdom and 
prosperity shed a lustre over his reign, which long continued 
to be remembered in Asia. He was the first who organised 
the vast mass of countries which had been conquered by his 
predecessors, but which were previously unconnected by any 
tie except that of being subject to the will of a common ruler. 
The empire of Darius stretched from the Aegean to the 
Indus, and from the steppes of Scythia to the cataracts of the 
Nile. He divided this vast tract into twenty satrapies or 
provinces, and appointed the tribute which each was to pay 
to the royal treasury. The western coast was connected with 
the seat of government by a high road, on which the distances 
were regularly marked, and spacious buildings were placed 
at convenient intervals to receive all who travelled in the 
king's name. The satraps in their provinces were so many 
almost independent sovereigns, except that they were ac- 
countable for the imposts of the provinces which they ruled. 
These provinces were, in all other respects, governed ac- 
cording to their own laws and institutions, so that the burdens 

l 4 



224 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XII. 



which were imposed on them were the only indications of 
foreign sway. These burdens, however, must have been ex- 
tremely heavy, being levied not only for the supply of the 
royal revenue, and the maintenance of the royal army and 
household, but also for the support of the satraps, each of 
whom kept up an army and a court, which in magnificence 
sometimes rivalled that of the king himself. The greatness 
of these viceroys was both oppressive to those whom they 
governed, and a source of weakness to the king's own go- 
vernment ; for if any of them incurred the sovereign's dis- 
pleasure, it was not always easy to coerce them or to deprive 
them of their power. We have already seen that Oroetes 
put to death Polycrates, the ally of Cambyses, for which he 
was never called to account. During the usurpation of the 
Magi, he was still more reckless, for he seized the governor 
of an adjacent province, and murdered both him and his son. 
Even this outrage he might have committed with impunity, 
had he not waylaid and murdered a courier who brought him 
an unwelcome message from the king. A faithful Persian 
servant disclosed this crime to Darius, who, with the aid of a 
body of 1000 Persians, put the satrap to death in his palace 
at Sardis. 

The simple and hardy manners of the Persians, at whose 
head Cyrus overthrew the kingdom of the Medes ; must have 
become considerably altered by their amalgamation with 
those of the Medes ; and still more so after the conquest of 
Babylon, which Cyrus is said to have chosen for his capital. 
The court was cruel and luxurious ; the women seem to have 
been of the most depraved character, and their influence was 
the source of most of the atrocious barbarities which fill the 
Persian annals. The sacerdotal caste, or the Magi, were 
the chief counsellors of the kings, who thus became the slaves 
of their priests, their eunuchs, and their wives. Such was 
the empire with which Greece was on the eve of entering 
upon a contest of life and death. 



chap. xra. 



DEMOCEDES, 



225 



CHAPTER XIII. 

FROM THE ACCESSION OF DARIUS HYSTASPES, B.C. 521, TO THE 
BATTLE OF MARATHON, B.C. 490. 

Darius was not a conqueror like Cyrus ; the ruling maxim of 
his government seems to have been rather to consolidate and 
secure his empire than to enlarge it, and all the wars of his 
reign are of a defensive character. Accidental causes directed 
his attention to the West, and there brought him into col- 
lision with the Greeks. The occasion arose out of the mis- 
fortunes of Polycrates; at the time when he was put to 
death at Sardis, the Samians who were in his retinue were 
dismissed, but the strangers were kept in prison until the 
death of Oroetes, when they were transported to Susa. 
Among these captives was a physician named Democedes, a 
native of Croton, whom Polycrates with his wonted munifi- 
cence had attracted to his court. At Susa Democedes re- 
mained for a time unnoticed ; but the king, having dislocated 
a foot while hunting, was informed of the skill of the Greek 
physician, who was summoned, and, after some reluctance, 
arising from a fear that his art might become the cause of a 
perpetual though honourable exile, undertook and effected a 
complete cure. The king loaded him with gold, and was 
ready to grant him any favour except permission to return to 
his own country, the very thing which he most longed for. 

Some time afterwards, Atossa, the king's favourite wife, 
also availed herself of the services of Democedes. By his 
descriptions of his native land, he excited her curiosity, and 
a wish to have Greek damsels to wait upon her. Darius 
was induced by her to send Democedes home, guarded by a 
small number of Persians, who were directed at the same 
time to survey the coasts of Greece and southern Italy under 



226 



HISTORY OF GREECE, 



CHAP, XIII, 



his guidance, and to bring him back to Persia. Democedes. 
after landing at Croton, of course refused to go on board 
again, and his companions were unable to compel him ; they 
were themselves wrecked on the southern coast of Italy, and 
made slaves, but were redeemed and carried back to Persia 
by a Tarentine exile named Gillus, who hoped, though in 
vain, to be restored to his country by the mediation of Persia. 

Another consequence of the misfortunes of Polycrates was 
the ruin of Samos. His brother Syloson, when in exile, had 
conferred a slight favour on Darius while he was serving in 
the army of Cambyses in Egypt ; and on hearing that Darius 
had been raised to the throne, Syloson went to the Persian 
court. The king bade him name a reward, and Syloson 
asked to be made tyrant of Samos as the successor of his 
brother. The island was then governed by Maeandrius, 
whom Polycrates, on going to Sardis, had left behind as his 
vicegerent. When the Persian force under Otanes arrived to 
restore Syloson, all resistance seemed hopeless, and Maean- 
drius capitulated on condition of being allowed to quit the 
island. But while he was withdrawing to the ship which 
was to carry him away, his hot-headed brother, Charilaus, 
suddenly fell upon the unsuspecting Persians who were 
waiting for the surrender of the citadel, and cut them to 
pieces. The main body of the Persian army, however, soon 
drove the Samians back into their fortress. This was reduced, 
and Otanes commanded an indiscriminate slaughter without 
regard to age or place, sacred or profane. The surviving 
population of the island was carried away captive, so that 
Syloson was put in possession of nothing but a desert. Mae- 
andrius meantime had sailed to Sparta, hoping to prevail on 
King Cleomenes to espouse his cause, but he met with no 
success, and, in consequence of an, attempt to bribe the king, 
was banished from Sparta and Peloponnesus. 

While these events were passing on the coast of the Aegean, 
Darius undertook an expedition against the Scythians about 



CHAP. XIII. 



DARIUS IN SCYTHIA. 



227 



the same time that the satrap of Egypt was engaged in the 
conquest of the Greek settlements in Africa. The Scythians, 
who had been driven from the north-east of Asia by the 
Massagetae, were now masters of the great plain between the 
Danube and the Don. The expedition against these nomadic 
hordes of savages had been delayed by a rebellion at Babylon 
in the beginning of the reign of Darius, but when this was 
quelled he set out against the Scythians. The cause, as well 
as the progress, of this war is involved in great obscurity ; 
and scarcely any fact relating to it is absolutely certain, ex- 
cept that Darius conducted it in person, and that it failed. 
His object, however, seems to have been to weaken the 
Scythians, and thus to secure his own empire on that side. 
His army is believed to have consisted of seven or eight 
hundred thousand men. A bridge of boats was ordered to 
be laid across the Thracian Bosporus, and it was success- 
fully accomplished by a Samian engineer called Mandrocles. 
There also 600 ships, furnished by the subject Greek cities, 
waited his commands ; and most of the Greek tyrants, who 
ruled under his protection along the coast of Asia, served in 
the fleet. They were to sail up the Danube to a point above 
the head of its Delta, and there to wait for the arrival of the 
land force. Most of the tribes through whose territories 
Darius passed, yielded without resistance. On arriving at 
the appointed place, the troops crossed to the left bank of the 
river; the king then ordered the bridge to be broken up, 
and the Greeks to follow him into Scythia. But being re- 
minded that the bridge might be wanted on his return, he 
directed it to be left standing for sixty days, after which the 
Greeks who guarded it were to break it down and return 
home. 

He then proceeded against the Scythians, but the events 
of the campaign elude every attempt to form a clear con- 
ception of them. This much only is certain, that the pur- 
suit, in which the Persians had wasted their strength, was 



228 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xiii. 



changed into a retreat, in which they were compelled to 
abandon their baggage and their sick. In the mean time the 
sixty days had elapsed, and the Greeks stationed at the 
bridge on the Danube were urged by the Athenian Miltiades, 
the ruler of the Thracian Chersonesus, to avail themselves of 
the opportunity of recovering their freedom by breaking up 
the bridge. But Histiaeus, the tyrant of Miletus, thought 
differently ; his arguments brought most of his countrymen 
over to his side, for he reminded them that their power as 
tyrants depended upon that of the Persian sovereign, and 
that his downfall would involve their own ruin. The bridge, 
accordingly, was allowed to stand, and Darius escaped from 
imminent danger. The army which he brought back was 
still large enough to enable him to leave 80,000 men in 
Europe, under the command of Megabazus, who was to 
complete the conquest of Thrace and of the Greek cities on 
the Hellespont. Darius himself rested some time at Sardis. 
Histiaeus asked and received, as a reward for his service on 
the Danube, a district on the river Strymon, where he 
founded the town of Myrcinus, which commanded the na- 
vigation of the river. Histiaeus still retained Miletus, but 
committed it to the charge of his cousin Aristagoras. Mil- 
tiades, however, appears to have been left in the undisturbed 
possession of the Chersonesus, a circumstance which throws 
great doubt upon the story of his offence. 

Megabazus began his operations in Thrace with the re- 
duction of Perinthos, and then proceeded to subdue all the 
Thracian tribes which had not yet submitted to his master. 
Darius, while staying at Sardis, had become acquainted with 
some Paeonians, and was so struck with their manners and 
appearance, that he commissioned Megabazus to invade their 
country, the upper vale of the Strymon, and transport the 
whole people to Asia. They attempted to resist the ag- 
gressor, but, finding themselves unable to do so, dispersed ; a 
part of them, however, submitted, and Megabazus carried 



CHAP. XIII. AFFAIRS OF MACEDONIA. 



229 



them into Asia, where Darius assigned a district in Phrygia 
for their habitation. 

The regions into which Megabazus had carried the Per- 
sian arms bordered on the kingdom of Macedonia ; and 
before he led his forces from Paeonia, he sent envoys to 
Amyntas, the king of that country, to demand, in the name 
of the Persian monarch, earth and water, the customary sym- 
bols of subjection. Macedonia at this period was only a 
small kingdom, which had grown to its present extent by the 
conquest of insignificant neighbouring states. The Mace- 
donian people were a mixture of Illyrian tribes and a more 
ancient Pelasgian population ; but the reigning dynasty was 
believed to be of purely Hellenic origin, and was traced to 
the Heracleid Temenus, who, in the division of Peloponnesus, 
had obtained Argos for his share. The founder of the Ma- 
cedonian dynasty was said to have been Caranus, a brother 
of the Argive prince Pheidon. While thus the kings of 
Macedonia were universally believed to be Greeks, the 
people are always called barbarians. Amyntas consented to 
become the vassal of Darius at the summons of Megabazus. 
A banquet was given to the Persian envoys ; in the course of 
which, however, their outrageous conduct tow r ards the ladies 
of the court roused the indignation of Alexander, the king's 
son, to such a point, that he caused them to be murdered in 
the banquet-hall. Amyntas himself took no further steps of 
resistance, nor did Darius ever avenge the death of his envoys. 

Megabazus, while engaged against the Paeonians, per- 
ceived that Histiaeus was collecting the elements of a for- 
midable power at Myrcinus, and afterwards communicated 
his suspicions to Darius. The king, resolving to deprive 
Histiaeus of the opportunity of doing any harm, sent for him 
on pretence of consulting him about some important under- 
taking. When Histiaeus arrived at Sardis, the king told 
him that he could no longer bear to be without his com- 
pany and conversation, and expressed a desire to take him 



23a 



HISTORY OF GKEECE. 



CHAJP. XIII. 



to Susa, where he was to share the king's table and coun- 
sels. Histiaeus was obliged to obey the command of his 
sovereign, and accompanied the king into a splendid cap- 
tivity, in which he was to spend the remainder of his days. 
Before setting out for Susa, Darius appointed Artaphernes 
satrap of the Asiatic coast of the Aegean, and of the southern 
provinces of the kingdom of Croesus, whose capital, Sardis, 
was still the seat of government for this part of Asia. Otanes 
succeeded Megabazus, and was very successful in reducing 
the maritime cities on the north of the Aegean, such as By- 
zantium and Chalcedon, and the islands of Imbros and Les- 
bos. Towards the year b. c. 505, all the nations from the 
banks of the Indus to the borders of Thessaly thus rested 
under the shade of the Persian monarchy ; and there ap- 
peared to be no power that could rival its majesty, and none 
from which it could not enforce submission. 

While the world was thus enjoying for a short time pro- 
found repose, the aristocratic party in Naxos was driven by 
its victorious adversaries into exile, and now applied to Aris- 
tagoras of Miletus for succours. As they had been united 
by political ties with Histiaeus, Aristagoras was not unwil- 
ling to restore them ; for he hoped that Naxos, when ruled 
by his creatures, would virtually become his own. But the 
undertaking was too much for him alone; accordingly he 
applied to Artaphernes, representing that an opportunity 
was now offered not only of conquering Naxos, but of making 
himself master of all the Cyclades. Aristagoras described 
the enterprise as very easy, and promised ta defray all the 
expenses. Artaphernes was taken with the scheme; and, 
with the king's consent, placed 200 ships and a Persian 
force at the disposal of Aristagoras. The fleet, commanded 
by a Persian admiral, Megabates, sailed from Miletus, having 
taken on board the Ionian army raised by Aristagoras. 

It was intended to lull the Naxians into security by making 
them believe that the expedition was destined for a different 



chap. xm. 



EXPEDITION TO NAXOS. 



231 



quarter. Megabates cast anchor off the coast of Chios ; and 
there a dispute arose between him and Aristagoras, which 
provoked him to such a degree, that he determined to thwart 
the expedition against Naxos, on which Aristagoras had 
staked so much. He accordingly sent a message to the 
Naxians to warn them of their danger. The Naxians now 
made vigorous preparations to defend themselves, so that 
when at last the Persian fleet appeared their city was in a 
condition to sustain a long siege. At the end of four months, 
the besiegers had made no progress ; the treasures of Aris- 
tagoras were exhausted, and he was obliged, in b. c. 501, to 
return to Miletus without having effected anything. The 
failure of the expedition rendered it impossible for him to 
discharge his debt to the Persian government, and he was 
a ruined man. He saw no way of extricating himself from 
his difficulties, except by inciting his countrymen to revolt. 
While he was pondering over this scheme, he received a 
message from Histiaeus which fixed his resolution. His- 
tiaeus found his captivity intolerable, and had no hope of 
delivery except in an insurrection of his countrymen. As a 
safe method of conveying his wishes to his friends, he shaved 
the head of a trusty slave, traced some letters with a hot 
iron on his skin, and, when the hair had grown again, sent 
him off to Miletus. When Aristagoras, as directed, inspected 
the slave's head, he found an invitation to revolt. In every 
city there were persons impatient of the Persian yoke, and 
Aristagoras forthwith assembled some of the leading men to 
deliberate upon a plan of action. Hecataeus, the historian, 
who was present at the meeting, and saw the danger of the 
scheme, dissuaded his friends from it ; but they, being rash, 
though neither bold nor firm, resolved upon war without 
securing the means for carrying it on. It was further de- 
termined to seize the Greek tyrants who were still stationed 
off My us with the Persian fleet. This was the signal of a 
general insurrection. Aristagoras, in order to obviate all 



232 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xm. 



opposition, and to gain over the democratic party, resigned 
his own authority, and delivered up the tyrants taken at 
Myus to the cities over which they had ruled. Liberty was 
now every where restored in the revolted cities, b. c. 500. 

After this, Aristagoras sailed to Greece to persuade some 
of the leading states to espouse his cause. He first went to 
Sparta, and addressed himself to Cleomenes. At a private 
interview he brought forth a brass plate, containing a map 
of the world, according to the most exact notion that had 
then been formed by the Samian sages of its outlines and its 
parts. Aristagoras pointed out to the king the situation and 
wealth of Persia, of which he might make himself master 
without much difficulty. But when Cleomenes learned the 
great distance between Sparta and Susa, he was alarmed, 
broke off the conversation, and bade the stranger quit Sparta 
without delay. Aristagoras then went as a suppliant to the 
king's house, and found him with his daughter Gorgo- — a 
child eight or nine years old — by his side. Aristagoras 
offered to the king a price for his assistance, and gradually 
raised it to fifty talents ; at that moment the child, who had 
listened unheeded, suddenly exclaimed, " Go away, father, the 
stranger will do you harm." Cleomenes accepted the omen, 
and Aristagoras soon afterwards quitted Sparta. 

He made his next application to Athens, after Sparta, the 
most powerful state of Greece ; and he had reason to hope 
for better success there than at Sparta. Athens had already 
had some transactions with the Persian satrap of Sardis, at 
the time when Cleomenes threatened to invade Attica* ; and 
the satrap had then consented to protect the Athenians, if 
they would send the usual signs of submission. The Athe- 
nian envoys, either from ignorance of the import of present- 
ing earth and water, or because they thought the danger of 
their country so pressing that deliverance was cheap at any 



* See above, p. 185. 



CHAP. XIII. 



BURNING OF SAUDIS. 



233 



price, undertook to comply. But on their return to Athens 
they were sharply censured, and their promise was not sanc- 
tioned. About the same time, the exiled Hippias was en- 
deavouring to induce Tissaphernes to take up his quarrel ; 
and when the Athenians heard of his machinations, they 
sent, as unwisely as before, to deprecate the satrap's inter- 
ference. The answer they received was, that they should 
be safe if they would recall their tyrant. This reply at 
once showed them what they had to expect from Persia, and 
they prepared themselves to defy its enmity. Such was the 
state of mind at Athens when Aristagoras arrived. He ac- 
cordingly found willing hearers when in the assembly of the 
people he unfolded the tempting prospects which he had 
spread before Cleomenes. In addition to other motives he 
urged that it was a religious duty to protect their Ionian 
kinsmen and colonists. A decree was readily passed to send 
a squadron of twenty ships for that purpose, under the com- 
mand of Melanthius. 

Aristagoras returned to Asia before the Athenian squadron, 
which followed soon after him, in b. c. 499, accompanied by 
five galleys from Eretria. The Eretrians had not, like the 
Athenians, been provoked to this step by any threats of 
Persia, but joined in the expedition to discharge a debt of 
gratitude towards the Milesians, who had once assisted them 
in a war against Chalcis. After landing near Ephesus, the 
Athenians were reinforced by a strong body of Ionians, with 
whom they proceeded without delay against the unguarded 
capital of Lydia, where Artaphernes then was ; he threw 
himself into the citadel, which was capable of standing a 
long siege, and gave up the city to be plundered by the in- 
vaders. A soldier, in the heat of pillage, set fire to a house; 
the flames soon spread through the whole city, and reduced it 
to ashes, as most of the houses were of wicker-work, or were 
thatched with reeds. The Lydians, however, made a despe- 
rate resistance ; and the Ionians and Athenians finding their 



234 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xiii. 



own position dangerous, as they could not hope to force the 
strong citadel, and might be attacked in their rear, resolved 
to make , a timely retreat to Ephesus. The whole force of 
the province, which had in the mean time been promptly 
levied, pursued the invaders, and, having overtaken them 
in the Ephesian territory, defeated them in a battle. Here- 
upon the Ionians dispersed, and the Athenians and Eretrians 
sailed home. 

When the Persian monarch heard of the burning of Sardis, 
his rage knew no bounds ; but he was more indignant at the 
obscure strangers who had invaded his dominions, than at 
the rebellious Ionians ; and one of his attendants was charged 
to recall the name of the Athenians to his thoughts every 
day. His first care, however, was to quell the Ionian insur- 
rection, which was beginning to spread into other parts. 
Histiaeus was summoned into his presence, and upbraided 
with the revolt of his kinsman. But the artful Greek re- 
moved all suspicion from himself, and even obtained leave to 
go to Ionia, pretending that he would suppress the rebellion. 
Meanwhile, Aristagoras had in vain solicited fresh succours 
from the Athenians. The Ionians themselves, however, did 
not remain inactive ; their fleet induced Byzantium and the 
other cities between the Aegean and the Euxine to assert 
their independence. The greater part of Caria, and the 
island of Cyprus, also shook off the Persian yoke. Yet all 
these fair prospects of liberty were soon overclouded ; for 
the generals of Darius, who had routed the Ionians and Athe- 
nians, soon reduced the maritime cities to obedience. From 
the Propontis, where several towns were taken at the first 
assault, Daurises hastened to suppress the revolt in Caria. 
After two defeats, the strength of the Carians was broken ; 
but they still held out, and retarded their final subjugation. 
The revolt of Cyprus lasted for one year, at the end of which 
the Cyprians, being betrayed by one of their own princes, 
were defeated by a Phoenician fleet. When this was accom- 



CHAP. XIII, 



THE IONIAN WAK. 



235 



plished, Artaphernes and Otanes began vigorously to press 
the cities of Ionia and Aeolis. After the fall of Clazomenae 
and Cuma, Aristagoras, who was now as desponding as he 
had before been sanguine, resolved to take refuge at Myr- 
cinus in Thrace. He was accompanied thither by a large 
number of his countrymen ; but was soon afterwards, while 
encamped before a Thracian city, cut off with his band, by a 
sally of the besieged. 

These things had happened before Histiaeus arrived at 
Sardis. On Artaphernes hinting to him that he had some 
connection with the revolt of the Ionians, Histiaeus made his 
escape from Sardis to Chios. In the latter place he was re- 
ceived with suspicion and anger as the man who had brought 
Ionia to the verge of ruin. But he appeased the people by 
telling them a forged story of Darius' intention to transplant 
all the Ionians to Phoenicia. He also renewed an intrigue 
which he had commenced at Sardis with some Persians ; but 
the bearer of his letters to them revealed the secret to Ar- 
taphernes, who put to death all the Persians concerned in 
the plot. Histiaeus wished to take the lead in the war which 
he had kindled, but he was so much distrusted, that he soon 
found himself a homeless adventurer. Miletus, glad to be 
rid of Aristagoras, now refused to admit her old tyrant, 
Histiaeus. He withdrew to Lesbos, where he met with better 
success, and collected a little squadron of eight triremes, 
with which he sailed to Byzantium ; and there seized the 
merchant vessels of all the cities which would not acknow- 
ledge his authority as sovereign of Ionia. Meantime the in- 
surrection of Ionia was drawing to a crisis. The Persian 
generals determined to besiege Miletus by land and by sea, 
being certain that its fall would be speedily followed by the 
submission of the other cities which looked up to it as 
their chief. A numerous fleet was collected in the ports of 
Phoenicia, Egypt, Cilicia, and Cyprus. While this arma- 
ment was expected, the Ionians assembled at Panionium 



236 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



chap. xirr. 



concerted a plan of defence. It was resolved to leave Mi- 
letus to defend itself on the land-side, and to exert all the 
strength of the confederacy to drive the Persians from the 
Aegean. The fleet was directed to assemble near the small 
island of Lade. It consisted of 353 triremes, while the hos- 
tile fleet, which was on its way from the East, numbered 
600. Notwithstanding their numerical superiority, the Per- 
sians were unwilling to encounter the Ionians on the element 
on which they had the advantage of far greater experience. 
The tyrants, who at the beginning of the insurrection had 
been expelled from their cities, and were then serving in the 
Persian army, were accordingly called upon by the Persian 
generals each to detach his fellow-citizens from the common 
cause by offers of pardon and by threats of the most rigorous 
treatment if they should refuse to submit. The overtures 
were in every case rejected, because each city imagined that 
the dishonourable proposal was made to itself alone. During 
this state of things, Dionysius, a Phocaean, observing that 
the Ionians at Lade did not display the order and good disci- 
pline necessary at such a juncture, prevailed on them to 
commit themselves to his guidance. He now every day 
trained his men in military exercises ; but, after seven days 
of this laborious occupation, the Ionians, displeased at his 
strict discipline, and at the hardships which he imposed upon 
them, resolved to shake off the intolerable yoke, and again 
began to neglect every precaution. During the heat of the 
day, they dispersed over the island, reposing in the most 
agreeable spots they could find. This folly induced some 
Samians to send to their banished tyrant Aeaces, the son of 
Syloson, declaring their readiness to close with his late pro- 
posals ; and it was agreed, that they should desert during 
the battle. 

When at length the Persian fleet sailed to attack them, the 
Ionians met them without suspicion of treachery. But at 
the very beginning of the contest the Samians quitted their 



CHAP. XIII. 



BATTLE OF LADE. 



237. 



post, and bore away to Samos. Their example was followed 
by the Lesbians, and, as the alarm spread, by the greater 
part of the fleet. The Chians, who almost alone held out, 
were at length overpow r ered by superior numbers, and com- 
pelled to flee. Some of them, who had abandoned their 
ships, w r hile passing by night through the Ephesian territory, 
where the women were celebrating a festival, were taken for 
robbers and cut to pieces by the Ephesians. Dionysius of 
Phocaea had fought to the last, and had taken three of the 
enemy's ships ; when forced to flee he sailed to Phoenicia, 
sank several merchantmen, and, laden with spoil, steered for 
Sicily, where he carried on an unremitting war against the 
Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians. 

The defeat off Lade, in b. c. 494, was soon followed by the 
fall of Miletus, which was stormed by the Persians, in the 
sixth year after the breaking out of the revolt. Those who 
escaped the sword were carried into captivity with their 
families, and transplanted to the head of the Persian Gulf, 
where they were settled in a town called Ampe, near the 
mouth of the Tigris. The temples of Miletus were despoiled 
of their treasures, and the city itself became a Persian colony. 
This catastrophe was felt by the Athenians as a national ca- 
lamity, and Phrynichus, who ventured to produce it on the 
stage before his countrymen, was punished by a heavy fine. 
In the following year the other Ionian cities experienced a 
similar fate ; the islands of Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos were 
swept of their inhabitants, and the subjugation of Ionia was 
complete. The cities on the north of the Aegean were over- 
powered one after another by the Persian fleet. On the 
approach of the enemy the inhabitants of Byzantium and 
Chalcedon left their homes, and established a new one at 
Mesembria, on the western coast of the Euxine. Miltiades 
the Athenian, too, thought himself no longer safe in his prin- 
cipality of the Chersonesus, which had been founded by his 
uncle Miltiades during the reign of Pisistratus from whose 



238 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xhi. 



jealous eyes he had withdrawn. Miltiades had been in the 
undisturbed possession of his principality ever since the re- 
turn of Darius from his Scythian expedition : but now, when 
he saw himself threatened with an invasion by the victorious 
Persians, he sailed away to Athens, having filled five galleys 
with his treasure. One of his ships conveying his son was 
intercepted by the Persians, but Miltiades himself reached 
Athens in safety, and again became one of its citizens. 

When the Persians, after the subjugation of Ionia, had 
satisfied their vengeance, Artaphernes made the conquered 
country a Persian province : all traces of independence in 
the cities were effaced ; they were compelled to submit all 
their disputes to arbitration ; a survey was taken of the 
country, and each district had a certain amount of tribute 
imposed upon it. Order and tranquillity were thus restored at 
the expense of liberty. Many who had fled during the in- 
surrection now returned, and the cities began to revive. In 
the year after the close of the war, Artaphernes was succeeded 
by Mardonius, the king's son-in-law, whose first step was 
calculated to allay the discontent of the lonians ; this was 
the deposition of the tyrants who had been set up in the cities 
by his predecessor, and the restoration of a democratical 
form of government, a measure which reflects great honour 
on the understanding of Mardonius, and shows that he had 
more knowledge of mankind, and larger views, than are 
commonly possessed by Asiatic princes. He had come with 
a mighty armament to wreak the vengeance of the king upon 
Athens and Eretria, and at the same time to spread the 
terror of his name in Europe. A large fleet was to sweep 
the Aegean, and to exact obedience from the islands, while 
Mardonius himself led an army through Thrace into Greece. 
The fleet first sailed to Thasos, which was well known for its 
gold mines, and now yielded without a struggle. But the 
progress of the Persian armament was checked by a violent 
storm which overtook it off Mount Athos, and was thought 



CHAP. XIII. 



ATHENS AND AEGINA. 



239 



to have destroyed no less than 300 ships and 20,000 lives, 
Mardonius himself was not much more fortunate : on his 
march through Macedonia, his camp was surprised in the 
night by the Brygians, an independent Thracian tribe ; he 
lost many of his troops, and was himself wounded. He did 
not, indeed, leave the country till he had tamed the Brygians, 
but his forces were so weakened that he thought it prudent 
to return to Asia. Thus ended the first Persian campaign 
in Europe, in b. c. 492. 

But the resolution of Darius was not shaken by these dis- 
asters, and next year he renewed his preparations for in- 
vading Greece. In the mean time he sent heralds round to 
the Greek cities to demand the usual symbols of submission. 
The arrival of his envoys brought about some changes in 
the state of Greece, to which we must now direct our atten- 
tion. The Athenians, as we have seen, had been delivered 
from the invasion of Cleomenes by the friendship of the Co- 
rinthians. Thebes, too weak by itself to revenge its discom- 
fiture by the Athenians, called in the aid of Aegina, between 
which island and Athens there existed an implacable enmity. 
The Aeginetans accordingly, confident in the superiority 
of their naval powers, actively espoused the cause of the 
Thebans by an invasion of Attica. The Athenians, being 
otherwise engaged, did not take revenge for this insult, and 
the quarrel slumbered for a time, until the arrival of the en- 
voys from Darius. Both at Athens and at Sparta they were 
put to death with cruel mockery ; many other cities on the 
continent of Greece complied with the demand of the Per- 
sians, and Aegina with the rest of the islands also submitted 
to the barbarians. The Athenians immediately sent ambas- 
sadors to Sparta, to accuse Aegina of having betrayed the 
cause of Greece ; Cleomenes forthwith repaired to Aegina, 
and was proceeding to arrest some of the leading citizens, 
when he was thwarted by his colleague Demaratus, who 
privately encouraged the Aeginetans to resist the attempt of 



240 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xin, 



Cleomenes. The latter now resolved upon freeing himself 
from his treacherous and troublesome colleague. He revived 
the old charge against Demaratus, that by his birth he was 
not entitled to the royal dignity ; and Leotychides was in- 
stigated to urge his claim to the throne. The Spartans, 
unwilling to decide so grave a question without the most 
satisfactory evidence, referred it to the Delphic oracle. The 
priestess was prevailed on, through the influence of Cleo- 
menes, to declare that Demaratus was not the son of Ariston, 
to whom the mother of Cleomenes had been transferred by 
her first husband in a state of pregnancy. Leotychides now 
succeeded to the throne, and wantonly insulted the deposed 
Demaratus, who soon afterwards quitted Sparta, and went to 
the court of Darius, where he was graciously received. 

Cleomenes now returned to Aegina in company with Leo- 
tychides ; and the Aeginetans, afraid of resisting their joint 
demand, at once surrendered ten of their principal citizens, 
who were deposited as hostages with the Athenians. Soon 
afterwards, the fraud committed at Delphi was detected : the 
priestess was deposed ; and Cleomenes, fearing punishment, 
fled to Thessaly ; thence he went to Arcadia, where he 
formed a plot against his own country, which alarmed the 
Spartans to such a degree, that they invited him back by 
promises of impunity. He did not, however, long survive 
his restoration, for in a fit of madness he died miserably by 
his own hand. Nor did Leotychides carry his ill-gotten 
dignity to the grave, for, having many years after this period 
been convicted of bribery, he was exiled and died at Tegea. 

On the death of Cleomenes, the Aeginetans complained at 
Sparta of the unjust seizure of their fellow-citizens. The 
Spartans condemned Leotychides to be given up to them in 
the room of their hostages, but the Aeginetans contented 
themselves with taking him to Athens to demand the resti- 
tution of his deposit. The Athenians, however, refused to 
release their prisoners, and the Aeginetans retaliated by 



CHAP. XIII. 



THE PERSIANS AT DELOS. 



241 



capturing the sacred ship which was conveying a number of 
distinguished Athenians to the festival of Apollo at Delos. 
In consequence of this fresh provocation, a conspiracy, which 
was formed by some Aeginetans for overthrowing the oli- 
garchical government of the island, was countenanced by the 
Athenians, but the succours sent by them not arriving in 
time the plot failed, and the conspirators to the number of 
700 were put to death. The Athenians had been delayed by 
the want of a navy, and had to borrow ships from the Corin- 
thians ; but they nevertheless continued the war with vary- 
ing success, while the Persians were preparing to invade 
Attica. 

In b. c. 490, a new force having been collected in Persia, it 
was placed under the command of Datis and Artaphernes, 
and assembled in Cilicia, where a fleet of 600 galleys, to- 
gether with transports for horses, was ready to take the army 
on board. The armament first sailed to Samos, and thence 
crossed over to the Cyclades. The Naxians, who were first 
attacked, fled into their mountains ; those who could not es- 
cape were carried off by the Persians, and their city and 
temples became a prey to the flames. The peaceful inhabit- 
ants of the sacred Delos fled to Tenos, leaving their rich 
temple to the protection of the gods. The Persians, con- 
sidering Apollo and Artemis, the tutelary deities of Delos, 
as identical with the sun and moon, which they themselves 
worshipped, not only spared Delos, but even rendered the 
greatest honours to its divinities. The fleet then sailed to 
Euboea, taking in reinforcements and hostages as it proceeded 
through the islands. Carystus, the first Euboean town 
before which the Persians appeared, rejected their demands. 
While it was defending itself, Eretria sent to Athens for 
succour against the impending danger, and the 4000 Athe- 
nians settled on the estates of the wealthy Eretrians were 
charged to protect that city. But the Eretrians themselves 
were divided in their opinions, some wishing to imitate the 

M 



242 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIII. 



Naxians, others to purchase the favour of the Persians 
by betraying their country. When the Athenians arrived 
and were informed of this state of feeling, they returned to 
Attica ; and the event proved the prudence of their retreat. 
After the fall of Carystus, the Persians laid siege to Eretria. 
For some days the people made a gallant resistance, but at 
last the gates were treacherously thrown open by the party 
which wished to gain the favour of the enemy. The con- 
querors literally fulfilled the commands of the king ; the 
more rigorously, that the fate of Eretria might strike terror 
into the Athenians. The city with its temples was plundered, 
burnt, and razed to the ground. The captives were depo- 
sited in a safe place, until they could be conveyed to Persia. 
The whole armament then steered its course to the coast 
of Attica. 

The aged tyrant Hippias, who had most earnestly urged 
the expedition, now guided the barbarians against his own 
country. By his advice the army landed on the plain of 
Marathon, in the bay of which the fleet lay at anchor. That 
plain is one of the few level districts in Attica, and is about 
five miles in length and two in breadth. Near the shore the 
low grounds at the foot of the hills on either side are swamps, 
or covered with stagnant pools. On this advantageous ground 
the Persians encamped, expecting an opportunity of fighting 
a decisive battle. Had the Athenians shrunk from a conflict, 
a march of a day or two would have brought the enemy 
before the walls of Athens ; they therefore no sooner heard 
of the landing of the hostile forces, than they marched out to 
meet them. At the same time nothing was neglected to 
strengthen themselves for the contest ; they armed not only 
all the serviceable citizens, but such of their slaves as were 
willing to earn their liberty with their blood. Phidippides, 
a man noted for his extraordinary speed, was sent off to re- 
quest instant succour from Sparta. The Plataeans, as allies 
and brothers of the Athenians, who were likewise summoned, 



CHAP. XIII, 



MILTIADES. 



243 



came and found the Athenians already facing the enemy. 
Phidippides, on his arrival at Sparta, related the fall of 
Eretria, and the imminent danger of Athens. The Spartans 
did not refuse assistance, but they probably did not feel the 
urgency of the juncture : the moon, moreover, wanted some 
days of the full, and it was contrary to their religious tenets 
to set out on an expedition during this interval ; they ac- 
cordingly dismissed the messenger with promises of future 
succour. On his return to Athens, however, he cheered and 
encouraged his countrymen by the news that, on his passage 
through Arcadia, the god Pan had promised to show his 
good-will towards the Athenians, although they had neglected 
his worship. Solemn vows were made to Artemis, and their 
minds being thus strengthened with confidence in the gocls, 
the Athenians crossed the hills which separate Marathon 
from the rest of Attica. 

Their army was commanded as usual by ten generals, 
Callimachus, the polemarch, being at their head ; by law he 
was entitled to command the right wing, and had a casting 
vote in all disputes that might arise among his colleagues, 
one of whom was Miltiades, the late ruler of Chersonesus. 
On his arrival in Athens, he had been persecuted by persons 
who represented him as having been a tyrant, and as an un- 
worthy countryman of Harmodius and Aristogeiton ; but he 
had been acquitted, for it could not be denied that, even 
while in Chersonesus, he had done good service to his country. 
The islands of Lemnos and Imbros, which were inhabited by 
a remnant of the Pelasgians, and had greatly annoyed the 
Athenians by their piratical expeditions, had been subdued 
by Miltiades, and subjected, nominally at least, to the do- 
minion of Attica. This achievement, and his conduct on the 
Danube when Darius was invading Scythia, turned the 
popular feeling to such a degree, that, on the approach of 
Datis and Artaphernes, he was elected one of the ten generals. 

When the hostile armies were face to face, the opinions of 

M 2 



244 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIII. 



the Ten were equally divided on the question, whether they 
should give battle to the Persians. Some were for waiting 
until the arrival of the Lacedaemonians, and hoped that in 
the mean time their army might accustom itself to the sight 
of the enemy, whose very name was terrible. But all con- 
siderations were outweighed by the representations of Mil- 
tiades, who intimated that treachery within the walls or the 
camp of the Athenians was far more dangerous than the 
number of the Persians ; for Hippias still had some partisans 
at Athens, and with. Persian gold might easily increase their 
number or purchase traitors. Miltiades also knew how little 
depended on the inequality of numbers, and how far superior 
the Athenians were to the barbarians in all that constitutes 
the real strength of an army. The honest Callimachus saw 
and felt the force of such arguments, and gave his voice for 
battle. The generals commanded the army in succession 
each for one day, and when it came to Miltiades' turn he 
drew up his little army in order of battle. 

The centre of the hostile army was occupied by the Persians 
themselves, and by the Sacians. Miltiades strengthened his 
wings at the expense of the centre, although the latter was 
opposed to the strongest, perhaps the only formidable, part of 
the enemy's forces. The two armies were separated by an 
interval of nearly a mile, and the Athenians occupied some- 
what higher ground. At the signal of attack they rushed 
down on the enemy, who awaited them with wonder and 
scorn, as men who were hurrying into certain destruction. 
But before the Persians had bethought themselves sufficiently 
to use their missiles with effect, they found themselves 
engaged in close combat, in which the Grecian weapons and 
armour gave the soldier a decided advantage. The Persians 
and Sacians, however, stood the shock, and soon broke 
through the opposite centre ; but the Athenian wings over- 
powered the motley hosts which were opposed to them, and 
drove them towards the shore and the marshes. While they 



CHAP. XIII. 



BATTLE OF MARATHON. 



245 



were struggling with the difficulties of the ground, Miltiades 
drew his men off, and, closing his wings, led them back to 
meet the enemy, who were returning from the pursuit of the 
Athenian centre. The defeat of this body decided the battle. 
The routed army now thought of nothing but reaching their 
ships ; many perished in the marshes, others in their eager- 
ness to embark : Hippias himself is said to have been among 
the slain.* The victors took seven ships, but Callimachus 
and one of his colleagues were left on the field. The Persian 
fleet, instead of shaping its course eastwards, steered towards 
Sunium, intending to proceed to the southern coast of Attica ; 
but they were foiled by the promptness of the Athenians, 
who, leaving a detachment to guard the prisoners and the 
booty, marched to Athens, and arrived there before the 
Persians appeared off the coast. The Persians, seeing that 
their plan had failed, set sail for Asia without committing 
any fresh act of hostility. So ended the day of Marathon. 

The battle of Marathon was ever after looked upon by the 
Athenians as the most brilliant achievement of their history ; 
and they had indeed reason to be proud of it, a small band of 
patriotic men having on that day gained a complete and de- 
cisive victory over a countless host of barbarian invaders, 
and thus secured the independence of Greece and of Europe 
generally, which but for this event would probably have 
become a province of an eastern despot. But the very glory 
of the achievement so dazzled the Greeks, that they were 
scarcely able to view it calmly and soberly, so that what they 
had actually done was increased in their imaginations to 
something altogether incredible and impossible. This much, 
however, is certain, that the Athenians, to whom the glory 
of that victory belonged almost exclusively, then for the first 
time became aware of their own strength ; and thus a state of 
things was eventually brought about, the consequences of 



* See, however, Herod, vi. 107. 
M 3 



246 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xin. 



which may be traced even to our own days. The number of 
Persians who lay dead on the field of battle is said to have 
amounted to 6400, while the Athenians lost no more than 
192, among whom the Plataeans are not reckoned. The 
Persian army contained the contingents of twenty-six nations. 
As to the amount of the barbarian host, it is described by 
some as having consisted of 600,000 men ; but if we bear in 
mind the statement of Herodotus, that the whole army was 
transported in 600 ships, and another which he makes else- 
where, that each ship carried 200 men, we shall reduce the 
sum total to 120,000. The Athenian forces, including the 
Plataean auxiliaries, are uniformly rated at about 10,000, in 
which, however, no account is taken of the slaves, who served 
as light-armed troops. This unexampled achievement did 
not make the Athenians overbearing ; they gratefully acknow- 
ledged that after all it was mainly owing to the interposition 
of higher powers, and many a legend was told recording the 
belief that the gods had taken a deep interest in the de- 
liverance of Greece. The place where the battle was fought 
is still marked by a tumulus, under which the Athenians are 
said to have been buried ; and to this day the field of Ma- 
rathon is believed to be haunted, as of old, with spectral 
warriors, and the shepherds are alarmed in the night by their 
shouts and by the neighing of their steeds.* 

The absence of the Spartans on the day of the battle was 
a momentous event. They came to Attica while the field 
was strewed with the dead, with no more than 2000 men. 
But although they were too late to share the glory of the 
day, they desired to see the field and the formidable bar- 
barians who had been vanquished there ; after this they re- 
turned home. Their delay in coming to the assistance of 
their countrymen in the hour of danger could not be wholly 

* According to Plut. (Camil 19.), the battle of Marathon was fought 
on the 6th of Boedromion ; but according to modern investigations, on 
the 16th or 17th of Metageitnion, that is, in the month of August. 



CHAP. XIII. 



DEATH OF MILT1ADES. 



247 



justified either by law or by prejudice, and this they them- 
selves appear to have felt. 

The new spirit which the victory over the Persians had 
infused into the conquerors, appeared almost immediately in 
an occurrence which closed the career of Miltiades. He 
forthwith demanded of the Athenians a fleet of seventy ships, 
with which he promised to increase their dominion, and the 
people granted his request without even knowing towards 
what object he would direct the expedition. He first 
attacked Paros, where he had a private enemy, and 
which was then one of the most flourishing among the Cy- 
clades. But the Parians baffled all his attacks, and, having 
received a dangerous hurt in his knee or hip, he returned 
home without having fulfilled the promise by which he had 
induced the people to fit out the fleet. The ill-feeling thus 
created in the public mind led Xanthippus, the father of 
Pericles, the chief of the house of the Alcmaeonids, to bring 
a capital charge against him for having deceived the people. 
Unable, in consequence of his wound, to defend his cause, 
which was undertaken by his brother, he was sentenced to 
pay a fine of fifty talents. As he could not immediately raise 
this sum, he was cast into prison, where he soon afterwards 
died of his sore. The principal cause of his condemnation 
may have been his desire to set himself above the laws of 
his country, for as he had lived many years like a sove- 
reign in the Chersonese, and had been exalted at Athens by 
his brilliant victory over the Persians, it is not impossible 
that he, being a member of an ancient Eupatrid family, may 
have manifested an inclination to disregard legal restraints; 
and if so, nothing that he had done for his country could 
justify him in the eyes of the Athenians. We may pity him, 
indeed, but he assuredly did not fall an innocent victim to 
popular liberty. 



m 4 



248 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIV. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

FROM THE BATTLE OF MARATHON TO THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS. 

The success of the Persians against the town of Eretria was 
but a poor compensation for the defeat they had sustained in 
Attica. When the captive Eretrians were brought before 
Darius, he was satisfied with planting them in the village of 
Ardericca, in a part of his own domains. But his anger was 
doubly inflamed against the Athenians by the event of Ma- 
rathon, and he now resolved that they should feel the whole 
weight of his arm. For three years preparations were made 
throughout his dominions, and every nation that owned his 
sway had to contribute to the new armament more largely 
than before. Ships, horses, and provisions in abundance were 
furnished. In the fourth year his attention was distracted 
by a quarrel in his family, and by an insurrection in Egypt. 
In a dispute between his two sons, Artabazanes and Xerxes, 
about the succession, Darius decided in favour of the latter, 
the younger, who was his son by Atossa, a daughter of Cyrus. 
But in the following year, B.C. 485, before he had completed 
his preparations against Egypt, he died, and Xerxes mounted 
the throne. Xerxes had all the advantages and all the 
defects resulting from an education given to a prince at the 
court of an eastern despot. He was the favourite son of a 
favourite and influential queen. He was not ambitious, but 
the persons around him urged him to prosecute his father's 
plans. Mardonius was eager to renew an enterprise in which 
he had failed through unavoidable mischance, and not through 
his own incapacity. He was warmly seconded by the Greeks 
who had flocked to Susa in the hope of accomplishing their 
selfish ends by the aid ofiPersia. Among them were members 
of the Thessalian family of the Aleuadae, and the exiled 



chap. xiv. PREPARATIONS OF XERXES. 



249 



Pisistratids. They succeeded in inflaming the imagination 
of Xerxes with the prospect of rivalling, or even surpassing, 
the achievements of his glorious predecessors. He accord- 
ingly resolved on the invasion of Greece ; before undertaking 
which, however, he led an army into Egypt, which he again 
reduced under the Persian yoke, in the second year of his 
reign. After this all his thoughts were bent towards the West, 
and the vast preparations were continued with redoubled 
activity in order to raise an armament worthy of the king's 
presence. During four years longer, Asia was kept in restless 
turmoil to collect the hosts which were to be poured out upon 
Europe. Magazines filled with stores were formed along the 
whole line of march as far as the confines of Greece. 

In addition to these precautions, two great works were 
executed which were believed to be necessary for a successful 
and unimpeded expedition into Greece. The first was the 
construction of a bridge across the Hellespont, which was to 
unite the continents of Asia and Europe, and thus form a 
royal road in defiance of nature : the execution of this 
bridge was entrusted to Phoenician and Egyptian engineers. 
The second was the cutting of a canal through the isthmus 
which connects the peninsula of Mount Athos with the main- 
land.* The destruction of the fleet under Mardonius, in its 
attempt to double Mount Athos, had rendered that coast 
terrible to the Persians. The new canal enabled the fleet in 
its voyage southwards to avoid that dangerous point. This 
work employed a multitude of men for three years. When 
all these preparations were completed, Xerxes set out for 
Sardis, where he designed to spend the following winter, and 

* The cutting through of the isthmus of Mount Athos has been regarded, 
in ancient as well as in modern times, as a mere fiction ; but not only 
have a survey of that coast, and an examination of the localities, shown the 
advantages of such a canal to the Persians, but the canal itself, though 
almost filled up with deposits, has been discovered. The only surprising 
circumstance is, that it should have required so long a time to make the 
canal, considering that Xerxes had such multitudes at his command. See 
Long's Essay in the Classical Museum, vol. i. p. 83. 



250 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIV. 



to receive the reinforcements which were to join the main 
army. While he was staying at Sardis, a storm broke to 
pieces the bridge over the Hellespont ; at which Xerxes was 
so enraged, that he put the architects to death.* New 
engineers now constructed two firm and broad causeways, 
stretching from Abydos to the opposite shore, resting each 
on a row of ships, which were stayed against the current that 
bore upon them from the north, by anchors, and by cables 
fastened to both sides of the channel. 

When all was in readiness, Xerxes, in the spring of b. c. 
480, began his march from Sardis in all the pomp of a royal 
progress. His mighty host consisted of nations of different 
colours, costumes, arms, and languages ; it moved on towards 
Abydos, where the king himself, from a lofty throne, sur- 
veyed the crowded shores and bosom of the Hellespont. 
After the performance of certain solemn rites, the army 
crossed by one bridge, while the baggage went by the other ; 
yet the living tide flowed without intermission for seven 
days and seven nights before the last man, the king him- 
self, had arrived on the European shore. From Sestos the 
army marched up the Thracian Chersonesus, and on its 
arrival at Doriscos the king mustered and numbered his land 
forces, while scribes recorded the names, and probably also 
the equipments, of the different races. There also assembled 
the fleet, consisting of 1207 triremes, and 3000 smaller 
vessels. The land army is said to have consisted of 1,700,000 
foot, and 80,000 horse ; but this was not all, for as the arma- 
ment advanced it received reinforcements which are com- 
puted at 300,000 men and 120 triremes. The real military 
strength of this colossal army, however, was almost lost among 
the undisciplined herds which could only impede its move- 

* The Greeks sometimes represented the formation of the bridge over 
the Hellespont as an enslaving or even scourging of those straits (Aesch. 
Pers. 371. ; Arrian, Anab. vii. 14.) ; hence arose the story that Xerxes 
actually chastised the rebellious stream by causing it to be scourged. 



CHAP. XIY. 



STATE OF GREECE. 



251 



ments and consume its stores. The Persians themselves were 
the real core of both the land and the sea force. 

From Doriscos the army accompanied by the fleet pursued 
its march along the coast, through a country which had 
already been subdued by Megabazus and Mardonius. All the 
cities near which the army passed, celebrated its arrival with 
a splendid banquet. There was no scarcity of provisions, as 
the magazines had been well stored, but the army occasionally 
suffered from want of water, and it is said that several rivers 
were drained by the invading hosts. At Acanthos the army 
parted for the first time from the fleet, and left the coast to 
strike across Chalcidice to Therme. Here Xerxes indulged 
his curiosity by sailing to the mouth of the Peneus, and 
viewing the splendid vale of Tempe through which it flows. 

In Greece, those states which had most to fear from the 
invaders were no doubt greatly disturbed by the mere rumour 
of what was going on in Asia immediately after the battle of 
Marathon. Yet their recent victory, and afterwards the revolt 
of Egypt, retarded their counsels, and prevented them from 
making an active use of their time. When at length it became 
manifest that Xerxes was prosecuting the plans of his father, 
the leading states, and those which breathed the same spirit, 
saw the necessity of providing against the impending danger. 
Spies were sent to Sardis, but they were detected, and 
after the assembled forces had been displayed before them, 
were sent home again in the hope that the report of what 
they had seen would crush all spirit of opposition. It was 
felt in Greece that the safety of the country depended upon 
the union of its inhabitants. But great was the difficulty of 
effecting such a union. All the tribes of Greece cherished, 
indeed, an ardent love of independence ; but their unanimity 
was in many instances suppressed by other passions and 
interests, which tended to thwart the common cause. The 
Thessalian family of the Aleuadae had urged Xerxes to in- 
vade Greece, in the hope that with Persian aid they might 

M 6 



252 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xiv 



make themselves masters of Greece. The Thessalian people 
would not have countenanced such treachery, but, being un- 
able to protect themselves, and not knowing what aid they 
could expect from the other Greeks, they yielded when 
Xerxes sent ambassadors from Sardis to all the Greeks, 
except Athens and Sparta, to demand earth and water. Their 
example was followed by all the tribes seated between them 
and the mountain chain of Oeta, and even by the Locrians, 
who nevertheless afterwards did not desert the cause of 
Greece. The Phocians refused to comply with the demands 
of the barbarians. The Dorians were too weak to offer re- 
sistance, and not sufficiently ardent in their patriotism to 
abandon their towns. Boeotia, which was under the sway of 
Thebes, yielded to the Persians, with the exception of the 
Thespians and Plataeans, who were united with Attica by 
their hatred and dread of Thebes. Thus, in the states north 
of Peloponnesus, selfish aims and want of patriotism pre- 
vented a coalition for the common good. 

In Peloponnesus also, causes were at work which hindered 
its inhabitants from exerting their whole strength. Most of the 
states of the peninsula were either allies of Sparta, or subject 
to her influence : but two were led to keep aloof, chiefly by 
the jealousy and aversion they felt towards her ; these were 
Argos and Achaia, which remained inactive during the war, 
and acted the part of mere spectators. The Achaeans seem 
not yet to have become reconciled to the Dorians, who had of 
old driven them from their homes. 

Such a state of things must have been disheartening to 
those who were ready to stake every thing for their liberty 
and independence. Athens and Sparta, however, prepared 
for the last extremity, and calmly availed themselves of all 
the means they had at their command. Athens possessed 
many great men, but one was now the soul of all her counsels ; 
this was Themistocles, the son of Neocles, connected with the 
priestly family of the Lycomedae, though his mother was 



chap, xiv, THEMISTOCLES AND AKISTIDES, 253 



perhaps not even of Greek origin. The numerous anecdotes 
of his youthful wilfulness and waywardness all point the 
same way, to a soul early bent upon great objects, and formed 
to pursue them with steady resolution. The end he aimed 
at was not merely the good of his country, but to make Athens 
great and powerful, that he himself might move and command 
in a large sphere. The peculiar faculty of his mind was the 
quickness with which it seized every object that came in its 
way, perceived the course of action required by new situations 
and sudden junctures, and penetrated into remote conse- 
quences. Such were the abilities which at this period were 
most needed for the service of Athens. At the time when 
Themistocles was beginning to rise into popularity with his 
countrymen, Aristides already possessed their respect and 
confidence. Though descended from an ancient and noble 
family, his fortune was so small that his wealthy relative, 
Callias, was blamed for allowing his kinsman to be reduced 
to indigence. He left his family dependent on the public 
bounty, though the offices he had filled afforded the amplest 
opportunities of enriching himself. Such disinterested in- 
tegrity was at all times one of the rarest virtues at Athens, 
and procured for him the well-deserved surname of the Just 
or the Disinterested. He, like Themistocles, had the welfare 
of his country at heart, but simply and singly, not as an instru- 
ment, but as an end. Though, therefore, there was no great 
discordance between him and Themistocles, yet they could 
not fail to come into frequent collision. But men of the 
austere character of Aristides are seldom beloved, and many 
a one must have been vexed at his being distinguished by so 
honourable a surname as the Just. Without having com- 
mitted any offence, and even without being charged with 
any, he was sent by ostracism into honourable exile ; and it 
is said that he assisted an illiterate countryman in writing his 
own name on one of the sherds that condemned him, b. c. 483. 
The removal of Aristides left Themistocles in almost un- 



254 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIV. 



divided possession of the popular favour. He saw that Athens 
could not remain in its actual condition, but must either 
cease to be an independent state, or enter on a new career 
by taking advantage of its natural position and becoming a 
maritime power. Soon after the battle of Marathon, Themis- 
tocles, with this object in view, persuaded his fellow-citizens 
to forego the profits derived from the silver mines of Laurion, 
which till then had been equally shared among them, and to 
apply the fund to the enlargement of their navy. He carried 
this object by appealing to their hatred and jealousy of 
Aegina, which was still at war with them, and mistress of 
the sea. The Athenians, by building 100 new triremes, in- 
creased their navy to 200 ships. At the same time a decree 
seems to have been passed directing that twenty new triremes 
should be built every year.* Thus the Athenians became a 
maritime people, for which, in fact, nature appears to have 
destined them ; and their naval power and skill became the 
chief source of their glory and influence. 

While Xerxes was wintering at Sardis, those Greek states 
which adhered to the cause of liberty sent envoys to hold a 
congress on the Isthmus of Corinth. The great object was 
to bring about union among the Greeks ; but it was in vain 
that an attempt was made at restoring peace between Athens 
and Aegina. The envoys sent to Argos and Crete met with 
no better success. The Corcyraeans, who then possessed the 
most powerful navy in Greece, promised to send a fleet, and 
actually equipped and manned sixty ships, but their intention 
seems to have been to keep back, and afterwards to join the suc- 
cessful party whatever might be the issue of the war. Some 
envoys were also sent to Gelo, the tyrant of Syracuse, the 
fame of whose power and greatness had spread far and wide. 
He was quite ready to support the Greeks with a large force, 
but only on condition that he should be allowed the supreme 

* Some authors assign this decree to a later period. (Diodor. xi. 43.) 



chap. xiv. MEASURES OF THEMISTOCLES. 



255 



command of the allied forces. Both the Spartan and the 
Athenian envoys declared, that the command of the naval 
force could be entrusted to none but a Spartan. Gelo then 
answered that they seemed to be better provided with generals 
than with troops, and bade the ambassadors tell the Greeks 
that they had lost the spring out of their year ; such he 
deemed his own succour to their cause. The spirit in which 
the envoys acted in Sicily was wise and prudent ; it would 
have been degrading and perilous to entrust all that was dear 
to them to the protection of a Sicilian tyrant. That the in- 
tentions of Gelo were not of the most honourable kind, is 
clear from the statement of Herodotus, according to whom 
he sent a friend to Greece to watch the course of events, and 
to offer earth and water to the Persians if they should be 
victorious. 

Meantime Themistocles was busied in allaying animosity 
and silencing disputes among the Greek cities ; and he was 
seconded in this noble task by Cheileos, of Tegea in Arcadia. 
He also used every expedient for cherishing the ardour and 
bracing the energy of his fellow- citizens, and the spirit which 
he infused into them is shown by the circumstance that the 
assembled Greeks bound themselves by an oath to consecrate 
to the god of Delphi a tenth of the substance of every Grecian 
people which, without being compelled by necessity, had 
surrendered to the Persians. 

The next point on which the congress determined was to 
fix the place where the Greeks should meet the enemy and 
defend themselves. The Thessalian people, before their sur- 
render to the Persians, had invited the deputies to send a 
strong body of troops to guard the pass of Tempe. Accord- 
ingly, while Xerxes was preparing to cross the channel at 
Abydos, 10,000 men, under the command of the Spartan 
Euaenetus and of Themistocles, were sent to take possession 
of Tempe. But finding that the occupation of that position 
would be useless, and even dangerous, they took the advice 



256 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIV. 



of Alexander of Macedonia, and marched back. The next 
defensible point appeared to be the pass of Thermopylae ; and 
here it was resolved to make a stand, and at the same time 
to guard the northern entrance of the Euboean .channel, 
whither nearly the whole naval force proceeded, while a 
small body of Peloponnesians marched to Thermopylae. The 
fleet, amounting to 271 triremes, was under the command of 
the Spartan Eurybiades, although Sparta had sent only ten 
ships, while Athens furnished 127, and supplied the Chalci- 
dians with twenty others. 

While the Persians were still in Pieria, a squadron of 
ten ships was despatched by their admiral to watch the 
movements of the Greeks. Off the island of Sciathos they 
fell in with three Greek vessels, which were overpowered 
and captured. The alarm which this disaster created in the 
fleet at Artemisium was so great, that Eurybiades resolved 
on quitting the station and retiring to Chalcis, where a few 
ships might defend the Euripus. After the return of the 
Persian squadron to Therme, the whole fleet began to steer 
southward. Near Cape Sepias, where they had cast anchor 
for the night, they were, early in the morning, overtaken 
by a storm, which burst upon them from the north-east 
with irresistible fury. The ships were torn from their 
anchorage, driven against one another, and dashed upon the 
cliffs. The tempest raged for three days and three nights, 
and when at length it subsided, the shores for many miles 
were strewed with wrecks and with corpses. The ships of 
war destroyed on that occasion were reckoned, on the lowest 
calculation, at 400 ; the lives, the transports, the stores, and 
the treasures which were lost were past counting. The re- 
mainder of the fleet then put into the Gulf of Pagasae. 

The Greeks naturally attributed this calamity of their 
enemy to the interference of the gods, and testified their 
gratitude by offering sacrifices and raising a temple to Boreas. 
It was believed that nearly the whole armada had perished, 



chap. XIV. BATTLE OF ARTEMISIUM. 



257 



and the Greek fleet returned to its station at Artemisium. 
Fifteen of the enemy's ships, which had been detained at 
Sepias, were captured at once. But the loss sustained by 
the Persians, great as it was, was scarcely felt in their vast 
armament ; and they feared the Greeks so little, that their 
only care seems to have been to prevent them from escaping. 
The Greeks, on the other hand, were not a little astonished 
when they perceived the immense force still opposed to them ; 
and Themistocles had great difficulty in restraining them from 
again turning their backs and seeking shelter in the Euripus. 
It is even said that he prevailed upon Eurybiades only by 
giving him a part of the thirty talents which he received from 
the Euboeans. But, however this may be, the Greeks soon 
recovered from their first panic, and did not afterwards shrink 
from facing the enemy. Meantime the Persian fleet stationed 
at Aphetae did not move, from fear of putting their oppo- 
nents to flight ; soon afterwards, however, the Greeks having 
ventured towards them, they advanced and drew a circle 
around their daring foes. The Greeks then began a brave 
attack, and speedily threw the Persian fleet into disorder. 
The Persians had already lost thirty ships, when night put 
an end to the conflict. From this action, the Greeks con- 
ceived fresh hopes, for they had gained at least the pledge of 
victory, and an insight into their enemy's weakness. In the 
following night another storm came on, and a Persian 
squadron, attempting to sail round the eastern coast of Euboea, 
was completely destroyed. The joyful tidings of this event 
reached the Greeks at Artemisium at the moment when they 
received a reinforcement of fifty-three ships from Athens. 
They now boldly sailed out to attack the enemy, who was 
terror-stricken by what had happened during the night. A 
squadron of Cilicians, which fell in with the Greeks, was 
taken and destroyed; while the main body of the Persian 
fleet remained inactive. But the next day the Persians sailed 
up to Artemisium to begin the attack. The Greeks advanced. 



258 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xiv. 



pierced and broke the crescent of the enemy's ships, and the 
unwieldy armament was thrown into confusion and shattered 
by its own weight. The contest lasted for a long time, and 
both parties suffered almost equally. Towards the evening 
the combatants parted ; the Athenians, finding that half their 
ships were disabled, saw that they could not survive such 
another day, and resolved to retreat. In this they were con- 
firmed by the news they received of what had just happened 
at Thermopylae. 

At the time when the congress was assembled on the 
Isthmus, the Olympic festival and that of the Carnean Apollo 
were at hand ; the danger did not seem to be so very pressing 
as to render it necessary to suspend those sacred games. 
Accordingly, only a small force was sent to Thermopylae to 
bar the progress of the enemy until the festivals were over. 
This litttle band was commanded by the Spartan king Leoni- 
das, the successor of the wild Cleomenes. It was composed 
of only 300 Spartans, attended by a body of Helots, 500 
men from Tegea, and about 2000 from other Peloponnesian 
cities. The Phocians, when called upon to join them, came 
to Thermopylae with 1000 men ; 700 Thespians also joined 
Leonidas as he was passing through Boeotia. In later times 
it was believed that the Spartan king, when he set out, fore- 
saw the fatal issue of the expedition : but this is only an in- 
vention to exalt the glory of the hero ; for on his arrival at 
the pass, he was not aware of the path across the mountain 
by which he might be attacked in the rear, and there was no 
reason why he might not, for a few days, withstand the attacks 
of the enemy in the narrow pass, which is shut in between 
the eastern promontory of Oeta, called Callidromos, and the 
shore of the Malian Gulf, and is four or five miles in length. 
It is narrowest at the two ends, being somewhat wider in the 
middle. There was, however, a track along the torrent of 
Asopos on the north side of the mountain, leading to the 
summit of Callidromos, and descending on the southern side, 



chap. xiv. LEONIDAS AT THERMOPYLAE. 



259 



near the end of the pass. Of this path no one knew any- 
thing, until Leonidas on his arrival was informed of its ex- 
istence ; in consequence of which he posted the Phocians, by 
their own desire, on the summit of the ridge to guard against 
a surprise. 

The first sight of the enemy struck the army of Leonidas 
with no less terror than the Greeks at Artemisium had felt at 
the approach of the hostile armada ; and the Peloponnesians 
would have retreated to defend their own isthmus, had not 
Leonidas prevailed upon them to stay, and sent messengers 
to the confederate cities to call for speedy reinforcements. At 
the northern entrance of the pass the Greeks had built a 
wall, and Xerxes was not a little astonished when he was 
informed by his scouts that the Spartans, apparently unaware 
of their danger, were before the wall, some quietly seated 
and combing their hair, while others were engaged in gym- 
nastic exercises. He had hoped to scare the enemy by his 
mere presence, and four days passed away before he was 
convinced that he would not have so easy a victory. On the 
fifth day he ordered a body of Median and Cissian troops to 
fall upon the presumptuous enemy, and to lead them captive 
into his presence. But their attack on the pass was repulsed, 
and their repeated onsets on the Greeks were broken like 
waves upon a rock. The king then sent his ten thousand 
Immortals, his own body guards, who were led on as to a 
certain victory, but they too were successfully withstood. 
During their fruitless assaults, the king, who witnessed the 
contest seated on a lofty throne, thrice started up in a trans- 
port of fear or rage. The slaughter of the barbarians was 
great, while on the side of the Greeks only a few Spartans 
are said to have fallen. Next day the attacks were renewed 
with no better success, and the confidence of Xerxes was 
changed into despondence and perplexity. 

In the mean time the secret of the path, called Anopaea, 
having been betrayed to the king by a Greek of the name of 



260 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIV. 



Ephialtes, Xerxes ordered a detachment of his troops to 
follow the infamous traitor. They set out at nightfall, and 
by day-break reached the spot where the Phocians were 
stationed. The Phocians retreated to the highest peak of the 
ridge, and resolved to sell their lives as dearly as they could, 
but the Persians, without turning aside to pursue them, kept 
on their way, and descended on the southern side of the 
mountain. When the Greeks in the pass were apprised of 
what had happened, there was little time for deliberation, and 
opinions were divided as to the course which ought to be 
pursued. Leonidas did not restrain those of his allies who 
wished to save themselves ; but for himself and his Spartans 
he declared his resolution of maintaining to the last the post 
which his country had assigned to them. All withdrew except 
the Thespians and 400 Thebans, who appear to have joined 
Leonidas only very reluctantly, and who alone survived the 
battle. The ten thousand, who had been guided by Ephialtes, 
appeared at the southern entrance of the pass early in the 
forenoon, and, according to a preconcerted plan, the king 
began his onset at the same time. Leonidas, now less anxious 
to save his men than to make havoc among the enemy, sallied 
forth from the pass, and charged the advancing barbarians, 
who, according to the Asiatic custom, were driven to the con- 
flict by the lash of their commanders. Many of the barbarians 
fell, but the Spartans too were thinned, and Leonidas himself 
died early. Four times the Persians were driven back by the 
Spartans. When at length the ten thousand had entered the 
southern end of the pass, the Spartans retreated behind the 
wall. The Thebans did not follow their example, but threw 
down their arms and begged for quarter. The Persians now 
rushed forward without resistance, broke down the wall, and 
surrounded a hillock on which, the Spartans awaited them. 
They all fell, and where they fell they were afterwards buried. 
The inscription on the monument raised over the slain stated 
that 4000 men from Peloponnesus had fought against 300 



chap. xiv. THE PERSIANS AT DELPHI. 



261 



myriads ; and bade the passenger tell their countrymen that 
they had fallen in obedience to their laws. It is difficult, 
however, to reconcile the accounts of the numbers engaged 
in that memorable struggle, which must have taken place in 
the month of July or August of the year B.C. 480. The 
Persians are said to have lost 20,000 men, and among them 
several of royal blood. This hard-won victory taught Xerxes 
a lesson, which he had refused to receive from the warnings 
of Demaratus, who now also told him that he would every 
where meet with the same desperate resistance, and advised 
him to send a detachment of his fleet round Peloponnesus to 
seize Cythera and infest the coast of Laconia ; but this plan 
was not adopted. 

Xerxes was now in possession of the key of northern Greece, 
and the Thessalians (probably the nobles) endeavoured to 
direct his course to their own advantage. They sent to the 
Phocians, demanding a bribe of fifty talents, for which they 
promised to avert the destruction impending over their 
country. The Phocians, however, declined the offer, and 
Xerxes, by the advice of his Thessalian friends, entered 
Doris, which was spared, having previously submitted to 
the invaders. Those Phocians who could make their escape 
took refuge on the high plains under the peaks of Parnassus 
or at Amphissa ; but on all that remained, on the fields, cities, 
and temples of the devoted land, the fury of the Persians, 
stimulated by the Thessalians, poured undistinguishing ruin. 
The sanctuary of Apollo at Abae was sacked and burnt, and 
fourteen towns shared its fate. The main body of the army 
then turned off towards the lower vale of the Cephisus, to con- 
tinue its march through Boeotia to Athens, while a small 
force was sent round Parnassus with orders to strip the 
temple of Delphi of its treasures and lay them at the king's 
feet. The Delphians had quitted the city, leaving it and its 
sanctuary to the protection of the god himself. On the 
arrival of the enemy, a fearful thunder-storm, it is said, 



262 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIV. 



began to rage ; huge rocks, broken off from the cliffs over- 
hanging the road, fell upon the enemy and crushed many ; 
at the same time a war-cry was heard from within the tem- 
ple of Athena. The Persians, terror-struck, retraced their 
steps, and were pursued by the Delphians with unresisted 
slaughter. Thus Delphi was delivered, and the divine power 
gloriously attested. 

When the Grecian fleet quitted its station at Artemisium, 
the Athenians had hoped that a Peloponnesian army would 
take up its position in Boeotia to protect Attica ; but it soon 
became evident that the Peloponnesians had no intention of 
venturing beyond the Isthmus, which they meant to fortify 
with a wall, and there to collect all their forces for the 
defence of the Peninsula. The Athenians, therefore, begged 
their allies to sail on with them to Salamis, that they might 
provide for the safety of their wives and children, and decide 
upon the course to be adopted against the approaching in- 
vasion. The Athenians had previously asked the advice 
of the Delphic god ; but he had commanded them to fly to 
the uttermost ends of the earth, as there was no means of 
saving Athens from the fire and sword of the barbarians. 
The messengers, in dismay at the prospect of so fearful a 
calamity, again approached the god as suppliants, praying 
for a milder decree. This was granted, but in dark and 
obscure terms: "Zeus," the priestess said, " has been prevailed 
upon by his daughter Athena to grant that, when all beside 
is lost, a wooden wall shall still shelter her citizens." The 
meaning of this oracle was the subject of various conjectures 
at Athens; the younger men readily believed that the 
wooden wall was their navy ; but the older citizens thought 
it incredible that Athena would abandon her ancient citadel. 
The people, in their uncertainty, looked to Themistocles for 
advice ; and as he himself had probably suggested the oracle, 
he had no difficulty in interpreting its meaning. He exhorted 
his fellow-citizens, if all other safeguards should fail them, to 



chap. xiv. ABANDONMENT OF ATHENS. 



263 



commit their safety and their hopes of victory to their newly 
strengthened navy. This counsel had prevailed ; and the 
time was now come when the resolution founded upon it was 
to be carried into effect. 

After desolating Phocis, the Persian army passed peace- 
fully through Boeotia towards Athens, for all the Boeotian 
cities, except Thespiae and Plataeae, which were reduced to 
ashes, had submitted and received Persian garrisons. At 
Athens, Themistocles moved a decree that the city should be 
abandoned to the protection of its tutelary goddess, and that 
the men, after placing their wives and children and the aged 
and infirm in security, should betake themselves to their 
ships. This was a severe trial to the feelings of the Athe- 
nians, but, yielding to circumstances, they, with the exception 
of a few who resolved to remain in the citadel, transported 
their families and movable property, some to Salamis, some to 
Aegina, and some to Troezen, where the exiles were received 
with great kindness. The Greek fleet assembled at Salamis 
was reinforced by a squadron contributed by the same states 
which had sent their contingents to Artemisium, and by a 
small number of ships from other quarters. The whole arma- 
ment thus strengthened amounted to 380 ships. Eurybiades 
was still the commander-in-chief, and in a council which was 
held to determine the position in which the enemy's approach 
should be awaited, the commanders were almost unanimous in 
their opinion that they ought to leave Salamis and take up 
a station nearer the Isthmus, where, in case of a defeat, they 
might join the army and renew the contest. This was cer- 
tainly opposed to the interest of the Athenians, who had 
staked their all upon the sea ; but although nearly half the 
fleet had been furnished by them, they had only one vote. 
Before any decision was come to, it was announced that the 
Persians had overrun Attica, and that the acropolis of 
Athens would soon be in their hands. Xerxes had pursued 
his march without resistance, spreading desolation over the 



264 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIV. 



plains of Attica till he came to the Cecropian rock. There 
the little band assembled in the acropolis baffled every at- 
tempt of the monarch and his hosts to take the rock by 
assault, until at length it was surprised. Some of the small 
garrison threw themselves down the precipice ; others took 
refuge in the sanctuary of the goddess, but they were 
hunted out by the Persians and put to the sword. The 
temples were then plundered, and the whole citadel set on 
fire. The next day some scruples seem to have disquieted 
the mind of Xerxes, for he called together the Athenian 
exiles, who were in his train, and bade them go up the rock 
and sacrifice according to their rites. They brought back 
the report of a happy omen for Athens. The sacred olive, 
which had been consumed by the fire which destroyed the 
temple near which it grew, had already put forth, from the 
burnt stump, a fresh shoot a cubit in length. 

When the news of these events was brought to the Greeks 
at Salamis, some of the commanders are said to have made 
preparations for immediate retreat, and others to have re- 
solved to give battle near the Isthmus. On his return to his 
ship, Themistocles communicated the result of the conference 
to his friend Mnesiphilus, a man of a vigorous practical un- 
derstanding, who at once saw the danger of such a mode of 
acting. Themistocles, strengthened in his own conviction 
by the expressions of his friend, hastened to Eurybiades, 
earnestly entreating him to call together another council 
and reconsider the fatal resolutions they had formed. This 
was done, and Themistocles endeavoured to bring the com- 
manders over to his views. Adeimantus, the Corinthian, 
concerned about the safety of his own city, was his chief 
opponent. Themistocles pointed out the advantages of 
their position at Salamis ; but finding this of no avail, he 
at length declared that the Athenians were resolved, if their 
allies persisted in their design, to take their families and 
property on board, and sail away to the south of Italy. This 



chap. xiv. THEMISTOCLES AT SAL AMIS. 



265 



threat determined Eurybiades, and his authority or influence 
decided the resolution of the council. 

Six days after the Greeks had left Artemisium, the Per- 
sian fleet arrived in the bay of Phalerum. Xerxes imme- 
diately went on board one of the ships with Mardonius, 
and summoned the chief commanders of the fleet into his 
presence, to determine upon the mode of proceeding. Among 
the many vassal princes who conducted their contingents in 
person, there was a woman, Artemisia, queen of Caria. She 
alone saw the danger of a hasty engagement, and suggested 
the idea of waiting some time, as the Greeks would be sure 
to quarrel and disperse. But the king resolved upon attack- 
ing the enemy without delay, and forthwith ordered the 
fleet to sail up towards Salamis and to form in line of battle. 
As, however, the day was already far advanced, it was 
determined that the battle should not be commenced until 
the next morning. The sight of the formidable armada 
again roused all the fears and apprehensions which Themis- 
tocles had been labouring to counteract. The thought of 
retreating to the Isthmus, where Cleombrotus, the brother 
of Leonidas, had just arrived with a large force, again arose 
in most minds. Another meeting was called, in which 
the voices of the Athenians, Aeginetans, and Megarians 
were drowned by the rest, who exclaimed against the 
folly of staying before a country which was already in the 
enemy's hands. Themistocles, seeing that all his remon- 
strances would be lost upon the allies, now resolved to save 
Athens in spite of them, and his allies in spite of themselves. 
While the commanders were still disputing, he withdrew, 
and summoning a slave, who spoke the Persian language, 
sent him to the Persian admiral with the message that the 
Greeks were panic-struck and bent on flight ; and that if the 
Persians would attack them at once they would insure a 
complete and easy victory, whereas if they were allowed 
to disperse the king would have to fight against them one by 

N 



266 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xiv. 



one. The Persians hastened to follow the advice which was 
so much in accordance with their own wishes. About midnight 
they moved from Phalerum to block up the entrance of each 
of the narrow channels by which Salamis is separated from 
Attica and Megara. A body of Persians was also stationed 
in the little island of Psyttaleia. Salamis was thus com- 
pletely inclosed, while the Greeks were still assembled in 
council, to which Themistocles had in the mean time returned. 
Suddenly he was called out of the room to speak to a strangef 
at the door. It was Aristides, who seems to have been still 
in exile, and had come over from Aegina under cover of 
the night, to inform his former rival that the Persians had 
surrounded the Greeks, and that there was no escape except 
by cutting a passage through the enemy's fleet. Themisto- 
cles told him what he had done, and introduced him into the 
council-room. When the Greeks were informed of their 
condition, they would hardly believe it, until a Tenian ship, 
which came over from the enemy, placed the truth beyond a 
doubt. Nothing now remained but to brace every nerve for 
the battle, which was to commence at daybreak. 

When the morning dawned, the Persian fleet was seen 
covering the sea between Psyttaleia and the mouth of the 
channel, and the army lining the shores of the bay of Eleusis. 
On one of the heights of Mount Aegaleos, a lofty throne was 
raised for Xerxes, from which he could view the fight. 
Before the Greeks embarked at Salamis, Themistocles ad- 
dressed them in a speech which set before them all that was 
best and all that was worst in the nature and condition of 
man, and exhorted them to choose and hold fast the good. 
They awaited the advance of the Persians in the straits, and 
when their gigantic fleet was pent up in the narrow channel, 
an Athenian ship darted forward and struck one of the 
Persians. This was the signal for a general engagement. 
The Persians did not yield to the Greeks in courage and 
perseverance^ but the valour of the Greeks, if not directed 



chap. xiv. BATTLE OF SAL AMIS. 



267 



by superior skill, was cooler and more deliberate, for it 
had not to struggle with any of the impediments which 
threw the Asiatics into confusion. The ships of the latter, 
taller and larger than those of the Greeks, were turned by 
the wind, their evolutions were thwarted by their numbers, 
and their sides exposed to the attacks of the enemy's prows. 
The ships stationed behind, and pressing forward to signalise 
themselves in the presence of the king, often fell foul of their 
friends whom they met retreating. The confusion which 
thus arose in the Persian fleet was, no doubt, greatly aggra- 
vated and rendered more mischievous by the variety of forces 
that composed it ; for the Egyptians, Phoenicians, Cilicians, 
Cyprians, Ionians, and other nations which served in it, were 
connected by no other bond than that of having the same 
master. The following instance of the want of a common 
feeling among them was probably not the only one which the 
battle afforded : — The Athenians, indignant at being at- 
tacked by a woman, had set a price of 10,000 drachmas on 
the head of Artemisia. She, with many others, was fleeing in 
the midst of the disorder, chased by the Athenian Ameinias. 
To make room for herself, she struck and instantly sunk a 
Persian ship ; and Ameinias, thinking that he had been 
pursuing a friend, now suffered her to escape. 

The event of the battle was in reality decided at the first 
onset, which threw the unwieldy armament into a confusion 
from which it could never recover, and which so many causes 
contributed to increase. Yet it was long before the resist- 
ance of the mass was finally overcome, and night had begun 
before the Persian fleet took refuge in Phalerum, whither 
the Greeks did not attempt to pursue it. An Aeginetan 
squadron, stationed near the mouth of the channel, completed 
the defeat of the fugitives. During the battle, Aristides had 
been watching its course, and when fortune began to turn 
against the Persians, he landed with a small band at 
Psyttaleia, where he drove the Persians into a corner, and 

N 2 



268 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. XIV. 



cut them in pieces to a man ; for, though an exile, he longed 
to share in the glory of the day, and to contribute his mite 
towards defending the independence of his country. 

In this battle, the barbarians are said to have lost 500, 
or, according to others, 200 ships ; the Greeks only 40. The 
number of the dead was proportionately much greater among 
the barbarians than among the Greeks, and contained many 
of the highest rank. Xerxes himself began to feel that his 
situation was dangerous, although he still possessed a force 
more than sufficient to renew the contest : another such de- 
feat would have utterly ruined his fleet, and left the Greeks 
in undisputed command of the sea ; he himself might be cut 
off from Asia, and shut up in a foreign country, exposed to 
famine and incessant attacks from his enemies. He accord- 
ingly resolved to retreat. In this resolution he was con- 
firmed by Mardonius, who had reason to dread the king's 
anger and vengeance, for it was he who had urged the king 
to an undertaking which had hitherto been nothing but a 
series of disasters. He now represented to the king that the 
land army of the Persians was still unconquered ; and that, 
although the Greeks had prevailed at sea, which was their 
own element, they would never be able to resist his land 
forces. He asked for 300,000 men, with whom he promised 
to undertake the subjugation of all Greece. Artemisia also 
supported this advice, and was at once sent to Ephesus with 
the king's children. Xerxes immediately gave orders to his 
fleet to make for the Hellespont with all speed, and to guard 
the bridges till his own arrival. He seems to have been 
overwhelmed by the thought of his danger, and resolved to 
make his escape, leaving Mardonius to accomplish the task 
which he himself gave up so ingloriously. 

It was not till about the middle of the following day, that 
the Greeks were informed of the departure of the hostile 
fleet. They immediately began to chase it*; but on arriving 
at Andros, without having seen any trace of it, they stopped 



chap. xiv. KETREAT OF THE PERSIANS. 



269 



to hold a council of war. Themistocles and the Athenians 
wished to sail to the Hellespont, destroy the bridges, and cut 
off the king's retreat ; but Eurybiades thought this a danger- f 
ous undertaking, and was of opinion that no obstacle ought 
to be thrown in the king's way. All approved of this view ; 
even Themistocles yielded, and prevailed upon the Atheni- 
ans, who were burning to pursue their enemy, to relinquish 
their design. The fleet now made some stay among the 
Cyclades to chastise those islanders who had sent succour to 
the barbarians. There is a tradition that Themistocles, in 
the spirit of the resolution formed by the Greek commanders 
at Andros, sent a captive Persian to the king with a message 
urging him to flee, as the Greeks were contemplating the 
destruction of the bridges on the Hellespont, and would thus 
cut off his return. Xerxes, terrified by this warning, hurried 
with the utmost speed to the Hellespont, accompanied by a 
body of 60,000 men * 

Mardonius attended his master as far as Thessaly, where he 
himself meant to take up his winter quarters. The scarcity 
of provisions during the march, and the consequent sickness 
among the troops, obliged Xerxes to consign multitudes to 
the care of the cities that lay on his road, and were already im- 
poverished by his first visit. The passage of the river Stry- 
mon is said to have been particularly disastrous, and many 
perished in its icy waters. On his arrival at the Hellespont 
he found the bridges destroyed by the waves, but the fleet was 
in readiness to carry him and his army over to Abydos. The 
abundance of provisions which there awaited them, and their 
excessive indulgence after severe want, were almost as per- 
nicious to the barbarians as the previous famine, so that the 
band which the king took with him to Sardis was a mere 
wreck of his huge host. 

* It is commonly said that Themistocles endeavoured by this advice to 
secure for himself a welcome reception in the king's dominions if he should 
ever need it ; but such a thought can scarcely have occurred to his mind 
at that time, when he was at the height of his glory and popularity. 

H 3 



270 



HISTOKY OF GKEECE. 



CHAP. XIV. 



Many of the Greek cities on the northern coast of the 
Aegean, when they heard of the results of the battle of 
Salamis, had shaken off their yoke, and asserted their inde- 
pendence. Olynthus, however, was reconquered by Arta- 
bazus, who had accompanied Xerxes, and its whole population 
was massacred in cold blood. He was less successful at 
Potidaea, for neither bribes nor open attacks were of any 
avail, and he had been besieging the place for more than 
three months, when an extraordinary ebb of the sea left bare 
the shore of the isthmus under the walls of the city. He 
accordingly sent a detachment round that part, but in the 
middle of their march the water returned in an unusually 
high tide, and the barbarians were either overwhelmed by 
the waves, or cut to pieces by the garrison. Artabazus, in 
despair, now raised the siege, and marched back to Thessaly, 
where Mardonius had taken up his quarters, with an army 
of 300,000 barbarians, and 50,000 Greeks willing to support 
them. 

While the Greek fleet was engaged among the Cyclades, 
Themistocles seized the opportunity of enriching himself at 
their expense. He in vain demanded a contribution from 
Andros ; the town was then besieged, but made so vigorous 
a resistance, that the Greeks were obliged to abandon the 
attempt, and returned to Salamis. In several other islands, 
however, Themistocles was more successful in making the in- 
habitants purchase impunity for their conduct by large bribes. 

All Greece now resounded with the praise of his wisdom 
and prudence, for the deliverance of Greece was univer- 
sally ascribed to him, next to the gods. The choicest part 
of the spoil was sent to Delphi in the shape of a colossal 
statue ; and when the commanders met in the temple of 
Poseidon, on the Isthmus, to award the palm of individual 
merit, almost unanimous consent assigned the foremost place 
to Aegina. When the prize was to be given to individuals, 
no one was generous enough to resign the first place to 



CHAP. XIV. 



BATTLE OF HIMERA. 



271 



another, though most were just enough to award the second 
to Themistocles. But he was honoured in the highest 
degree at Sparta, whither he went, according to Plutarch, 
invited ; but as Herodotus relates, wishing to be honoured. 
The Spartans gave him a chaplet of olive-leaves, which was 
the reward they had bestowed upon their own admiral, Eury- 
biades ; and 300 Spartan knights escorted him, on his return, 
as far as Tegea. 

At the same time that the glorious battle of Salamis was 
fought and won by the Greeks, Sicily was delivered 
from a danger not less threatening. Terillus, tyrant of 
Himera, had been expelled from his city by Theron, tyrant 
of Agrigentum, and solicited aid from Carthage. The Car- 
thaginians, glad of an opportunity to gain a footing in the 
island, sent an army, amounting, we are told, to 300,000 
men, under the command of Hamilcar. Himera was be- 
sieged; but Gelo of Syracuse, who was married to a daughter of 
Theron, marched to its relief, and confined the Carthaginians 
to their camp. By his promptness he succeeded in defeat- 
ing the enemy, with the loss, it is said, of half their forces ; 
and Hamilcar himself was among the slain. The rest took 
refuge in a position where the want of water compelled them 
to surrender. Most of the Carthaginian ships were destroyed 
by fire, and those which escaped perished in a storm on 
their way home. This great victory is stated to have been 
gained on the same day as that of Salamis. The number of 
prisoners who were sold as slaves was immense ; and with 
their aid the Sicilian towns, especially Agrigentum, adorned 
themselves with the most magnificent public buildings, the 
ruins of which still remain as monuments of the great day of 
Himera.* 

* The account of this war in Diodorus, xi. 20. folL, is disfigured by 
much that seems to have arisen from his national vanity, for he himself 
was a Sicilian. 

M 4 



272 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



CHAP. XV* 



CHAPTER XV. 

FROM THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS TO THE END OF THE PERSIAN INVASION. 

A few days after the battle of Salamis, when the Persians 
had quitted Attica, the Athenians returned to cultivate their 
fields and repair their homes, in the hope that their land 
would not again be visited by the ravages of the same 
invader, and that, in case of need, the other Greeks would 
energetically support Athens, which had now twice borne 
the brunt of the danger which threatened Greece. During 
the winter the Greeks remained tranquil, but in the spring 
they displayed all the activity of men who knew that Mardo- 
nius was in Thessaly, and a Persian fleet still upon the sea. 
This fleet was now assembled at Samos, with the intention 
of acting on the defensive, and was watching the lonians 
with great suspicion. It amounted only to 300 ships, 
including an Ionian squadron. The distrust of the lonians 
was not unfounded, for while the Greek fleet of 110 ships 
was assembled at Aegina, under the command of the Spartan 
king Leotychides, and the Athenian Xanthippus, some lonians 
came over to solicit aid for the purpose of restoring Ionia to 
independence. But all they could effect was, to induce the 
commanders to sail eastward as far as Delos, where they 
stationed themselves in an attitude of defence, but determined 
not to advance farther east. Every one knew that this time 
the conflict must be decided by the land forces, and to them 
all eyes were directed. 

Meantime, Mardonius had been making preparations for 
the approaching contest. He must now have been convinced 
that the conquest of Greece was not so easy as he had once 



chap. XV. PROCEEDINGS OF MARDONIUS. 



273 



imagined, and he was looking with no small anxiety towards 
the opening of the campaign. He sent envoys to all the 
Greek oracles to gain some insight into the future, and the 
answers which he received may have suggested the idea of 
detaching Athens from the cause of Greece, and of gaining 
her as. an ally for Persia. Alexander, king of Macedonia, was 
chosen to conduct this negotiation. On his arrival at Athens 
he laid before the people the proposals of Mardonius, and at 
the same time added his own advice, urging them to accept 
the generous offer, as it would be hopeless to engage in a 
contest with so powerful an enemy. The Spartans, on hearing 
of the embassy, were alarmed lest the Athenians should 
allow themselves to be ensnared ; they were anxious to 
retain the alliance of the Athenians, at least until the forti- 
fications of the Isthmus should be completed. Spartan 
envoys were accordingly sent to Athens to remind her of 
what she owed to Greece and herself, and to offer liberal 
support in case Attica should again be called upon to make 
sacrifices similar to those of the preceding year. The distinct 
and manly answer of the Athenians at once destroyed the 
hopes of Mardonius and silenced the fears of the Spartans. 
" So long as the sun," they said, "held on his course, Athens 
would never come to terms with Xerxes." The priests were, 
at the same time, directed to pronounce a solemn curse on 
every Greek who should negotiate with the barbarian, or 
abandon the national confederacy. 

As soon as Mardonius heard the message, he set out from 
Thessaly, and marched at full speed towards Athens. The 
Thessalians were more zealous in his service than ever, and 
in Boeotia he was heartily welcomed. The Boeotians even 
advised him to fix his quarters among them, and held out to 
him the prospect of conquering Greece without a blow, as 
the Greeks, they said, might easily be induced to turn their 
arms against one another. But Mardonius wished to make 
himself master of Athens, in order to restore his credit with 



274 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XV. 



Xerxes, who was still at Sardis, and lie hoped also to crush 
the spirit of the Athenians by taking possession of their 
country and city. He accordingly proceeded : at Athens he 
found nothing but the deserted walls ; for its inhabitants, 
seeing that no aid was to be expected from the Pelopon- 
nesians, had withdrawn to Salamis. This happened in b. c. 
479, ten months after the capture of Athens by Xerxes. 

Mardonius immediately sent to Salamis to renew the 
proposals which he had made through Alexander. Only 
one wretched man was found in the council shameless 
enough to recommend compliance ; but he paid dearly for 
his audacity, being stoned to death by the populace when 
he quitted the house in which the commanders were as- 
sembled ; and when the Athenian women heard of his crime, 
they vented their fury upon his innocent wife and children. 
While the Athenians were giving these proofs of inflexible 
resolution, the Spartans seemed to have wholly forgotten 
their danger ; for, at the news of the approach of Mardonius, 
instead of hastening to the protection of Athens, they only 
quickened the completion of the fortification of the Isthmus 
for their own security. Cleombrotus, the guardian of the 
young king Pleistarchus, who superintended the work, was 
instructed not to march against the Persians until Pelopon- 
nesus should be quite secured from all fear of a sudden 
attack. An eclipse of the sun which happened at the time 
frightened him so much that he returned home, where he 
soon afterwards died, and was succeeded in the guardianship 
of Pleistarchus by his son Pausanias. In the mean time 
Athens, Megara, and Plataeae sent an embassy to Sparta to 
complain of the indifference and neglect with which their 
zeal had been requited, and to call for assistance to rid Attica 
of the barbarians. The ambassadors found the Spartans 
engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyacinthia, as if 
they had no more pressing business to attend to. The envoys 
held out a threat that they would accept the proposal of 



CHAP. XV. DEATH OF CLEOMBROTUS, 



275 



Mardonius if no succour was sent, and severely complained 
of Sparta's backwardness. The celebration of the festival 
afforded the ephors a welcome pretext for not giving an 
immediate answer, as they wished to say nothing decisive 
until the fortifications of the Isthmus should be completed. 
They, accordingly, preferred keeping the Athenian am- 
bassadors in the dark, and running the risk of losing the 
alliance of Athens, to disclosing their designs before it 
was time to carry them into effect. At length, however, 
when every motive of delay had ceased, the ephors ordered 
Pausanias to put himself at the head of an army of 5000 
Spartans, each attended by seven helots. But, even now, 
the army set out at night before the Athenian ambassadors 
were informed of it ; and it was not till the next day, when 
the threat was renewed, that Athens would throw itself into 
the arms of Persia, that the ephors assured the ambassadors 
that the Spartan army was already on its march. 

Such is the account given by Herodotus of this tran- 
saction ; but it represents the conduct of the Spartans as so 
capricious and childish, that we can hardly believe it to be 
true. The Athenian ambassadors were detained at Sparta 
for ten days, and it is not improbable that the return of 
Cleombrotus from the Isthmus, and his death, took place 
during that period ; if so, the time required for appointing 
a successor, together with that which had elapsed during the 
illness and death of Cleombrotus, would be sufficient to 
account for the delay. The army may, at length, have been 
sent off in haste, and even in secret, perhaps to avoid being 
waylaid by the Argives, with whom Mardonius seems to 
have had some influence. These suppositions, if true, 
would show the conduct of Sparta in a less unfavourable 
light than it must otherwise appear in. 

Mardonius was induced by various reasons not to await 
the arrival of Pausanias, nor to fight a battle in Attica. He 
resolved on falling back upon Boeotia, where he would be 



276 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XT,? 



favoured by the nature of the country, and by the neigh- 
bourhood of the city of Thebes. He had, until the last, 
hoped to induce the Athenians to join him, and had there- 
fore abstained from ravaging their country ; but now, before 
he retreated, he gave the reins to havoc and plunder, ravaged 
the land, and destroyed all the buildings which had been 
left standing by Xerxes. On his arrival in Boeotia he 
pitched his camp in the plain between Erythrae and the 
river Asopus, expecting that Pausanias would give him 
battle there, for he longed to have an early opportunity of 
fighting. But he nevertheless took precautions against the 
consequences of a defeat. Meantime, Attaginus the Theban 
entertained Mardonius and fifty of his officers with a splendid 
banquet, at which some Persian officers are said to have 
expressed the gloomy forebodings with which they looked 
forward to the approaching conflict ; though the Persians 
were now supported by nearly all the Greeks north of the 
Isthmus. 

When Pausanias arrived at Corinth, he was joined by the 
forces of all the Peloponnesian allies, and continued his 
march into Attica. At Eleusis he met with an Athenian 
reinforcement under the command of Aristides, and then 
crossed over into Boeotia. Near Erythrae he halted, and 
drew up his forces at the foot of Cithaeron. The army* 
consisting wholly of infantry, amounted to 110,000 men, 
comprising, it is said, 1800 Thespians who had survived 
the destruction of their city. The Athenians had furnished 
8000 men, but the Plataeans could muster only 600. The 
number of the Persian army more than tripled that of the 
Greeks, being composed of 300,000 Asiatics and 50,000 
Greeks. Mardonius waited for a time, in expectation that 
the Greeks would descend from the high ground on which 
they were stationed and give him battle in the plain. But 
as this was not done, he ordered his cavalry, commanded by 
Masistius, to go up and attack them. The Greeks were, on 



CHAP. XV. MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMIES. 



277 



the whole, protected by the rugged ground, but the position 
of the Megarians was less favourable, and they had to bear 
the brunt of the charge. Their ranks were rapidly thinned, 
their spirit began to fail, and when Pausanias called upon 
the Greeks to hasten to their assistance, there was con- 
siderable hesitation, until the Athenian Olympiodorus offered 
to cover the Megarians with his small detachment. Masistius 
was thrown from his horse, and the Athenians rushed upon 
him before he could rise. The Persians making a desperate 
onset to recover his body, the rest of the Greeks came to the 
assistance of the Megarians and Athenians. After a sharp 
conflict, the Persian cavalry was repulsed with some slaughter, 
and returned to their camp with the sad tidings of the fall 
of their commander. Although the Greeks had lost many 
men, they were animated by their final triumph ; and the 
body of Masistius was drawn on a cart along the lines, that 
every one might gaze upon the gigantic barbarian. 

This success emboldened Pausanias to seek a position 
where his army, though more exposed, would be better 
supplied with water than near Erythrae. With this view 
he descended into the territory of Plataeae, which still lay 
in ruins, and posted himself on the banks of one of the 
tributaries of the Asopus. The Lacedaemonians occupied the 
post of honour on the right wing, near the spring Gargaphia. 
The Athenians and Tegeans both claimed the left wing ; 
but in the end the Athenians gave way, on the ground that 
the juncture was one which did not admit of contention 
about forms ; but the Lacedaemonians, to whom the decision 
was left, exclaimed, as one man, that the Athenians were the 
more worthy. Mardonius advanced with all his forces, which 
he drew up on the opposite bank of the Asopus. The 
Lacedaemonians were faced by the Persians, the Athenians 
by the Greek auxiliaries. Amid these preparations the day 
passed away. On the following morning, the soothsayers 
tried to discover the issue of the battle from the entrails of 



278 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XV. 



the victims. The diviners on both sides read the same 
answers in their sacrifices: Tisamenus, the Spartan soothsayer, 
promised victory to the Greeks if they would confine them- 
selves to acting on the defensive, and the Persians were 
warned by their diviners not to begin the attack. Day after 
day, accordingly, the armies faced each other, in inactivity. 
The Greeks were plentifully supplied with provisions, whereas 
the Persians were daily more and more straitened in their 
means of subsistence. Eight days thus passed away, during 
which the Greeks were continually strengthened by the 
influx of fresh troops, before Mardonius thought of watch- 
ing the passes through which the Greeks received their 
supplies and reinforcements. A body of cavalry was now 
sent out under cover of night, and at once intercepted a 
convoy of 500 beasts of burden. At length, when after the 
lapse of ten days the signs continued as unpropitious as 
before, Mardonius resolved to wait no longer. Notwith- 
standing the advice of Artabazus, he summoned a council of 
war, in which he endeavoured to prove that fate was on his 
side, and that the Persians would be invincible so long as 
they abstained from spoiling the sanctuary at Delphi. 
Relying upon this view of the approaching future, he bade 
his hearers cheerfully prepare for the battle which he had 
determined to give the next day. 

In the dead of the following night, Alexander of Mace- 
donia rode up to the Athenian camp, and informed the 
outposts that Mardonius was determined to attack them on 
the morrow ; at the same time he exhorted them to keep 
their ground, as the Persians had only a few days' provisions 
left, and would soon be compelled to retire. Pausanias, on 
learning this, ordered the Athenians to exchange their posi- 
tion for that of the Lacedaemonians, since they were familiar 
with the Persian mode of fighting. In the morning, Mar- 
donius, on hearing of the change, immediately altered his 
own dispositions, making the Persians again face the Spartans. 



cftAP. XV. BATTLE OF PLATAEAE. 



279 



Pausanias, finding his design thwarted, brought the Spartans 
back to the right wing, and both armies resumed their 
original order. Mardonius, mistaking this for a sign of Spar- 
tan cowardice, ordered his cavalry to charge them ; and their 
onset was so vehement, that the assailants got possession of 
the Gargaphian spring. This was a great loss to the Greeks, 
who were now deprived of their supplies of water ; and as 
provisions from Peloponnesus could no longer reach them, it 
became evident that the decisive battle could not be long 
deferred. A war-council was held, at which it was resolved, 
that if no battle should be fought in the course of the day, 
they should retire during the following night to a place 
nearer Plataeae, which was better supplied with water, and 
that a strong detachment should be sent to clear the pass 
and open the road for the convoy of the supplies, which 
were detained on the other side of mount Cithaeron. Mar- 
donius, in the mean time, did not follow up the attack of his 
cavalry. At nightfall the Greeks moved off, and posted 
themselves near a temple of Hera, close to Plataeae. A 
Spartan commander of the name of Amompharetus, who had 
not been present at the council, and considered this move- 
ment as a disgraceful flight, refused to follow with his 
division. Pausanias and the other commanders in vain 
endeavoured to persuade the obstinate man ; but when at 
last the other Greeks had gone, and Amompharetus perceived 
the imminent danger to which he would expose himself and 
his band by remaining any longer, he reluctantly led them 
after the main body. 

When Mardonius heard that the Greeks had decamped 
during the night, he too imagined that they had taken flight, 
and without delay crossed the Asopus to attack them. The 
Athenians happening to be out of sight, Pausanias sent for 
them, but they were prevented from obeying the command 
by the Greek auxiliaries of the Persians. As the signs were 
still unfavourable, Pausanias ordered his men to wait till 



280 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XV.' 



the gods should vouchsafe to give the signal for battle. The 
Persians meantime advanced within bow-shot, and began 
to ply the Spartans with their arrows. Still no favourable 
sign appeared, but a loud prayer addressed by Pausanias to 
Hera changed the aspect of things. The g.ods sent auspi- 
cious tokens, and the next instant the Spartans rushed upon 
the enemy. The Persians fought bravely, but without 
method or order. Mardonius himself, with 1000 picked 
horsemen of the royal guard, was foremost in the fight. He 
was conspicuous by his white charger and by the splendour 
of his armour ; but, while the issue of the conflict was still 
doubtful, he was mortally wounded by the Spartan Aeim- 
nestus ; and his fall decided the fate of the day, which was 
the 25th of September b. c. 479. The Persians gave way, 
and their example was immediately followed by all the other 
barbarians. Artabazus had lingered behind with his division 
of 40,000 men, and when he came up and found that all was 
lost, he took the road to Phocis, intending to hasten to the 
Hellespont. The Greek auxiliaries gladly dispersed without 
a blow ; the Thebans alone maintained for a time a sharp 
conflict with the Athenians. But at length they were 
defeated, and sought shelter behind the walls of Thebes. 
The remainder of the Persian army prepared to defend 
themselves in their camp as well as they could. 

The contest was so quickly decided, that the other Greeks 
who were posted in the vicinity were too late when, on 
hearing of the battle, they advanced. It now only remained 
to storm the camp, and thus to deliver Greece, at one blow, 
from the presence of the barbarians. The Lacedaemonians, 
who were foremost in pursuit of the enemy, endeavoured 
to scale the rampart, but without success. The arrival of the 
Athenians changed the face of the contest : they were the 
first to mount the wall, and succeeded in opening a breach 
by which their allies poured into the camp. The barbarians^ 
who had lost all hope and self-possession, submitted, like 
sheep crowded in a narrow fold, and were slaughtered with- 



chap. xv. DIVISION OF THE SPOIL. 



281 



out a struggle. The rage of the Greeks could hardly sate 
itself with blood. Out of the whole multitude, only 3000 
are said to have escaped the carnage. The treasure found 
in the camp was immense, for Xerxes is stated to have left 
all that was not absolutely necessary for his own use in the 
possession of Mardonius. Pausanias ordered the Helots to 
collect the whole of the spoil, that gods and men might receive 
their due. 

A portion of the booty, nominally a tenth, was set apart 
for the Delphic god, in the shape of a golden tripod supported 
by a three-headed brazen serpent. Another portion adorned 
the sanctuary at Olympia with a colossal statue of Zeus, on 
the base of which were inscribed the names of the cities 
which had shared in the glory of the contest. A third was 
consecrated, in a similar form, to Poseidon on the Isthmus ; 
and a sum of eighty talents was set apart to build a temple 
of Athena at Plataeae. After paying the debt of gratitude 
to the gods, the valour of the most distinguished champions 
was rewarded. The first place was, by common consent, 
assigned to the Lacedaemonians ; and a magnificent present 
was selected for Pausanias, consisting of ten samples of 
everything that was most valuable in the booty. Three 
barrows were then raised over the dead, whose number is 
said to have been very small (91 Spartans and 52 Athenians) ; 
one over the officers, a second over the Spartans, and a third 
over the Helots. Similar barrows marked the graves in 
which the other cities collected their slain. 

Artabazus reached Asia in safety, though a part of his 
army perished by hunger, and by the attacks of the Thracian 
tribes during the march. Alexander of Macedonia seems 
likewise to have fallen upon the fugitives, and was rewarded 
with the Athenian franchise. According to the general belief, 
Mardonius was buried at the outlet of the defile near Ery- 
thrae.* Greece was now completely and finally delivered 



* Paus. ix. 2. § l. 



282 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XV. 



from the Persian invader. The issue was decided by the 
sanguine rashness of Mardonius, and by the firmness and 
ability displayed by Pausanias at the most critical moment. 

Before the army broke up, the Greek commanders, and 
especially Aristides, were anxious to make some provision 
for the preservation of union among the allies, and for 
directing their forces against the common enemy. An 
altar was erected to Zeus, under the title of the Deliverer 
(EXEvdipiog), and all the fires in the country, as being 
polluted by the presence of the enemy, were extinguished, 
and lighted anew from the national hearth at Delphi. It 
was then decreed, that deputies should be sent from all the 
states of Greece every year to Plataeae, for the purpose of 
political consultations, as well as to celebrate the anniversary 
of the battle with sacred rites ; and that every fifth year 
a festival, called the feast of liberty (^EXevdepia), should be 
solemnised at Plataeae. The allies were to keep up an 
army of 10,000 men at arms and 1000 cavalry, besides a 
fleet of 100 galleys, to prosecute the war against the bar- 
barians. The Plataeans were declared sacred and inviolable 
so long as they continued to offer the sacrifices now instituted 
on behalf of Greece ; while, in return, they had to perform 
yearly ceremonies in honour of those who had fallen on their 
soil in defence of Greece.* The chastisement of the 
Thebans, who had not only submitted to the barbarian, but 
had zealously lent their aid to enslave their country, was the 
next subject of consideration. According to the oath which 
had been taken the year before on the Isthmus, Thebes 
should have been compelled to give up one tenth of all that 
it possessed to the Delphic god ; but, in consideration that 
the city had been forced into the part it acted by a small 
faction, it was resolved that the just punishment should fall 
upon the guilty few. Ten days after the battle, accordingly, 

* Plut. Aristid. 20. ; comp. Thucyd. iii. 58. 



CHAP. XV. 



BATTLE OF MYCALE. 



283 



the army appeared before the gates of Thebes, and demanded 
the surrender of the traitors, especially Timagenidas and 
Attaginus. Their influence, however, was still so great in 
the city, that compliance with the demand was refused. For 
twenty days the town was blockaded, and the country 
ravaged, when at length the offenders consented to be 
delivered up. Attaginus, however, made his escape. Pau- 
sanias spared and dismissed his wife and children; but 
seeing that his accomplices hoped to bribe their judges, he 
frustrated their scheme by a measure which is the first 
indication of his arbitrary and imperious disposition; for, 
having dismissed the forces of his allies, he carried the 
prisoners to Corinth, where he put them to death, apparently 
without any form of trial. 

On the same day on which the Persians were defeated at 
Plataeae, they suffered the first signal blow from the Greeks 
on their own continent. The fleet under Leotychides was 
still stationed at Delos, watching the movements of the 
Persians. During this interval, envoys from Samos appeared 
before Leotychides, expressing their desire to shake off the 
Persian yoke, and to put down their tyrant, Theomestor, 
a zealous supporter of Persia. The Spartan king was 
strongly inclined to listen to the call, for his former fears 
seem in a great degree to have subsided during his stay at 
Delos ; and, accordingly, after a brief deliberation, he set 
sail for Samos. The Persians did not venture to meet him 
on the sea, and the Phoenician squadron with the remainder 
of the fleet sailed away towards the mainland to seek the 
protection of the army which was stationed at the foot of 
Mount Mycale. It consisted of 60,000 men, and had been 
left there to keep Ionia in submission. Xerxes himself was 
still at Sardis. The ships were drawn up on the beach, and 
enclosed with a hastily constructed wall of stone and timber. 
The Greeks, after some hesitation, resolved to cross over to 
Mycale and give battle. Leotychides then issued a procla- 



284 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XV. 



mation to the lonians, calling upon them to remember the 
liberty of their country. This frightened the Persians, for 
they believed that it was the signal for an outbreak among 
the lonians ; and, having removed those who were most 
suspected, they drew up at the foot of the mountain behind a 
breastwork. 

At this moment a report flew through the ranks of the 
Greeks, that a victory had been gained over Mardonius in 
Boeotia. This report at once roused the confidence and 
courage of the Greeks, and, cheered with the assurance that 
Greece was already delivered, they advanced to combat for 
the mastery of the islands and the Hellespont. The Athe- 
nians, with the contingents of a few other cities, came up 
first and began the attack. The Spartans were at some 
distance from the scene of action, so that before they could 
reach it the Athenians had forced the breastwork of the 
Persians, and had driven their antagonists into the enclosure 
which surrounded their ships. The Athenians entered with 
them, and the greater part of the barbarians, without at- 
tempting to resist their pursuers, betook themselves to the 
passes of the mountains which they had entrusted to the 
Milesians. The Persians alone maintained the contest, even 
after their general Tigranes and one of their admirals had 
fallen. The arrival of the Spartans at length decided the 
conflict, and put the enemy to a total rout. The Samians, 
as soon as it was possible, joined the Greeks, and their 
example was followed by the other lonians. The carnage 
among the Persians was fearful; even those who escaped 
into the mountains were betrayed by the Milesians, who led 
them by tracks which brought them upon the enemy, and 
then joined in destroying them. Only a small remnant 
escaped to Sardis. The Greeks, after having collected the, 
booty and burnt the enemy's ships, returned to Samos.* 

• The victory at Mycale is said to have been gained on the evening of 



CHAP. XV. 



SIEGE OF SESTOS. 



285 



The islands of the Aegean were now safe, and the only 
remaining difficulty was to devise means for defending the 
Ionians, who could be permanently protected only by the 
presence of a Greek force. It was at length resolved that 
they should be left to make the best terms they could with 
Persia, and that the islands of the Aegean should be solemnly 
admitted into the Greek confederacy. After this the fleet 
sailed to the Hellespont for the purpose of destroying the 
bridges ; but when it was found that these no longer existed, 
Leotychides and the other Peloponnesians proposed to sail 
home. Xanthippus and the Athenians wished to remain, 
in order to recover the dominion of Miltiades in the Cher- 
sonesus. As no one else had an interest in this matter, the 
Athenians were left to accomplish their object by themselves. 
Xanthippus immediately laid siege to Sestos, a strong place, 
in which many Persians from other parts had taken refuge 
on the approach of the Greek fleet. The governor of Sestos, 
Artayctes, who had signalised himself by acts of the most 
wanton cruelty, was now taken by surprise, having made no 
preparations for sustaining a siege. The autumn was 
already far advanced, and, as the fortress was sufficiently 
strong to resist the attacks of the besiegers, many began to 
be anxious to return home ; but Xanthippus and his col- 
leagues refused to abandon the enterprise, and the blockade 
was continued during the winter. When the spring of 
b. c. 478 came, famine began to rage in the town. In this 
extremity, Artayctes and other Persians of rank attempted 
to make their escape by night. When, in the morning, their 
flight was discovered, the Greek inhabitants of the town 
opened the gates to the besiegers. Many of the fugitive 
Persians, including Artayctes, were overtaken and brought 
back. Atrtayctes tried to save his life by the offer of 300 

the same day on which the battle of Plataeae was fought ; but if so, it is 
difficult to comprehend how the report of the latter battle could have 
reached the Greeks at Mycale. 



286 



HI ST OK Y OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XT. 



talents, but such an atonement for his crimes was rejected; 
he was nailed to a cross, and his son stoned to death before 
his eyes. After the conquest the Athenian fleet sailed home. 

On their return the Athenians found their country a 
wasted land, and their city, with the exception of a few 
houses, a heap of ruins. Athens seemed to be reduced to 
the lowest stage of poverty and weakness ; but in reality 
her strength had never before been so great, and time only 
was wanting to call it into action and clothe her with beauty 
and splendour. The restoration of the private dwellings 
was left to their owners; they were rebuilt without any 
uniform or regular design, and upon a scale suited to the 
indigence of the citizens. The streets were narrow and 
crooked, and the inconvenience thus produced was so great, 
that the Areopagus was obliged to interfere. But the city 
never outgrew the defects of this hasty restoration. The 
rebuilding of the temples was reserved for another season, 
the thoughts of Themistocles and Aristides being engaged 
by the care of providing for the immediate security and 
permanent strength of the city. It was necessary to restore 
the walls, and to extend them so that they might encompass 
a larger space. The allies of Athens, however, viewed her 
proceedings with feelings which the recollection of her noble 
self-sacrifice ought to have suppressed. What she had suf- 
fered was forgotten ; and what she had done only awakened 
jealousy and fear. Aegina and Corinth, her maritime rivals, 
were perhaps the first to take the alarm ; and Sparta was 
easily persuaded to check the growth of a power which 
might soon become formidable to herself. Envoys accordingly 
were sent from Sparta, with a message that sounded like 
the language of friendship, advising the Athenians to throw 
down all the walls still standing north of the Isthmus, as 
they would only serve to shelter the barbarians in any new 
invasion : Peloponnesus, they said, would always afford a 
sufficient refuge for all the Greeks. By the advice of 



CHAP. xv. FORTIFICATION OF ATHENS. 



287 



Themistocles, the Athenians, not yet able to resist violence, 
dismissed the envoys with a promise that an embassy should 
be forthwith sent to Sparta to discuss their proposal. 
Themistocles himself set out at once, directing that the 
other ambassadors should not follow him until the walls 
had been raised to such a height as would sustain an attack. 
"While Themistocles was staying at Sparta, waiting for the 
arrival of his colleagues, every Athenian capable of labour, 
without distinction of age or sex, was busily engaged in 
the work of fortification ; no edifice, public or private, sacred 
or profane, that could supply building materials, was spared. 
In the mean time Themistocles endeavoured to counteract 
the reports which were brought to Sparta, and persuaded 
the ephors to send some trustworthy men to Athens to 
ascertain the real state of things. At the same time, how- 
ever, by a secret message he requested his countrymen to 
detain the envoys until he and his colleagues returned. 
Aristides and another of the expected ambassadors at last 
arrived, and informed Themistocles that the walls were 
high enough to stand a siege. It was now time to drop the 
mask, and let the Spartans hear the voice of truth. At his 
next audience Themistocles informed them that the forti- 
fication was advanced too far to be stopped, and bade them 
in future treat the Athenians as reasonable men, who knew 
what was due to their own safety as well as to Greece. 
The Spartans with their usual skill dissembled their vexation, 
and only expressed their regret that what had been meant 
merely as a friendly suggestion should have been construed 
as a design of encroaching on the right of the Athenians to 
do in their own country as they thought fit. So the envoys 
on both sides returned home, and the city walls were quietly 
completed. 

When this work was finished, Themistocles turned his 
thoughts to a still more important one, which was to deter- 
mine the character and prospects of Athens. He had been 



288 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XV. 



convinced by recent events that his country, in order to be 
secure, must be strong, and its position at once pointed out 
to him the necessity of making Athens a maritime state. 
He had already made its navy more powerful than that of 
any of its neighbours ; but it was still destitute of a fortified 
harbour. Hitherto Athens had been satisfied with Phalerum, 
the smallest of the three harbours near the city ; but The- 
mistocles now proposed to fortify the three ports, Phalerum, 
Munychia, and Piraeus, by a double range of walls ; one on 
the land side, enclosing space for a considerable town ; the 
other following the windings of the shore between the 
mouth of Phalerum and that of Piraeus. This wall was of 
a breadth which allowed two waggons to pass each other, 
and was raised to the height of sixty feet. Piraeus now 
became a town of great importance ; the building of it is 
said to have been designed and superintended by the Milesian 
Hippodamus. It soon became the residence of merchants 
and foreigners, who came to exercise their arts or trades at 
Athens. 

Athens was now prepared for her glorious career, and in 
the spring of B.C. 477 the allied fleet again put to sea. 
The thirty ships which Athens sent were commanded by 
Aristides and Cimon the son of Miltiades; and Pausanias 
was at the head of the whole armament. It first sailed to 
Cyprus, wrested the greater part of that island from the 
Persians, and then having sailed northward laid siege to 
Byzantium. There the Spartan regent began more fully to 
unfold a character and views of which he had already given 
some indications. After the capture of Byzantium, he laid 
aside the manners of his country, to adopt those of the 
barbarians, and began to treat his allies as if they were his 
subjects. His object did not come to light till many years 
later, but it was quite evident that he no longer felt a pride 
in being a citizen of Sparta, and, therefore, that his fidelity 
to the cause of Greece was not to be relied on. His brilliant 



CHAP. XV. 



INTRIGUES OF PAUSANIAS. 



289 



success at Plataeae seems to have dazzled and bewildered 
his mind ; his ambition was boundless, and he was blind to 
the dangers which he had to encounter in effecting his 
designs. He appears to have thought that the condition of 
a vassal of the great king of Persia was a higher and happier 
station than that which he occupied, and from which he 
knew that he must retire in a few years. But it is surprising 
to find that he was so utterly unable to measure his means 
with his ends, and that he recklessly neglected the most 
necessary precautions. 

Among the prisoners whom he had taken at Byzantium 
were some noble Persians connected with the royal family, 
who afforded him an opportunity of opening a negotiation 
with Xerxes. He secretly allowed them to escape, and then 
sent a trusty messenger to Xerxes to claim the merit of this 
service, and to offer to lay Sparta and the rest of Greece 
at the king's feet if he would give him his daughter in 
marriage. Xerxes eagerly caught at the proposal, and sent 
down Artabazus as governor of the satrapy of Western Asia, 
enjoining him to keep up an active correspondence with 
Pausanias, and to supply him with money and every other 
aid. Pausanias, finding the king ready to enter into the 
scheme, began to act as if it were no longer necessary to 
dissemble his intentions ; he assumed the state of a Persian 
satrap, imitated the luxuries and fashions of the barbarians 
in his table and dress, and travelled through Thrace 
escorted by a guard of Persians and Egyptians. In his 
vision of greatness he forgot the ties by which he was still 
bound, and treated those over whom he held a responsible 
command with harshness and arrogance. The Ionians, 
who had only just emancipated themselves, were provoked 
by treatment worse than they had commonly experienced 
from the barbarians. The Athenian generals, on the other 
hand, displayed qualities which were the more winning 
from their contrast with those of Pausanias, and the allies 

o 



290 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XV. 



began to feel how much happier they would be under the 
command of the just Aristides and the generous and gentle 
Cimon. This feeling was strengthened by the reflection, 
that Athens, and not Sparta, was the parent to whom most 
of them owed their origin. So the wish gradually ripened 
into a resolution, and all the confederates, with the exception 
of the Peloponnesian states and Aegina, called upon the 
Athenians to accept the supremacy, in all the common affairs 
of the alliance, which had hitherto been enjoyed by Sparta. 

It was Aristides who brought about this great revolution, 
and established his country in this honourable and well-earned 
preeminence. He now undertook, by the general desire, the 
task of regulating the laws of the union, and its relation to 
Athens as its head. The object of the confederacy was to 
protect the Greeks against the barbarians, and to weaken and 
humble the latter as much as possible. All were to contribute 
towards this common end, and Athens was to collect and 
direct their forces as the organ of the public will. 

The constitutions and internal administration of the 
allied states were not to be interfered with. Aristides 
fixed the assessments of the numerous allied cities so as to 
satisfy all, and without incurring even a suspicion of at- 
tempting to obtain the least benefit for himself. He was 
acknowledged to be above calumny. The whole amount of 
the yearly contributions was settled at 460 talents (about 
115,000/.); Delos was chosen for the treasury of the con- 
federates, and its temple as the place where their deputies 
were to hold their meeting. 

As rumours of the conduct of Pausanias had in the mean 
time reached Sparta, the ephors immediately recalled him, 
and sent out other commanders. But it was too late to recover 
what had been lost, and the new generals found that they must 
be content with a subordinate rank. Spartan pride was un- 
able to brook this, and they retired from the field of action, 
leaving their rivals triumphant. Henceforth the strength of 



chap. xv. ADMINISTRATION OF ARISTIDES. 



291 



Greece was divided between two confederations, for the 
supremacy of Sparta was still recognised by her Peloponnesian 
allies, who now rallied round her more closely than ever. 
Thus Sparta was thrown back into her original sphere, while 
Athens had risen into an entirely new one. The history of 
Greece henceforth assumes a wholly different aspect. The 
supremacy of Athens lasted for a period of 73 years, from 
B. c. 477 till 404. Before we proceed with the history of 
the two confederacies, we will briefly notice the later 
occurrences in the lives of the men who had brought about 
this great change. 

The regulation of the Ionian confederacy was the last great 
event in the life of Aristides. The changes in the Athenian 
constitution which are ascribed to him may, however, to 
some extent, have been the result of the new position to 
which he had raised his country. He threw down the 
barrier of privilege which separated the highest of Solon's 
classes from the lower, by opening the archonship and the 
council of the Areopagus to the poorest of the citizens ; so 
that the fourth class, the Thetes, were now let into the 
highest dignities of the state. This change had been gra- 
dually prepared by the alteration which had taken place, 
since the time of Solon, in the value of property, which 
rendered the archonship accessible to a much more numerous 
body than the old lawgiver had contemplated. The heroic 
exertions of all classes at Athens, during and after the Persian 
invasion, rendered this period particularly fit for placing all 
citizens upon an equal footing ; nay, it may be said that the 
new state of things rendered such a change in the constitu- 
tion absolutely necessary. 

Aristides lived to see the compact which he had established 
between Athens and her confederates broken in a material 
point ; but he could not prevent it. He enjoyed to the last 
the unabated confidence and respect of his countrymen. He 
died — whether in or out of Athens is uncertain — as he had 

O 2 



292 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XV. 



lived, in poverty. It is even said that he did not leave 
behind him wherewith to defray the expenses of his funeral. 
His monument was erected at the public charge, and his 
posterity for several generations was pensioned by the state. 

Pausanias, recalled to Sparta, was subjected to a severe 
inquiry. On some points he was convicted, and condemned 
to slight penalties ; but no evidence was produced of his 
correspondence with the barbarians, and the accusation was 
dropped. Unable to live in the condition to which he was 
reduced, he cast aside the authority of the ephors, quitted 
Sparta without their leave, and embarked for Byzantium, 
which was still in the hands of one of his creatures, whom 
he had left as his deputy when he was recalled to Sparta. 
As he renewed his treasonable practices, the Athenians 
obliged him to leave the place. He then retired to Colonae 
in Troas, where he carried on his criminal intrigues so 
openly, that a report of them soon reached Sparta, and he 
was once more roused from his dream of greatness by a 
short message from the ephors. He obeyed the command and 
returned home, for his plans were still far from being ripe, 
and he could not hope to carry them into effect if he should 
draw upon himself a sentence of outlawry. He was thrown 
into prison, but soon obtained his liberty, and demanded a 
trial. No satisfactory evidence of his treason having been yet 
obtained, the affair was again dropped ; and if he could have 
remained quiet after this, he might still have lived secure, and 
died without infamy. But he had gone too far to stop or to 
recede. He contemplated exciting an insurrection of the 
Helots, and maintaining himself at the head of the state by 
the aid of Persia. But the plan was as improvidently con- 
certed as it was recklessly adopted, and was betrayed to the 
ephors by one of the Helots themselves. But even on this 
information they, with their usual caution when the repu- 
tation of a Spartan was at stake, forbore to act, and patiently 
waited for more unexceptionable evidence. Pausanias, in 



CHAP, XV. 



DEATH OF PAUSANIAS. 



293 



the mean time, continued his correspondence with Persia ; 
but he had the prudence to request the satrap to put to death 
the bearers of his letters. At length the suspicions of 
Argilius, one of these messengers, were awakened by the 
remarkable fact that none of those who were sent by Pau- 
sanias ever returned. He counterfeited the seal, opened the 
letter intrusted to him, and found his apprehensions con- 
firmed. His resentment was roused, and he revealed the 
secret to the ephors. A plan was now devised for the convic- 
tion and punishment of the traitor. Argilius took refuge as a 
suppliant in a temple of Poseidon, near Taenarus, and within 
the sacred precincts raised a temporary hovel, divided into 
two compartments by a thin partition, behind which some of 
the ephors were concealed, in the expectation that Pausanias 
would soon come to inquire the motive of Argilius' conduct. 
This anticipation was realised, and the ephors overheard the 
whole conversation between Pausanias and Argilius, which 
left no donbt of the traitor's guilt. As Pausanias was re- 
turning home, the ephors approached to arrest him, but he 
escaped into the temple of Athena Chalcioecos. As they could 
not seize him in the sanctuary, the building was unroofed, its 
entrance blocked up, and its approaches were carefully guarded. 
His aged mother is said to have carried the first stone to block 
up the doorway to immure her son. When he was on the 
point of expiring, he was carried out of the sacred precincts, 
in order that the sanctuary might not be polluted, and 
breathed his last as soon as he had crossed its bounds. But 
subsequently, the recollection of his past services rendered his 
fate a subject first of compassion and regret, and at length 
of religious compunction. By command of the Delphic 
oracle, his bones were removed to the spot near the temple 
where he had expired, and two brazen statues of Pausanias 
were set up in the sanctuary of the goddess. Eeligious 
scruples about the death of Pausanias continued for a long 
time, however, to disturb the minds of some of the Spartans. 

o 3 



294 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XV. 



The fate of Pausanias involved that of Themistocles. 
Conscious of the great services he had rendered to Greece, 
he became proud and indiscreet. After the battle of Salamis 
his power and influence had reached its height, but his ra- 
paciousness often led him to convert his glory into a source 
of petty profits, as we have seen in his conduct towards the 
islanders after the flight of Xerxes. He did not scruple to 
sell his mediation in the disputes of many of the maritime 
states to any one who was willing to purchase it, and he thus 
drew upon himself the well-merited charge of perfidy, avarice, 
and cruelty. But while he thus made some enemies by his 
selfishness, he provoked others by his firm and enlightened 
patriotism. Sparta never forgave him the shame he had 
brought upon her by thwarting her insidious attempt to crush 
the independence of Athens. Another blow which he in- 
flicted upon Sparta consisted in his defeating her when she 
wished to exclude from the amphictionic council those states 
which had aided the barbarians ; by which measure the in- 
fluence of Sparta would probably have become predominant 
in the council. At Athens, however, he was gradually sup- 
planted in popular favour by other men ; and his own indis- 
cretions seconded them in their endeavours to persuade the 
people that he had risen too high to remain a harmless 
citizen. He was, accordingly, condemned to a temporary 
exile by ostracism, which he himself had before directed 
against Aristides. He withdrew to Argos, where he was 
welcomed as the deliverer of Greece and as the enemy of 
Sparta. There he was residing in b. c. 471, when Pausanias 
was convicted of treason. Among the papers of Pausanias 
were found some traces of a correspondence between him 
and Themistocles, from which it seemed that he had been 
implicated in the scheme of the Spartan. Ambassadors 
were immediately sent to Athens to accuse him, and to insist 
upon his being punished like his accomplice. No evidence 
has ever been produced to prove that the charge was well 



CHAP. XV. 



FLIGHT OF THEMISTOCLES. 



295 



founded ; all that can be said with any degree of certainty 
is, that Pausanias in a letter communicated his designs to 
the exiled Themistocles, in the hope that he would embrace 
any opportunity of avenging himself upon his ungrateful 
country. Themistocles was too prudent not to see at once 
that the scheme was that of a madman. But, however this 
may be, his enemies at Athens rejoiced at so good an 
opportunity for ruining him, and officers were sent out 
with the Spartans to arrest him. This Themistocles had 
foreseen, and fled ; first to Corcyra, but not feeling suf- 
ficiently safe there he crossed over to Epirus, where he 
sought shelter in the palace of Admetus, king of the Molos- 
sians, who was absent when Themistocles arrived. The 
queen, with womanly compassion, taught him how he might 
secure her husband's protection ; and when the latter re- 
turned, he found Themistocles seated at his hearth, holding 
the young prince in his hands. Among the Molossians this 
was the most solemn form of supplication ; and when The- 
mistocles disclosed the danger of his situation, the king was 
touched, and assured him of his protection. When the Spar- 
tan and Athenian officers dogged their prey to his house, the 
king, faithful to his word, refused to surrender his guest. 

At the court of Admetus, Themistocles seems to have been 
joined by his wife and children ; and he might have remained 
there, but he had already formed the design of seeking his 
fortune at the court of Persia. Admetus supplied his guest 
with the means of crossing the Aegean, and Themistocles 
embarked at Pydna in Macedonia. A storm carried the ship 
to Naxos, which was then besieged by the Athenians. To 
avoid being accidentally discovered, Themistocles made him- 
self known to the master of the ship, and, by promises and 
threats, prevailed upon him to keep his secret, and to pre- 
vent any of the crew from going on shore at Naxos. At 
length the ship landed him safely at Ephesus, where he re- 
ceived the property which his friends had been enabled to 

o 4 



296 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XV* 



rescue for him. Very soon after his arrival in Asia, Xerxes 
was assassinated, in b. c. 465, and was succeeded by his son 
Artaxerxes. Themistocles, accompanied by a Persian friend, 
proceeded to the court. In a letter addressed to the king, 
he acknowledged the evil which he had inflicted on the royal 
house, but claimed the merit of having saved Xerxes at Sala- 
mis, and of having thwarted the plan of the Greeks to inter- 
cept him in his flight. He also intimated, that his present 
misfortunes were the consequence of his zeal for the interest 
of the king of Persia, and desired that a year might be allowed 
him to acquire the means of disclosing his plans in person. 
The request was granted, and Themistocles now made him- 
self acquainted with the language and manners of the Per- 
sians. He succeeded so well, and won the favour of Arta- 
xerxes to such a degree, that even the courtiers are said to 
have envied him. At length he was sent down to the mari- 
time provinces, and a pension was conferred upon him in 
the oriental fashion : three flourishing towns were assigned 
for his maintenance, of which Magnesia was to provide him 
with bread, Myus with viands, and Lampsacus with wine. 
He settled at Magnesia, where he maintained a sort of 
princely rank. The common story is, that he put an end to 
his own life, because he saw no possibility of performing 
his promises ; but the disbelief of Thucydides renders this 
story at least very doubtful. A splendid monument was 
raised to his memory at Magnesia ; but in later times it was 
believed that his remains were buried within the port of 
Piraeus. 



CHAP. XVI. 



CIMON. 



297 



CHAPTER XVL 

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ATHENIAN MARITIME ASCENDENCY 
TO THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA. 

As Greece and the islands of the Aegean were now freed 
from the fear of any further aggression on the part of Persia, 
most of the states united under the supremacy of Athens 
would have been satisfied with the security thus afforded to 
them ; but Athens saw a vast field of ambition opened to 
her in the East, where the situation of the Greek colonies 
afforded a fair pretext for the continuance of hostilities. 
Foremost among the men who were active in directing the 
attention of their countrymen to that quarter, was Cimon 
the son of Miltiades. In his youth he had given little pro- 
mise of the talents and the character which he afterwards 
displayed ; and is even said to have neglected the ordinary 
accomplishments of an Athenian gentleman. As an orator 
he never distinguished himself, and it is probable that it was 
his consciousness of this defect which determined him to 
choose a career away from Athens, and to abandon the popular 
assembly to his rivals. The penalty of fifty talents, which 
he had to pay at the death of his father, would probably have 
ruined him, had not the wealthy Callias undertaken to dis- 
charge it in consideration of receiving the hand of Cimon's 
sister in marriage. He first distinguished himself in the 
battle of Salamis, and many of his friends saw in him a capa- 
city and a disposition which fitted him for the highest places 
in the republic. Aristides, in particular, regarded him as fit 
to be a coadjutor to himself and an antagonist to Themistocles. 
The readiness with which the allied Greeks, disgusted with 
the conduct of Pausanias, united themselves with Athens, 

o 5 



298 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xvi. 



was in a great measure owing to Cimon's mild temper, and 
to his frank and gentle manners. 

The popularity of Themistocles was already declining, 
while Cimon, on account of several successful enterprises, was 
rapidly rising in public favour. The first of these achieve- 
ments was the conquest of Eion on the Strynion, in b. c. 476. 
The Persian governor, Boges, finding that he could no longer 
hold out against the besiegers, set fire to the town, and 
perished in the flames with his friends, family, and treasures. 
The acquisition of this place was of great importance to 
Athens, being the foundation of one of its most flourishing 
colonies. In the course of the same year, Cimon effected 
another, and in the eyes of the people no less valuable, con- 
quest. The island of Scyros was inhabited by a mixed race 
of Pelasgians and Dolopians, who, by their piratical habits, 
had incurred the ban of the Amphictions ; and Cimon seized 
this opportunity for exterminating the people, and dividing 
their land among Attic colonists.* The next undertaking 
was directed against Carystos in Euboea, which had pro- 
voked the hostility of the Athenians. It made a long re- 
sistance before it was reduced to submission. The conquest 
of Naxos, which took place in b. c. 466, was an event of far 
greater moment. That island began to feel its connection 
with Athens irksome, and the latter was resolved to exact 
by force that which was no longer cheerfully given. The 
revolt of Naxos was quelled after a hard siege. Instead of 
allies, the Naxians now became subjects of Athens, and ex- 
perienced from their protectors the worst evil which they had 
to fear from Persia. Their example, however, did not deter 
others from making similar attempts to throw off the supre- 
macy of Athens. One after another they refused compliance 
with the demands of the leading state, and were punished 

* Cimon is said to have afterwards discovered in Scyros the remains of 
Theseus, who was believed to have been buried there. In B.C. 468 they 
were brought to Athens with great pomp. 



CHAP. XVI. BATTLE OF EURYMEDON. 



299 



with the loss of their independence. Many sought to com- 
mute their personal services in the endless expeditions to 
which they were summoned, for stated payments of money. 
Cimon, perceiving the advantages of such an arrangement, 
accepted it wherever it was offered. The effect of it was, 
that the states which adopted this course ceased to keep up 
a naval force of their own ; and thus became more and more 
unwarlike, and less able to resist the growing demands of 
the Athenians. 

In b. c. 465, Cimon obtained his most memorable triumph 
over the Persians. A great sea and land force had been 
collected at the mouth of the Eurymedon in Pamphylia. The 
fleet consisted of at least 350 sail, which were to be joined 
by eighty galleys from Cyprus. Cimon, who had gradually 
strengthened his fleet, as he slowly moved along the south 
coast of Asia Minor, till it amounted to 250 galleys, pro- 
voked the enemy to an engagement before the arrival of the 
eighty Cyprian vessels ; and having defeated them, and sunk 
or taken 200 ships, sailed up the river to their camp ; there 
he landed his men, flushed with victory, and completely 
routed the Persian army. On the same day, he is said to 
have met the squadron coming from Cyprus, and to have 
utterly destroyed it. 

After having gained this double or treble victory, Cimon 
sailed northwards, where the Persians were still in posses- 
sion of the Thracian Chersonesus. He dislodged them not 
only from the territory which had once belonged to Athens, 
but from perhaps the best part of his own patrimony. It 
appears to have been in the year b. c. 464 that the Athe- 
nians became engaged in a contest with Thasos, which was 
both able and disposed to make a vigorous resistance. The 
principal object of the struggle were the gold mines on 
the continent, which Athens seems to have claimed. The 
islanders, however, were first defeated at sea by Cimon, and 
then closely besieged. While this siege was going on, the 

o 6 



300 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xvi. 



Athenians, who had formed a settlement in Thrace at 
Enneaodos, suffered a great disaster, being cut off to a man 
by the Thracians, who viewed the colony as a hostile inva- 
sion of their territory. The Thasians, alarmed at the turn 
which the war had taken, sent an embassy to Sparta, hoping 
to induce that rival of Athens to make a diversion in their 
favour by invading Attica. The Spartans readily under- 
took to do so, and had nearly completed their preparations in 
secret, when a calamity befell them which forced them to 
struggle hard for their own existence. 

In the year b. c. 464, the whole of Laconia was shaken by 
an earthquake, which opened great chasms in the ground, 
and rolled down huge masses of rock from the heights of 
Taygetus. In Sparta itself, only five houses are said to 
have been left standing, and more than 20,000 persons were 
believed to have been killed. Amid the confusion occasioned 
by this catastrophe, many of the Helots hastened to the city, 
hoping to take advantage of the helpless condition of their 
masters. The presence of mind of King Archidamus saved 
Sparta, for he foresaw the danger, and as soon as the first 
consternation had subsided, gathered all the people in arms 
around him. The Helots on their arrival, perceiving this, 
retreated and dispersed. This part of the danger was thus 
averted ; but the Messenians also seized the opportunity of 
rising against their detested lords, and fortified themselves 
in their ancient stronghold of Ithome. They were joined 
not only by numerous Helots, but even by some of the free 
Laconian towns. The Spartans laid siege to Ithome, but 
made only very slow progress. In the mean time the Tha- 
sians, left to themselves, were compelled to capitulate in the 
third year of the war, and became subjects of Athens. The 
Spartans, seeing no prospect of reducing Ithome, called on 
their allies for aid, and did not blush to ask for help from 
the Athenians, against whose country they had only just 
been secretly preparing an expedition. At this time the 



chap. xvi. THIRD MESSENIAN WAR. 



301 



aristocratic party at Athens was favourably disposed towards 
Sparta, and was headed by Cimon, who had now reached the 
height of popularity, and entertained a warm admiration for 
the character and institutions of the Lacedaemonians. The 
democratic party opposed the proposal to support Sparta, but 
Cimon's advice prevailed, and he himself was sent with a 
large force to assist in the siege of Ithome. 

The Spartans had hoped that the Athenians, who were 
eminently skilled in the art of besieging, would enable them 
speedily to reduce the place. But as a long time passed 
away without any impression being made upon the besieged, 
they began to suspect that the Athenians were unwilling to 
accomplish that for which they had been invited, and the 
consciousness of their own guilt made them apprehend 
a treacherous scheme on the part of their Attic auxiliaries. 
This feeling gradually became so strong that, while they re- 
tained all their other allies, they dismissed the Athenian 
troops, simply saying that they had no further need of them. 
The Athenians, perceiving the real motive, were probably 
more exasperated by the want of confidence thus displayed, 
than they would have been by a perfidious attack. All con- 
nection with Sparta was accordingly broken off, and an alli- 
ance was entered into with Argos, Sparta's ancient rival. 
Meantime the Messenian war was carried on for a number of 
years, until b. c. 455, when the brave defenders of Ithome 
obtained honourable terms. They were permitted to quit 
Peloponnesus with their families, on condition of being de- 
tained in slavery if they ever returned. The Athenians 
gave them the town of Naupactus, of which they had recently 
become possessed. The site was one full of hope for the un- 
fortunate emigrants, and extremely useful to the Athenians 
for their operations in the Corinthian gulf. 

The abrupt dismissal of the Athenian forces during the 
siege of Ithome was highly gratifying to the democratic 
party, and justified the advice they had given at the time 



302 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XVI, 



when the succour was asked for. There was at that period 
fast rising in power and renown a young man, whose glory 
was destined to eclipse that of even the greatest among his 
countrymen. This was Pericles, the son of Xanthippus, the 
conqueror of Mycale, by Agariste, a descendant of the 
famous Cleisthenes. In his youth he had not rested 
satisfied with the ordinary Greek education, but had applied 
himself with great ardour to intellectual pursuits, which 
were then new at Athens, and confined to a very small circle 
of inquisitive spirits. Pericles entered with deep interest 
into the abstrusest philosophical speculations, in which pur- 
suits his chief guide was Anaxagoras, with whom he was united 
in intimate friendship, and who was believed to have exer- 
cised a great influence upon his habits of thought, and upon 
the tone and style of his eloquence. All the rare acquire- 
ments with which Pericles enriched his mind were con- 
sidered by him as instruments for the use of the statesman. 
But although signally gifted and accomplished for political 
action, yet he entered upon his career with hesitation and 
apprehension, for his very greatness was calculated to alarm 
those who were nervously anxious about the maintenance of 
popular freedom. His personal appearance was graceful 
and majestic, though his head was somewhat dispropor- 
tioned in its length; and old men who remembered Pisis- 
tratus were struck by the resemblance to him which they dis- 
covered in Pericles, not only in his features but in the sweet- 
ness of his voice and the volubility of his utterance. After 
the ostracism of Themistocles and the death of Aristides, 
while Cimon was engaged in continual expeditions, Pericles 
began to present himself more and more to the public eye, 
and was soon the acknowledged chief of the democratic party, 
which had been headed by Themistocles, and now openly 
aimed at counteracting Cimon's influence. 

After the constitutional changes introduced at Athens by 
Cleisthenes and Aristides, the aristocracy had no hope of re- 



ADMINISTRATION OF CIMON. 



303 



covering what it had lost ; but it became more intent on 
keeping all that it had, and on stopping any further inno- 
vation at home, as the commonalty grew more enterprising. 
As far as foreign policy was concerned, the aristocratic 
party wished to preserve the balance of power in Greece, 
and to direct the Athenian arms against Persia, in the hope 
of diverting the Greeks from intestine warfare. The de- 
mocratic party had other interests, and concurred with the 
views of its opponents only in so far as they tended to enrich 
and aggrandize the state of Athens. The contest between 
these two parties seems for a time to have been carried on 
rather with a noble emulation in the service of the republic 
than by assaults upon each other. Cimon had enriched 
both the republic and himself, and he made a munificent use 
of his wealth. He did much for the security and embellish- 
ment of the city; and preparations were now made for 
joining Athens with its harbours, by walls carried down on 
the one side to Phalerus and on the other to Piraeus. The 
greater part of these walls, the construction of which was 
difficult on account of the marshy nature of the ground, was 
executed by Cimon, with magnificent solidity, at his own 
charge. He also adorned the public places of the city with 
trees, introduced a supply of water, and converted the Aca- 
demy, a district about two miles north of the city, from an 
arid waste into a delightful grove, with lawns and courses for 
the exercises of the young, and shady walks for the thought- 
ful ; a scene of wholesome recreation for all. But besides this 
noble kind of liberality, Cimon indulged in another which was 
as degrading to the benefactor as to the benefited : he is said 
to have opened his gardens and orchards to all who wished to 
avail themselves of their contents ; to have feasted the people 
at his tables, to which they had access at all times ; and to 
have distributed clothes and money among the poorer citizens. 
In these points, however, Cimon probably did not stand alone, 
for the aristocracy, no longer able to oppress the commonalty, 



304 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XVI. 



must have found it expedient to court the people, and to part 
with a portion of its wealth for the sake of retaining its 
power. But though Cimon's munificence no doubt origi- 
nated in this feeling of the aristocracy, it must have been 
remarkable not only in its degree, but in its kind ; and was 
not the less that of a demagogue because he sought popu- 
larity not merely for his own sake, but for that of his order 
and his party. 

In this light Cimon's liberality was viewed by Pericles, who 
endeavoured to counteract its influence by several measures. 
He was not able to rival Cimon's profusion, and even ma- 
naged his private property with rigid economy, that he might 
keep his probity, in the management of public affairs, free 
from temptation and suspicion. His friend Demonides is 
said to have first suggested to him the idea of rendering 
Cimon's liberality superfluous by applying the public re- 
venue to a similar purpose. But Pericles perhaps thought, 
and with justice, that it was safer, and more becoming, that 
the people should supply their poorer brethren with the 
means of enjoyment out of its own funds, than that they 
should depend upon the bounty of wealthy individuals ; 
especially as the fathers of the present generation had wil- 
lingly resigned the produce of the mines of Laurion to the 
use of the state, and had thereby raised their country to 
power and greatness. Pericles thus became the author of a 
series of measures, all of which tended to provide for the 
subsistence and gratification of the poorer class at the public 
expense : but while he was thus engaged in courting the 
favour of the multitude, he was no less anxious to command 
its respect ; he was unremittingly attentive to business, and 
never allowed himself to indulge in the convivial entertain- 
ments of his friends confining himself to the society of a very 
select circle. His speeches were all most studiously and 
scrupulously prepared, and the impression which they pro- 
duced was heightened by the calm majesty of his air and 



CHAP. xvi. MEASURES OF PERICLES. 



305 



carriage, which he maintained under all provocations. He 
did not appear in the popular assembly except on great oc- 
casions, and carried many of his measures through his friends 
and partisans, the most prominent among whom was Ephi- 
altes, a man distinguished for his rigid integrity as well as 
for the earnestness and fearlessness with which he bore the 
brunt of the conflict with the opposite party. 

Immediately after the reduction of Thasos, Cimon was 
expected to accomplish some other conquest, perhaps on the 
frontiers between Macedonia and Thrace; but he did not 
attempt it : this forbearance irritated the people, and his 
adversaries inflamed the popular indignation by ascribing 
his conduct to the influence of Macedonian gold. This charge 
was unquestionably unfounded ; and Pericles, though called 
upon by the people to come forward as one of the accusers, 
declined to do so, at the entreaty, it is said, of Cimon's sister 
Elpinice ; he kept back the thunder of his eloquence, and only 
rose once, for form's sake, to second the accusation. Accord- 
ing to Plutarch, Cimon was acquitted ; but from other state- 
ments it would seem that he was sentenced to pay a fine 
of 50 talents. 

A more serious struggle between the two parties arose 
soon afterwards, when Pericles resolved on attacking the 
aristocracy in its ancient and revered stronghold, the Areo- 
pagus, which was composed of the ex-archons, and was at 
once a council and a court of justice. By the reforms of 
Aristides, even the poorest Athenian might become a mem- 
ber of it ; but the change which these measures produced in its 
composition was probably as yet hardly perceptible, and had 
no effect on its maxims and proceedings. Pericles' object 
was to narrow the range of the functions of the Areopagus, so 
as to leave it little more than an august name. Ephialtes 
was his principal coadjutor in this undertaking, and thereby 
exposed himself to the implacable enmity of the opposite 
party, which set all its engines in motion to ward off the 



306 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



chap. xvr. 



blow. It was at this juncture that Sparta solicited the 
aid of Athens against the Messenians ; and the treatment 
which the Athenians received at the hands of the Spartans 
afforded the party of Pericles a great advantage in the con- 
flict with its adversaries at home, and furnished it with new 
arms against Cimon, who at once became obnoxious as the 
avowed friend of Sparta, and as the author of the expedition 
which had drawn so rude an insult on his countrymen. The 
attack on the Areopagus, therefore, was now prosecuted 
with greater vigour, and Cimon could exercise little influence 
in its behalf. His party, however, put forth all its strength 
in a last effort to save the stronghold of its power, and was 
supported in its efforts by the poet Aeschylus, who in his 
"Eumenides" represented the Areopagus as the most venerable 
and hallowed institution. This play was probably performed 
in the year of the rupture with Sparta, and just after the con- 
clusion of the treaty with Argos. But, notwithstanding the 
surpassing excellence of the drama, the author failed in his 
political object ; and Ephialtes carried a decree, by which the 
Areopagus was shorn of its authority, and retained only a 
few branches of its jurisdiction. In what the innovation 
consisted, is matter for conjecture only ; but it is highly pro- 
bable that the power of the Areopagus as a council was 
reduced, and that its jurisdiction over the conduct of the 
citizens was abolished. 

This triumph of Pericles and his party over the Areopagus 
seems to have been immediately followed by the ostracism of 
Cimon, which took place about two years after the return of 
the Athenians from Messenia ; so that his exile does not ap- 
pear to have been the effect of popular resentment, but rather 
a measure to secure tranquillity in the city. Though Athens 
gained great immediate advantages by its rupture with 
Sparta, yet it lost the friendship of Corinth, one of its old 
and most useful allies. Corinth was at war with Megara ; 
the latter, relying on Athens, renounced its alliance with 



CHAP. XVI. 



EXPEDITION TO EGYPT. 



307 



Sparta, and admitted an Athenian garrison. The Athenians 
then connected Megara with the port of Nisaea and with the 
sea by a work similar to that which had lately been com- 
menced between Athens and Piraeus. 

While these things were going on in Greece, Inarus, king 
of some Libyan tribes on the west of Egypt, excited, in b. c. 
460, an insurrection there against the Persians, and his au- 
thority was recognised throughout the greater part of the 
country. Artaxerxes sent his brother with a large army to 
suppress the rebellion. An Athenian armament of 200 
galleys was lying at the time off Cyprus, and Inarus sent to 
obtain its assistance. The Athenian commanders at once 
sailed south ward, and having joined the insurgents, enabled 
them to defeat the Persians, whose general fell in battle by 
the hand of Inarus. They then sailed up the Nile to Memphis, 
of one quarter of which a body of Persians was still in pos- 
session, and which was now besieged by the Athenians. This 
siege lasted upwards of five years, at the end of which time 
the Athenians, being pressed by a far more numerous army, 
were obliged to abandon Memphis, and were surrounded on 
an island in the Nile called Prosopitis. Out of their army 
of 40,000 men, only a few escaped through Libya and Cyrene, 
and thence returned home. Inarus himself was nailed by the 
Persians to a cross. 

In b. c. 457, while the siege of Memphis was still going 
on, the Corinthians, enraged at the occupation of Megara by 
the Athenians, made war on them, in which they were joined 
by Aegina and the maritime towns of Argolis. The Athe- 
nians, not waiting to be attacked, at once landed a body of 
troops near Haliae, in Argolis, but were driven back to their 
ships by the united forces of Corinth and Epidaurus. They 
soon made up for this check, however, by a victory over the 
Peloponnesian fleet near Cecryphalea, in the Saronic gulf ; 
and their admiral, Leocrates, was still more successful in de- 
feating the allies in a great sea-fight near Aegina. He took 



308 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XVI*. 



seventy of their ships, and then, having landed his troops on 
the island, laid siege to the town. The Corinthians, thinking 
to effect a diversion, sent only a small force to Aegina, and 
invaded the territory of Megara. But Athens, though its 
armies were at this time engaged in Egypt, Cyprus, and 
Phoenicia, was still indomitable, and animated by as high a 
spirit as ever. Myronides, a man not inferior to Miltiades or 
Cimon, assembled all who had been left at home for the de- 
fence of the city, and marched out with them against the 
Corinthians. In the first engagement no decisive victory was 
gained, but the Corinthians retired from the field of battle. 
Being reproved at home for yielding so easily, they, twelve 
days after, came back to the scene of action and challenged 
the Athenians to another contest. The latter immediately 
issued from Megara, and completely defeated their enemy. 
In their flight many of the Corinthians got into a pit, from 
which they could find no egress. The Athenians surrounded 
the place, and with their missiles slew every man within. 

Some time before this ineffectual attempt of the Corin^ 
thians to relieve Aegina, Artaxerxes, in the hope of drawing 
the Athenians away from Egypt, sent Megabazus to Sparta 
with a sum of money to bribe the principal Spartans to en- 
gage their countrymen in an expedition against Athens. 
The Spartans were not unwilling to receive the money, but 
were unable to render the service required for it, for Ithome 
still held out, and Sparta itself had not yet recovered suffi- 
cient strength to venture on the proposed invasion. Pericles, 
who seems to have received some intelligence of these pro- 
ceedings, now urged the completion of the long walls. A 
faction of the aristocratic party, however, who viewed that 
great work only as a bulwark of the hated commonalty, 
vehemently opposed its completion. A favourable oppor- 
tunity for regaining their ascendency seemed to offer itself 
to that party in the year in which Myronides defeated the 
Corinthians. The Phocians had invaded Doris, and taken 



CHAP. XVI. 



BATTLE OF TANAGKA. 



309 



one of its towns. The pious Spartans forthwith assembled 
an army of 10,000 allied troops, and 1500 of their own, and 
forced the Phocians to restore their conquest. After accom- 
plishing their objects, the Spartans were informed that the 
passes of he Isthmus were occupied bj the Athenians, who 
intended to cut off their return. This induced their com- 
mander, Nicomedes, to march into Boeotia and to encamp at 
Tanagra, near the borders of Attica. The oligarchical faction 
at Athens secretly promised him their cooperation if he would 
strike a great blow. The better part of the Athenians, sus- 
pecting the intrigue, exhorted their fellow-citizens not to 
wait for an attack. An army of 14,000 men was mustered, 
and a body of cavalry came to their aid from Thessaly, which 
•was allied with Athens. While the two armies were 
facing each other near Tanagra, Cimon came to the Athe- 
nian camp and requested leave to serve among the men of his 
tribe. The Athenian generals, suspecting treachery, referred 
his request to the council of Five Hundred, which rejected 
it Cimon, who had only the good of his country at heart, 
retired, advising his friends to prove by their conduct the 
falsehood of the suspicion which had been cast upon them. 
A hard-fought battle then ensued, in which Pericles distin- 
guished himself above all others ; but the Athenians were 
defeated through the treachery of the Thessalians, who in 
the midst of the action went over to the enemy. The slaughter 
was great on both sides ; and the Peloponnesians, after 
ravaging the Megarian territory, returned home over the 
Isthmus, the passes of Geranea being now open. This battle 
w T as fought in b. c. 457. 

It is said that the Athenians were so disheartened and 
discouraged by this defeat, that they recalled Cimon from his 
exile, in order that by his mediation the war might be con- 
cluded. But this seems inconsistent with the facts recorded 
by Thucydides, and Cimon's recall took place a considerable 
time after the battle of Tanagra, with which it had perhaps 



310 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XVI. 



no connection at all. Very early in the year b. c. 456, we 
find the Athenians again in the field, eager to wipe off the dis- 
grace of Tanagra. They had friends in Boeotia, whose influence 
depended upon the success of the Athenian arms. Under 
the command of Myronides they met a numerous army of 
Boeotians at Oenophyta, and gained a brilliant victory, which 
made their interest in Boeotia and Phocis decidedly pre- 
dominant. To secure these advantages, Myronides razed the 
walls of Tanagra, and forced the Locrians of Opus to put 
into his hands 100 of their citizens as hostages. About this 
time the Athenians completed their long walls* which gave 
their city almost the strength of an island. Not long after- 
wards, in the same year, the Aeginetans capitulated on nearly 
the same terms as had been granted to the Thasians : demo- 
lition of their walls, surrender of their ships, and payment of 
tribute. 

In the following year, b. c. 455, an Athenian armament of 
50 galleys and 4000 heavy armed troops, under Tolmides, 
sailed round Peloponnesus, burnt the Spartan arsenal at 
Gythium, took a town called Chalcis belonging to the Co- 
rinthians, and defeated the Sicyonians, who attempted to 
prevent the landing of the troops. But the most important 
advantage gained in this expedition was the capture of 
Naupactus, which the Athenians soon afterwards gave up to 
the exiled Messenians from It home.* 

The defeat of the Athenians in Egypt took place in 
b. c. 455, but even after that catastrophe they did not sue for 
peace, but were bent on extending their power and annoying 
their enemies. Early in b. c. 454 they availed themselves of 
an opportunity to increase their influence in the north of 
Greece. A noble Thessalian, Orestes, had been driven from 
his country, and applied to the Athenians for aid to effect his 
restoration. The request was granted, and the forces of 
Boeotia and Phocis, now at the disposal of Athens, were 
called out to support the claim of Orestes. This expedition, 
* See p. 301. 



CHAP. XVI. 



KECALL OF CIMON. 



311 



however, was a failure, for the Thessalian cavalry proved 
invincible, and forced the invaders to retreat. Pericles en- 
deavoured to soothe the public disappointment, by coasting 
along the south side of the Corinthian gulf, making a descent 
on the territory of Sicyon, and routing the Sicyonians who 
came out to oppose him. Having taken some Achaeans on 
board, he then sailed over to the coast of Acarnania, and 
laid siege to the town of Oeniadae. The attempt to take 
that place, however, was unsuccessful, and the general result 
of the whole campaign seems to have been neither advan- 
tageous nor encouraging. 

Such occurrences as these might easily incline the people 
in favour of Cimon, whose administration had been one un- 
broken series of victories and conquests; and it is highly 
probable that he was recalled from exile soon after the above- 
mentioned expedition of Pericles, about b.c. 453. The de- 
cree for that purpose was moved by Pericles himself. Cimon's 
recall was followed by a cessation of hostilities which lasted 
for three years before a formal truce was concluded between 
the belligerents. What motive may have led Pericles to 
promote the recall of his rival is uncertain, but it is not im- 
possible that he wished to conciliate Cimon and his party on 
honourable terms, in order that by their united efforts they 
might counteract the treacherous schemes of the oligarchical 
faction, which had shown its spirit at the battle of Tanagra, 
and would willingly have delivered Athens into the hands of 
a foreign enemy in preference to seeing the democratic party 
prosperous. Ephialtes, the friend of Pericles, was assassi- 
nated, apparently the year before Cimon's recall, and there can 
be no doubt that the reckless oligarchic faction was guilty of 
that crime, which showed the spirit by which it was ani- 
mated, and may have disposed Pericles to strengthen himself 
by a coalition with Cimon, and to promise his concurrence 
in Cimon's foreign policy, which happened at this time to 
fall in with the inclinations of the people. 



I 

I 



312 HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xvr. 

During the three years which followed Cimon's return, 
Greece was in the enjoyment of a happy peace ; and this 
pause was followed by a truce of five years, in the course of 
which Cimon embarked on his last expedition against Persia. 
The Egyptian pretender, Amyrtaeus, solicited succour from 
Athens ; and as there was not only honour and spoil to be 
gained, but a stain to be wiped off, Cimon was appointed 
commander of a fleet of 200 galleys, with which he sailed to 
Cyprus. Thence he sent a squadron to the assistance of 
Amyrtaeus, while he himself with the rest laid siege to 
Citium. Here he was carried off by illness, or by the conse- 
quences of a wound, b. c. 449. The armament was soon after- 
wards compelled by want of provisions to raise the siege. 
While the Athenians were sailing away with the remains of 
their commander, they fell in with a great fleet of Phoenician 
and Cilician galleys, and having completely defeated them, 
they followed up this victory with another which they gained 
on shore. After this they were joined by the squadron from 
Egypt, which returned without having achieved any material 
object, and all sailed home, in b. c. 449. 

In after-times Cimon's military renown was enhanced by 
the report of a peace which he was said to have compelled 
the Persian monarch to conclude on the most humiliating 
terms ; for the king was supposed to have agreed to abandon 
at least the military occupation of Asia Minor to the distance 
of three days' journey from the coast, or even of the whole 
peninsula west of the river Halys, and to abstain from 
passing the mouth of the Bosporus and the Chelidonian 
islands on the coast of Lycia, or the town of Phaselis, into 
the western sea. The silence of Thucydides, and the ac- 
counts of later writers, which are contradictory in regard both 
to the date and to the conditions, of the treaty, render the whole 
affair extremely doubtful. From the subsequent history it is 
quite evident that such a state of things as this alleged peace 
implies, never existed ; and no allusion is made to the peace in 



CHAP. XVI. DISPUTES OF SPARTA AND ATHENS. 313 



any of the later transactions between Greece and Persia. 
The whole story is a fable, which arose no doubt out of the 
recollection of Cimon's glorious victories, and seems to 
have assumed a distinct shape in the rhetorical school of 
Isocrates. 

Cimon's death saved him from the mortification of seeing 
his exertions for the maintenance of peace in Greece defeated 
by causes which he could not have controlled. Pericles is 
said to have carried, about this time, a decree summoning a 
congress, to be held at Athens, of deputies from various parts 
of Greece, and even from the islands and Asiatic colonies. 
The professed objects of this assembly were, the restoration 
of the temples which had been destroyed in the Persian wars, 
and to provide for the security of commerce among the 
Greeks. The real end which Pericles had in view is very 
doubtful ; he may have wished to strengthen the Athenian 
confederacy, and to gain over some Greeks who were still 
wavering between Athens and her rival. But whatever may 
have been the objects of the scheme, it fell to the ground, 
according to Plutarch, through the counter-machinations of 
Sparta. 

An occasion for hostilities between the two rival states 
seems to have arisen in b. c. 448, the year after Cimon's 
death. The Delphians had, from time immemorial, exer- 
cised the superintendence of the oracle of Apollo, and the 
guardianship of the sacred treasures, by ministers of their 
own choice. The Phocians, perhaps relying on the pro- 
tection of Athens, wrested this important charge from them. 
Sparta now stepped forward to assert the claims of her Dorian 
friends at Delphi, and an army was sent out which restored 
the possession of the temple to the Delphians. Delphi was, 
at the same time, induced to renounce the league with the 
Phocians, and to declare itself an independent state. To 
Sparta several privileges were granted by the Delphians. 

p 



314 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XVX* 



But shortly after the withdrawal of the Spartan forces, 
Pericles appeared at Delphi with an Athenian army, and re- 
instated the Phocians in the custody of the temple; the 
privileges which had been bestowed upon the Spartans were 
now transferred to the Athenians. This, however, was only 
a prelude to more important movements, which took place in 
the following year, B.C. 447. Numbers of Boeotian exiles, 
who had been driven from their homes in consequence of the 
Athenian ascendency in Boeotia, took possession of Chae- 
ronea, Orchomenos, and other towns. The danger thus 
threatening the interests of Athens called for its prompt in- 
terference. Tolmides, at the head of a band of 1000 volun- 
teers, set out, against the cautious advice of Pericles, to 
suppress the insurrection. With this force and some allies 
he first attacked Chaeronea, and succeeded in reducing it. 
A garrison was left in the place; but as he was retiring with 
the rest of his little army, he was surprised in the neighbour- 
hood of Coronea by the appearance of a hostile army ; the 
Athenians were completely defeated, and Tolmides himself 
was among the slain. The consequence of this disaster was 
a counter-revolution in Boeotia, which overthrew the Athe- 
nian influence throughout that country. To recover their 
prisoners, the Athenians undertook to withdraw all their 
troops from Boeotia. The exiles returned everywhere, and 
the party hostile to Athens gained the ascendency throughout 
Boeotia. 

In B.C. 445, when the five years' truce expired, the effects 
of this disaster became more fully manifest. The first 
was the revolt of Euboea; and when Pericles had crossed 
over to reduce the island to subjection, he received tidings 
of a revolution at Megara, where the adverse party had put 
the greater part of the Athenian garrison to the sword. At 
the same time he learned that a Peloponnesian army was on 
its march to Attica ; he accordingly returned with the utmost 



chap. xvi. THE THIRTY YEARS 5 TRUCE. 



315 



speed to defend Athens. The Peloponnesians soon afterwards 
entered the country and ravaged the plains on the western 
frontier. The Spartans were commanded by their young 
king, Pleistoanax, who was guided by the counsels of Clean- 
dridas. Pericles is said to have prevailed upon the latter by 
bribes to induce the king to withdraw with his army. On 
their return home both the king and his adviser were accused 
of having sold the interests of their country, and both es- 
caped by going into exile. As soon as Pericles saw himself 
freed from this enemy, he returned, with fifty galleys and an 
army of 5000 heavy-armed men, to quell the revolt of 
Euboea. He speedily overpowered all resistance, and many 
of the wealthy landowners were driven from their estates to 
make room for Attic colonists of the poorer classes. 

Notwithstanding this success, the people of Athens were 
disposed to make peace ; and the Spartans, having been be- 
trayed by their own commanders, were not eager for a fresh 
expedition ; but seeing the state of public feeling at Athens, 
they exacted conditions which in other circumstances would 
have been rejected with scorn. They required the complete 
deliverance of Peloponnesus from Athenian influence. Athens 
accordingly had to give up Troezen, the ports of Pegae 
and Nisaea, and its connection with Achaia ; on these terms 
a truce for thirty years was concluded in b. a 445, between 
Athens and Sparta, and the confederacies over which each 
presided. Phocis also seems to have been lost by the 
Athenians, and the custody of the Delphic temple to have 
been restored to the Delphians. Pericles may not have con- 
sidered these concessions so important as they appeared to 
others, who did not understand the real foundation of the 
greatness of Athens ; for she was still the absolute mistress 
of the sea, and her maritime empire remained untouched. 
The majority of the people of Athens appear to have been 
convinced that their real strength lay in their navy; and 



316 



HISTORY OP GREECE. chap, xvi. 



backed by this feeling, Pericles bore down all opposition on 
the part of the aristocracy, which, after Cimon's death, was 
headed by Thucydides, the son of Melesias, who was sent 
into exile by ostracism in b. c. 444. This event completely 
broke the aristocratic faction, and the sway of Pericles in the 
Athenian councils became more absolute than ever, and lasted 
with scarcely any interruption to the end of his life. 



CHAP. xvn. THE ATHENIAN ALLIES. 



317 



CHAPTER XVII. 

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE THIRTY YEARS* TRUCE TO THE 
RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS AND CORINTH, WITH 
A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF PERICLES. 

The thirty years' truce afforded to Athens an interval of 
repose highly favourable to her prosperity ; and during this 
period Pericles was enabled to carry out his views into 
action with scarcely a breath of opposition to divert him 
from his purpose. Throughout his public life, Pericles had 
mainly two objects in view : first, to extend and strengthen 
the Athenian empire ; and secondly, to raise the confidence 
and self-esteem of the Athenians themselves to a level with 
the lofty position which they occupied. Nearly all his mea- 
sures clearly tended to one or the other of these ends. 

By this time considerable changes had taken place in the 
relation between Athens and her allies. Even in the lifetime 
of Aristides, a proposal was made, nominally by the Samians, 
to transfer the treasury of the confederacy from Delos to 
Athens. Aristides, though he saw the unfairness of the 
measure, admitted its expediency, and it was soon afterwards 
adopted. The ruling party at Athens, which had probably 
induced the Samians to make the proposal, thus gained its 
end without the appearance of open violence. At a some- 
what later time, Cimon deprived all the weaker among the 
allied states of their means of defence ; so that when Pericles 
came to the head of affairs, there remained little to be done 
to convert the confederacy into an empire, over which Athens 
ruled as a despotic sovereign. It seems to have been he who 
first raised the annual contributions of the allies from 460 
talents to 600, and led the Athenians to exercise a direct 
authority over the states which had lost their independence, 

p 3 



318 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XVII. 



and to interfere with the concerns of their internal adminis- 
tration. A democratic form of government, if not always 
imposed upon the allies at the time of their subjugation, came, 
in most cases, to be established as a natural consequence of 
their subjection to Athens. But this was a trifling grievance 
when compared with the regulation by which all trials for 
capital offences, and all cases involving property above a 
certain low amount, were transferred from the cognisance of 
the local courts to Athenian tribunals. Great as were the 
advantages which Athens derived from this innovation, the 
inconveniences and annoyances caused to the allies must 
have been far greater, for justice was rendered at once ex- 
pensive, slow, and uncertain. 

The interference of the Athenians in the domestic affairs 
of the allies became the occasion of a war which threatened 
to put an end to the thirty years' truce ; but the issue of 
which only consolidated the Athenian empire, and afforded 
Pericles an opportunity of showing his brilliant qualities as a 
military commander. A quarrel had arisen between Samos 
and Miletus, and the latter, on being vanquished, sought the 
protection of Athens. At the same time a party at Samos 
was endeavouring, with Athenian assistance, to overthrow 
the oligarchical government which had till then existed in 
the island ; and this effort was favoured at Athens, Pericles 
gladly availing himself of the opportunity of reducing the 
island. As the Samians did not at once comply with the 
request to submit their dispute to an Athenian tribunal, 
Pericles was sent out with a squadron of forty galleys to 
enforce obedience, and to regulate the constitution of the island 
according to the interests of Athens. On his arrival he esta- 
blished a democratic form of government, and secured it 
against the aristocratic party by taking one hundred hostages, 
whom he lodged in Lemnos ; and having exacted a contri- 
bution of eighty talents, he sailed home, leaving a small 
garrison in Samos. When Pericles was approaching the 



chap. xvn. REVOLT OF SAMOS. 



319 



island, a number of the aristocratic party had quitted their 
country, and opened a correspondence with the Persian 
satrap of Sardis ; and after the departure of Pericles, they 
formed a plan for regaining possession of their country : with 
an army of mercenaries they sailed across, and having entered 
into an understanding with their friends at home, they suc- 
ceeded in overpowering the Athenian garrison, and abolish- 
ing the newly established form of government. The hostages 
were secretly removed from Lemnos, and then the Athenian 
alliance was openly renounced. The Athenian prisoners 
were handed over to the satrap, and the revolt was complete. 
This happened in B.C. 440. The Samians tried to make 
friends in Greece among the enemies of Athens ; the allies of 
Sparta held a congress, but it appears that Corinth prevailed 
upon her confederates to abandon the Samians to the ven- 
geance of the incensed Athenians. This was a virtual re- 
cognition of the supremacy exercised by Athens over her 
allies. 

These deliberations were probably still going on when 
Pericles and nine colleagues crossed the sea with a fleet of 
sixty sail to suppress the insurrection. Some ships were de- 
tached from this armament to look out for the Phoenician 
fleet, which was reported to be on its way to assist the 
Samians, while another squadron was ordered to fetch rein- 
forcements from Chios and Lesbos ; but Pericles, even with 
the forty galleys to which his fleet was thus reduced, did not 
shrink from engaging with a Samian force of seventy, and 
gained a victory. Soon afterwards he received reinforce- 
ments, and having landed a body of troops on the island, he 
drove the enemy into the town, and surrounded it with a 
triple line of entrenchments. After this, however, the 
Samians gained some advantages at sea, though they must 
have been very slight. Pericles with sixty galleys sailed out 
to meet the Phoenician fleet, whose approach was expected 
every day. The Phoenicians did not make their appearance, 

P 4 



320 



HISTOHT OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XVII. 



but during the absence of Pericles, the Samians surprised the 
naval encampment of the Athenians, and gained a great vic- 
tory over their enemies. This success made them masters of 
the sea, and enabled them to introduce supplies into their 
town. They remained in the ascendant for about fourteen 
days, but on the return of Pericles the state of things was 
reversed, and the Samians were once more closely besieged. 
Their recent success, however, had created some uneasi- 
ness ( at Athens, and great reinforcements were sent out to 
Pericles. The Samians, still undaunted, ventured upon 
another sea-fight. This was soon decided against them^ 
and compelled them to remain on the defensive; until at 
length, when the war had lasted for nine months, they were 
reduced by famine to capitulate. The terms which they ob- 
tained may be considered mild; they were obliged to dis- 
mantle their fortifications, to deliver up their ships, and to 
pay the cost of the siege by instalments. Byzantium, which 
had from the first sided with Samos, though it had taken no 
active part in the war, was reduced very soon afterwards. 

On his return to Athens, Pericles was greeted with ex- 
traordinary honours. The whole merit of the success was 
ascribed to him, and he himself compared his conquest with 
that of Agamemnon. In the funeral obsequies of those 
Athenians who had fallen in the Samian war, Pericles de- 
livered the customary oration, and at the end of it, was 
honoured by the women with a shower of diadems and chap- 
lets. The conquest of Samos at once established and con- 
solidated the sovereignty of Athens over her allies : it had 
been recognised by Chios and Lesbos, which aided in the 
suppression of the Samian revolt, as well as by Sparta and 
her allies. The term alliance had now become a mere name, 
for the allies were in reality the subjects of Athens ; and the 
last remnant of an appearance of independence on their part 
was effaced by the transfer of the common treasure of the 
confederacy from Delos to Athens. No account was hence- 



chap. xvii. ATHENIAN COLONIES. 321 



forth rendered to the members of the league of the manner 
in which the treasure contributed by them was spent, and a 
great portion of it was generally expended for purposes 
which benefited none but the Athenians. Every Athenian, 
therefore, looked upon himself with pride, as one of a people 
which ruled over a great empire with absolute sway ; and 
upon Athens, not merely as the capital of Attica, but as the 
metropolis of extensive dominions. This was the object 
which Pericles had always aimed at ; and that class of his 
measures which provided numerous individuals with the 
means of subsistence tended to the same end. This was 
done by the establishment of colonies in places where the 
new settlers might best promote the interests of Athens : 
thus 2000 Athenians settled at Oreos, in the north of Euboea, 
and 500 in Naxos ; others formed colonies in Andros, in 
the Chersonese, and on the Strymon in Thrace, where they 
founded the city of Amphipolis, though, owing to the peri- 
lous situation of the place, the Athenians themselves never 
formed a considerable part of its population. 

During an expedition of Pericles into the Euxine for the 
purpose of displaying the power of Athens, and strengthen- 
ing her influence, he found an opportunity of taking posses- 
sion of Sinope ; and it seems to have been about the same 
period that Amisos admitted so many Athenians among its 
citizens that in after-times the whole population was con- 
sidered as an Attic race. * In the west, the colony of Thu- 
rium, or Thurii, was established in b. c. 443, near the site of 
Sybaris. Among the settlers who joined the Athenian colo- 
nists were the historian Herodotus and the orator Lysias, 
for the Athenians invited foreigners from all parts of Greece 
to share in the risks and advantages of the expedition. The 
descendants of the ancient Sybarites, who had sent for the 



* Appian, Bell Mithrid. 8, 83. 
P 5 



322 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XVII. 



Athenians, formed a considerable portion of the population 
of the new town, and claimed particular privileges for them- 
selves. This roused the indignation of the other settlers, 
and led to furious hostilities, in which the ill-fated Sybarites 
were completely exterminated. Other adventurers from 
Greece then joined the Thurians on terms of perfect equality, 
and the new state seems to have framed its constitution upon 
the model of that of Athens. 

For the purpose of raising the value of the Athenian fran- 
chise in public estimation, Pericles, about B.C. 444, carried 
a law enacting that the rights of citizenship should be con- 
fined to those persons both whose parents were Athenians. 
One result of this was, that soon afterwards, when the Libyan 
prince Psammetichus sent a present of corn to be distributed 
among the Athenian people, nearly 5000 persons, who had 
till then acted as citizens, were excluded from a share in the 
gift, on the plea that they were aliens ; and, it is said, suf- 
fered the penalty appointed by law for those who usurped 
the privileges of citizens, being sold as slaves. Those who 
were found to be really entitled to share in the gift amounted 
to very little more than 14^000. But small as this number 
was, and though it was still more reduced by the multitudes 
that went out as colonists, still Pericles was obliged to make 
it one of his leading objects to provide for the subsistence of 
those who were left, and the large expenditure which he 
directed was devoted mainly to this purpose. Thus a 
squadron of sixty galleys was sent out every year, and was 
kept at sea eight months, partly indeed to keep the crews in 
training, but at the same time with a distinct view to bene- 
fiting a large body of citizens by the pay which probably sup- 
ported them during the remainder of the year. But still 
more ample employment was provided for the poorer class 
by the great architectural works which were undertaken, by 
the advice of Pericles, for the defence and embellishment of 
the city, and which have rendered his accession to power 



CHAP. XVII. PERICLES ADORNS ATHENS. 



323 



an epoch no less important in the history of the arts than in 
that of Attica itself. 

In order to secure the communication between Athens and 
Piraeus, even in case either of the two long walls built by 
Cimon should be surprised by an enemy, Pericles constructed 
a third, within the two first, which ran parallel and near to 
that which joined the city with Piraeus. The temples at 
Athens and Eleusis, which still bore marks of the ravages 
caused by the Persians, were restored, and new ones were 
erected on a scale of magnificence corresponding to the in- 
creased wealth and power of the state. The summit of the 
acropolis was covered with sacred buildings and monuments ; 
among which the Parthenon, dedicated to the tutelary 
divinity of Athens, rose supreme in majesty and beauty. 
The Propylaea, an ornamental fortification on the western 
side, formed a most splendid approach to the temple. A 
theatre, capable of containing a large portion of the popu- 
lation of Athens, had been begun before the time of Pericles, 
and he added one designed for the performance of music, 
thence called the Odeum. In the planning and adorning of 
these edifices, some of the greatest architects and sculptors 
Greece ever produced, such as the unrivalled Phidias, found 
ample exercise for their genius and talents ; while multi- 
tudes of workmen of an inferior order were employed in a 
long train of subordinate arts. The colossal image of Athena 
in the Parthenon was formed of ivory and gold ; and the 
same precious materials were profusely used in the decoration 
of the sculptures which adorned the exterior of the temple. 
The groups in the pediments, the work of Phidias, excite, 
even in their mutilated remains, the admiration of all lovers 
of the arts. While these works gave employment at home 
to numerous craftsmen of every description, a great num- 
ber of persons were actively engaged in procuring from 
abroad the materials which were required. The rapidity 

p 6 



324 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XVII. 



with which the new buildings were completed was no less 
marvellous than the perfection of art which they exhibited ; 
the Propylaea, the most costly and difficult of all,- was 
finished in five years. During the whole period of this ex- 
traordinary activity, there must have been a comparative 
scarcity of labour at Athens. 

But while Pericles thus increased the strength and splen- 
dour of the city, he also spent a considerable portion of the 
public revenue on the spectacles and amusements which 
ultimately became the all-engrossing objects of Athenian 
life. He did not, indeed, introduce that passion for amuse- 
ments, but he increased their number and heightened their 
attractions, and made them accessible to all the citizens; 
whereas, until then, they had been reserved for the more 
affluent. Ever since Athens had had a standing theatre, a 
small sum had been paid for admission ; and Pericles now 
carried a law which enabled the poorer citizens to receive 
the amount from the treasury, and thus to enjoy what they 
had previously been debarred from, or had had to purchase 
by an inconvenient sacrifice. This measure, though harm- 
less in itself, opened the way for a profuse distribution of 
money under the pretext of enabling the poor to participate 
in various festivals, and led to the establishment of a fund*, 
which diminished the resources of the commonwealth appli- 
cable to the public service. 

Another innovation of a similar nature seems likewise to 
have been followed by a train of pernicious consequences, 
which Pericles himself could not have anticipated : he intro- 
duced the practice of paying the jurors for their attendance 
in the courts of justice. f This again was in itself no more 
than fair and equitable; but afterwards, the original pay, 
which was extremely moderate, was tripled, and became one 
of the heaviest items of the public expenditure. Another 

* The name of this fund was to &eccpiit6v. 

t This pay was ,called (xurdbs foKcurriKbs, or to Zikoi<ttik6v. 



chap. xvii. PUBLIC BUILDINGS AT ATHENS. 



325 



regulation, which is sometimes, though erroneously, attributed 
to Pericles, was the payment for attendance in the popular 
assembly * ; a regulation which became more and more per- 
nicious as the burden which it laid upon the state was more 
sensibly felt. In judging of these measures it must not, 
however, be forgotten that Pericles did not, like a tyrant, 
bribe the people by largesses ; but that the money given to 
them was, in reality, their own property ; that Pericles not 
only guided, but also followed, the popular inclination ; and 
that, in general, his taste coincided with that of the Athenians. 
It must be confessed, at all events, that the splendour and 
magnificence of the age of Pericles was not the work of one 
mind or genius, but of the Athenian people ; and it is this 
fact which places the age of Pericles far above all similar 
periods in the history of the world. The public buildings 
and unrivalled works of art, with which Athens was then 
adorned, on the one hand tended continually to refine that 
matchless purity of taste by which the Athenians were long 
distinguished, and, on the other, exalted and endeared the 
state in the eyes of its citizens. They were, so to speak, 
the trophies of the great victories which had been gained 
over the barbarians, and the fruits of Athenian patience and 
fortitude. We may, indeed, regret that the treasures spent 
upon those temples and monuments were not always obtained 
by fair means, but were in a great measure procured by 
wrongs and robberies committed upon the subjects of Athens. 
In this respect, however, the Athenians, after all, were not 
worse than any other nation, ancient or modern, that has 
borne sway over others ; and whatever wrong was done, did 
not fail to bring its own punishment ; for while it raised the 
pride and confidence of the ruling city, it called forth in an 
equal degree the spirit of discontent and resistance among 

* This pay is called fuvdbs iKKhTifficurriKSs. 



326 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XVII. 



the allies ; and both combined hurried on the Athenians to 
their ruin. 

Until the time of the Persian war, Athens had contributed 
less to the intellectual progress of Greece than many other 
cities, both in Greece itself — -such as Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, 
Aegina — and in the eastern and western colonies ; but 
her peaceful glories quickly followed and outshone those of 
her military victories and conquests. In the period between 
the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, both literature and the 
fine arts tended towards Athens as their most favoured seat ; 
for there genius and talent were encouraged by an ample 
field of exertion, by public sympathy and applause, as well 
as by the prospect of other rewards. Accordingly it was at 
Athens that architecture and sculpture reached the highest 
degree of perfection, and that Greek poetry was enriched 
with a new kind of composition, the drama, which united 
the leading features of every species previously known, and 
constituted the highest class of poetry. The drama grew 
out of one of the forms of lyric poetry which had been suc- 
cessfully cultivated before, and which, for the greater part 
of a century, continued to predominate in the drama. Si- 
monides of Ceos, Bacchylides, and Pindar, were lyric poets, 
whom the judgment of every succeeding age has considered 
superior to all others. Of the former two, only fragments 
have come down to us ; but the extant works of Pindar dis- 
play a grandeur of thought and conception which is beyond 
dispute, as it is beyond comparison. At the time of his 
death, in b. c. 438, the Attic drama had just attained its full 
maturity ; and lyric poetry never again rose to the height 
which it had reached through his genius. 

The drama was that branch of poetical literature which 
peculiarly signalised the age of Pericles. The steps by 
which it was brought to the form which it exhibits in the 
earliest remains are involved in great obscurity. Phryni- 



chap. xvn. THE ATTIC DKAMA. 



327 



chus, the immediate predecessor of Aeschylus, is mentioned 
very favourably by the ancients themselves ; and the effects 
which his works are reported to have produced, show that 
he must have been a poet of great power. Aeschylus looked 
upon him as a worthy rival, and was in part stimulated by 
his example to unfold the capabilities of his art by a variety 
of new inventions. These, however, were so important as 
to entitle their author to be considered as the father of Attic 
tragedy. He introduced the dialogue, the story of each 
drama having previously been told in a series of monologues, 
This innovation altered the whole character of the drama, 
inasmuch as the purely dramatic part was raised from a sub- 
ordinate to the principal rank, while the lyric or choral part 
became subsidiary. With Aeschylus also arose the usage of 
exhibiting what was called a trilogy ; that is, three tragedies, 
distinct indeed, but in reality constituting one great drama, 
so that they were like so many acts of the same piece. Ac- 
cording to a long-established custom, he himself bore a part 
in the representation of his own plays, and not only super- 
intended the evolutions of his choruses, but invented several 
minute additions to the theatrical wardrobe. Agatharchus 
is said to have painted for him the first scene which had 
ever been made according to the rules of linear perspective. 
Out of seventy tragedies which were ascribed to him, only 
seven have been preserved ; among which there is one com- 
plete trilogy, the Oresteia*, but they are sufficient to give us 
an idea of the sublimity and originality of his genius. 

His younger contemporary, Sophocles, surpassed Aeschy- 
lus in the general harmony of his conceptions, in the equable 
diffusion of grace and vigour throughout every part, and in 
the unlimited command over all the power and all the charm 
of expression which the Greek language supplied ; though it 
cannot be denied that in some respects Sophocles was a genius 
of a lower order. He gained the highest popularity at 
Athens, and succeeded in supplanting his elder rival in the 



328 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



CHAP. XVII. 



estimation of the public. The Athenians were so delighted 
with his "Antigone," that they appointed him one of the ten 
generals who accompanied Pericles in the war against Samos, 
b. c. 440 ; a reward quite in accordance with the feelings of 
the Athenians, however strange and unsuitable it may appear 
to us. He died full of years and glory, but not before he 
had himself experienced the mutability of the public taste in 
the growing preference given to Euripides, who died a year 
sooner, but, in the character of his poetry, belongs entirely to 
the latest period of the life of Sophocles. 

The Attic drama was not merely an entertainment for the 
idle, or a study of the lovers of literature and art, but was 
applied to moral, religious, and sometimes even political 
purposes. Allusions to living persons and occurrences of the 
day were by no means rare, and were easily introduced ; but 
such things were generally intended more to display the 
poet's ingenuity than to produce any practical effect on his 
audience, or to influence the management of public affairs. 
The sphere of comedy, on the other hand, lay within the 
walks of daily life, and its main business was with the im- 
mediate present; for there was not a class of persons or 
things, which could engage public attention, that might not 
be brought within the range of its representations. Another 
kind of comic drama was called the satiric, and was com- 
monly performed as a farce after a tragedy; in this the 
chorus consisted of satyrs. It was totally distinct from 
comedy. All these theatrical performances were connected 
with the celebration of the festivals of Dionysus, and under 
that god's protection the comic poets enjoyed unbounded 
freedom and licence ; no objects nor persons, not even the 
gods themselves, were exempt from their unsparing ridicule. 
With such unlimited power, the comic poets assailed every 
kind of vice and folly, provided it was sufficiently notorious 
to render their ridicule intelligible. Of the early Attic 
comedy we possess no specimens: Aristophanes, the only 



chap. XVII. ADMINISTRATION OF PERICLES. 329 



comic poet of whom complete works have come down to us, 
belongs to a later period than that of which we are now 
treating; but there can be no doubt that his predecessors 
were as unsparing in their assaults, and as unbridled in their 
censure and animadversion, as Aristophanes himself. The 
influence which this severe censorship exercised upon public 
men and measures, however, seems to have been very slight ; 
the exhibition was designed chiefly for amusement, and the 
time and place of the performance of comedy were not 
adapted for serious thoughts. The very boldness and im- 
punity of the poets, in fact, rendered them harmless. In 
B.C. 440, a law was passed to restrain the licence of the 
comic poets, but it did not remain in force more than two or 
three years, after which it was entirely repealed, and no 
similar attempt seems to have been made as long as Athens 
preserved her political independence. 

Pericles, in his public life, presented little that could give 
scope to attacks from the comic poets, except his almost un- 
limited power, by allusion to which they frequently endea- 
voured to alarm the people; but his private life offered 
some vulnerable points, by exposing which his enemies were 
able to strike more dangerous blows at him, and for a time 
must have embittered his domestic happiness. His superin- 
tendence of the execution of public works, and the large sums 
of money which for that purpose passed through his hands, 
could not fail to excite suspicion, and to give a handle for 
calumny. The first blow was not aimed directly at himself, 
but was intended to wound him through his friend Phidias, 
who was accused of having embezzled a part of the gold 
which he had received from the treasury to use in the co- 
lossal statue of Athena already mentioned. This charge, 
however, fell to the ground, through a contrivance which 
Pericles had suggested in the composition of the statue, for 
the golden ornaments had been fixed in such a manner that 
they could be taken off without doing it any injury. Ac- 



330 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xvrx. 



cordingly, when Pericles challenged the accusers to verify 
their charge, they shrank from the application of the decisive 
test. This defeat, however, did not deter them from making 
another and more successful attempt ; they accused Phidias 
of having carved his own portrait and that of Pericles on the 
shield of the goddess, which was viewed as an arrogant in- 
trusion among the objects of worship. Phidias was thrown 
into prison, and died there ; and the informer was rewarded 
with certain immunities, and placed under the protection of 
the ten generals. 

This success emboldened the enemies of Pericles to proceed; 
for they must have seen that, after all, it was not difficult to 
inspire the people with distrust and jealousy of its powerful 
leader ; and they now began their manoeuvres against Aspasia, 
in whose safety Pericles felt as much concern as in his own. 
She had long attracted public attention, no less by her per- 
sonal beauty than by her cultivation of the intellectual 
powers and female graces, in which probably no Athenian 
woman could compete with her. Her influence over Pericles 
furnished the comic poets with an inexhaustible fund of ri- 
dicule, and his enemies with a ground for serious charges. 
Another handle was afforded to his enemies by the circum- 
stance that the most independent thinkers of the age, such 
men as Anaxagoras, Zeno, Protagoras, were ever welcome 
guests in the house of Pericles. Their doctrines were cer- 
tainly very far removed from the vulgar superstitions of the 
multitude, and this fact gave a plausible pretext for describing 
the circle in which they moved as a school of impiety. Out 
of these materials a criminal prosecution was instituted by 
the poet Hermippus against Aspasia. At the same time a 
law was passed against persons denying the existence of the 
gods, which was aimed immediately at Anaxagoras, and in- 
directly at Pericles. Pericles was likewise called upon to give 
in his accounts to the Prytanes, in order that they might be 
submitted to a trial ; for it was hoped that they would not be 



CHAP. xvn. POPULARITY OF PERICLES. 



331 



able to pass a rigorous scrutiny, and that he would be found 
guilty of embezzlement, or some other more general offence 
in the administration of the public funds. But all these ma- 
chinations failed, at least of reaching their main object. The 
issue of those against Anaxagoras is uncertain ; according to 
some he was acquitted ; while others state that, by the advice 
of Pericles, he quitted Athens to escape condemnation. The 
cause of Aspasia was pleaded by Pericles himself, who is said 
to have had recourse even to tears and entreaties ; and this 
danger also was averted. Such a proof of his eloquence and, 
perhaps still more, of his personal influence, induced his 
enemies to drop their proceedings against himself, at least 
for the present, and to wait for a fitter opportunity. After 
these storms, Pericles recovered his former high and firm 
position, which to the end of his life was never again endan- 
gered, except by one transient gust of popular displeasure. 
Ancient historians state that he so much dreaded the possi- 
bility of being obliged to account for the public money he 
had expended, that, in order to avert the danger, he kindled 
the war which put an end to the thirty years' truce; but 
there are no grounds for this charge beyond the mere as- 
sertions of his enemies, which have never been established by 
proof, and are contradicted most emphatically by Thucydides^ 
the great contemporary historian. 



332 HISTOKY OF GREECE. CHAP. xvni. 



CHAPTER XVIIL 

CAUSES AND OCCASIONS OF THE PELOPONNE SI AN WAR. 

The peace which terminated the Aeginetan war* had shaken 
the ascendency of Athens on the continent of Greece ; but 
the few years of peace down to the outbreak of the Pelopon- 
nesian war produced ample compensation by the brilliant 
administration and the far-reaching policy of Pericles. The 
completion of the fortifications of Piraeus, the establishment 
of Thurii in southern Italy, and of Amphipolis in Thrace, the 
successful war of Pericles against Samos, — all these events 
tended to increase the long-cherished jealousy of Sparta and 
the smaller Grecian states ; and the hatred and alarm excited 
by the formidable power of Athens became more and more 
general. We will not here inquire into the internal causes 
of the discord which pervades the whole history of the Greek 
states, and which rendered the outbreak of that unfortunate 
war unavoidable, but shall at once proceed to consider its 
immediate forerunners and its beginnings. Thucydides, the 
most authentic, and at the same time the most intelligent, 
judge of Greek history, mentions two causes, the Corinthian 
war, and the revolt of the city of Potidaea. 

Epidamnus (the modern Durazzo), a colony founded on the 
coast of Illyricum by the Corcyraeans in conjunction with 
Corinthian and other Doric settlers, had in a short time at- 
tained considerable prosperity, but had afterwards been hard 
pressed and weakened by the Illyrian Taulantians, its eastern 
neighbours ; and shortly before the outbreak of the Pelopon- 
nesian war, it was distracted by civil discord. A quarrel be- 
tween the popular party and the wealthy aristocracy (Dorians) 



* Thucydides (i. 87.) calls it the Euboean war. 



chap. xvin. AFFAIRS OF CORCYRA. 



333 



ended in the victory of the former and the expulsion of the 
latter, who allied themselves with the neighbouring bar- 
barians, and endeavoured to effect their return by force of 
arms. They ravaged the territory of Epidamnus, and pressed 
the town so closely, that the Epidamnians applied to Corcyra, 
their metropolis, to act as mediators between themselves and 
their exiled fellow-citizens, and to assist them in bringing the 
war with the barbarians to a close. But the Corcyraeans not 
listening to this request, the Epidamnians in their distress 
consulted the oracle of Delphi. The god advised them to 
surrender their town to the Corinthians, and to choose Co- 
rinthians for their commanders. Corinth, the metropolis of 
Corcyra, had, according to the established custom of the 
Greeks, taken part in the foundation of Epidamnus, and now 
promised its assistance the more readily, as an opportunity 
was thus offered for punishing and curbing Corcyra, which 
had often disregarded, or wholly neglected, its duties as a 
colony towards the parent city, and had attained a prosperity 
and naval power which seemed to be dangerous to Corinth 
itself. At first, Corinth sent settlers and a garrison con- 
sisting of Corinthians, Ambracians, and Leucadians, who, 
from fear of the Corcyraean fleet, went overland through the 
territory of Apollonia, which was likewise a Corinthian 
colony. As soon as the Corcyraeans were informed of this, 
they appeared with a fleet before Epidamnus, demanding the 
restoration of the exiles, and the dismissal of the Corinthian 
garrison. Compliance being refused, the Corcyraeans, joined 
by the exiles and some Illyrians, laid siege to the town, 
blockading it both by land and by sea. 

The Corinthians, on hearing this intelligence, began in 
good earnest to make preparations to relieve their citizens 
and friends. At their request, new settlers repaired to Epi- 
damnus ; many also advanced money and ships, and a consi- 
derable fleet was thus raised, consisting, among others, of ships 
from Megara, from some of the maritime towns of Argolis, 



334 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



CHAP. XVXXX. 



from Ambracia, Leucadia, and Cephalenia. Meantime, in 
order to prevent the fleet from setting sail, the Corcyraeans 
sent envoys, accompanied by others from Sicyon and Lace- 
daemon, to Corinth, to propose that the Corinthians should 
either withdraw their people from Epidamnus, or, if they 
pretended to any right in the colony, should refer their 
claims to the decision of some neutral state or of the Delphic 
oracle. The Corinthians offered to consent to this proposal, 
on condition that the Corcyraeans should in the mean time 
raise the siege. But no decision was come to, and the peace- 
ful solution of the question became impossible; the Co- 
rinthian fleet set sail, and a herald was sent out to declare 
war against Corcyra. The Corcyraeans made one more 
attempt to deter the Corinthians from waging war against 
them, but to no purpose. They, too, had in the mean time 
got ready a fleet of eighty ships, while that of Corinth con- 
sisted of only seventy-five. A battle was fought near the 
promontory of Actium, at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, 
in which the Corcyraeans gained a complete victory ; fifteen 
Corinthian ships were destroyed, and the remainder of the 
fleet hastily returned home. On the same day, Epidamnus 
surrendered to the besiegers, who, acting mercifully towards 
the Corinthians alone, kept them in captivity, while they 
sold all the other inhabitants of the town as slaves, and put 
to death all the Greeks who had been taken prisoners in the 
battle, except the Corinthians. This affair took place in 
b.c.434. 

After this victory the Corcyraeans were for a time in 
undisputed possession of the sea. They immediately began 
taking vengeance upon the Corinthian allies, so that Corinth 
thought it necessary to send a fleet and an army to Actium, 
and to the coasts of the country of the Thesprotians, for their 
protection. The Corinthians were at the same time making 
every effort to provide themselves with new ships for the con- 
tinuation of the war, and to procure allies, troops, and money. 



chap, xviii. ENVOYS OF CORCYRA AND CORINTH. 335 



Corcyra, on the other hand, resorted for assistance to Athens. 
Its envoys there met others who had been sent from Corinth 
for the purpose of preventing an alliance between Athens and 
Corcyra, the two most powerful maritime states of Greece. 
" You must not," said the Corinthian envoy, " interfere in 
our disputes with our colonies, which have neglected their 
duties and are ungrateful. It is unlawful for you to enter 
into an alliance with Corcyra, because you are bound by 
treaty to Corinth, and it is not in the spirit of that treaty to 
afford assistance to the states not comprised in it, against 
those who were parties to it, and to become our enemies instead 
of remaining our friends. Corinth has not deserved this of 
you ; remember our neutrality during the Samian war, and 
allow us now to reduce to obedience and chastise our re- 
bellious allies in the same manner as we allowed you to act 
towards yours, preventing even the other Peloponnesians 
from interfering in your private disputes with the states 
subject to you." 

" The fact that we have been a party neither to that treaty 
of peace nor to any other," replied the representative of 
Corcyra, " is the very reason why you should not refuse us 
your assistance. We desire to be independent, and not to 
be always subject to a state, which, though it is the founder 
of our own city, has already been outstripped by us in mari- 
time power. The state which, next to your own, is the most 
powerful at sea, offers you its alliance : accept it, and con- 
sider how conveniently Corcyra is situated for those who 
sail to Italy or Sicily, how safely we can guide you, and how 
effectually we can prevent your enemies from opposing your 
enterprises in the western seas. Examine well the im- 
portance of an alliance between the two most powerful mari- 
time states in Greece." 

Such were the arguments advanced by the envoys. The 
Athenians held two assemblies, the first of which was favour- 
ably disposed towards the Corinthians ; but in the second, 



336 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xvm. 



the Athenians, though they did not decree war against 
Corinth, yet concluded a defensive alliance with Corcyra for 
the mutual protection of their territories, in case either of 
them should be attacked. The enticing prospect of gaining 
a footing in distant Sicily, and of extending their maritime 
dominion, and at the same time the fear lest Corcyra should 
form alliances with other states, were the chief reasons which 
led them to take this step, which was in reality a declaration 
that they did not consider themselves bound by the treaty, 
for the appearance of neutrality was very soon gone. But, 
independently of the hopes founded upon an alliance with 
Corcyra, the war-party at Athens, whose restlessness and 
insatiable ambition had kept the state almost uninterrupt- 
edly engaged in military undertakings ever since the Persian 
wars, now was anxious to provoke a war the consequences 
of which could not be foreseen, and which the peaceable 
portion of the people dreaded as much as, after many years 
of suffering and distress, it detested it. 

In accordance with the defensive alliance thus concluded, 
the Athenians sent ten galleys to Corcyra, with orders not 
to engage in any action unless the territory of Corcyra should 
be attacked. The Corinthians, on the other hand, sailed out 
with a fleet of 150 ships, including those of their above-men- 
tioned allies, and anchored at Cheimerium, a port and pro- 
montory on the Thesprotian coast. The Corcyraean fleet of 
110 ships took its station near Sybota, a group of islands 
between the main land and the southern point of Corcyra. 
Their land army and 1000 Zacynthians were encamped on 
the promontory of Leucimne; and some barbarian forces, 
allied with the Corinthians, were stationed on the opposite 
coast of the mainland. Having completed their preparations, 
the Corinthians sailed by night from Cheimerium towards 
the north, and at daybreak perceived the Corcyraean fleet 
approaching. The ships were drawn up in battle-array, and 
a naval engagement ensued, which, in regard to the number 



CHAP, xviii. BATTLE OF SYBOTA. 



337 



of ships engaged in it, was the greatest that Greeks had ever 
fought against Greeks. The ships approached one another 
very closely, and the heavy-armed troops fought as though 
it had been a land-fight. The left wing of the Corcyraeans 
put the right wing of the Corinthians to flight, and pur- 
suing it with twenty ships as far as the coast of the mainland, 
disembarked, and plundered and burnt the enemy's tents. In 
the mean time the left wing of the Corinthians was victorious, 
and the Athenians, who had hitherto taken no part in the 
contest, were now prevailed upon by the flight of their allies 
to abandon their neutrality. The Corinthians pursued their 
enemies as far as the coast, and having secured their wrecks 
and the slain, were preparing for a fresh attack upon the 
Corcyraean ships, which had reassembled, when suddenly 
they observed twenty Athenian ships approaching. These 
the Athenians had sent as a reinforcement to join the ten 
which had been previously despatched. The Corinthians, 
suspecting that there were more ships than the twenty 
which they saw, immediately rowed back. The cause of 
this sudden retreat did not become apparent to the Cor- 
cyraeans till afterwards, and as the night was setting in they 
also withdrew to Leucimne, whither the Athenian ships 
likewise repaired. On the following morning the thirty 
Athenian galleys, united with those of the Corcyraeans, 
sailed to Sybota, to challenge the fleet stationed there to a 
fresh engagement. The Corinthians, however, felt too weak to 
accept the challenge ; so that although they were drawn up in 
battle-array, yet, after having communicated with the Atheni- 
ans through a herald and charged them with having violated 
the peace, they withdrew, and having erected a trophy on the 
coast, sailed homewards. On their way, they took Anactori- 
um, a town belonging to them in common with the Corcyraeans, 
and established Corinthian settlers in it. Eight hundred of 
the Corcyraean prisoners, who were slaves, were sold ; while 
250 of the most distinguished and wealthy were kept as cap- 

Q 



338 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xviii. 



tives and treated with great consideration, in the hope that they 
might use their influence at Corey ra to form a party favour- 
able to Corinth. Although the Corcyraeans had lost 70 ships, 
and more than 1000 men taken prisoners, yet they likewise 
erected a trophy, on the ground that they had destroyed 30 
of the enemy's ships, and had recovered their wrecks and 
slain, and that the Corinthians had retreated before the 
Athenians, and declined a battle on the following day. 

This battle, which was fought in b. c. 432, is described by 
Thucydides as the first occasion of the war between Corinth 
and Athens. Other circumstances, which gave rise to the 
general war, and were at the same time a continuation of 
the hostilities against Corinth, occurred in the peninsula 
of Chalcidice, immediately after the battle of Sybota. The 
Athenians were involved in a war with Perdiccas, king of 
Macedonia, the son of Alexander, who during the Persian wars 
had acted the part of a friend towards Greece. They were 
supported by the king's brother Philip. Perdiccas negotiated 
with the Lacedaemonians, allied himself with the Corinthians, 
and endeavoured in every possible way to induce the towns 
of Chalcidice and Thrace, which w r ere tributary to 5 and allied 
with Athens, to revolt. The Athenians, dreading the revenge 
of the Corinthians, who were now their avowed enemies, 
tried to get the start of them, and required the Potidaeans, a 
Corinthian colony in Pallene, tributary to Athens, to pull 
down their southern fortifications, to give hostages, to dismiss 
the Corinthian magistrates, and to receive no more in future. 
At the same time they instructed the fleet of thirty ships 
which was then setting out against Macedonia, under the 
command of Archestratus, to enforce the execution of these 
orders, the revocation of which the Potidaeans vainly sought 
to obtain by sending ambassadors to Athens. The Spartans, 
however, having promised that, if Potidaea should be at- 
tacked, a Peloponnesian army would march into Attica, the 
Potidaeans were emboldened openly to assert their inde- 



CHAP. XYIII. 



SIEGE OF POTIDAEA. 



339 



pendence before the arrival of the Athenian fleet, in b. c. 432, 
and their example was followed by many of the Chalcidian 
and Bottiaean towns. The Chalcidians on the coast were 
persuaded by Perdiceas to demolish their towns, to transfer 
their habitation to Olynthus, and there to concentrate their 
strength so long as the war should last. Meantime the 
Athenian fleet arrived ; but finding that the towns had already 
revolted, and seeing that its force was too small to attempt 
the reduction of the insurgents, it proceeded to the coast of 
Macedonia and there commenced hostilities against Perdiceas. 

To support Potidaea, the Corinthians sent 1000 men 
under the command of Aristeus, the son of Adeimantus ; 
and when the Athenians heard of this, they despatched 
a second fleet of 40 galleys and 2000 heavy-armed men 
under the command of Callias. They first sailed up the 
Thermaean Gulf, and found their countrymen engaged in the 
siege of Pydna; but both armies soon concluded a treaty 
with Perdiceas, in order to combine their operations against 
Aristeus, Reinforced by many allies, they now proceeded 
by land towards Potidaea. Aristeus was waiting for them 
on the isthmus near Olynthus, and Perdiceas, who had for- 
gotten his treaty with the Athenians directly they had 
turned their backs, commanded the cavalry. The plan of 
Aristeus was to place the Athenians between two fires, and 
to attack them in the rear as soon as they should have com- 
menced the engagement with him. But in order to prevent 
a sally being made from Olynthus, Callias sent a detachment 
thither, and with his remaining forces attacked Aristeus. 
The wing of the army which the latter commanded in person 
was victorious over the division opposed to it, which he pur- 
sued to a great distance; but the rest of his forces were 
completely routed by the Athenians, and the Peloponnesians 
and Potidaeans fled into the town. When Aristeus returned 
from the pursuit and found his army defeated, he thought it 
best to force his way into Potidaea, and in this he succeeded 

Q 2 



340 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XVIII. 



In this battle, fought B.C. 432, the Athenians lost 150 men 
and their general Caliias, while the enemy had about 300 
slain. 

After this victory the Athenians commenced the circum- 
vallation of Potidaea, by carrying a wall across the isthmus 
on the side of Olynthus ; on the southern side, towards 
Pallene, no similar work was undertaken, until a fresh rein- 
forcement of 1600 heavy-armed men arrived from Athens, 
under the command of Phormio, who completed the blockade 
by land and by sea. 

The Corinthians now no longer hesitated, seeing that there 
was little hope of delivering their colony and the Pelo- 
ponnesians blockaded in it. In their desire to see matters 
decided, they were supported by the Spartans, who summoned 
a meeting of the confederates to Sparta, to which all states 
which thought themselves wronged by the Athenians were 
invited to send deputies. Most of the deputies brought for- 
ward their complaints openly, but some, like the Aeginetans, 
acted in an underhand way, employing agents who made in- 
sinuations rather than straightforward charges. The speeches 
of all the deputies breathed hatred against Athens and her 
ambitious proceedings. The Megarians also bitterly com- 
plained of their powerful neighbour, saying that their com- 
merce was paralysed, and that Athens, by a formal enact- 
ment, had blocked up their ports and markets.* 

The Corinthians, being the party most grievously offended* 
spoke last, and their envoy's words were earnest and impres- 
sive. Thucydides puts into the mouth of the Corinthian a 
masterly description and comparison of the characters of the 
Spartans and Athenians. The orator strove to stir up the 
Lacedaemonians to energetic action and incessant watchful- 
ness against a people whose natural disposition was neither 
to keep peace itself, nor to allow others to enjoy it ; which 

* The law here alluded to was passed in B.C. 433, on the proposal of 
Pericles. (Thucyd. i, 67, 139. ; Plut. Pericl 30.) 



ch. xvni. DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST ATHENS. 341 

was never reduced to despair by any loss it might sustain, nor 
satisfied with what it actually possessed, but with restless 
activity kept hurrying on to its future destinies. 

It happened that Athenian envoys, who had been sent on 
other business, were at this time at Sparta. They obtained 
permission to represent the interests of Athens in the assembly, 
where the speaker set forth what Athens had done for the 
good of all Greece, developed the natural progress of the 
confederacy and supremacy of Athens, and with eloquent 
arguments urged the necessity of compelling the submission 
of the refractory subjects and allies of Athens ; in conclusion, 
he seriously cautioned Sparta against the passionate de- 
mands and instigations of her allies, as well as against any 
rash breach of the peace. 

The assembly then deliberated : most voices were for the 
instant declaration of war. But Archidamus, king of Sparta, 
an intelligent and moderate man, dissuaded his countrymen 
from immediately venturing upon war. As a genuine Spartan, 
he advised them to be slow and cautious, and to try to come 
to an understanding with Athens by means of negotiations ; 
but at the same time he declared that it was due to the 
position and honour of Sparta to prepare for the eventuality 
of a war. This moderate counsel was neutralised by the 
brief but energetic call of the ephor Sthenelaidas to take 
immediate vengeance upon Athens. At the conclusion of 
his address, he put the question to the vote* ; and war was 
decreed, B.C. 432. The resolution was at once communicated 
to the envoys of the confederates, and the assembly broke up. 

But although the war had been decreed by the Lacedaemo- 
nians, who almost against their own will were driven to take 
this step in consequence of the power of Athens becoming 
daily more threatening, yet their preparations were made in 
the usual cautious way. The Delphic oracle, when consulted, 

* The Spartans voted fiorj, not ffi<p<?. (Thucyd. i. 87.) 
Q 3 



342 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAF. XVIII, 



approved of the war, provided that it was carried on with 
vigour, and promised the aid of the god. A second congress 
of the allies was then held, and the Spartans again put the 
question of war and peace to the vote. The majority again 
declared for war. But it took a long time to complete the 
preparations both at Sparta and in the other Peloponnesian 
towns, and a whole year passed away before they were ready 
for the first invasion of Attica. 

Even then the Spartans were anxious to justify the war in 
the eyes of Athens and of Greece, and for this purpose they 
despatched envoys to Athens to make demands with which it 
was extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Athenians 
to comply. Thus they demanded atonement for the crime of 
Cylon*, ostensibly to propitiate the goddess Athena, but in 
reality to obtain the banishment of Pericles, who by his 
mother's side was connected with the accursed family of the 
Alcmaeonids. The Athenians retorted by requiring the 
Spartans to expiate the pollution with which they had pro- 
faned the sanctuary of Taenarus, by dragging from it some 
Helots who had taken refuge there, and then putting them 
to death. The Athenians further demanded that the Spartans 
should atone for the murder of Pausanias, committed in the 
temple of Athena Chalcioecos.f 

In this manner, things long past and forgotten were 
brought forward by both parties, in order that they might 
have on their side, at all events, the appearance of justice 
and necessity in breaking the thirty years' peace, and re- 
commencing hostilities. The more substantial demands of 
the Spartans, however, were these : that the Athenians should 
raise the siege of Potidaea ; declare Aegina independent ; and 
abolish the decree against Megara, a point on which they 
laid particular stress. The last embassy that came from 
Sparta finally declared, that the Spartans wished for peace ? 



* Compare above, p. 157. 



f See above, p. 293. 



chap, xviii. FAILURE OE NEGOTIATIONS. 



343 



and that it would not be broken if Athens would grant in- 
dependence to the other Greeks. The Athenians held an 
assembly for the purpose of giving a final answer. The 
orators were of different opinions, and no decision was come 
to, until at length Pericles, in a speech of great persuasive 
power, showed that the war was unavoidable, and pointed 
out the manifold advantages of the Athenian navy as con- 
trasted with the poor land forces of Sparta. He thus pre- 
vailed upon the assembly to declare to the Spartan envoys, 
that the Athenians were still willing to refer their differences 
to an impartial judgment, but would hold themselves in 
readiness to repel any attack. The envoys returned home, 
and no further negotiations were attempted. 

Many of his contemporaries, who ought to have known 
better, regarded Pericles as the sole, or at least as the main, 
cause of the war ; and the contemptible and impure motives 
attributed to him by Ephorus (in Diodorus), Plutarch, and 
others, were certainly not talked of by the idle and gossiping 
people alone, but were readily assumed by the more en- 
lightened enemies and detractors of the great statesman. 
All such scandal, however, is more than refuted by the 
silence of Thucydides, who relates the events of the period 
critically and with undoubted impartiality, nowhere sparing 
or concealing the weakness and faults of his fellow- citizens. 
In his work we find none of the fanciful stories or scandalous 
anecdotes with which the comic writers and moralising 
historians regaled their readers. 

Even before the general war commenced, and while the 
preparations for it were yet going on, the Thebans suddenly 
began hostilities by an attack upon the neighbouring town of 
Plataeae. This event occurred in the spring of B.C. 431, the 
first year of the war, the fifteenth after the peace of Pericles, 
and about six months after the battle of Potidaea.* Plataeae, 

* We may here observe, that in relating the history of the Peloponnesian 
war, so far as it is contained in Thucydides, we shall adopt his division of 

Q 4 



344 



HISTORY OF GREECE, 



CHAP. XVIII, 



which was allied with Athens, did not belong to the confe- 
deracy of the Boeotian towns, and was always at enmity with 
Thebes. The Thebans, therefore, gladly accepted the invita- 
tion of a party at Plataeae, which hoped with their assistance 
to gain the ascendency ; and, in the dead of night, Plataeae 
was surprised by a body of 300 Thebans. But instead of 
breaking into the unprotected houses of the citizens, as their 
Plataean guides advised, and of thus completing the conquest 
at once, they halted in the market-place, and endeavoured by 
negotiations to induce the townspeople to surrender. During 
the first alarm, the Plataeans, not knowing the number of the 
invaders, were prevailed upon to enter into a parley with the 
Thebans ; but as soon as they discovered the fewness of the 
enemy, they resolved to attack them. They opened pas- 
sages through the walls of their houses, and thus, unseen by 
the Thebans, assembled in considerable numbers. Having 
barricaded the streets and closed the gates, they fell upon the 
enemy a little before day-break. The darkness of the night 
was in their favour ; the Thebans at first made a vigorous 
defence, but as stones and tiles also were showered upon 
them from the roofs, they began to disperse through the 
streets, which were unknown to them, and had just been 
deluged by a heavy shower of rain. The greater part at 
length rushed through the gate of a large building, which 
they believed to be a gate of the city, and were there taken 
prisoners. When the main body of the Thebans, which was 
on its w r ay to reinforce the 300, received intelligence of their 
misfortune, it hastened its march; but the river Asopus, 
which crossed the road, having been swollen by the recent 
rain, delayed it so long, that when it arrived the struggle at 
Plataeae was over.* The Thebans now tried to seize as 

the years of the war into summer and winter. Diodorus reckons accord- 
ing to Olympiads and the years of the Athenian archons. The political 
year of the Athenians began with the change of the archons, which took 
place at the new moon after the summer solstice. (Comp. Thucyd. v. 20.) 

* The distance between Thebes and Plataeae was 70 stadia, not quite 
9 English miles. 



CHAP. XVIII. 



PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 



345 



many of the Plataeans as they could find without the walls, 
intending to keep them as hostages for their own prisoners. 
The Plataeans, however, threatened to kill the prisoners unless 
the Thebans quitted their territory. The Thebans then 
withdrew ; and the Plataeans, having first removed all their 
moveable property from the country into the town, put to 
death all the prisoners, amounting to 180, contrary to a pro- 
mise they had made to the departing Thebans. The Athe- 
nians were unable to prevent this., although they had received 
immediate intelligence of the attempt upon Plataeae ; for 
the distance between the two cities was so great, that the 
messengers arrived too late. All that they could do, there- 
fore, was to provide the allied town with a military force 
and supplies, and to transport to Athens all persons who 
were unfit for service in a siege. 

After this events the preparations for the war were carried 
on most vigorously, and the allies of both parties were called 
upon in good earnest to get their contingents ready. All 
displayed great activity, and were anxiously waiting for the 
result ; but gloomy apprehensions of an approaching period 
of misfortune were generally entertained. The sympathies 
of most of the continental Greeks were enlisted in favour of 
Sparta, for the Spartans from the beginning declared them- 
selves the champions of the independence of all the Greeks 
who thought themselves injured in any way by the Athe- 
nians. But the fear excited by the approaching contest was 
so general and so great, that all persons paid more than 
common attention to prophecies, oracles, and natural phe- 
nomena, such as earthquakes and eclipses of the sun and 
moon, and imagined that they everywhere heard the voice of 
the angry gods. 

The allies of Sparta included the whole of Peloponnesus, 
except Argos, which remained neutral ; this was the case at 
first with Achaia also, but the Achaean Pellene, at the com- 
mencement of the war, and subsequently the rest of Achaia, 

Q 5 



346 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xviii. 



sided with Sparta. Beyond the Isthmus, she was supported 
by Megara, Phocis, Locris, Boeotia, Anibracia, Leucas, and 
Anactorium. Ships were furnished by Megara, Sicyon, 
Pellene, Elis, and Leucas ; Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris 
supplied cavalry, and the rest infantry. The Spartans 
courted the friendship even of barbarian chiefs, especially of 
the king of Persia, and also called upon their Doric kins- 
men in Sicily and Italy, with whose assistance they hoped 
to increase their fleet to 500 sail. Their land force might 
be raised to the number of 60,000 men. 

The allies of the Athenians were the Chians, Lesbians, 
Plataeans, the Messenians of Naupactus, the greater part of 
Acarnania, the Zacynthians, and the Corcyraeans. The fol- 
lowing countries were tributary* to them : Caria with its 
towns on the sea coast, Doris (contiguous to Caria), Ionia, 
the Hellespont, the coast of Thrace, all the islands between 
Peloponnesus and Crete, and the Cyclades with the excep- 
tion of Melos and Thera. To the forces obtained from these 
must be added Thessalian horsemen from Larissa, Pharsalus, 
and other towns. The yearly tribute, according to the state- 
ment of Pericles, amounted to 600 talents, while the public 
treasury contained 6000, independently of the treasures of 
the temples. The fleet consisted of 300 triremes manned by 
at least 50,000 marines and rowers ; the land army amounted 
to 13,000 heavy-armed, besides 16,000 men who were em- 
ployed in the defence of the fortifications of the city and har- 
bours, exclusive of the garrisons stationed in various fortified 
places. Ships were furnished by the Chians, Lesbians, and 
Corcyraeans ; the others paid their contingents in troops and 
money. 

The army of the Peloponnesian confederates having as- 
sembled on the Isthmus of Corinth, king Archidamus put 
himself at its head; but before he began his march he sent 



* 'YTroTeAeTs, not tyfAixax 01 * 



chap, xviii. ALLIES OF BOTH PARTIES. 



347 



Melesippus to Athens to see whether the approach of the 
enemy had produced any change in the minds of the Athe- 
nians ; but they had long before determined, by the advice of 
Pericles, not to enter into any negotiations, nor to listen to 
any herald. Accordingly Melesippus was escorted back to 
the frontier without having obtained a hearing. On parting 
from his conductors he exclaimed, "This day will be the 
beginning of great evils to Greece." 



Q 6 



348 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP, XIX, 



CHAPTER XIX. 

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE PELOPONNE SI AN WAR TO THE 
END OF THE THIRD YEAR. 

After the return of Melesippus, Archidamus with the 
united army set forward on his march * ; but he advanced 
slowly, still hoping that the Athenians would avoid coming 
into conflict with him. Thus he did not proceed straight 
towards Athens, as his army would have wished, but marched 
through Megaris into the northern districts of Attica, and 
halted near Oenoe, a frontier fortress, which had been garri- 
soned. Archidamus laid siege to it, but all his efforts to 
take it were fruitless. The army began to murmur, and even 
charged him with partiality and with being bribed; but, 
in spite of this, he adhered for some time to his plan of action. 
The Athenians were thus enabled to follow the advice of 
Pericles to remove with their property from the northern 
part of Attica to the city. They did so, however, with 
reluctance ; for the people of Attica had from early times been 
fond of a country life, and it was only on the most pressing en- 
treaties of Pericles that they made up their minds to abandon 
their farms, to transport their sheep and beasts of burden 
to Euboea and the neighbouring islands, and, with their 
wives, children, and furniture, to protect themselves behind 
the walls of the city which had scarcely room to receive them 
all. With the exception of the acropolis and some temples, 
every place was occupied by the emigrants, many of whom 
erected habitations for themselves by the sides of the long 
walls. 

* Two thirds of the contingents went with him ; the whole army con- 
sisted of 60,000 men. Others calculated it at 100,000 men. (Thucyd. 
ii. 47. ; Plut. Pericl. 33. ; Schol. on Soph. Oed. Col 697.) 



chap. xix. FIRST INVASION OF ATTICA. 



349 



At length Archidamus, finding that his attempts upon 
Oenoe were useless, abandoned the undertaking in the 
middle of the summer, about eighty days after the attack 
made upon Plataeae. He turned westward, ravaged Eleusis 
and the Thriasian plain, and routed the Athenian cavalry. 
He then proceeded eastward as far as Acharnae, the largest 
demos of Attica, about seven miles north of Athens, and, 
having encamped there, made several ravaging excursions. 
His object was to draw the Athenians out to a battle in the 
open field, and for this reason he made no attack upon the 
city itself. The Athenians, who until then had remained 
quiet, seeing the Peloponnesian army so near their own city, 
impatiently demanded to be led out to battle ; the 3000 heavy- 
armed, who formed the contingent of Acharnae, especially 
burned to take revenge for the devastation of their fields. 
But Pericles remained immoveable, steadily refusing to risk 
everything upon the issue of a battle, and heeding neither 
the clamour of his opponents nor the taunts of the comic 
poets. He prevented the meeting of the assembly, that the 
Athenians might not adopt a rash and pernicious resolution, 
which might compel him against his own will to engage in 
a decisive struggle. The first object of his care was the 
safety of the city itself, and the protection of its immediate 
neighbourhood, by sending out from time to time squadrons 
of horse. On one occasion, the Thessalian cavalry had a hard 
fight with the Boeotian horse, but was obliged to retreat 
with some loss, when a detachment of heavy-armed infantry 
came to succour the Boeotians. 

Archidamus, having waited for a considerable time in the 
vain hope that the Athenian army would come forth and give 
battle, at last quitted his encampment, and marched into the 
north-eastern part of Attica, laying waste the country as he 
proceeded. He then entered the territory of Oropus, re- 
turned home by way of Boeotia, and disbanded his army. 

In the mean time an Athenian fleet of 100 galleys, with 



350 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIX. 



1000 men-at-arms and 400 bowmen on board, had set sail to 
retaliate upon Peloponnesus. They were joined by 50 Cor- 
cyraean ships, and by some others. After ravaging several 
parts of the coast, they landed at Methone, in Laconia, which 
was fortified, but had no garrison. There Brasidas achieved 
his first feat in arms. He happened to be stationed in the 
neighbourhood with a small body of troops ; with only 100 
heavy-armed, he cut his way through the besieging army 
with the loss of a few men, threw himself into the town, and 
kept possession of it. The Athenian fleet continued its 
course towards Elis, and captured Pheia ; but on the approach 
of a strong Elean army gave it up again, and after ravaging 
the country proceeded to other coasts. About the same time 
the Athenians sent another fleet of 30 galleys into the Eu- 
boean channel to protect the island; they devastated the 
coasts of Locris, took Thronion, and near Alope routed a 
body of Locrians. While these events were taking place, 
the Aeginetans with their wives and children were driven 
from their island, and Aegina was occupied by Athenian 
settlers. The exiles were kindly received by the Lacedae- 
monians ; and settlements in Thyrea, a border district be- 
tween Argolis and Laconia, were assigned to them. 

While the Athenians were thus actively engaged in several 
places, their fleet in the western seas continued its course. 
It took Sollion, a small Corinthian town on the coast of 
Acarnania, and transferred it to the dominion of its neigh- 
bour Palaerus. The Athenians then stormed Astacos, 
whence they sailed to the island of Cephallenia, which sur- 
rendered without resistance. Besides these new acquisitions, 
which were particularly valued by the Athenians on account 
of their situation, they gained at the same time the alliance 
of Sitalces, king of Thrace, a powerful and prudent prince, 
whose friendship was of great importance to the Athenians in 
the war against Chalcidice and Macedonia. The treaty was 
concluded through the mediation of Nymphodorus of Abdera, 



CHAP. XIX. 



INVASION OF MEGARA. 



351 



who also prevailed upon Perdiccas of Macedonia to espouse 
the cause of Athens, in consideration of the restoration to 
him of the town of Thermae. 

A considerable time after the departure of the Pelopon- 
nesians from Attica, late in the autumn of the same year, the 
Athenians made another expedition with all their forces, 
10,000 heavy-armed citizens, 3000 resident aliens, and a 
large number of light-armed troops, the greatest army that 
Athens had ever collected. The object of this expedition was 
to wreak the popular resentment upon Megara_, and Pericles 
himself undertook the command. But the army confined 
itself to laying waste the country, and then returned home. 
As the invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians was annually 
repeated, so the devoted land of Megara was henceforth visited 
twice every year by the unwelcome army of the Athenians, 
which never advanced farther than the western frontier of that 
country. The Athenians avoided a battle in the open field, just 
as the Peloponnesians for a long time did not venture upon a 
naval engagement ; so that during the first years the war con- 
sisted of a series of predatory expeditions only, without any 
serious intention on either side of bringing the contest to an 
issue by a decisive battle. At Athens, at least, it was gene- 
rally believed that the war would be very protracted : it was 
therefore resolved to put aside 1000 talents of the public 
treasure in the acropolis, as a fund which was not to be 
touched except in an extreme case ; and, in like manner, to 
keep always ready 100 of the best galleys for the protection 
of the city, and not to employ them for any other purpose. 
Permanent sentinels were also stationed in certain places in 
the neighbourhood, as a security for Athens on any sudden 
emergency. 

During the winter after the first year of the war, the 
Athenian s, according to the custom of their ancestors, 
honoured with a solemn burial those who had fallen. Peri- 
cles was chosen to deliver the funeral oration, the substance 



352 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xix, 



of which has been preserved by Thucydides, who was pro- 
bably one of the bystanders. This speech is full of a noble 
consciousness of the dignity and greatness of Athens, and is 
a splendid panegyric of its glories.* 

The immediately succeeding years of the war very much 
resemble the first ; the struggle is going on in several places 
at once, in the west and in the east, but nothing is decided. 
The internal strength and vigour of Athens, however, were 
remarkably displayed under the heavy visitation of the fearful 
plague, which made ravages in Attica greater than any which 
the armies of the Peloponnesians were able to inflict upon 
the country. 

Scarcely had Archidamus, early in the summer of b. c. 430, 
again entered Attica with his army and commenced his de- 
vastations, when a pestilential disease, which with few inter- 
ruptions continued to rage for two years and carried off 
numerous victims, made its appearance at Athens.f By 
the advice of Pericles, the country people had again taken 
refuge within the city, the crowded state of which in- 
creased the virulence of the malady to a most alarming 
extent. Thucydides himself was attacked by it, but was one 
of the few who escaped with their lives ; he had also many 
opportunities of observing the disease in others, and has left 
to posterity a most complete and lucid account of all the 
symptoms, so far as they could be described by one who was 
not a medical man. We shall pass over his description, 
which has ever been regarded as unsurpassed, and only 
mention the unfortunate moral consequences of the disease. 
The plague, which, in the opinion of the historian and his 

* The fact that Plato (Menex., p. 236.) ascribes this oration of Pericles 
to Aspasia, must be regarded as a piece of irony perfectly in accordance 
with the object and tenor of that dialogue. 

f Thucyd. ii. 87. ; Diod. xii. 58. This plague proved fatal to 4400 
heavy-armed, and to upwards of 10,000 slaves. To restore the reduced 
population, Pericles repealed the law which withheld the franchise from all 
whose fathers and mothers were not Athenian citizens. 



CHAP. xix. THE PLAGUE AT ATHENS. 



353 



contemporaries, originated in the most distant south, had 
spread over Egypt, Libya, the Persian empire, and the 
islands of the Aegean, and at Athens first broke out in 
Piraeus ; for some time it was commonly believed that 
the Peloponnesians had poisoned the wells.* From the 
port it spread into the over-crowded city. As men died 
in the temples in which they had taken up their abode, 
as well as elsewhere, the profanation of sacred places soon 
ceased to be regarded as a violation of religion, and the 
corpses of the dead were left unheeded even in the sanc- 
tuaries of the gods. The religious rites of burial were like- 
wise neglected amid this fearful distress ; many did not 
think of burying their dead at all, but threw them into the 
streets. The wells were crowded with the bodies of those 
who had thronged to them to quench their burning thirst ; 
in short, all that had hitherto been considered sacred and in- 
violable in the pious customs of the people was disregarded 
during the fearful pressure of that time. As the plague 
carried off indiscriminately men of all classes, rich and poor, 
high and low, the feeling of insecurity produced in many 
persons a perfect indifference to all the obligations of law 
and morality, leading them to indulge in debaucheries as long 
as they could, in order that they might enjoy to the utmost the 
probably brief remaining period of life ; no one felt inclined 
to make any sacrifice for what was good and noble ; no one 
ventured to meditate upon the consequences of his actions ; 
and no one believed in retribution for excesses and offences, 
which were committed without scruple, in the belief that death 
would snatch the offender from the hands of avenging justice. 

During this period of calamity the army of the Pelo- 
ponnesians, not deterred by the news of the frightful 

* The same belief is frequently met with in history at the outbreak of 
great epidemics. In our own times, the country people in various parts 
of Europe entertained similar opinions on the first appearance of the 
cholera. 



354 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIX, 



ravages of the plague, laid waste the northern districts of 
Attica, and then marched past the city towards the south. 
Having devastated the country about Laurion and the lands on 
the southern coast, they quitted Attica after a stay of about 
forty days. In the mean time, however, Pericles had prepared 
a fleet of 100 galleys, and embarked 4000 heavy-armed Athe- 
nians and 300 horse in transports formed out of old ships ; the 
whole force being destined for an expedition against Pelopon- 
nesus. The armament was joined by fifty ships from Chios 
and Lesbos, and having made a descent upon the coasts of 
Argos and Laconia, and ravaged the territories of Epidaurus, 
Troezen, Haliae, and Hermione, advanced as far as the small 
Laconian town of Prasiae, after the destruction of which the 
Athenians returned home : but the fleet, under the command 
of Hagnon and Cleopompus, immediately proceeded northward 
to assist in the siege of Potidaea. There, however, no im- 
portant result was gained ; for the disease, which had been 
brought from home in the fleet, spread through the rest of the 
besieging army, which had hitherto been free from it. After 
it had, in forty days, carried off 1050 men out of 4000, Hagnon, 
with the remainder, returned to Athens. The siege of Potidaea 
was continued as before, and the Potidaeans held out till 
towards the end of the second year of the war.* At length 
the want of provisions reached such a height, that the be- 
sieged -were forced to live upon human flesh ; they were thus 
compelled to enter into negotiations with the Athenian com- 
manders, Xenophon, Hestiodorus, and Phanomachus, for the 
surrender of the town. The besiegers, desirous of bringing 
their difficult operations in a cold climate to a close, and at 
the same time considering the enormous expense of the siege, 
granted to all a free departure. The Athenians were not 
satisfied with this form of the surrender, and would have 

* According to Plato (Sympos., p. 219.), Socrates and Alcibiades took 
part in the expedition against Potidaea. 



CHAP. XIX. 



NAVAL OPERATIONS. 



355 



preferred one at discretion ; yet they acquiesced, and during 
the same winter sent new settlers to Potidaea. 

The other military operations of this year were less suc- 
cessful. A naval expedition of the Lacedaemonians, the first 
they had fitted out in this war, directed against the island of 
Zaeynthus, produced little or no effect, and Zacynthus re- 
mained allied with Athens. Equally unsuccessful was an un- 
dertaking of the Ambraciots against the Amphilochian Argos, 
another ally of Athens. During this winter, the Athenians 
displayed their activity in several quarters. Phormio sailed 
with twenty galleys round Peloponnesus, established himself at 
Naupactus, and thus blockaded the Corinthian and Crissaean 
gulfs. At the same time Melesander sailed with six galleys 
to Caria and Lycia, partly to raise money, partly to pro- 
tect the Athenian merchant ships against Peloponnesian 
pirates. But on an expedition into the interior of Lycia 
with his small force and some allies, he was killed. The 
shameful manner in which the hostile parties acted towards 
each other, violating even the common laws of nations, is 
shown by the murder of some ambassadors which occurred in 
the course of this year. Aristeus of Corinth, with other 
Peloponnesian envoys, had set out for Asia to request the king 
of Persia to support the cause of the Peloponnesians, and take 
part in the war. On their way they went to the court of 
Sitalces, whom they endeavoured to draw away from the 
alliance with Athens. There they met Athenian envoys, 
who contrived to get them seized while crossing over into 
Asia, and delivered up to the Athenians : they were carried 
to Athens, and put to death without a trial ; the Athenians 
alleging that this was only an act of retaliation for the out- 
rages committed by the Lacedaemonians on Athenian and 
allied merchants, who had been captured and put to death. 
The Lacedaemonians actually killed every one, without dis- 
tinction, who did not espouse their cause. 

Before proceeding to relate the events of the following 



356 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XIX. 



year, we must mention the close of the career of the great 
statesman Pericles. Cast down and discouraged by the double 
calamity of their unfortunate country and city, the people of 
Athens had already become weary of the war ; and whatever 
might have been their hopes when, under the auspices of 
Pericles, they entered upon the contest, they were now in- 
clined for peace, and even sent envoys to Sparta. As this 
proved fruitless, all, rich as well as poor, murmured against 
Pericles as the only cause of their misfortunes ; and being 
no longer able to live in peace and luxury, they seemed in- 
clined to call to a severe account the very man by whose 
labours they had risen to their power and influence. Per- 
ceiving that the people acted, as he had anticipated, with 
reluctance, pusillanimity, ingratitude, and disregard of duty, 
Pericles convened an assembly to soothe their anger, en- 
courage their faint hearts, and lead them to form a more cor- 
rect estimate of their own position. His speech, full of the 
grandest thoughts, the truth of which must ever be recognised, 
exhibited him as the real ruler of the people, whose sove- 
reignty was virtually limited to occasional expressions of 
discontent, and whose indignation found vent in slanderous 
reports : such a master was in fact necessary for the Athe- 
nians, and they were intelligent enough to acknowledge 
his surpassing excellence. It almost sounds like irony when 
he says, " It is you that have decreed the war, not I alone ; v 
for he only had been the spiritual lever of the popular will. 
His description of the power and invincibility of Athens was 
listened to by the people with gratification ; they obeyed 
their leader ; made more energetic preparations for war than 
before, and gave up all thoughts of peace. But the grudge 
against Pericles, nevertheless, remained unabated, because 
there was none more powerful on whom the popular indigna- 
tion could vent itself ; and he was sentenced to pay a fine, 
and deprived of his office as general. Soon afterwards, 
however, he was re-elected, and all his former power was 



CHAP. XIX. 



DEATH OF PEKICLES. 



357 



restored to him ; the people having meanwhile changed 
their mind. Every thing was committed to his care and dis- 
cretion, because most other men had become indifferent to 
public affairs owing to domestic afflictions ; and because, 
after all, it was well known that there was no one more 
capable than he of conducting the business of the state. 
In this manner, he continued to exert himself for the good 
of Athens till about the middle of the third year of the war ; 
that is, till the autumn of b. c. 429. He was then seized by 
the plague, which had previously bereft him of his children, 
his relations, and friends. Plutarch relates that at the death- 
bed of his last son, Paralus, he burst into tears ; and that 
this w T as the only time in his life that he was overwhelmed 
by grief, and lost his self-possession. When he himself lay 
at the point of death, and his friends around him were speak- 
ing to one another of his power and of his many victories, 
Pericles, who was believed to be insensible, interrupted them 
by saying, "I wish you would rather remember the fact, 
that no Athenian has ever through me put on mourning." 
The Athenians soon found out what they had lost in him ; 
how moderate and how zealous for the greatness of Athens 
he had been in times of peace ; and how cautious and cal- 
culating in war. The preservation and careful increase of 
their navy, and unremitting vigilance for the safety of Athens, 
on the one hand ; and, on the other, abstinence from attempt- 
ing distant conquests, and moderation in the management 
of the war; — these were the conditions on which alone they 
could look forward to a certain victory. But the successors 
of Pericles were under the influence of ambition, avarice, and 
envy; and the star of Athens soon began to sink. His 
authority was unquestioned ; the people confided in his wis- 
dom, and allowed itself to be guided and restrained by him, 
for the power of his eloquence was irresistible. Thus the 
government, while nominally a democracy, was in reality 
in the hands of the first man in the state. How different 



358 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



CHAP. XIX. 



were his successors ! Jealous of one another, they courted 
popular favour, and the people was at times more arbitrary 
and fickle than ever. Hence the unfortunate occurrences 
during the latter half of the war, in contemplating which we 
can only wonder how the state could for so many years with 
such indomitable perseverance and energy sustain the greatest 
exertions and reverses. 

The year b. c. 429, the third of the war, is remarkable 
for the heroic and almost miraculous defence of Plataeae 
against the united power of the Peloponnesians. In the 
beginning of the summer, king Archidamus with his Pe- 
loponnesian army again passed the Isthmus. But instead 
of marching to Athens, he directed his course against Pla- 
taeae, whose fidelity to the Athenians made her as odious to 
the Boeotians as to the Peloponnesians. On his arrival in 
the territory of Plataeae, and when he was on the point of 
beginning his usual ravages, the Plataeans sent envoys to 
remonstrate with him, and appealed to their acknowledged 
bravery and self-sacrifice in the Persian war for the good of 
all Greece. They reminded him that, after the glorious battle 
of Plataeae, Pausanias had guaranteed to their state its inde- 
pendence as a reward for its services. But Archidamus 
announcing himself as the deliverer of Greece from the 
tyranny of the Athenians, proposed that they should remain 
neutral during the war, and admit both parties alike to 
amicable intercourse without aiding either. The Plataeans 
could not act independently, for their wives and children, to- 
gether with all those who were unfit for service, were at 
Athens. They accordingly sent envoys to consult the 
Athenians, who advised them to persevere and rely upon the 
assistance of Athens; the ambassadors therefore returned, 
and the negotiations with Archidamus were broken off. The 
wonderful fact is, that 400 Plataeans, 80 Athenians, and 110 
women who had remained behind to prepare the food of the 
besieged, were able to resist the united efforts of a large 



CHAP, xix. SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF PLATAEAE. 359 



army. Archidamus was engaged for seventy days and nights 
in raising a strong mound in front of the city. In order to 
prevent this mound from rising above the level of the wall, 
the besieged, with incredible exertions and rapidity, sur- 
mounted the latter with a superstructure of brick ; and to 
render the conquest of their town as difficult as possible, 
they built a second wall within the old one. By undermining 
the ground they caused the fortifications of the enemy to 
break down, and by various contrivances rendered the mi- 
litary engines of the besiegers useless. In short, they de- 
fended themselves so energetically, that Archidamus was 
obliged to complete his fortifications all around the town, and 
to leave them in the custody of the Boeotians and their 
allies. He himself returned home with the rest of his army 
about the middle of September. 

The heroism of the besieged deserved a better fate than 
that which befell them ; but Plataeae, in general, performs a 
tragic part in Greek history. Its faithful attachment to 
Athens drew upon it the hatred of its parent city, Thebes ; 
which, during the flourishing period of Greece, always acted 
equivocally, and, being unable to check the growing power 
of Athens, tried to injure it by a mean and jealous policy, 
which even sacrificed or risked the independence of all 
Greece. The siege of Plataeae continued two years longer, 
and it was not till the summer of the year b. c. 427 that 
the besieged, who had been reduced by one half, surren- 
dered to the Lacedaemonians. In the winter of the fourth 
year of the war, b. c. 428, they were hard pressed by want of 
provisions, and determined to make a sally ; but half their 
number, fearing failure, did not join in the enterprise. The 
others chose a dark and rainy night for their bold adventure ; 
the roaring wind was a protection to them, and while those 
who remained behind contrived to engage the attention of 
the enemy, the daring Plataeans, with incredible difficulty, 
succeeded in reaching their goal. Only one was taken 



360 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xix. 



prisoner, but several had remained behind, so that only 
212 reached Athens by roundabout ways. Those who had 
been left in Plataeae continued to defend themselves for a 
considerable time, until the Lacedaemonian commander him- 
self saw that they were reduced to the last extremity, and 
were no longer able to defend or even to man their walls. 
He therefore proposed to them that they should surrender 
themselves and their town, and leave their fate to the judicial 
decision of Sparta. The Plataeans submitted, and soon 
afterwards five judges appointed by Sparta arrived. They 
asked the Plataeans this question only ; whether, during this 
war, they had done any service to the Lacedaemonians or 
their allies? The question at once revealed to the unfor- 
tunate men the fate in store for them. Their spokesman 
tried by the most moving words to excite the compassion of the 
Spartans ; he eloquently described the claims of his country- 
men to the gratitude of all Greece, and especially of Sparta, 
on account of their prompt assistance in the war with the 
Helots *, and ended with an urgent entreaty that they might 
not be handed over to the Thebans, their most inveterate 
enemies, but be allowed to return to their own town, 
and left to their fate; for, he added, they would rather 
die the most fearful of all deaths, the death of hunger, than 
fall into the hands of the Thebans. But the Thebans, 
who were present during this address, endeavoured to 
efface the impression which it had produced. They ex- 
culpated themselves, as well as they could, from the charge 
of having supported the Persians, and accused the Plataeans 
of partiality for Athens, w T hich was more dangerous to the 
independence of Greece than hosts of barbarians. They 
bitterly reproached the Plataeans with having been guilty of 
a breach of promise a few years before, when, after the noc^ 
turnal surprise of their town, they had faithlessly murdered 

* This refers to the third Messenian war, from B.C. 464 to 455. See 
above, p. 301. 



chap. xix. DESTRUCTION OF PLATA E A E. 



361 



the most distinguished Thebans ; and for this offence they 
now demanded that instant and bloody vengeance should be 
taken. "What they wished was done. The prisoners were 
brought forward one by one ; the above question was put to 
each, and as soon as he answered in the negative, he was led 
to death : not one was spared. Thus died 200 Plataeans and 
29 Athenians ; the women were all made slaves. The town 
of Plataeae was given up for one year to Megarian exiles, 
and to such Plataeans as were favourably disposed towards 
Thebes ; afterwards it was razed to the ground. This was 
the end of a town which had for 93 years been a faithful 
ally of Athens. As Thucydides does not mention the sending 
of any succour from Athens during the long period of the 
siege, we must suppose that the Athenians, distracted by 
other military undertakings, and perhaps also by the plague, 
forgot to relieve their allies. We are not informed what 
became of the Plataean women and children who had taken 
refuge at Athens, or of those who made their escape before 
the final catastrophe. The want of active sympathy dis- 
played by the Athenians on that occasion enables us to form 
some idea of the distracted state of affairs, and of the light 
in which connections between states were viewed. It is 
not impossible, however, that irresolution, or the maxim 
laid down by Pericles not to venture upon a decisive 
battle by land, may have influenced the conduct of the 
Athenians. 

Let us now return to the military enterprises of the third 
year of the war. The Athenians continued the struggle in two 
places, Chalcidice and the Gulf of Corinth. The expedition 
sent against Chalcidice advanced to lay siege to the Bottiaean 
town of Spartolos ; but a sally of the inhabitants, and re- 
peated attacks, compelled the Athenians to throw themselves 
into Potidaea, whence they soon afterwards returned to 
Athens. 

They were more successful, however, at sea. The Am- 

R 



362 



HISTORY OF GREECE* 



CHAP. XIX. 



bracians, in conjunction with the barbarous tribe of the 
Chaonians, formed the design of conquering Acarnania. 
They secured the aid of the Lacedaemonians by entreaties, 
and by holding out to them the prospect of becoming masters 
of Zaeynthos, Leucas, Cephallenia, and Acarnania : some 
ships, with 1000 heavy-armed soldiers, were accordingly sent 
under the command of Cnemus ; and these, being joined by 
a numerous army concentrated in those parts, marched against 
Stratos, the principal city of Acarnania. The Stratians 
were prepared to receive their enemies ; they rushed from 
an ambuscade upon the Chaonians, who were advancing 
most impetuously, and put them to flight. This deterred 
Cnemus from venturing upon another engagement ; he with- 
drew with his army to Oeniadae, which had sent some troops 
to join him, and there disbanded it. It had been arranged 
that the fleet of Corinthians and Sicyonians should set out 
from the Crissaean gulf to join the army of Cnemus ; but 
Phormio, with his twenty galleys, was still maintaining his 
post at Naupactus, and when the Peloponnesian fleet, 
amounting to forty-seven sail, was on the point of crossing 
over from Patrae to the coast of Acarnania, he compelled 
them to fight a battle in the open sea. His skill and naval 
experience were of great advantage, and he cunningly availed 
himself of the moment when a fresh morning-breeze was 
forcing the enemy's ships against one another. In the battle 
which ensued he gained a complete victory, and having cap- 
tured twelve ships, he sailed into the harbour of Molycrion, on 
the coast of Aetolia. Having raised a trophy on Ehion, at 
the entrance of the Corinthian gulf, he dedicated one of the 
captured vessels to Poseidon, and returned to his station at 
Naupactus. The Peloponnesians hastened towards the 
southern coast, and on their arrival at Cyllene met Cnemus 
returning from the Acarnanian expedition. In order to re- 
trieve their double defeat, the Spartans sent three of their 
citizens, and among them Brasidas, to act as counsellors or 



XJHAP. xix. PHOBMIO AND HIS FLEET. 



363 



colleagues of Cnemus. In a short time they had collected a 
fleet of seventy-seven galleys. Phormio also had asked for 
reinforcements, but they came too late. He was stationed 
with his twenty ships outside the gulf in the open sea, deter- 
mined to accept battle there only. The Lacedaemonians, on 
the other hand, wished to fight in the straits. Thus the 
fleets faced each other for several days, until the Lacedae- 
monians by a stratagem compelled Phormio to abandon his 
position, and then attacked him in the straits. He lost nine 
of his ships, but the remaining eleven, which escaped to 
Naupaetus, there threw themselves upon their pursuers with 
such spirit, that they captured six ships and recovered their 
own. The Messenian army of Naupactus, which followed 
the movements of the fleet along the coast, did good service 
by recovering some of the captured ships from the Pelopon- 
nesians. Both parties claimed the victory, and the Pelo- 
ponnesians also set up on the Achaean Ehion a ship which 
they had taken, as a trophy. In the following night, how- 
ever, they retreated to Corinth, from fear of the reinforce- 
ments expected by Phormio. The twenty ships which 
had been engaged about Crete soon arrived and joined 
those of Phormio at Naupactus. During the winter of the 
same year, this fleet undertook an expedition to the coast of 
Astacos in Acarnania, in order to strengthen the authority 
and dominion of Athens. Against the hostile Oeniadae, 
however, no attempt was made, because it was protected all 
round by marshes. At the beginning of spring the fleet 
returned from Naupactus to Athens laden with booty and 
prisoners, who, according to an established custom, were ex- 
changed if they were freemen. 

But before the dispersion of the Peloponnesian fleet for the 
winter, the Megarians suggested to the Spartan commanders 
that a sudden attack should be made upon Piraeus. Accord- 
ingly, providing themselves with all necessaries, they went 
across the Isthmus, and embarked at Nisaea in forty ships ; 

b 2 



364 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XTX. 



but instead of at once proceeding to Piraeus, they first bent 
their course to Salamis, where they took three ships, and 
overran the island, laying waste the country wherever they 
w^ent. No sooner were the Athenians informed by signals of 
what was going on in the island, than they hastened down to 
Piraeus and sailed across. But they came too late, for the 
Peloponnesians, laden with booty, had already departed, and 
were on their way to Corinth. In consequence of this alarm, 
the Athenians were afterwards more careful in guarding their 
harbours. 

At the beginning of the winter a new champion, who, 
according to the custom of barbarians, announced himself in 
a most pompous manner, appeared to support the cause of the 
Athenians, but after all did nothing. This was Sitalces, who 
promised to conquer Chalcidice for the Athenians with an 
army of 150,000 men, to drive king Perdiccas from his 
kingdom, and place his brother Philip on the throne. The 
Athenians were to assist in the conquest of Chalcidice with 
their fleet and army, but they sent only envoys and money. 
The winter also was very severe, so that the expedition 
of the Thracian prince ended in his merely laying waste 
Chalcidice and a large portion of Macedonia, after which 
he returned into his kingdom, having been absent only thirty 
days. 

Thus terminated the third year of the war, during which 
the efforts of the Athenians appear insignificant, especially 
In comparison with what they did in the following years. 
We may suppose the cause of this to have been the melan- 
choly condition of the city, and especially the loss of Pericles, 
which may have prevented their sending to Sitalces the aid 
they had promised. Afterwards they displayed greater 
vigour, but also greater passion, in the management of the 
war. 



CHAP. XX. 



REVOLT OF LESBOS. 



365 



CHAPTER XX. 

FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN "WAR. 

The fourth year began with the usual invasion of Attica by 
the Spartan king Archidamus. The Athenians also followed 
their former tactics, and employed their cavalry only to pre- 
vent the enemy from approaching too near the city. At 
the same time, the island of Lesbos, distinguished for its 
wealth and its navy, renounced the alliance with Athens. 
Even before the outbreak of the war, the Lesbians had en- 
tertained thoughts of joining the Lacedaemonians, but had 
been rejected by them. They had. however, made all pos- 
sible preparations, having fortified their capital of Mytilene, 
and increased their army and navy ; yet the revolt broke out 
sooner than they themselves wished, in consequence of the 
inhabitants of Methymna, some of the neighbouring islanders, 
and even Mytilenaeans, who wished to keep up the con- 
nection with Athens, having informed the Athenians of the 
design. The Athenians, still suffering from the epidemic, 
and pressed by the invasion of the Peloponnesians, at first 
endeavoured, by envoys, to induce the Mytilenaeans to re- 
main faithful to their ancient treaty, and to prevent theh 
continuing their military preparations. But as they failed 
in this, they despatched a fleet of forty galleys, which had 
been originally destined to operate against Peloponnesus, 
under the command of Cleippides, with orders to make a 
sudden attack upon the Mytilenaeans at a festival of Apollo, 
which was approaching, and at which the people used to 
assemble at some distance from the city. He was also to 
compel them to pull down their fortifications and to sur- 
render their ships. The ten galleys which formed the Les- 

r 3 



366 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XX. 



bian contingent in the Athenian fleet were seized, and their 
crews imprisoned. The Lesbians, however, were informed 
of the approach of the Athenian fleet, and, postponing the 
festival, protected themselves behind their fortifications. 
The Mytilenaeans having rejected the proposals of the Athe- 
nians, the latter commenced hostilities ; but the Mytilenaeans 
feeling themselves too weak to make a successful resistance 
without the aid of allies, and also with a view to gain time, 
concluded a truce with the admirals, and sent envoys to 
Athens to negotiate for peace and the withdrawal of the 
fleet. But at the same time they secretly despatched am- 
bassadors to Sparta to solicit the support of the Lacedae- 
monians. The envoys sent to Athens returned without 
having effected anything, and hostilities were recommenced. 
After a sally and an indecisive engagement, the Mytilenaeans 
remained quiet within their fortifications, and the Athenians 
blockaded the city on the sea side, while the Mytilenaeans, 
supported by the other Lesbians, except Methymna, con- 
tinued masters of the island. Meantime, the ambassadors, 
who had gone to Sparta, had proceeded, by the advice of the 
Spartans, to Olympia, where the great games happened to 
be then going on, and where they might explain their case 
to the assembled allies. There they brought forward the 
oft-repeated complaints about the domineering spirit of the 
Athenians, who had deprived their allies, with the exception 
of Lesbos and Chios, of their independence, and reduced them 
to the condition of subjects. The same fate, they said, was 
now preparing for them ; the original understanding of the 
alliance, that Athens should deliver the Greeks from the 
barbarians, had been forgotten, and for a long time Athens 
had been, not the liberator of the Greeks, but the destroyer 
of their freedom. Their proposals were readily listened to, 
and they were admitted into the Peloponnesian league. But 
both parties were mistaken in believing that the Athenians 
were now too weak to offer a vigorous resistance, and in 



CHAP. XX. 



REVOLT OF LESBOS. 



367 



imagining that the time had come when they might be com- 
pletely annihilated. For in the face of the growing danger, 
the Athenians during this year displayed a military force 
such as they had never done before, and as they rarely did 
afterwards ; the cause of this was, either that they had re- 
covered from the calamities of the preceding years, or, as is 
more probable, that they now wisely made the greatest 
efforts, so that they might not appear to be really weakened 
or to have lost any part of their power. Attica, Salamis, 
and Euboea, were guarded by 100 ships ; 100 others were 
cruising about Peloponnesus ; many also were engaged at 
Potidaea and in other quarters ; so that during this summer 
not fewer than 250 excellently equipped galleys were in 
active service. The rapidity with which they were got 
ready furnished evidence of the unimpaired resources of 
Athens. 

When the Peloponnesians had concluded their treaty with 
Lesbos, they immediately summoned two thirds of the con- 
tingents of their allies to assemble on the Isthmus, and 
caused engines to be constructed for the purpose of trans- 
porting their fleet across into the Saronic gulf, in order to 
attack Athens at once by land and by sea. But the Athe- 
nians quickly and unexpectedly appeared with a fleet of 100 
galleys on the coasts of Peloponnesus, and even advanced to 
the neighbourhood of Sparta. Thus the Peloponnesians, 
who on account of the harvest had assembled but slowly, 
found themselves compelled to give up their expedition. 
The Lacedaemonians, however, sent a fleet of forty sail, 
under the command of Alcidas, to assist the Lesbians. Mean- 
while the Mytilenaeans had made an unsuccessful attack 
upon Methymna, which remained faithful to Athens; and 
an attempt of the Antissaeans upon the same town was like- 
wise repulsed. But the Mytilenaeans still remained in pos- 
session of the rest of the island, until in the autumn the 
Athenians sent an army of 1000 heavy-armed, under the 

R 4 



368 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XX, 



command of Paches, who carried a single wall round the 
land side of the city, which was thus in a short time com- 
pletely invested both by land and by sea. The expense of 
the warlike operations, which had suddenly been conducted 
on so large a scale, had completely drained the public trea- 
sury of Athens, on which heavy demands had previously 
been made, especially on account of the siege of Potidaea ; 
and the Athenians now, for the first time, imposed upon them- 
selves a property-tax, which produced 200 talents. They 
also sent out Lysicles with twelve galleys to levy contribu- 
tions from friends and foes. On his arrival in Caria, he 
proceeded inland as far as the vale of the Maeander, where 
he perished in a battle with the Carians and Anaeans. 

The fleet of the Lacedaemonians did not make its ap- 
pearance at Lesbos in the course of this year ; but towards 
the end of the winter they despatched Salaethus, who 
actually made his way through the blockading fleet into 
the city, to inform the Mytilenaeans that the fleet would 
soon follow, and that they would at the same time invade 
Attica : thus the besieged were encouraged to continue their 
resistance. In accordance with this promise the Pelopon- 
nesians, in the summer of b. c. 427, the fifth year of the war, 
invaded Attica,, under the command of Cleomenes,, the Mncle 
and guardian of the young king Pausanias. They ravaged 
not only the districts which had been cultivated again, but 
those also which had been spared in former invasions ; so 
that the Athenians w r ere now more severely pressed than 
ever. As in B.C. 430, the Peloponnesians, expecting to re- 
ceive news from Lesbos, made a long stay, and left the 
country only when they began to suffer from want of pro- 
visions. Their fleet had been detained on its course towards 
Lesbos, and the Mytilenaeans had surrendered to the Athe- 
nians before its arrival. Salaethus, despairing of any succour 
from Sparta, had entrusted the commonalty with the arms of 
the regular infantry, which had hitherto been reserved for 



chap. XX. SURRENDER OF MYTILENE. 



369 



the privileged class ; but the people, instead of sallying out 
against the enemy, became clamorous for bread, and declared 
that unless the wealthy citizens would distribute their hidden 
stores of corn among the famishing people, they would make 
their own terms with the Athenians. The ruling body, 
dreading a capitulation from which they would be excluded, 
thus found themselves compelled to surrender the city to 
Paches, stipulating only for their personal liberty, until the 
return of the envoys who were to be sent to Athens for 
further orders. Although Paches accepted the proposal, the 
Mytilenaeans crowded as suppliants round the altars. Paches 
allayed their fears, and for the present sent them to Tenedos. 
He then subdued Antissa, and thus became master of all 
the island. 

At length the Lacedaemonian fleet, under the command of 
Alcidas, approached ; but on receiving intelligence of the 
fall of Mytilene, it made for the south, landed at Embaton, 
in the territory of Erythreae, and there tried to obtain ac- 
curate information about the state of affairs. Alcidas then 
held a council of war, in which Teutiaplus, a brave Elean, 
suggested an immediate attack upon the Athenians, who 
were probably intoxicated with their victory. Others w T ere 
of opinion that they should take possession of the Ionian and 
Aeolian cities, and enter into negotiations with Pissuthnes, 
the satrap at Sardis. But Alcidas thought it most advisable 
to return to Peloponnesus as soon as possible. He accord- 
ingly sailed southward along the coast, and landed at Myon- 
nesus, where he ordered most of his prisoners to be put to 
death, and thereby offended the Ionians. Thence he pro- 
ceeded to Ephesus, where, at the request of the Samians, he 
set free some Chian prisoners. He then hastily directed his 
course homewards, perceiving that the Athenians in Lesbos 
had been informed of his presence, and that Paches, in order 
to protect the defenceless Ionian towns, had set out in pur- 
suit of him. His fleet was overtaken by a storm, and dis- 

r 5 



370 



HISTORY OF GKEECE. 



CHAP. XX. 



persed before it reached the coast of Peloponnesus* This 
was the first Lacedaemonian fleet which had ventured as far 
as the coasts of Asia Minor ; it was, in fact, such an unex- 
pected phenomenon, that the inhabitants of the coast-towns 
believed it to be an Athenian fleet, and came out peaceably 
to meet it. Thus they fell into the hands of Alcidas, who 
afterwards cruelly put them to death as above mentioned. 

Before Paches returned from the pursuit, he conquered 
Notion the port-town of Colophon ; and restored the do- 
minion over it to the Colophonians ; but subsequently an 
Athenian colony was established there. After his return to 
Lesbos, Salaethus was taken and sent to Athens along with 
the Mytilenaeans kept in Tenedos, and many others who 
were believed to be guilty of the revolt. At the same time 
he sent back the greater part of his army, while he himself 
remained for the purpose of settling the affairs of the island. 

The Athenians ordered Salaethus to be put to death as 
soon as he arrived. The fate of the Mytilenaeans was dis- 
cussed, and in the first heat of their exasperation it was 
resolved that all the men should be put to death, and the 
women and children sold as slaves. With these bloody 
orders a ship was sent to Paches. But on the following day, 
the Athenians repented of their hasty anger : another assembly 
was immediately convened for the purpose of reconsidering 
their resolution. Among the orators who spoke on that oc- 
casion was Cleon, the son of Cleaenetus, who on the previous 
day had supported the cruel decree ; he was generally known 
among his fellow-citizens as a person fond of violent mea- 
sures,, and enjoyed the greatest popularity with the mul- 
titude. This popular leader is known to us less from 
Thucydides, who gives a brief but pregnant description of 
him, than from the comedies of Aristophanes, his bitterest 
and most implacable enemy. There is no one else among his 
contemporaries against whom that great poet displays such 
profound hatred and deep moral indignation as against 



CHAP. XX. 



CLEON. 



371 



Cleon ; and no other public man had so incessantly to ex- 
perience the fearful earnestness of his comic muse. Cleon 
is treated by him as the very essence of all human vulgarity 
and brutality ; as characterised by an insolence and vanity 
bordering upon madness, by a supernatural and inhuman 
thirst of blood, and, lastly, by a degree of cowardice such as 
is found only in the most cruel natures. 

Allowing for the poetical exaggerations of Aristophanes, 
who blames or brands with honest truth and undisguised 
anger that which the delicate-minded historian only alludes 
to, the two descriptions completely supplement each other ; 
and Thucydides, well understood, judges of Cleon as se- 
verely and with the same indignation as Aristophanes. The 
people of Athens had become very unlike what they were 
during the great period of the Persian wars ; the last years 
of f* the Olympian," as the Athenians called Pericles in 
their admiration of his power and wisdom, were troubled 
and embittered by the obstinacy, fickleness, and pusilla- 
nimity of the people, whose bad qualities were praised and 
fostered by their leaders, among whom Cleon had been 
busy in undermining the authority of Pericles, and in ex- 
citing the people against him and his measures. It was 
Cleon who stirred the popular passion at the time when 
Pericles restrained it, and would not allow the people to 
engage in an open contest with Archidamus ; he is also 
mentioned as the person who proposed the fine which Pe- 
ricles was sentenced to pay. In the accusations of Anaxa- 
goras, Phidias, and Aspasia, Cleon is said to have acted the 
part of an informer. Yet Cleon did not at once, after the death 
of Pericles, obtain his influential position. Aristophanes 
mentions as his immediate successor Eucrates, a dealer in 
flour, who may have been animated by the moderation of 
Pericles. His influence was only of short duration, and he 
must have been thrown into the shade by Cleon. Eucrates 
was succeeded by Lysicles, a cattle dealer, who married 

r 6 



372 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XX. 



Aspasia, and perhaps intended to act in the spirit of Pericles; 
but we have already seen that he perished in Caria. After 
him Cleon, the leather merchant, was decidedly the most 
influential demagogue. In such hands was the fate of Athens, 
and such were the men who flattered and guided the sove- 
reign people. They strove to outdo one another, and under- 
took to manage the affairs of a state, which they were utterly 
incapable of conducting, not to say governing. They all 
stood on the same level, and lacked the qualities which 
Pericles was conscious of possessing, and which are indis- 
pensable to form a perfect statesman, — a correct judgment 
of the wants of the state, ability to give a sound exposition 
of them, patriotism, and disinterestedness ; the combination 
and harmonious working of all which are necessary to enable 
any one to promote the public good. Cleon had no qualifi- 
cation but the second*, — some oratorical power. Nicias, who 
stood infinitely higher in all other respects, did not possess 
this talent, and was therefore unable to acquire a lasting in- 
fluence with the people. Alcibiades, lastly, was intelligent 
and eloquent in the highest degree, but neither disinterested 
nor truly patriotic, and hence his brilliant natural talents 
brought the greatest misery upon Athens. Under such guides, 
who were too powerless, selfish, or dishonest to guard the 
people against mistakes, who even hoped to establish their 
personal power upon the ruins of the state, the Pelopon- 
nesian war could not but become an abyss into which the 
victorious party itself must sooner or later sink. 

But of all the men who prepared the downfall of Athens, 
none was, in the opinion of Aristophanes, more impure and 
brutal than Cleon ; and Thucydides, in the speech on the 
fate of the Mytilenaeans put into his mouth, places him in 
a no less unfavourable light. His energy there appears as 
thoughtless rashness, and his courage as a mixture of narrow- 



* 'EpjJLTjvcvaai. 



CHAP. XX. 



FALL OF MYTILENE. 



373 



raindedness and brutality ; in it he shows himself calumni- 
ating, insolent, jealous of the merits and talents of others, 
fond of scandal, crouching before the people, corruptible, and 
boastful. But Thucydides in the same speech describes a 
people which was worthy of such a guide : credulous, vain, 
fond of innovation, cruel, and unjust. 

Cleon, however, did not carry his bloody proposals : the 
moderate speech of Diodotus, who wished only the most 
conspicuous among the rebels to be put to death, was sup- 
ported by a small majority ; and this fact characterises the 
altered disposition of the people. In consequence of this 
defeat, Cleon's influence with the people must for a time 
have been weakened, and during some years men of mode- 
rate principles were at the head of affairs. The arguments 
of Diodotus having prevailed upon the assembly to reverse 
their previous decision, a second galley was quickly despatched 
with orders to spare the city. By the great exertions of the 
rowers, supported by a favourable wind, it arrived in time. 
Paches having just read the decree of the people, and being 
engaged in making preparations to carry it into effect. Thus 
the city was saved by a mere chance, but the ringleaders 
who had been sent to Athens, 1000 in number, were put to 
death. Mytilene lost its ships and walls. The remainder of 
the island was divided into 3000 lots, 300 of which were 
consecrated to the gods, the rest were assigned to Attic colo- 
nists, to whom the Lesbians, who were allowed to cultivate 
the land, paid a fixed rent of two minae for' each lot. The 
possessions of Mytilene on the continent likewise fell into the 
hands of the Athenians. Thus Lesbos lost its independence. 

We may observe in general that this year is particularly 
remarkable for cruel and bloody occurrences. We have 
already related the fearful fate of the Plataeans ; but the 
civil war which broke out in Corcyra was characterised by 
an exasperation and cruelty which surpassed everything pre- 
viously known. Corinth had sent back the Corcyraean 



374 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XX. 



prisoners for the purpose of gaining over the island through 
their influence, and of withdrawing it from the alliance with 
Athens. The returned prisoners, joined by the wealthy and 
aristocratic citizens, succeeded in overpowering the demo- 
cratic party, But in a few days the latter, supported by 
the majority of liberated slaves, and even by women, gained 
the upper hand, and the defeated party in self-defence set 
Are to the houses round the market-place, and did incal- 
culable damage. On the following day, Nicostratus arrived 
from Naupactus with twelve ships and 500 heavy-armed 
Messenians. As an Athenian general he supported the 
popular side, and endeavoured to put an end to the civil 
contest by a fair and moderate arrangement ; but party 
animosity burst forth again when the Peloponnesian fleet, 
amounting to fifty-three galleys, under Alcidas and Brasidas, 
arrived. The Corcyraean ships, which were got ready in 
great haste, were unable to withstand those of the Pelo- 
ponnesians ; and the Athenian squadron, though it fought 
bravely and skilfully, was too weak for a serious contest. 
Thus the Peloponnesians gained the day, and captured thirteen 
Corcyraean galleys. But Alcidas, notwithstanding the pru- 
dent advice of Brasidas, made little use of his victory ; and 
when, in the second night after the battle, fire-signals con- 
veyed intelligence of the approach of an Athenian armament, 
the Peloponnesian fleet hastily retreated under cover of the 
night. On the arrival of the Athenian fleet of sixty galleys, 
under the command of Eurymedon, and the withdrawal of the 
hostile armament, the Corcyraeans proceeded to take revenge, 
with unprecedented cruelty, upon the vanquished party ; and, 
as is commonly the case in civil wars, personal enmity, 
jealousy, avarice, and all other evil passions, suggested means 
for denouncing and murdering .private foes on the ground of 
their being enemies to the popular cause. No sanctuary 
afforded protection, no ties of blood or kindred were regarded. 
Eurymedon departed without having done anything towards 



chap. xx. PREVALENCE OF PARTY-SPIRIT. 



375 



the pacification of the town. The exiled nobles, however, 
fortified themselves on the hill Istone, and made themselves 
masters of the open country, harassing their adversaries by 
interrupting their commerce, and even cutting off their 
necessary supplies. 

To the description of these scenes of horror Thucydides 
subjoins a reflection on the subsequent history of the war, in 
which such fearful occurrences were no longer unusual ; " for 
afterwards," says he, " all Greece was in commotion, there 
being everywhere two parties, and the leaders of the popular 
party calling in the aid of the Athenians, while the minority 
of nobles invited the Lacedaemonians." Every one was 
obliged to side with one of the two parties ; those who 
wished to remain neutral were persecuted by both ; and 
party spirit destroyed even the most sacred family ties. The 
honest simplicity of the good old times was gone for ever : 
what had formerly been regarded as a human weakness, now 
became a virtue ; what used to be censured, now became the 
object of praise and imitation. The prudent were outwitted, 
and the uneducated, who rushed into action without reflect- 
ing, were generally victorious. 

Besides Lesbos, the Athenians made in this year another 
conquest which was important in a different way. In order 
to protect Salamis and Attica against such attacks as that 
which had nearly proved successful in the third year of the 
war, and to render the coast of Attica still more secure, 
Nicias having taken possession of the small island of Minoa, 
on the coast of Megaris, south of the port of Nisaea, fortified 
it by a wall facing the mainland, and made use of it as a 
permanent outpost. 

It was in this year also that the Athenians began to inter- 
fere in the affairs of Sicily. There, too, the Dorians were 
hostile to the lonians, and Syracuse was at war with Leontini. 
All the Doric cities, except Camarina, sided with Syracuse, 
and had joined the Peloponnesian confederacy ; the Locrians 



376 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XX. 



of Italy took the same side. The Chaleidian towns, Cama- 
rina and Rhegium in Italy, supported the Leontines. They 
sent envoys to Athens, and Gorgias the Leontine, by his 
brilliant and persuasive eloquence, induced the thoughtless 
Athenians to promise succours. Twenty ships, under the 
command of Laches and Charoeades, were sent out, partly to 
prevent provisions being carried from Sicily to Peloponnesus, 
partly to see whether it might not be possible to reduce 
Sicily to a condition of dependence upon Athens. The forces 
conveyed by the squadron landed at Rhegium, and, conjointly 
with the Athenian allies, made preparations for war. In the 
same winter they made an expedition with the Rhegines 
against the Aeolian islands, to the north of Sicily, which 
were allied with Syracuse, and having ravaged them, they 
returned to Rhegium. 

Meantime the plague, after a short cessation, had broken 
out at Athens a second time, and continued for one year 
longer the most formidable enemy that the Athenians had to 
dread ; for hitherto they had generally defeated the Pelo- 
ponnesians, and in the following years their military success 
was still greater. 



CHAP. XXI. UNDERTAKINGS BY LAND. 



377 



CHAPTER XXL 

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTH YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN 
WAR TO THE GENERAL PACIFICATION OF SICILY. 

For some years the Athenians obtained decided advantages 
over their opponents, and, elated by the tide of momentary 
good fortune, they became more haughty and domineering 
than ever. Believing that their arms were invincible, they 
several times rejected proposals of peace, and punished the 
generals who had needlessly, in their opinion, entered into 
negotiations, or had, as it was said, accepted bribes from the 
enemy. 

But the war assumed a different character, chiefly because 
the Athenians began to venture more and more upon carry- 
ing on their operations by land. At the commencement of the 
sixth year, when the Lacedaemonians, under Agis, the son of 
Archidamus, were preparing again to invade Attica, and had 
already advanced as far as the Isthmus, earthquakes occurred 
in various parts of Greece, which filled the minds of the 
Greeks with terror, and prevented the Spartan army from 
entering Attica; while the Athenians, thus left at liberty for 
other enterprises, were successful in Boeotia, Locris, and 
Aetolia. Sixty galleys, with 2000 heavy- armed on board, 
under the command of Nicias, sailed against the island of 
Melos, with the view of compelling it to join the confederacy 
of Athens. Although they laid waste the island, they could 
not accomplish their principal object, and Nicias, quitting 
Melos, sailed to Oropus, where he disembarked his troops and 
immediately marched against Tanagra, in Boeotia. At the 
same time, the whole force of Athens, under Hipponicus and 
Eurymedon, arrived, and on the following day the Tana- 
graeans with their Theban auxiliaries were defeated. The 



378 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxi. 



two Athenian armies then separated, and after Nicias had 
ravaged the coasts of Locris he returned to Athens. 

Meanwhile Demosthenes had sailed round Peloponnesus 
with thirty galleys, and being joined by all the Acarnanians, 
by forces from Zacynthus and Cephallenia, and by fifteen 
Corcyraean ships, he proceeded to attack Leucas. The 
Acarnanians wished him to lay siege to the town, but Demos- 
thenes yielded to the prayer of the Messenians of Naupactus 
to make war upon the Aetolians ; an additional induce- 
ment to do this was the prospect of opening a road through 
Aetolia, the country of the Ozolian Locrians, and Phocis, 
into Boeotia. The Acarnanians, vexed at the siege of Leucas 
being given up, did not accompany him on this expedition, 
and the fifteen Corcyraean galleys likewise sailed home. 
From Oeneon, on the Locrian coast, Demosthenes advanced 
into the interior of the country, and made himself master of 
several towns. But the Aetolians had in the mean time col- 
lected their forces ; and when the Athenian general had taken 
the town of Aegition, situated about ten miles from the coast 
among the hills, the Aetolians, guided by the fugitive inha- 
bitantSj descended upon the invaders from the heights. The 
latter held out for a long time, but at length, when the com- 
mander of the bowmen had been slain, when their arrows 
w r ere spent, and when they were completely exhausted, 
they sought safety in flight, and the greater part perished 
in the unknown country, their Locrian guide also having 
fallen. A few only escaped to Oeneon. The majority of the 
slain were allies ; but the Athenians lost 120 of their best 
warriors, and Procles, the colleague of Demosthenes. The 
latter himself returned to Naupactus, and remained there 
from fear of his fellow-citizens. The Aetolians, on the other 
hand, immediately solicited the aid of the Lacedaemonians 
against Naupactus, and towards autumn the desired succour, 
consisting of 3000 heavy-armed, arrived, under the command 
of Eurylochus. He marched from Delphi through the 



chap. xxi. DEFEAT OF THE AMBEACIANS. 



379 



country of the Ozolian Locrians, who, though allied with 
Athens, consented to give hostages to him ; thence he pro- 
ceeded towards Naupactus, where he made himself master of 
an unfortified suburb. By many entreaties, Demosthenes 
had at length prevailed upon the Acarnanians to send him a 
force of 1000 heavy-armed. With these and his own troops 
he now defended Naupactus, which, under these circum- 
stances, Eurylochus thought it impossible to take. He ac- 
cordingly proceeded westward, and, at the request of the 
Ambracians, directed his course against the Amphilochian 
Argos, after having waited in the neighbourhood of Calydon 
and Pleuron until the Ambracians had commenced hostilities. 
He succeeded in joining them, while Demosthenes and the 
Acarnanians hastened to the assistance of the Argives. By 
a skilfully laid ambuscade, Demosthenes forced the far more 
numerous army of the Peloponnesians to retreat, and the rest 
of the allied forces were also put to flight, although the 
Ambracians, who were stationed on the right wing, had at 
first been victorious. The loss of the enemy was great. The 
Peloponnesians now entered into negotiations with Demos- 
thenes, and were allowed to retreat under the command of 
Menedaeus, for Eurylochus and Macarius had both fallen in 
the battle. Soon afterwards the Ambracians suffered a still 
greater defeat. In entire ignorance of what had taken place, 
they hastened to the scene of action and encamped on an emi- 
nence, where they were attacked by Demosthenes at daybreak. 
The carnage which ensued is almost incredible, considering 
the extent and power of their state. " This calamity," says 
Thucydides, " was the greatest that befel a Hellenic city in 
this war within so short a space of time." The Acarnanians 
and Amphilochians, however, fearing the growing power of 
Athens, prevented the destruction of Ambracia, with which, 
after Demosthenes' return to Athens, they concluded a treaty 
of alliance for the period of 100 years, the principal terms 
of which were neutrality and mutual protection. 



380 



HISTORY OF GREECE, chap. xxi. 



In Sicily, too, the Athenians made some progress in the 
course of this year. Laches, who, after the death of Charoe- 
ades, was the sole commander of the fleet, proceeded with 
his allies to besiege the Messenian town of Mylae, the in- 
habitants of which he compelled to surrender and to accom- 
pany him in his expedition against Messene. This town, 
likewise, soon afterwards surrendered on certain conditions, 
and gave h stages. The Athenians also made a successful 
naval attack upon the Epizephyrian Locrians in southern 
Italy, and gained possession of a fortified place on the river 
Halex. During the winter, they and their allies undertook 
an expedition against Inessa, the citadel of which was in the 
hands of the Syracusans. This enterprise failed ; and as 
the invaders were retreating, the Syracusans attacked their 
rear, and slew many. Laches, however, made some success- 
ful descents on the coast of Locri, in Himeraea, and on 
the Aeolian islands. He was then superseded in the com- 
mand by Pythodorus, who had arrived with a few ships, 
forming part of the reinforcements which the Athenians, 
at the instance of their Sicilian allies, who wished to see the 
war brought to a speedy termination, had resolved to send : 
the main body of the auxiliary squadron followed under the 
command of Sophocles and Eurymedon. Pythodorus, in 
the mean time, made an expedition against the Locrians, 
which, however, proved a failure. 

This was the last event of the sixth year of the war.* In the 
following year the contest between the Syracusans and the 
allies of the Athenians was continued, without the Athenians 
themselves taking any active part in it ; for they were en- 
gaged nearer home with more important affairs in Greece 
itself, and in Peloponnesus. At the beginning of the sum- 
mer B.C. 42o, the Syracusans, in conjunction with the 

* To this year also belongs the purification of Delos, and an eruption 
of Mount Aetna, which occurred in the spring of B.C. 425, and was the 
third within the recollection of the Greeks in Sicily. (Thucyd. hi. 115.) 



CHAP. XXI. 



WAR IN SICILY. 



381 



Locrians, took Messene, whose inhabitants themselves, weary 
of the alliance with. Athens, had in fact invited them. At 
the same time Rhegium, which was distracted and weakened 
by party feuds, was hard pressed by the Locrians. Messene 
was made the centre of all future undertakings. After some 
insignificant skirmishes on the coast of Messene between the 
Syracusans and Athenians, in which the latter lost a few 
ships, the Messenians advanced against the Chalcidian town 
of Naxos, but were repulsed with the loss of 1000 men. 
Immediately after this, the Leontines and Athenians again 
attacked Messene ; but the land army of the Leontines was 
defeated by a sally of the Messenians and Locrians ; the naval 
force of the Athenians, however, immediately effected a 
landing, and drove the Messenians back into their tow r n. 
But the Athenians now withdrew to Ehegium, and took no 
further part in the struggles of the islanders, which in the 
course of the following year were terminated throughout 
Sicily by a general peace. But, before we give an account 
of this, we must cast a glance at the affairs of Greece itself. 

The Lacedaemonians commenced the hostilities of the 
seventh year with an invasion of Attica under Agis. They 
arrived earlier than usual, and did not find such ample supplies 
of provisions as on former occasions ; and as bad tidings also 
were brought from Peloponnesus, the army, after a stay of 
only fifteen days, broke up again. This invasion, the fifth, 
was the last. The subsequent w T ar in Attica, commonly 
called the Decelean, was of a different nature. 

The unfavourable tidings from Peloponnesus were that 
the Athenians had gained a firm footing in the peninsula. 
Demosthenes, the conqueror of Ambracia, though not invested 
with any command, had sailed in the fleet commanded by 
Sophocles and Eurymedon, with permission to land on the 
coast of Peloponnesus and to make conquests. The com- 
mander of the fleet, indeed, wished to sail at once against 
Corcyra, whither 60 Peloponnesian galleys had proceeded to 



382 



HISTOEY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXI. 



support the aristocrats who had fortified themselves on 
Mount Istone ; but Demosthenes advised them to land at 
Pylos on the coast of Messenia; and they were forced to com- 
ply by a storm which rendered it necessary for the fleet to 
put into that very harbour. His plan was to fortify the town, 
which appeared to him to be a position of great importance 
for the future operations of the war. The continuance of the 
storm was favourable to his scheme, which the generals So- 
phocles and Eurymedon thought fanciful and of small ad- 
vantage. The soldiers, finding the time heavy on their hands, 
set about the work proposed by Demosthenes, and displayed 
such ardour, that within six days Pylos was provided with 
fortifications on those sides where it had been weak and 
vulnerable. As soon as the work was completed, the fleet 
under Eurymedon and Sophocles sailed away, but Demos- 
thenes remained behind with five ships and a small force. At 
first the Spartans were not much concerned about this new 
fortress, which in fact they believed to be too weak to offer any 
resistance. Yet as soon as the news of it reached Attica, the 
Peloponnesian army hastily withdrew from that country, and 
the Spartans themselves marched against Pylos. The fleet 
stationed at Corcyra was likewise called back, and, in order 
to avoid the Athenians, was transported across the Leu- 
cadian isthmus. Not long afterwards the land army also ar- 
rived from Attica. Demosthenes, on the other hand, quickly 
despatched two galleys to Zacynthus to inform Eurymedon of 
his danger, and to request him to return with the fleet. The 
Lacedaemonians designed to block up the harbour, and to 
render it impossible for the Athenians to effect an entrance 
into it. The island of Sphacteria, situated in front of the 
harbour of Pylos, which was fifteen stadia in length, unin- 
habited, and covered with wood, was occupied with a body 
of heavy-armed troops, who at first relieved one another, but 
those ultimately left on the island were 420 Spartans with 
their retinue of Helots, commanded by Epitades. Demos- 



CHAP. XXI. 



SIEGE OF PYLOS. 



383 



thenes made a very prudent use of the small force under his 
command. The greater part of it he posted in the best forti- 
fied places on the land side, while he himself with sixty heavy- 
armed men and a few bowmen marched down to the water's 
edge to prevent the Lacedaemonians from disembarking. 
He found it scarcely necessary to encourage his men, whose 
spirits were raised by the very boldness and danger of the 
enterprise. The Lacedaemonians commenced a simulta- 
neous attack by land and by sea. Forty-three ships had run 
into the harbour, under the command of Thrasymelides. 
They advanced in small squadrons, relieving one another, and 
displaying the utmost ardour. Brasidas, the greatest Spartan 
hero during this period of the war, was most conspicuous in 
urging on the commanders of the galleys not to spare the 
ships, if with their loss they could but effect a landing ; in 
his eagerness to accomplish this object, he drove his own 
ships ashore and was on the point of landing, when the Athe- 
nians fell upon him, so that he was covered with wounds and 
at length sank backwards into his ship, while his shield fell 
into the sea. All similar attempts were repelled with un- 
daunted courage and perseverance. The most skilful sailors 
of Greece were here fighting on land against the ships of the 
Lacedaemonians, the most renowned warriors in land battles ! 
The Athenians, on Lacedaemonian ground, withstood the 
Spartans on the sea, the real element of the Athenians ! 
After a struggle which lasted for nearly two days, the con- 
test was discontinued, while the Spartans sent to procure 
timber from Asina for constructing engines. But in the 
meanwhile the Athenian fleet arrived from Zacynthus, aug- 
mented to the number of 50. They awaited the attack of 
the Spartan fleet in the open sea, but the latter remained in 
the harbour, which, however, was not closed as had been 
intended. The Athenians accordingly entered it, to attack 
their foes. In the battle which ensued, the Lacedaemonians 
fought with desperation. From the shore they defended 



384 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



chap. xxr. 



their ships with the greatest obstinacy ; but the Athenians 
ultimately prevailed, and the result of the victory was, that 
Sphacteria with its garrison was closely blockaded. The 
Peloponnesians maintained only their position on the main 
land. The consequences of this battle were as unexpected 
as they were overwhelming ; the most illustrious Spartans 
were shut up in Sphacteria, and there was little probability 
of rescuing them by a fresh contest. The Spartans were all 
at once seized by a desire for a truce and peace. An armis- 
tice was immediately concluded with the Athenians, on con- 
dition that tne Spartan fleet should remain in the hands of 
the Athenians until the return of the envoys who were to be 
sent to Athens, and that the captives in Sphacteria should be 
supplied with a certain quantity of provisions under the 
superintendence of the Athenians. Hostilities of course 
ceased, and everything remained unchanged until the return 
of the envoys. An Athenian ship conveyed the Spartan 
envoys to Athens. They offered peace and alliance, on the 
one condition that their fellow-citizens in Sphacteria should 
be set free, as the Athenians had sued for peace a few years 
before. The Spartans imagined that it would now be accepted 
as an equivalent for the object of their own desires. But the 
Athenians, that is, those who had the popular ear, aimed at 
more than this. By th^ advice of Cleon^ they made quite 
different proposals, claiming the restitution of possessions 
which had been lost in former wars, such as Nisaea and 
Pegae in Megaris, Troezen, and Achaia. The envoys pro- 
posed to discuss these claims with a few chosen individuals, 
but this was successfully opposed by Cleon, who asserted that 
the question was one to be decided by the whole people. 
Hereupon the envoys thought it necessary, for the honour of 
Sparta, to break off the negotiations and return. After an 
absence of twenty days they again arrived at Pylos, and 
the truce was forthwith put an end to. But the Athenians, 
alleging that the truce had been infringed, refused to restore 



chap. xxi. PROCEEDINGS AT ATHENS. 



385 



the sixty ships, and the struggle was recommenced with un- 
exampled efforts on both sides. The island was watched in 
the daytime by two Athenian galleys, which were continually 
cruising round in opposite directions, and at night the whole 
fleet, now increased to seventy sail, was moored round the 
coast. The Peloponnesians, on the other hand, made repeated 
attacks upon the fortress. 

The siege was protracted in both places. The Athenians 
began to suffer from want of provisions, and especially of 
water; the prisoners in the island received their regular 
supplies, chiefly from the sea and by means of Helots, 
who were rewarded with money and liberty. All devices 
and artifices were resorted to ; even divers approached the 
island and carried provisions into it. The Athenians were 
growing weary of the siege, which they were apprehensive it 
might be necessary to continue even during the winter ; in 
which case matters might, after all, take an unfavourable 
turn. They almost regretted not having accepted the pro- 
posals of peace. As usual, their dissatisfaction now vented 
itself upon those who had been opposed to the peace, and es- 
pecially upon Cleon. At first the people wished to send him 
to Pylos, in order to ascertain the situation of the Athenians, 
and to convince himself of the truth of the alarming reports 
which he had denied. Such a mission was not to Cleon's 
mind ; he advised the people to despatch reinforcements, 
and thus to bring the matter to a speedy and glorious ter- 
mination ; at the same time he pointed out Nicias, his per- 
sonal enemy, as the man best qualified to undertake the 
task, which, he added, was in his opinion by no means diffi- 
cult. Nicias eagerly caught at this, and declared himself 
ready to resign his office of general to Cleon for this under- 
taking. Cleon, believing the proposal to be only a joke, ac- 
cepted it with equal readiness. But finding that Nicias was 
in earnest, and called the people to witness that he laid down 
his office, Cleon endeavoured to evade the dangerous honour 

s 



386 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxi. 



by various excuses. The more lie drew back, however, the 
greater was the amusement of the multitude, who would not 
let him escape, but formally appointed him general, and 
laughingly called upon him to embark at once. Seeing that 
there was no alternative, he at length consented to accept the 
post, and again assumed his vaunting tone, boastfully de- 
claring that with the small additional force which he was to 
take along with him, and the soldiers already at Pylos, he 
would within twenty days either bring the Spartans alive to 
Athens, or cut them to pieces on the spot. The people 
laughed, while the more rational among them entertained a 
hope either that they would now get rid of Cleon for ever, 
or else that he would really succeed in the important object 
entrusted to him. 

What Cleon had rashly asserted, accident verified. He 
artfully caused the cautious Demosthenes to be appointed his 
second in command*, because he knew that he had already 
formed the plan of putting an end to the siege by an attack 
upon the island. Demosthenes had deferred this step chiefly 
because the thick wood covering the island rendered a regular 
attack impossible. But now, just at the right time, a great 
part of the wood was accidentally destroyed by fire, and De- 
mosthenes discovered that the enemy were far more numerous 
than he had until then believed. When Cleon arrived, the 
armies united, and at the dawn of day landed on the island. 
Demosthenes had made his dispositions in such a manner, 
that the whole island was attacked at once. Epitadas and 
his men made a long and valiant resistance. At first the 
Athenian soldiers ventured to attack their enemies only from 
a distance, so firmly rooted was their respect for Spartan 
warriors; but they soon became accustomed to face them, 
and poured down upon them with a simultaneous charge and 
a deafening shout. The Lacedaemonians were almost blinded 

* The more intelligent of the Athenians, and among them Aristophanes 
{Equit. 55.), considered Demosthenes as the real conqueror. 



chap. xxi. SURRENDER OF THE SPARTANS. 



387 



and choked by clouds of dust which rose from the ashes of 
the burnt trees; all orders were drowned by the enemy's 
clamour ; and at length, yielding to the superior numbers of 
their assailants, they retreated to a fort at the north end of 
the island. There they held out for a long time, and the 
struggle remained undecided, until the commander of the 
Messenians, unobserved, ascended the heights in the rear of 
the Lacedaemonians, who were thus hemmed in on every 
side, That they might not be all cut to pieces, Cleon and 
Demosthenes stopped the fight, and sent a herald to ask 
whether they would surrender to the Athenians at discretion. 
The Spartans, of whom 290 were left alive, seeing that 
further resistance was hopeless, submitted, and were carried 
prisoners by Cleon to Athens. The siege had lasted for 
seVenty-two days, but Cleon had made good his promise. 

The Athenians and Messenians of Naupactus garrisoned 
Pylos, and many Helots deserted to them. The fields of the 
Lacedaemonians were laid waste, and the presence of the 
enemy in their immediate neighbourhood became so trouble- 
some and harassing, that the Lacedaemonians repeatedly en- 
deavoured by negotiations to recover Pylos and their captive 
countrymen. But in vain ; the haughty demands of the 
Athenians being always such as they were compelled to 
reject. The prisoners remained in the hands of the Athenians, 
who declared that, if the Peloponnesians should again invade 
Attica, they would put their prisoners to death. 

In their other undertakings also during this year, the 
Athenians were generally successful. Nicias was sent against 
Corinth with a fleet of eighty galleys, 2000 heavy-armed Athe- 
nians, and horse-transports with 200 cavalry. He landed at 
Solygeia, about sixty stadia south-east of Corinth^ and fought 
a successful battle against the Corinthians, who had hastily 
assembled to meet him, and lost 200 men, while only fifty of 
the Athenians were slain. He then sailed towards Crom- 
myon, which he plundered, and thence proceeded to the 

s 2 



388 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxi. 



coast of Argolis, where he took possession of Methone, and 
ravaged the territories of Troezen, Haliae, and Epidaurus ; 
after which he returned to Athens, 

After the victory of Pylos, Eurymedon and Sophocles, on 
their way to Sicily, arrived at Corcyra, and supported the 
Corcyraeans against those who had fortified themselves on 
Mount Istone. The latter were obliged to come to terms, 
and submit to the arbitration of Athens. But by a stratagem 
the people of Corcyra inveigled the prisoners into an in- 
fraction of the agreement, and then acted with unparalleled 
and most atrocious cruelty towards the unfortunate men. 
They were led out of the temple in which they were shut up, 
in troops of twenty, between two rows of armed men, who 
aimed their blows each at the object of his personal hatred 
as he passed. When sixty had been executed in this manner, 
the others, seeing their fearful fate, refused to leave the 
building. The murderers then ascended the roof, and 
through an opening attacked their victims with arrows ; but 
most of them made away with themselves. The party of the 
nobles was thus completely annihilated; the popular party 
became the unopposed masters of the city, and the bloody, 
civil war which had raged so long was now terminated. 

Towards the end of the year the Chians were ordered by 
the Athenians to break down their fortifications, but with a 
promise that they should retain their constitution ; for the 
example of Lesbos had taught the Athenians to distrust 
those islanders. 

In the following year, b, c. 424, the eighth of the war, the 
Athenians still continued victorious, and made new con- 
quests. They now reached the highest point of their good 
fortune ; but the continuance of the war, which they might 
have terminated on the most favourable terms, soon restored 
the equilibrium of power between the two contending parties. 
For the Athenians left nothing untried ; no success satisfied 
them, or prevented them from immediately aiming at a still 



CHAP. XXI. 



CAPTURE OF CYTHERA. 



389 



greater one. They were so enterprising and ambitious, that 
they regarded every thing which they had not attempted as 
a real loss. 

They now established themselves on the eastern coast of 
Peloponnesus, as they had done before on the western. 
Under the command of Nicias, with two colleagues, a fleet 
of sixty galleys, with 2000 heavy-armed, some cavalry, and 
many Milesian and other allied troops, sailed against the 
island of Cythera, which, being of great importance to the 
Lacedaemonians as a station for the transports from Egypt 
and Libya, and as a bulwark against any attacks from the 
sea, had always been strongly garrisoned by them. The 
Athenians landed on two points, and with their main force 
advanced against the town of the Cytheraeans, who at 
first offered some resistance, but afterwards surrendered to 
the aggressors, on condition that they should not be put to 
death ; with this one exception, the Athenians were to dis- 
pose of them according to their pleasure. Nicias left them 
in possession of their island, and only garrisoned the towns 
of Cythera and Scandeia. The fleet then proceeded to Laconia, 
the Athenians everywhere ravaging the towns and fields on 
the coast, and meeting with no resistance ; for the Lacedae- 
monians, after so many disasters, and especially after the loss 
of Pylos and Cythera, had scarcely courage to continue the 
war with any vigour. They had, from the beginning, em- 
barked in maritime warfare with reluctance, and the Athe- 
nians had now decided advantages even on land. In this 
desponding disposition, the Spartans confined themselves to 
defending the most important points, and allowed the the- 
nians to continue their landings and ravagings. The latter, 
after having visited Epidaurus and Limera, took Thyrea, 
which was occupied by Aeginetans, and having plundered 
and burned every thing, they carried the surviving Aegi- 
netans with them as prisoners to Attica. The people of 
Athens resolved to transport the Cytheraean prisoners to 

s 3 



390 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXI. 



other islands, but to leave the rest of the inhabitants to cul- 
tivate their ancient possessions, subject to the payment of 
a tribute of four talents. The Aeginetans were sentenced 
to death ; and the Lacedaemonian governor of Thyrea was 
added to those who had been taken prisoners in Sphacteria. 

While the Athenians were thus intoxicated with their good 
fortune and their victories, they were extremely annoyed at 
the intelligence that the commanders of their fleet in Sicily, 
without having gained a victory or effected a conquest, had 
concluded a peace with the Sicilians. Weary of their long- 
protracted quarrels, and justly arguing that their internal 
wars would render them defenceless against foreign enemies, 
the Sicilian towns began, at first one by one 9 to make peace 
with each other ; they then all met in a peace congress at 
Gela, where, by the urgent advice of the Syracusan Hermo- 
crates, who cautioned them against the powerful Athenians, 
as aiming at nothing less than the possession of their fair 
and wealthy island, they concluded a general peace. The 
allies of Athens gave notice of this peace to the Athenians, 
intimating that they no longer required their assistance. 
The commanders of the fleet, Pythodorus, Eurymedon, and 
Sophocles, forthwith returned to Athens; but the people 
received them with murmurs, because they came without 
having gained any victories, and without booty: two of 
them were sent into exile, and Eurymedon was sentenced to 
pay a fine, on the alleged ground that they had been induced 
by bribes to quit Sicily. The people was so elated with its 
recent good fortune, that as no enterprise was too great for 
its ambition, so it neglected all proportion between its means 
and its ends, and would not hear of any obstacles which 
nature or man could oppose to its success. 



chap. xxn. 



BRASIDAS. 



391 



CHAPTER XXII. 

FROM THE GENERAL PACIFICATION OF SICILY TO THE PEACE OF NICIAS. 

During the latter years of the first half of the Peloponnesian 
war, there appeared among the Spartans a hero such as 
Sparta never again produced in the course of the war. Ly- 
sander, the conqueror of Aegospotami, was brave and suc- 
cessful, indeed, but his character *is much censured by the 
ancients ; whereas Brasidas, with whom we have already 
become acquainted, is praised by Thucydides unconditionally, 
though that author is generally sparing and scrupulous in his 
commendations. Independently of his undoubted bravery, 
Thucydides praises especially his kindness and affability, 
which gained for him more hearts and towns, and did more 
injury to the Athenians, than his courage and success in 
arms. He restored the confidence of his countrymen, and 
by his bold but cautious undertakings rendered it possible to 
conclude a peace on equal terms. Nicias and Cleon, on the 
side of the Athenians, could not stand a comparison with 
him ; for the former had none of his quickness and boldness 2 
while the latter possessed neither his valour, his caution, nor 
his humanity. 

Brasidas first checked the undertakings of the Athenians 
against Megara. The Athenians, as we have already noticed, 
had made themselves masters of the small island of Minoa. 
In the present year they led a great force against Nisaea, 
and being supported and guided by treachery among the 
Megarians themselves, they obtained possession of the port 
town and the long walls connecting it with Megara; the 
capital itself was in imminent danger, for there, too, traitors 
were ready to open the gates to the Athenians. At this 
time Brasidas was in the territory of Corinth, collecting an 

s 4 



392 



HISTORY OF GREECE, chap. xxii. 



army against Thrace. On being informed of the peril of 
Megara, he hastened thither with a considerable force, while 
Boeotians came to its assistance from the other side. The 
armies for a long time faced each other without engaging : 
the Athenians, knowing the advantage of the enemy in point 
of numbers, and carefully weighing the circumstances of the 
case, were unwilling to stake their military glory on the issue 
of a battle ; they contented themselves, therefore, with occu- 
pying Nisaea, and returned to Attica. The Megarians then 
selected 100 of the most guilty among the popular party, and 
compelled the commonalty itself to condemn them to death. 
After this an extremely narrow oligarchic form of govern- 
ment was instituted at Megara, and remained in power for a 
long time. 

This undertaking, which was far from answering the ex- 
pectations which the Athenians had founded on it, was fol- 
lowed by a serious calamity, — the first after a long series of 
victories. A vast scheme devised against Boeotia, and es- 
pecially against Thebes, failed. A number of men, exiles, 
emigrants, and others, dissatisfied with the political condition 
of the Boeotian towns, were negotiating with the Athenian 
general, Hippocrates, and with Demosthenes, the commander 
of the fleet at Naupactus, with a view to overturn the exist- 
ing oligarchical constitutions of the towns, and to establish a 
popular government on the model of that existing at Athens* 
Some of them intended to betray the port of Siphae, on the 
Corinthian gulf, into the hands of Athens ; while others were 
to deliver up to her Chaeronea, on the borders of Phoeis, 
which was tributary to Orchomenos. In the east, the Athe- 
nians were to take possession of Delium, a place sacred to 
Apollo. All this was to be done in one day, and it was 
arranged that Hippocrates should at the same time invade 
Boeotia from the south. It was intended by this plan to 
separate the military forces of the Boeotians, and thus the 
more easily to compel the towns to change their constitutions* 



chap. xxn. 



BATTLE OF DELIUM. 



393 



Besides his forty galleys, Demosthenes was accompanied on 
this expedition by all his Acarnanian allies. But, neglecting 
the appointed time at the beginning of winter, he arrived too 
early at Siphae ; and his design had also been betrayed. 
Accordingly, he found Siphae and Chaeronea guarded by all 
the forces of the Boeotians, Hippocrates arrived afterwards, 
but the men who had carried on the negotiations did not 
now venture to cause the towns to rise. He did not take 
possession of Delium until the Boeotians had already with- 
drawn from Siphae. In less than three days he surrounded 
the sacred place with a wall and ditch, and, after leaving a 
garrison in it, he began to retreat with the rest of the army. 
The heavy-armed forming the rear had already reached the 
territory of Oropus, in Attica, when the whole of the Boeotian 
army came in sight. Ten out of the eleven Boeotarchs 
were against giving battle, but Pagondas, the eleventh, who 
was at the same time their military commander, prevailed 
upon them to adopt his advice, by reminding them that the 
Athenians, without provocation, had crossed the frontier, and 
that it was the duty of the Boeotians to put an end for ever to 
such encroachments by boldly repelling and chastising the ag- 
gressors. Pagondas then drew up the army for battle ; and the 
Athenians, joined by the division of Hippocrates from Delium, 
did the same. The extreme wings of the two armies were not 
engaged, being separated by two rapid brooks. On their left 
wing the Thebans were defeated, although the Thespians, 
at all times renowned for their valour, distinguished them- 
selves particularly against the Athenians, and most of them 
were cut to pieces. On their right wing the Boeotians were 
victorious, and, by surrounding their opponents with brigades 
of cavalry, completed the confusion and defeat of the Athe- 
nians, who dispersed in all directions towards the coast and 
frontier. The pursuit and massacre lasted till the darkness - 
of the night put an end to them. The garrison of Delium 
alone remained, in Boeotia ; the rest of the army fled by 

s 5 



394 



HISTORY OF GKEECE. 



CHAP. XXII. 



land to Attica, or took refuge in the ships on the coast of 
Oropus. On the following day, the Boeotians made pre- 
parations to take Delium by storm. They refused to give 
up the dead unless that place was surrendered, because the 
sanctuary of the god had been profaned and polluted by the 
Athenians.* After a siege of seventeen days Delium was 
taken ; a part of its garrison was put to the sword, 200 were 
taken prisoners, and the rest escaped. The loss of the Athe- 
nians in this war was very considerable ; 1000 heavy-armed 
Athenians, with their commander Hippocrates, had fallen, 
besides a large number of light troops and others.f The 
Boeotians lost about 500. 

This defeat was the most important and bloody during the 
first half of the Peloponnesian war, but it was only the 
beginning of still greater disasters, which destroyed the proud 
confidence of the Athenians in their good fortune, and soon 
inclined them to accept the peace for which Greece was 
longing. The unsuccessful landing of Demosthenes with his 
allies on the coast of Sicyon, which took place soon after 
the battle of Delium, was of less importance. Nor had the 
loss, in the winter of the same year (b. c. 423), of the long 
walls of Megara, which the Megarians afterwards entirely 
destroyed, much influence upon the events of the war. 
The undertakings of the bold Brasidas against the Athenian 
possessions in Chalcidice and Thrace were of far greater con- 
sequence. As in former years the Athenians had made their 
ravaging expeditions against the coasts of Peloponnesus, in 
order to force the Lacedaemonian armies to quit Attica, so 

* It was not customary for the victors to make any stipulations or con- 
ditions on delivering up the dead to the vanquished party for burial ; but 
in this case the Boeotians probably considered that the seizure by the 
Athenians of a sacred place had deprived them of any claim to the ordi- 
nary courtesies, 

f According to Plato (Sympos. p. 221.), Socrates and Alcibiades were 
together during the battle and in the flight. Xenophon is mentioned by 
Strabo (ix. 2. 7.). Laches, too, served on that occasion in the infantry. 



chap. xxii. BRASIDAS IN MACEDONIA. 



395 



now the Lacedaemonians commenced a war against the trans- 
marine possessions of the Athenians, hoping that thus they 
might be enabled to recover Pylos and Cythera. 

The Lacedaemonians were called upon to support and en- 
courage the revolt of the Chalcidian towns, not only by their 
inhabitants, who wished to have Brasidas for their deliverer 
and protector, but also by Perdiccas of Macedonia, who had 
secretly become untrue to his treaty with Athens. The Lace- 
daemonians accordingly sent Brasidas from Peloponnesus with 
1700 heavy- armed and a number of mercenaries. He went 
by land, and, without encountering any great resistance on 
the part of the towns allied with Athens, reached Thessaly, 
whence with an escort of Thessalians he entered Macedonia. 
Perdiccas immediately joined him, in consequence of which 
the Athenians thenceforth regarded the king as their enemy. 
Brasidas, thus reinforced, proceeded first against Arrhibaeus, 
king of the Lyncestian Macedonians, whom it was intended 
to subdue. But Brasidas, before having recourse to arms, 
wished to try negotiations, and to propose an amicable 
arrangement, especially as Arrhibaeus himself had appealed 
to his decision. Although Perdiccas was opposed to this, yet 
Brasidas had an interview with Arrhibaeus, and was pre- 
vailed upon to withdraw his forces from Lyncestis. The 
immediate consequence of this was, that Perdiccas, to show 
his displeasure, reduced the amount of pay and supplies 
which he furnished to the Lacedaemonians from one-half to 
a third. 

But Brasidas had not gone to the north, to waste his time 
in interfering in quarrels with which he had no concern ; 
the Athenian possessions in Chalcidice and on the coast of 
Thrace were the chief objects of his enterprise ; he pro- 
claimed himself the deliverer of the Greek towns from the 
dominion of Athens. In this mission he showed himself so 
brave, prudent, and kind, that for many years afterwards his 
name was honoured throughout those regions ; the name of 

s 6 



396 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXII. 



the Lacedaemonians through him became popular among the 
Athenian allies, and many began to wish to unite themselves 
with Sparta.* 

Brasidas first advanced against Acanthos, a colony of 
Andros, on the eastern coast of Chalcidice ; he made his ap- 
pearance about the time of the vintage, and by the promise 
that he would maintain their independence, — fear for their 
fields may likewise have had some influence on their deter- 
mination, — he induced the Acanthians to revolt from Athens, 
and to admit the Lacedaemonians within their walls. Soon 
afterwards Stagiros also, another colony of the Andrians, 
embraced the cause of the Lacedaemonians. 

During this winter Brasidas proceeded northwards against 
Amphipolis, an important colony of Athens, on the Strymon, 
in the territory of the Edonians. Eion was situated farther 
south, near the mouth of the river, and likewise belonged 
to the Athenians. Quick marches, the severity of the 
season, and the ready assistance of those who sided with 
Sparta, enabled Brasidas unexpectedly to appear before the 
walls of Amphipolis. He immediately took possession of 
the country round the city ; but as he delayed attacking the 
town itself, the party at Amphipolis which was in favour of 
Athens, and for the moment was still the more powerful, 
looked round for assistance, and sent for Thucydides f , the 
celebrated historian of the Peloponnesian war. He happened 
to be on the coast of Thrace, about half a day's journey from 

* Respecting the great influence of Brasidas, compare, besides Thucy- 
dides, Aristophanes (Vesp. 474. fol. 640.). Thucydides describes him as 
a model for all his Athenian contemporaries ; and throughout his whole work 
he bestows unconditional praise on two men only, Pericles and Brasidas. 

f It is possible that Thucydides was condemned (irpohorrlas), perhaps at 
the instigation of Cleon, for not having saved Amphipolis. The legal 
punishment of death was either commuted into that of exile, or he escaped' 
from it by flight The latter is more probable, because he remained in, 
exile for twenty years (Aristoph. Vesp. 288. fol. ; Pausan. i. 23. § 11.), 
partly in Thrace, and perhaps also in Sicily ; but generally near the scene 
of the war, as he himself (v. 26.) states. 



chap. xxii. BEASIDAS IN CHALCIDICE. 



397 



Amphipolis, and hastened with seven ships to save at least 
Eion, which he succeeded in occupying ; but Brasidas, in 
order to avoid being encamped too long before one place, 
sent a herald to offer to the Amphipolitans the mildest 
possible terms, and thus speedily induced the town to sur- 
render. He was, however, unable to make himself master of 
Eion and the mouth of the river ; and for this the Athenians 
were indebted to their countryman, Thucydides. The taking 
of Amphipolis was followed in rapid succession by the con- 
quests of less important towns ; but it was above all things 
the prudent and kind conduct of Brasidas that inclined the 
towns allied with, or subject to, Athens to revolt. They had 
heard of the defeat of Delium, of the effectual defence of 
Megara by Brasidas ; accordingly the Athenians appeared to 
them to be weaker than before, and a revolt as so much 
the less dangerous. During this winter the Athenians 
actually did nothing beyond here and there strengthening the 
garrisons of the towns ; while the Spartans, either from fear 
for the safety of their captive countrymen at Athens, or from 
envy of Brasidas, left their glorious general without support. 
But he nevertheless continued his operations. He proceeded 
southwards towards Acte, the eastern peninsula of Chalcidice, 
which the canal of Xerxes had changed into an island. The 
small towns there were easily won over, with the exception 
of Sane and Dion, for whose surrender he could not wait, 
being called away by some of the inhabitants of Torone, on 
the coast of the peninsula west of Athos, who promised to 
give up their town to him. On his arrival in the neigh- 
bourhood at night, he found his friends waiting for him, and 
ready to admit him secretly into the town. The plan suc- 
ceeded; the partisans of the Lacedaemonians immediately 
joined the invaders, and the others were pacified by a mild 
proclamation, in which Brasidas assured them that they 
might trust to the faithfulness and honourable conduct of the 
Lacedaemonians, and that they, like the people of the other 



398 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



towns, would find in him their deliverer from the yoke of the 
Athenians. The few Athenians who were in the place fled 
to the fort of Lecythos, situated north of Torone, and there 
prepared to defend themselves. An unfortunate accident, 
however, enabled Brasidas to take the place by storm, and he 
put all the prisoners to the sword. A few only succeeded by 
means of boats in crossing over to Pallene. After this, 
Brasidas was engaged in making arrangements in the newly 
conquered towns, and in planning new expeditions : while he 
was thus occupied, the winter of the eighth year of the war 
came to a close. 

The victorious progress of Brasidas in Chalcidice did not, 
indeed, neutralise the advantages which the Athenians had 
gained in Peloponnesus ; but the balance of power was suffi- 
ciently restored. The Athenians, seriously alarmed about 
their dominion in Chalcidice and Thrace, were anxious to 
check the rapid advance of Brasidas, and at the same time to 
make their preparations with the necessary circumspection. 
The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, thought that the 
proper moment had now come for recovering their prisoners, 
of whose safety they had all along been very considerate. 
Hence both parties seem to have been equally desirous of 
peace ; and thus a truce was concluded at the very beginning 
of the ninth year of the war. * It was concluded for one 
year, and its terms were to be the preliminaries of a definite 
peace. The proposals of the Lacedaemonians, that every 
thing should remain in statu quo, and that the negotiations 
for peace should be forthwith commenced, were accepted 
by the people of Athens on the advice of Laches. But while 
the treaty was being ratified by the envoys of both parties, 
an event took place in Chalcidice which rendered its per- 
formance impossible. This was the revolt of Scione from 
the Athenians to Brasidas. The latter, by his insinuating 



* On the 14th of Elaphebolion (March), B.C. 423. 



chap. xxn. REVOLT OF SCIOXE. 



399 



conduct, had quickly won the affections of the people of that 
town, who were at first disinclined to join him ; and the Scio- 
naeans were now so much delighted with him, that they 
honoured him, as the deliverer of Greece, with a crown of 
gold, and presented him with fillets, as if he were a victor at 
the Olympian games. Just at the moment when he was pre- 
paring to advance against Mende and Potidaea, Athenian and 
Spartan commissioners arrived to inform him of the truce 
which had been concluded. Brasidas immediately returned 
to Torone, and the treaty was everywhere approved of. But 
now it was discovered that Scione had revolted from Athens 
two days after the conclusion of the treaty, and the Athenian 
commissioner accordingly demanded that the town should be 
restored to its former masters. Brasidas would not listen to 
this, and maintained that Athens had no right to make 
such a claim. When the Athenians were informed of these 
events they immediately prepared to send an expedition 
against Scione. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, 
proposed to submit the matter to a judicial decision, and 
declared that any other mode of acting would be a breach of 
the treaty. But the Athenians, seeing one town lost after 
another, thought they ought no longer to act the part of mere 
lookers on. Cleon did his best to stir up the people, and it 
was resolved that Scione should be taken and every man in 
it put to death. 

In the mean while, Mende also joined Brasidas, who, as it 
had come over of its own accord, did not hesitate to accept 
its inhabitants as his allies. Both towns now made vigorous 
preparations to defend themselves against the Athenians. 
But before the latter appeared, Brasidas, in conjunction with 
Perdiccas, made a second expedition against Arrhibaeus. 
The Lyncestians were defeated, and Perdiccas was only 
waiting for the arrival of the Illyrians, in order to complete 
the conquest with their assistance. Brasidas, apprehending 
some danger for his Chalcidian towns, and unwilling to 



400 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxn. 



remain any longer at a distance from them, was preparing 
to return, when on a sudden a report was spread that the Illy- 
rians had declared for Arrhibaeus. The barbarian troops 
of Perdiccas were seized with a panic, and dispersed in the 
greatest disorder. Brasidas alone remained behind; he 
determined upon a well-organised retreat, and encouraged 
his men to hold out and show themselves worthy of their 
country. The barbarians soon observed that his was not 
the retreat of a conquered or routed enemy. They accord- 
ingly set out in pursuit of the fleeing Macedonians, and 
occupied a defile through which Brasidas had to pass on 
his march into Macedonia. But there, too, the prudence of 
the Spartan outwitted his enemies, and he soon arrived in 
Macedonia with his army in safety. Indignant at the faith- 
less flight of Perdiccas, the Lacedaemonians treated his 
country like that of an enemy, and plundered every thing 
that came in their way. The enmity which thus arose 
between Brasidas and the king induced the latter again to 
ally himself with the Athenians. 

On the arrival of Brasidas at Torone, the Athenians were 
already in possession of Mende. In point of fact the truce 
was broken ; but still throughout this year the war was 
carried on only in those distant countries, while in Greece 
itself the two leading states, either by accident, or perhaps 
actuated by an irresistible desire for peace, seemed to observe 
the truce. Nicias and Nicostratus had arrived in Chalcidice 
with an armament of 50 galleys and a considerable number of 
troops, and began to carry on their operations against Mende 
from Potidaea. They made an unsuccessful attack upon the 
garrison of Mende, which they found encamped in a strong 
position before the town. On the following day, the Lacedae- 
monians having gone to Scione, the Peloponnesian and 
Athenian parties in the town began to quarrel and fight 
in the midst of which the gates were thrown open to the 
Athenians. The town was plundered, and the citadel closely 



chap. xxn. CAPTURE OF TORONE BY CLEON". 401 



invested ; but the garrison succeeded in forcing their way to 
Scione. In the latter place, too, the garrison occupied a 
strong position outside the town, which had to be conquered 
before the siege could be begun. As it was clear that this 
would be a tedious undertaking, the Athenians were satisfied 
for the present with completely investing the town. 

While this siege was in progress, Perdiccas concluded a 
negotiation with the Athenians, and, to give them a proof of 
his new friendship, he prevented the reinforcements, which 
were approaching by a road pointed out by Brasidas, from 
joining the Lacedaemonians. Towards the end of the win- 
ter, Brasidas made another attempt to surprise Potidaea by 
night ; but was bafHed by the Athenian garrison. At the 
beginning of the tenth year of the war, the truce expired, 
and, on the part of the Athenians, Cleon undertook the 
command. Entrusted with a force of 30 galleys, 1200 
heavy-armed, 300 horse, and a large number of allies, he 
proceeded to Scione, which was still besieged. Taking along 
with him a part of the besieging army, he landed in the port 
of the Colophonians, not far south from Torone. On learning 
there that the garrison of Torone was weak and that Bra- 
sidas was absent, he attacked it both by land and by sea, 
and was fortunate enough to take the place before Brasidas, 
though he was not far off, could come to its assistance. The 
men were sent to Athens, and the women and children re- 
duced to slavery. This happened in the spring, b. c. 422. 
Leaving a garrison in Torone, Cleon sailed round Mount 
Athos towards Amphipolis. From Eion, he first made an 
unsuccessful expedition against Stagiros, but took Galepsos 
from the Macedonians. In the mean time, Brasidas had 
received succours which increased his army to 2000 heavy- 
armed and 300 Greek horsemen ; his light-armed troops were 
still more numerous, for he was joined by all the forces of 
the Edonians, Myrcinians, and Chaleidi&ns. With 1500 of 
these troops he encamped on an eminence called Cerdylion, 



402 HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxn. 

not far from Amphipolis, whence he could watch the move- 
ments of the enemy. The other troops took up their position 
at Amphipolis, under the command of Clearidas. Brasidas 
calculated that Cleon, under-estimating the strength of 
his enemy, would soon advance against Amphipolis; his 
expectation was realised, not because Cleon was impelled 
by his courage, but because his army began to show signs 
of discontent, and gave him to understand that it was only 
his ignorance and cowardice which prevented him from ad- 
vancing. He was thus compelled to march up the country. 
In the vain hope that he would not have to encounter any 
enemy, and that all would proceed very smoothly, he pitched 
his camp upon an eminence before Amphipolis. Seeing no 
troops on the walls, and the gates closed, he imagined 
that he might take the town at one blow. While Cleon 
was approaching, Brasidas had withdrawn into Amphi- 
polis. He did not, however, consider it advisable to make 
an open attack upon the superior forces of the enemy, but 
determined to take them by surprise, before Cleon departed 
or received reinforcements. He accordingly selected 150 
heavy-armed, and, in an inspiriting speech, cheered them on 
in their bold undertaking. 

The Athenians had observed that Brasidas had entered 
the town, and Cleon was informed that the enemy was 
preparing to carry some plan into execution. No sooner 
had Cleon convinced himself of the truth of the report, than 
he gave the signal for a retreat, having no desire whatever 
to engage in a battle. But not being able to wheel the 
left wing quickly enough, his awkward tactics exposed the 
whole army, and Brasidas, seizing the opportunity, fell, with 
his men upon the retreating ranks of the Athenians. At 
the same time, Clearidas attacked the enemy on another side, 
and the whole army was soon routed. Brasidas himself, while 
rushing against the right wing, received a mortal wound ; 
but the Athenians did not observe his fall : he was taken up 



CHAP.xxn. DEATH OF CLEON AND BEASIDAS. 403 

and carried away by those who stood nearest to him. Cleon, 
who had from the first thought of nothing but flight, was 
overtaken by a Myrcinian targeteer, and slain. TJie heavy- 
armed, who were all Athenian citizens, made a long and 
brave resistance, but in the end they also were put to 
flight. Brasidas, having been conveyed to Amphipolis, was 
there informed of the victory of his men, and died soon 
afterwards. Six hundred Athenians fell on that day, while 
the victors lost only seven men, for there had been no re- 
gular engagement, — only a pursuit of fugitives. Those who 
escaped immediately returned with the fleet to Athens. At 
Amphipolis, divine honours were paid to Brasidas ; he was 
buried in the market-place, his tomb was surrounded with a 
fence, sacrifices were offered to him as to a hero, and annual 
games were celebrated in his honour. The Amphipolitans, 
who formed a close alliance with the Lacedaemonians, hence- 
forth regarded Brasidas as the real founder of their town, 
and destroyed every thing which might remind them of 
Hagnon and the Athenians. 

In the mean while, an auxiliary force which had been sent 
from Sparta had tarried too long at Heraclea, and had, 
moreover, been refused a passage through Thessaly. Thus 
the plans of Brasidas were not prosecuted, and the Lacedae- 
monians thought only of making peace. The advantages 
gained by the belligerents might be considered equal. The 
recent defeat at Amphipolis made the Athenians appre- 
hensive about their allies, and their pride and arrogance were 
considerably lowered. The Spartans still thought of the 
fate of the prisoners of Sphacteria, of the disgraceful loss of 
Pylos and Cythera, and of the danger of an insurrection 
among the Helots.* In addition to all this, the thirty years 9 
peace with Argos had expired, and Sparta did not feel her- 
self strong enough to carry on a war with Argos and Athens 

* An instance of unexampled cruelty against the Helots is recorded by 
Thucyd. iv. 80. 



404 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXII. 



at the same time. Moreover, Brasidas and Cleon, who had 
hitherto been the chief obstacles in the way of peace — the 
former, because war afforded him opportunities of displaying 
his military talents, and of gaining glory ; the latter, that 
he might amid the din of arms conceal his evil designs, his 
calumnies of others, and his own faithlessness — both these 
men had been removed by death from the scene of action. 
Nicias, who loved a quiet and undisturbed life, though he 
was brave and possessed of warlike ability, and Pleistoanax, 
king of Sparta, were engaged in bringing about a peace, the 
negotiations for which were continued during the winter. 
With a view to accelerate its conclusion, the Peloponnesians, 
about the beginning of spring, even commenced new pre- 
parations for war. But after many conferences, the basis of 
a treaty was at length settled in the spring of b. c. 421, on 
the footing of a mutual restitution of conquests made during 
the war; and as the Thebans would not admit thatPlataeae 
belonged to this class, on the ground that it had been freely 
surrendered, it was stipulated that Athens should keep 
Nisaea, which she had acquired by a similar transaction. 
With the exception of the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and 
Megarians, who did not agree to this treaty, all the con- 
federates accepted it, and mutually ratified it with sacrifices 
and oaths. Among the stipulations, of which Thucydides has 
preserved the original document, we may mention, that the 
Athenians restored to the Lacedaemonians, Pylos, Cythera, 
Methone, and Atalanta ; that the Chalcidian and Thracian 
towns conquered by Brasidas became neutral ; that Amphi- 
polis was restored to the Athenians, as also Scione, which, 
together with Torone and some other towns, was left entirely 
at the mercy of the Athenians. The neutral towns were to 
pay only the tribute fixed by Aristides, and in other respects 
to be independent. All Athenian and Lacedaemonian 
prisoners were to be returned without ransom. This peace 
was ratified at Athens on the 25th of the month of 



chap. xxii. THE PEACE OF NICIAS. 



405 



Elaphebolion (the 4th of April), B.C. 421, the eleventh year 
of the war. This peace, commonly called the peace of Nicias, 
was concluded for the period of fifty years. 

The question, which of the two states was first to comply 
with the stipulations of the peace, was decided by lot, which 
fell upon Sparta. She forthwith liberated the prisoners, and 
sent envoys to Clearidas, with orders at once to surrender 
Amphipolis to the Athenians. He at first showed some 
hesitation, being actuated in some degree by a desire to 
please the Chalcidians, who were hostile to the Athenians ; 
but he was ultimately obliged to comply with the commands 
of Sparta, or at least to withdraw the Lacedaemonian garri- 
son from the town. But as the confederates who were 
dissatisfied with the peace evinced no intention, notwith- 
standing the urgent entreaties of Sparta, to give in their 
adhesion to it, the Lacedaemonians, in order to be well pre- 
pared for any contingency, especially in case of a war with 
Argos, concluded, in April of the same year, an offensive and 
defensive alliance with Athens, which contained the stipula- 
tion, that each of the contracting parties should be entitled 
at its discretion to increase or diminish the number of its- 
allies or subjects. This at once roused the fear and oppo- 
sition of all the second-rate states ; and thus the peace con- 
tained numerous elements which might lead to its speedy 
violation and termination. 



406 



HISTORY OF GREECE. CHAP. xxm. 



CHAPTER XXIII. 

FROM THE PEACE OF NICIAS TO THE CONQUEST OF MELOS. 

For a period of nearly seven years, the two leading states, 
Athens and Sparta, observed the treaty so far as not to in- 
vade each other's territory, but otherwise Greece was by no 
means in the enjoyment of peace. From the very beginning, 
the contracting parties did not strictly adhere to the con- 
ditions they had nominally agreed to ; each endeavoured to 
injure its dreaded and hated rival by forming new connec- 
tions, and the states of inferior rank continued to stir the 
fire of war until it burst forth into a fierce and ruinous 
blaze. Thucydides, considering the contest to have been 
carried on uninterruptedly for twenty-seven years, treats even 
this intermediate period as belonging to the war; and we 
shall adopt the same method, so long as we have him for 
our guide. 

The Corinthians began the movement ; they themselves, 
indeed, did not at once renounce the Peloponnesian alliance, 
but they induced the Argives to put themselves without 
delay at the head of a new confederacy, which was to be 
joined by all the Greek states except Athens and Sparta. 
The Mantineans, who had of late enlarged their dominions, 
were the first to join the new league, in order to secure their 
late acquisitions. Their example was immediately followed by 
the Eleans, who concluded an alliance, first with Corinth, 
and then with Argos, because they thought that they had 
been treated unjustly by Sparta; so that this new alliance 
was a sort of demonstration against Sparta. The Corinthians 
themselves next went over, ostensibly in order to fulfil the 
terms of ancient treaties and vows which bound them not 



chap, xxiii. NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE PEACE. 407 



to abandon their Chalcidian allies, but in reality because 
they considered themselves wronged by the Athenians, who 
retained possession of Solion and Anactorion. With them, 
the Chalcidians also joined the rising confederacy. The 
Boeotians and Megarians were, for the present, prevented 
from becoming members of it, by the circumstance that 
Argos had a democratic form of government, while they 
themselves were ruled by oligarchies. Thus no further 
allies were gained at this time. The Tegeatans were de- 
cidedly opposed to the new confederacy, and the Boeotians 
too, in spite of Corinthian machinations, maintained their 
separate armistice with Athens. 

In the face of these hostile manifestations, Sparta and 
Athens were engaged during the summer in negotiations and 
controversies respecting the carrying into effect of the peace ; 
but no satisfactory results were come to. What both wanted 
was the honest will, for Sparta, which had shown itself so 
ready at the beginning, now hesitated, and owned that it was 
not strong enough to restore Amphipolis to Athens against 
its will, or to compel the Boeotians and Corinthians to accept 
the terms of the peace. The Athenians replied, that under 
these circumstances they could not give up Pylos, and only 
after long negotiations consented to assign other settlements 
(in Cephallenia) to the Messenians and Helots who were 
living at Pylos. 

Matters became still more complicated, when, in the follow- 
ing winter, at the election of the ephors, men of the party in 
favour of war were placed at the head of affairs at Sparta. 
Assisted by the Boeotians, they endeavoured to enter into the 
alliance with Argos ; the negotiations, however, were carried 
on slowly and without energy, and, for the present, nothing 
was effected. But the Lacedaemonians, interested above all 
things in the recovery of Pylos, concluded, about the end of 
the winter, a separate treaty with the Boeotians; this act 
was contrary to the treaty with Athens, according to which 



408 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxiii. 



such connections could be entered into only by both states 
in common. By this treaty, the Boeotians agreed to sur- 
render to the Lacedaemonians, Panacton, which had been 
taken in the tenth year of the war from Athens, and the 
Athenian prisoners who were kept at Thebes. This was to 
enable the Spartans to obtain from the Athenians the re- 
storation of Pylos. But when, in the spring of 420, Spartan 
commissioners came to take possession of Panacton, they 
found that it had been dismantled by order of the Boeotian 
government, on the plea of an ancient compact between 
Boeotia and Athens. When the Argives were informed of 
this alliance, they imagined that it had been entered into 
with the consent of Athens ; and fearing lest they might be 
involved in a war at once with Sparta, Tegea, and Athens, 
they sent envoys to Sparta, in the beginning of b. c. 420, to 
negotiate for a treaty and alliance. The Spartans were 
willing to accept the proposal, but suddenly the Argives 
broke off the negotiations and embraced the cause of 
Athens. 

The Athenians, dissatisfied with the alliance between 
Sparta and Boeotia, indignant at the destruction of Panacton, 
and remembering the many terms of their own peace with 
Sparta which had not been carried into effect, dismissed the 
Spartan envoys with a somewhat stern answer. Alcibiades, 
the son of Cleinias, above all others, urged his countrymen 
to violate the peace. " In comparison with the statesmen of 
other republics, he was yet young, but he was honoured by 
the people on account of the fame of his ancestors." In 
reading this statement of Thucydides, we might be inclined 
to believe that he intentionally passed over or undervalued 
the circumstances which, at the first appearance of so extra- 
ordinary a man in public life, would certainly have been 
touched upon by other historians. But in Thucydides every 
thing is well considered and in accordance with the artistic 
rules of historical composition. The transition from the 



CHAP. XXIIT. 



ALCIBIADES. 



409 



accounts of public matters to the description of a man's per- 
sonal character is everywhere kept within strict limits, and 
carried out with wonderful moderation and impartiality. 
Hence, we also shall abstain from saying in this place more 
of that perfect image of the Athenian character and genius 
than Thucydides himself thought it right to state. The 
events in the life of Alcibiades, down to his coming forward 
against Nicias, appeared comparatively unimportant to the 
calm and thoughtful mind of Thucydides, although his name 
had long been in every one's mouth, and his manners and 
conduct gave the tone to the fashionable circles at Athens. 
We may pass over the various stories about his youth, as 
relating to the results merely of his birth and education. 
Everything belonging to him was marked by dazzling splen- 
dour and possessed wonderful fascination : his birth, his 
wealth, his beauty, and his virtues, not more than his vices. 
In him, Nature seems to have tried to combine her most 
varied productions. The consciousness of his powers and a 
restless ambition impelled him on all occasions to claim the 
foremost place, and his calculating subtlety was always a 
more powerful incentive than strict justice or a regard for 
the interests of his country. He was so reckless about his 
intellectual endowments, his personal beauty, and his wealth, 
that the rapid changes in his favour with the people were 
only the reflex, as it were, of his own fickleness. He was 
naturally of an aristocratic temperament, which was con- 
firmed by the circumstances amid which he was brought up, 
and his more than oligarchic sentiments were displayed in 
decisive moments most unequivocally. Whenever he as- 
sumed the appearance of a popular leader, it was always for 
the purpose of gaining some personal object. * 

The history of the period of the war which now follows, 
down to its termination, is at the same time the history of 



* This seems to be the meaning of Thucyd. vin. 48. 
T 



410 • HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxm. 



the life of Alcibiades. He exerted himself to prevent the 
conclusion of the intended alliance with Sparta, because he 
considered a treaty with Argos to be more advantageous 
and lasting, but still more, because he had from the first 
been opposed to the peace which was brought about by the 
mediation of Nicias and Laches, and in the conclusion of 
which he himself, who was then at the utmost only twenty- 
eight years of age, had been taken no notice of. For 
although he had done good service to the prisoners of 
Sphacteria, and had renewed the connection of public hospi- 
tality which had existed between his family and Sparta, yet 
the Spartans seem to have preferred transacting business 
with the sober and intelligent Nicias. For this slight, 
Alcibiades now took revenge. He invited the Argives to 
come to Athens, accompanied by envoys from Elis and 
Mantinea, in order to conclude an alliance against Thebes 
and Sparta. The Argives willingly sent their envoys, 
but at the same time there arrived others from Sparta, who 
were commissioned to demand the restoration of Pylos in 
exchange for Panacton, to justify the treaty concluded with 
Thebes, but, above all, to prevent the conclusion of an alliance 
with Argos. Alcibiades contrived to thwart the designs of 
Sparta, while an insult offered to the ambassadors* rendered 
a peaceful settlement almost impossible ; and thus the alliance 
between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, was actually 
concluded. It was an offensive and defensive alliance, and 
was to last for 100 years. The peace between Athens and 
Sparta still continued, but the immediate consequence of 
these proceedings was, that Corinth, which had only accepted 
the previous treaty with Argos, but had not sworn to it, again 
inclined towards the Lacedaemonians, and afterwards, when 
the celebration of the Olympic games was over, they could 
not be induced to return to their former allies. The Eleans, 



* Thucyd. v. 45. 



chap, xxiii. WAR BETWEEN ARGOS AND EPIDAURUS. 411 



feeling secure under the protection of the new confederacy, 
excluded the Lacedaemonians from the Olympic games of 
this year, because they had occupied Lepreon during the 
religious truce ; nay, they even fined the Lacedaemonians, 
who, as no understanding could be come to, were actually 
obliged to perform the customary sacrifices in their own 
country. 

In the following year, B.C. 419, the thirteenth of the war, 
there appeared in Peloponnesus symptoms of a greater and 
more general struggle. A war had arisen between the 
Argives and the Epidaurians in consequence of a dispute 
about some sacrifice, and the Athenians actively assisted the 
Argives. Alcibiades, who was then one of the Athenian 
generals, had entered Peloponnesus with some troops, evi- 
dently with a view to make himself acquainted with the 
scene of his future operations. At the same time, he gained 
over the town of Patrae in Achaia to the alliance with 
Athens, and persuaded its inhabitants to extend their walls 
as far as the sea-coast. But his plan of fortifying the 
Achaean Rhion, and of thereby obtaining the command of 
the entrance to the Corinthian gulf, was thwarted by the 
Corinthians and Sicyonians. The Lacedaemonians were 
prevented by unfavourable sacrifices from supporting the 
Epidaurians, but even their approach was enough to induce 
the Athenian forces to retreat ; and throughout this year, 
although the ravaging inroads were continued, nothing de- 
cisive was effected. It was only towards the end of the 
year that the Spartans sent 300 men by sea to Epidaurus, 
upon which the Argives immediately applied to the Athe- 
nians, reminding them of the terms of their alliance ; and 
on the proposal of Alcibiades, the Athenians inscribed on 
the pillar containing the treaty with Sparta the words, " the 
Lacedaemonians have not observed their oath : " helots also 
were sent to Pylos to harass Laconia. But, notwithstanding 
all this, the peace was formally still maintained. As the 

T 2 



412 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXIII^ 



Epidaurians, however, continued to be distressed, and symp- 
toms of discontent and hostility became here and there 
visible, the Lacedaemonians thought that they ought to 
hesitate no longer, and in the latter part of the summer of 
B.C. 418, they assembled an unusually large army of 
allies, which they themselves joined with all their forces, 
and invaded the Argive territory in three divisions. Yet 
no decisive battle was fought, for king Agis allowed himself 
to be persuaded by two Argives to conclude an armistice, 
in the hope that it would lead to a final and peaceful settle- 
ment ; accordingly, to the great annoyance of the Spartans 
and their allies, he departed with his splendid army without 
having struck a blow. The Argives, too, were so eager to fight, 
that they severely punished those who had, without orders, 
acted the part of mediators. The Athenians had come too 
late with their auxiliary force of 1000 heavy-armed and 
400 horse, under the command of Laches and Nicostratus. 

Although, after the truce just concluded, the Argives 
no longer needed these auxiliary forces, yet they re- 
mained in the territory of Argos, and, by the advice of 
Alcibiades, it was resolved to commence hostilities, on the 
ground that the truce had been concluded by Argos alone, 
and was, therefore, invalid. All the allies, who were soon 
joined by the Argives, now set out against Orchomenos in 
Arcadia, and compelled the town to surrender. Thence 
they proceeded to Tegea, which was to be delivered up to 
them by treachery. This danger roused the Spartans, who 
were greatly exasperated at the truce concluded by their 
king, and they not only assembled their own military forces, 
but commanded their Arcadian and other allies to furnish 
their contingents as speedily as possible. On the frontier of 
Laconia, they dismissed the sixth part of their army, con- 
sisting of the oldest and youngest men, to protect their 
homes, and with the rest entered the territory of Mantinea, 
ravaging the country and pitching their camp near a sane- 



chap, xxiii. BATTLE OF MANTIS E A. 



413 



tuary of Heracles. The Argive allies chose a position, strong 
and difficult of access, for drawing up their forces in battle 
array; and Agis, taking the counsel of an experienced 
warrior, did not venture to attack them on that day. On 
the morrow, when he again advanced, he found the enemy 
already drawn up in the plain, and the Lacedaemonians, in 
the greatest haste and alarm, prepared for battle. But in 
the conflict, they fought with calmness and undaunted 
courage, and gained a decisive victory. Of the Argives 1100 
fell, while the Lacedaemonians lost only 300. This battle of 
Mantinea was one of the most important in the whole war ; 
and for the Lacedaemonians was doubly advantageous, because 
it restored the ancient military glory of Sparta, which had 
been impaired by the defeats of Pylos and Sphacteria. 

At the time of this battle, which occurred in the month of 
August, just before the festival of the Carneia, the Epidaurians 
had made a ravaging expedition into the territory of Argos, 
which was feebly protected, but were themselves closely in- 
vested by the Eleans and Athenians. Soon after the Carneian 
festival, about the beginning of winter, the Lacedaemonians 
again advanced as far as Tegea, but this time they made pro- 
posals of accommodation to Argos, where a faction, hostile to 
the democratic government and favourably disposed to Sparta, 
was inclined to make peace. These negotiations, which Al- 
cibiades in vain endeavoured to frustrate, were brought to 
a satisfactory termination. The Argives accepted the pro- 
posals, the principal stipulation of which was that they were 
to leave the Epidaurians in peace, and oblige the Athenians to 
depart from their territory. Soon afterwards another treaty 
of alliance was concluded for 50 years between Argos and 
Sparta, whereby Argos renounced its former allies. The 
new confederates immediately exerted themselves to extend 
the league: they renewed the ancient treaties with the 
Chalcidians, and called upon king Perdiccas of Macedonia 
to join the confederacy, a request with which he who traces 

t 3 



414 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXIII. 



his own origin to Argos, was not unwilling to comply. The 
Athenians now withdrew their besieging forces from Epidau- 
rus, and towards the end of the winter the Mantineans 
found themselves constrained to join the alliance between 
Sparta and Argos. At Sicyon an oligarchic government 
was established, and the same change was effected at Argos 
with the aid of Sparta. Such were the immediate conse- 
quences of the new confederacy, which, however, did not 
last long. 

While the Lacedaemonians were engaged in setting up oli- 
garchic governments in the towns of Achaia, the popular party 
at Argos again raised its head, B.C. 417. The struggle com- 
menced at a time when Sparta was celebrating a festival, and 
the democratic party gained the victory. The aid sent by Sparta 
to support the minority came too late, and was altogether too 
slow ; the victorious party hastened to form connections with 
Athens, and built strong and long walls from Argos to the sea- 
coast, by which they were enabled to receive support and sup* 
plies by sea in case of their town being besieged. It was not till 
the following winter, that the Spartans with their allies arrived 
before Argos ; they succeeded in making themselves masters 
of, and in breaking down the walls, which had been erected by 
enormous exertions ; the Argive town of Hyriae was taken ; 
its free-born inhabitants were put to death, and then the 
Lacedaemonians withdrew from Argos. After this, the 
Argives attempted to make a ravaging expedition into the 
territory of the Phliasians, who had given shelter to their 
exiles. In order to strengthen their league, and to prevent 
the re-establishment of an oligarchic government, Alcibiades 
in the following summer, B.C. 416, sailed with a squadron of 
20 galleys to Argos, took 300 of the oligarchs on board, and 
carried them to the neighbouring islands, where they were 
kept under the superintendence of Athens. 

Soon afterwards the Athenians undertook an expedition 
against the island of Melos. The Melians, who were a Doric 



chap. xxin. SIEGE AND CONQUEST OF MELOS. 415 

colony, boasted of having been in the undisturbed possession 
of their island for 700 years, that is, ever since the Doric 
migration ; and they were the only islanders who did not 
belong to the Athenian confederacy. Some years previously, 
b. c. 426, Nicias had in vain attempted to conquer the island, 
and the Melians, who had before been neutral, then became 
open enemies of the Athenians. The inactivity of Sparta 
now tempted the Athenians to make another attempt to sub- 
due the island. Thirty-eight ships, most of which were 
Athenian, and about 3000 heavy^ armed, partly Athenians 
and partly allies, approached the coast of Melos under the 
command of Cleomedes. At first, negotiations were tried 
between Athenian envoys and the Melian oligarchs ; they 
did not lead to any result, but are characteristic and remark- 
able for the pride and confidence of the Athenians in their 
own power, as contrasted with the courageous hope and un- 
daunted bearing of the Melians, who considered it a disgrace 
to surrender without fighting for their independence. In 
spite of the threatening language of the Athenians, the 
Melians would only consent to become the friends of Athens, 
and insisted on preserving their neutrality as before. The 
Athenians, adhering with equal obstinacy to their demand 
that the Melians should become either allies or tributary, 
and treating with contempt the assistance which the Melians 
expected from Sparta, began to lay siege to the town. The 
siege was continued till the following winter, being protracted 
by the bold defence and successful sallies of the Melians, 
until the Athenians sent reinforcements, and traitors amono- 
the besieged themselves rendered further resistance impos- 
sible. The Melians surrendered at discretion, and experienced 
the same fate as had been inflicted upon the people of Scione. 
Some time afterwards, the conquerors sent 500 settlers to oc- 
cupy the desolate island. The Lacedaemonians had not sent to 
their kinsmen the expected assistance, and on the whole showed 
no hostility towards Athens, but acted in accordance with the 

T 4 



416 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP, XXIII. 



existing treaties. For while the Athenians made predatory 
excursions from Pylos into Laconia, the Spartans merely pro- 
claimed that whoever wished, might in his private capacity re- 
taliate upon the Athenians. Once only, they meditated another 
expedition against Argos, which however was thwarted by 
unfavourable signs in the victims ; so that the only result of 
their preparations was to induce the Argives to deprive those 
oligarchs who were suspected of favouring Sparta of any 
power to do mischief, and to establish the democratic govern- 
ment still more firmly. The Lacedaemonians assigned to 
the Argive exiles Orneae, a town on the Arcadian frontier* 
and made a ravaging excursion into the territory of Argos ; 
but after their departure, an Athenian armament joined by 
the Argives took Orneae and destroyed it. 

About this time, numerous trifling occurrences and disputes 
seemed to forebode more important events, and even the 
winter of this year saw the beginning of the great Sicilian 
war. 



char xxiv. THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION. 



417 



CHAPTER XXIV. 

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OP GTLIPPUS 
IN SICILY. 

We have now reached, if not the most interesting, at least the 
most important period — the turning point — of the bloody- 
drama of the Peloponnesian war. At the beginning of the 
expedition against Syracuse, Athens was at the height of 
her power and pride ; but after the termination of the Sicilian 
war, we find her entering upon the gloomy path of gradual 
decline, which is marked by only a few glorious events, and 
those connected with individual persons, especially with 
Alcibiades; confidence in themselves and in their good 
fortune abandoned the Athenian people, and their authority 
among their allies and tributaries was evidently gone. The 
ship of the state, which had so long maintained its course 
under the management of reckless as well as of bold and skilful 
pilots, was now overpowered by the billows beating against 
it on all sides, and was fast hurried to destruction. 

The expedition against Sicily was one of the fruits of the 
Athenian democracy, such as it had been developed after 
the time of Pericles. All the conservatives, or men of the 
moderate party, were against it ; and the crime committed 
against the Hermae, of which we shall have to speak here- 
after, may be regarded as a desperate attempt of those who 
wished for peace to prevent the sailing of the fleet, and to 
put an end to the war by any means, however violent. 

The desire of ,the Athenian people and its leaders to 
establish themselves in the western seas, in Sicily, and even 
beyond it, had been awakened long before this time, but 
became manifest especially after the death of Pericles, when 
the people and the demagogues obtained the uncontrolled 

T 5 



418 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxiv. 



management of public affairs, and with few interruptions 
retained it until the downfal of Athens. Her participation 
in the Leontine war, which lasted from the fifth until the 
eighth year of the Peloponnesian war, and ended without 
any important results, has already been noticed. The peace 
of Gela, which was brought about by the wise counsel of the 
Syracusan Hermocrates, checked for a time the designs of 
the Athenians, who had not yet come forward with the 
energy which might have been expected from their power. 
That peace united all the Siceliots* against Athens, their 
common enemy. The embassy of Phaeax, in b. c. 422, the 
object of which was to protect the popular party of the 
Leontines, which had been expelled by the nobles and the 
Syracusans, and to gain allies for Athens and the people of 
Leontini against the powerful state of Syracuse, had not 
been very successful ; but the delight of the Athenians in 
extensive and adventurous undertakings had become so in- 
fluential a feeling, that men like Alcibiades knew how to 
make the excitable people adopt their own ambitious and 
audacious schemes, which it thenceforth regarded with 
almost parental fondness. An additional incentive to action 
in Sicily was the fact that the undertakings of the Athenians 
in Peloponnesus were not carried on with ardour or on a 
grand scale, on account of the peace which had never yet 
been formally abrogated ; nor were they particularly success- 
ful. The people wished for war, and yet were loth to be 
the first to break the peace, to which Sparta clung with 
obstinacy as long as it possibly could. Alcibiades moreover 
was not satisfied with the manner in which the war had 
hitherto been carried on ; his mind was full of some brilliant 
expedition, worthy of the maritime power of Athens ; his 
and the people's thoughts rose even to the idea of establish- 

* Siceliotae is the name of the Greek inhabitants of Sicily ; while the 
original inhabitants of the island and the settlers from Italy were called 

Siculi. 



chap. xxiv. ORIGIN OF THE WAR IN SICILY. 419 



ing a universal empire. Lastly, the majority of the people 
did not know the extent and population of Sicily, nor take 
into consideration the fearful consequences of the failure of 
such an undertaking. The causes and the beginning of the 
Sicilian war were as follow. 

In the winter of the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian 
war, ambassadors of the Egestaeans came to Athens, solicit- 
ing aid against the Selinuntians, their neighbours, who, 
supported by the Syracusans, were harassing Egesta by land 
and by sea. Their description of the dangerous and in- 
creasing power of Syracuse, and their promise to support 
the Athenians with money, induced the people to send 
envoys to Sicily, in order to ascertain the state of affairs 
and what means the Egestaeans had at their disposal. In 
the spring of B.C. 415 the envoys returned with the 
Egestaeans, who brought with them sixty talents of un- 
coined silver, as a month's pay for sixty galleys, and re- 
peatedly and urgently implored the Athenians to assist 
them. The Athenian envoys also gave rapturous descrip- 
tions of the wealth of the town, and it was at once decreed 
to send a fleet under the command of Alcibiades, Nicias, 
and Lamachus, who were invested with unlimited powers. 
Alcibiades thus saw the realisation of his most ardent wish, 
in being placed at the head of so important an undertaking. 
Lamachus also was delighted, because he would now have 
opportunities of displaying his valour. Nicias, who was 
cautious and a lover of peace, did not much like his new 
office ; and having a presentiment of the evils that might 
be occasioned by the projected enterprise, he endeavoured 
at a meeting of the people, which was held five days after 
the first assembly, to dissuade the Athenians from their 
plan. He advised them not to expose the state, which had 
scarcely recovered from the effects of the plague and the r 
miseries of the war, to fresh dangers and sufferings ; he 
cautioned them not to make new enemies in addition to the 

t 6 



420 



HISTORY OP GREECE. chap. xxiv. 



old ones, who were ever ready to seize the first favourable 
moment for recommencing the contest; he warned them 
against the dangers to be apprehended from the existence 
at Athens itself of factions, which in the event of an un- 
fortunate issue of the undertaking, would make common 
cause with the Lacedaemonians; he entreated them above 
all things not to allow themselves to be cajoled into a war 
by the ambitious and inexperienced Alcibiades, and that 
too in behalf of a powerless state, which in case of need 
would be unable to render any service in return. His advice 
met with little support; the majority was for war. Alci- 
biades, who had been personally attacked by Nicias, flattered 
the people by talking of the greatness of Athens, and de- 
clared that this war was a necessary consequence of the na- 
tional character, and of the policy which Athens had hitherto 
pursued. A sudden halt was, in his opinion, more danger- 
ous than an unsuccessful contest. By the brilliant prospects 
which he held out to the people, he filled them with enthu- 
siasm for the expedition, and Nicias saw that it could not 
be prevented. He therefore advised his countrymen to 
send a large force to Sicily, in order that they might with 
certainty calculate upon success, and in consideration of the 
great distance, to provide all the needful supplies on a most 
liberal scale. He hoped thus to make the people reflect 
upon what they were doing ; but they interpreted his re- 
marks as implying an approval of the war, and as such 
warmly applauded them ; so that the desire to enter upon 
the undertaking became only more ardent and more general. 
It was decreed that the generals should have full power to 
determine the force of the armament necessary for the ex- 
pedition. Extensive preparations were accordingly made ; 
and as the state was actually in a flourishing condition, 
every thing went on rapidly, and with perfect confidence in 
the success of the undertaking. 

But the warlike youths and the restless party with Alci- 



chap. XXIV. MUTILATION OF THE HEKMAE. 421 

biades at their bead were disappointed in their expectations. 
All those who had been silent in the assemblies from fear 
of being considered ill-disposed citizens, or who from the most 
different motives and from a regard to their own interests 
wished for peace, but especially both the secret and the 
avowed enemies of the sovereign people — all these exerted 
themselves to prevent the decree of the people from being 
carried into effect, and more particularly to injure Alcibiades, 
who was the soul of the whole undertaking. The intriguing 
selfishness and jealousy of the peace party ruined the common 
cause and effectually prevented the successful execution of 
the Sicilian expedition, the plan of which was by no means 
ill conceived. The fear that Alcibiades, returning at the 
head of a victorious fleet, might attempt to set himself up 
as tyrant, united the different parties in a scheme to ruin 
him who alone was capable of carrying out the undertaking ; 
and by this means they soon afterwards brought the greatest 
calamity upon their own country. 

When all the preparations for the expedition were com- 
pleted, it happened that one morning nearly all the numerous 
busts of Hermes, with which the piety of private citizens 
and of public bodies had adorned the streets of Athens, 
were found mutilated by unknown hands. Such mutilations 
of the Hermae had occurred at Athens before this time, but 
on a smaller scale ; they had been the work of drunken 
rioters at night, and in that age of scepticism and unbelief 
such things did not excite much attention. But the great 
number of the images mutilated in the same night gave to the 
deed unusual importance, and filled the minds of the citizens 
with alarm. The crime was considered as a bad omen for 
the fleet, which was ready to sail ; it was believed to be the 
work of a wide-spread conspiracy, whose object was to over- 
throw the popular form of government. Great rewards 
were publicly promised to any one who could give informa- 
tion about the perpetrators of the crime ; nay, accomplices 



422 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxiv. 



in it received assurances of impunity, if they would denounce 
the other offenders; and all persons were called upon to 
come forward with evidence not only about the sacrilegious 
crime committed on the Herruae, but also about other 
offences against religion, particularly the violation of the 
mysteries of Eleusis. Informers immediately presented 
themselves, especially resident aliens and slaves ; who were 
soon followed by others of the higher classes, such as An- 
docides, who had himself been thrown into prison on suspicion 
of having been one of the criminals. Those who were thus 
denounced generally took to flight, either because they 
were really guilty, or because they saw that the excited 
people would not listen to any defence. Nearly all who 
were apprehended were put to death; those who had 
escaped were sentenced to death, and their property was 
confiscated. Thucydides himself was unable to give the 
secret history of this trial of the Hermocopidae, as they 
were called ; though he is the only impartial and unbiassed 
authority ; for Andocides, one of the accused, who defended 
himself fifteen years later, was a thorough party-man and 
bent only upon exculpating himself. If we take Thucydides 
as our guide, we shall be led to the following conclusions. 

The affair was not, at the outset, aimed against Alcibiades, 
nor was he among those denounced for the mutilation of the 
Hermae. The accused were all men belonging to the higher 
classes of society, avowed oligarchs and enemies of the 
democratic government, but at the same time enemies or 
rivals of Alcibiades, whose popularity and influence with 
the people seemed to be employed by him only for attaining 
higher objects, perhaps the tyrannis itself. Now as Alci- 
biades, though not named among the Hermocopidae, was 
among those who were charged with having violated the 
mysteries, all who were hostile to him came forward against 
him, because he was an obstacle in their way, preventing 
them from acquiring lasting influence with the people, and 



chap. xxn\ CHARGE AGAINST ALCIBIADES. 



423 



because they hoped that after his removal they might occupy 
the first place in the republic. In these words, Thucydides 
may be describing either the demagogues or the oligarchs ; 
but it is also possible and even probable that the demagogues 
and leaders of the oligarchy made common cause on this 
occasion with a view to attain the same object, both regard- 
ing Alcibiades as their enemy. Thus we can understand 
that the informers, such as Cleonymus and Androcles, were 
democrats, while the judges, like Charicles and Pisander, 
were oligarchs. Both parties thus zealously exerted them- 
selves in the eyes of the excited and frightened people to 
prevent the overthrow of the popular sovereignty ; and 
both were in the first instance satisfied with the removal 
of Alcibiades. What they wished took place. For Alci- 
biades, who felt himself strong enough, and perhaps also 
innocent enough, to defy all charges of being concerned in 
the profanation of the mysteries — none of the informers 
had stated that he was an accomplice of the Hermocopidae 
— demanded to be immediately tried in a court of justice, 
declaring himself ready to submit to any punishment if he 
should be found guilty. His desire was not to enter on his 
office as commander of the fleet until he should be perfectly 
cleared from suspicion, and to have the whole affair settled 
before his departure. But his enemies were afraid lest he 
should be acquitted, for the soldiers were attached to him, 
and he still possessed the favour of the rest of the people. 
Hence they induced the people to pass a decree, that the 
investigation should be deferred till the termination of the 
Sicilian war. Their secret intention was to devise new 
charges during his absence, and then to get him recalled 
and condemned. 

About the middle of summer the fleet was ready to sail. 
The whole population of Athens accompanied the warriors 
down to Piraeus. Their minds were agitated by hope and 
fear, for Athens was now committing to the perils of a long 



424 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXIV, 



voyage and a distant war a large portion of her wealth and 
strength : the citizens had rivalled one another in equipping 
the ships as splendidly as possible ; the warriors wore their 
best armour, so that the whole armament resembled a 
triumphant military spectacle rather than an expedition 
against an enemy. The greatness of the armament was 
nearly what Nicias had declared to be necessary: 100 
Athenian galleys and 34 of the allies, with 5100 heavy- 
armed (2200 of them Athenians), 480 bowmen, 700 Rhodian 
slingers, 120 light-armed Megarians, and 30 horse. The 
fleet was accompanied by 30 transports and 100 boats. After 
general prayers, in which the soldiers were joined by the 
people on shore, and libations to the gods, the fleet, on which 
Athens rested her boldest hopes, set sail. It first made 
for Aegina, and thence proceeded to Corcyra, the place of 
rendezvous for the other allies. 

Before the fleet left Corcyra, the news of the expedition 
had reached Syracuse, but it was far from being universally 
believed. Hermocrates, who had brought about the peace at 
the congress of G-ela, gave, indeed, the most positive as- 
surance that the Athenians were approaching, and encouraged 
his countrymen to prepare themselves without delay for a 
resolute resistance. At the same time he advised them not 
to wait for the enemy's arrival at Syracuse, but to sail 
towards the coast of Tarentum to meet them, and thus, 
perhaps, to thwart the whole expedition. Athenagoras, on 
the other hand, who was a great favourite with the people, 
acted a part like that once played by Cleon at Athens, ac- 
cusing Hermocrates and the nobles of intentionally frighten- 
ing the people, in order, during the general consternation, to 
further their own oligarchical schemes. At last one of the 
generals declared that they ought at least to prepare them- 
selves for all emergencies. Thus ended the first debates, in 
which the wise counsel of Hermocrates, to go to meet the 
enemy, was overruled. 



CHAP. xxiv. PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATHENIANS. 425 



Meantime the Athenian fleet, divided into three squadrons, 
for the better maintenance of order, sailed from Corcyra. 
Three ships were sent ahead to reconnoitre and ascertain the 
sentiments of the Sicilian and Italian towns, before an attempt 
was made to land. The fleet itself sailed round the lapy- 
gian foreland along the coast. The towns of Italy showed a 
hostile spirit, and allowed the Athenians only to cast anchor 
and to take in water. At Rhegium the fleet halted ; the 
Rhegines did not, indeed, admit the Athenians into their 
town, declaring in general that they would remain neutral, 
and follow the example of the other Italian towns, but they 
supplied them with a market. Soon afterwards the three 
ships arrived from Egesta with the discouraging news that 
there was no trace of the wealth of Egesta, about which the 
first envoys had said so much ; thirty talents was all that could 
be found. This piece of news surprised the generals not a 
little, for it proved that the whole expense of the expedition 
would in the end have to be borne by Athens alone. Nicias, 
therefore, was of opinion that they should straightway proceed 
against Selinus, in order to put an end to the war between 
that town and Egesta, either by force or by persuasion, and 
should induce the Egestans at least to maintain the sixty 
galleys which they had asked for. After this display of their 
power, he advised his colleagues to return, and not to enter 
into a tedious and costly war with Syracuse in behalf ot 
Leontini. Alcibiades, whose prospects of glory and power 
would have been destroyed by such a course, maintained that 
they ought first to try to gain as many allies as possible in 
Sicily, and then, united with them, to advance against 
Selinus and Syracuse, unless they should previously yield to 
their demands. Lamachus, ever ready to fight, thought that 
they ought at once to attack Syracuse, which he hoped to 
take at the first assault. His advice was no doubt the best 
according to our notions, but the manner in which the 
Greeks carried on war must be judged of by a different 



426 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxiv. 



standard. Never throughout the Peloponnesian war do we 
find a direct aiming at a great object, and decisive battles, 
such as those of Delium and Amphipolis, appear to have 
been the results of some accidental necessity. The Greeks 
displayed bravery when they had to fight their way out of 
difficulties, but they do not seem to have known how to carry 
out a bold attack, sword in hand, and an appearance of 
weakness is everywhere manifest. We must not, however, 
forget the difficulties with which the Greeks had to contend 
in war, especially in sieges. 

The opinion of Alcibiades was adopted, just because it 
presented a middle course between those proposed by his col- 
leagues ; and preparations were forthwith made to gain allies 
among the Sicilian towns. Messana refused to admit the 
Athenians, and only consented to offer them a market out- 
side the walls. Naxos was taken ; Catana was seized by sur- 
prise and forced into the alliance ; but Camarina clung to 
the treaty of Gela. During this expedition, the fleet ap- 
peared before Syracuse also, partly to reconnoitre, partly 
to announce the Athenians as the deliverers of the exiled 
Leontines. No attack, however, was made upon Syracuse, 
which was making active preparations, but was not yet 
ready to venture on an open contest. An attempt to land in 
the territory of Syracuse and to carry off plunder was pre- 
vented by a detachment of Syracusan horse, who killed some 
of the scattered light-armed troops of the Athenians. 

Hostilities had thus scarcely commenced, when the Sala- 
minia, the Athenian state-vessel for conveying heralds, 
arrived, to recall Alcibiades from the command of the army, 
and to take him back to Athens to defend himself. For after 
his departure, his enemies had been busy at work : the 
people had been systematically excited into an almost feverish 
state of mind ; an inquiry was set on foot and continued 
without interruption ; everything was believed without 
scrupulous examination, and the most honourable citizens 



CHAP. XXIV. 



RECALL OF ALCIBIADES. 



427 



fell victims to the denunciations of wicked hirelings. The 
exasperation of the people, which was fostered artificially, 
was increased to raging madness by the suggestion that the 
real malefactors had after all not yet been detected. At 
length, one of those already imprisoned, the orator Ando- 
cides, was prevailed upon by the promise of impunity for 
himself to give a complete account of the sacrilege committed 
on the Hermae, in which he confessed himself to be an ac- 
complice. The people rejoiced at this ; and as he confessed 
his own guilt, they had no hesitation in believing his state- 
ments. Of those thus denounced all who could be appre- 
hended were put to death ; those who had escaped were 
sentenced to receive the same punishment, and rewards 
were promised for their heads. 

Peace was thus, to some extent, restored to the heated and 
excited minds of the people. But Alcibiades, whose viola- 
tion of the mysteries had been interpreted as an act no less 
hostile to the people, had not yet been punished. His ene- 
mies had succeeded so far, that the people now regarded their 
former favourite in the light of an odious tyrant, and some 
accidental circumstances increased their exasperation against 
him. While the Lacedaemonians were on the Isthmus of 
Corinth, making preparations for some undertaking against 
the Boeotians, a rumour was spread at Athens, that by the 
advice and with the consent of Alcibiades, they were to in- 
vade Attica, and overthrow the popular government. Oli- 
garchical movements were at the same time observed in 
Argos, and it was supposed that Alcibiades was concerned in 
them also. Under these circumstances, the Salaminia was 
ordered to bring Alcibiades and some others who had like- 
wise been accused to Athens. The proceeding was to be 
conducted with as little noise as possible, because it was well 
known that the army was attached to him. Alcibiades em- 
barked in his own galley and departed from Sicily, accom- 
panied by the Salaminia. Near Thurii, in southern Italy, he 



428 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxiv. 



and the other accused landed and made their escape ; the 
Salaminia, after having for some time in vain searched for 
him, continued her voyage homeward. Soon afterwards 
Alcibiades crossed over to Peloponnesus; but the Athe- 
nians condemned him and the other fugitives to death ; his 
property was confiscated, and the curse pronounced against 
him by the Eumolpids was engraved upon pillars. 

When Alcibiades was gone, the soul of the Sicilian expedi- 
tion was lost ; whatever was undertaken was now carried on 
in a still slower and more tedious manner, and the Syracusans 
soon overcame their fears, seeing that the Athenians at- 
tempted nothing against their city, but proceeded to distant 
districts of the island ; nay, their feeling of security increased 
so much, that they began to treat the Athenians with inso- 
lence and contempt. Nicias had not given up his old plan, 
and Lamachus does not seem to have had sufficient influence 
to oppose him. The army, moreover, was divided into two 
parts, each of which could probably carry on its own opera- 
tions. Thus Lamachus proceeded with the fleet along the 
northern coast towards Egesta, made himself master of the 
town of Hyccara, and carried away its population into 
slavery. Into Himera he had not been able to gain admit- 
tance. At Egesta, only thirty talents were obtained, and 
then the fleet sailed back to Catana, whither the army had in 
the meantime proceeded by land. 

At length, when the winter had already set in, it was re- 
solved to lay siege to Syracuse. Some Syracusans who had 
joined the enemy, had directed the attention of the Athe- 
nians to an excellent place for pitching their camp, near the 
Olympieum, at little more than a mile to the southwest of 
the city. In order to effect a landing there without being 
harassed by the hostile cavalry, the Athenians by a stratagem 
drew the Syracusan forces to Catana ; while they themselves 
sailed by night past Syracuse towards the Olympieum, and 
had time enough to pitch their camp in a very convenient 



CHAP. XXIV. 



BATTLE NEAR ANAPOS. 



429 



place, which was inaccessible to cavalry ; for on the one side 
they were protected by walls, houses, and a marsh, and on 
the other by precipitous heights. At the same time they 
inclosed their ships with a palisade, and near a point called 
Dascon threw up a hasty work, because on that side they 
were most open to attack. The bridge over the Anapos was 
"broken down. The Syracusans did not interfere with the 
Athenians, but pitched their camp on the road to Heloros, 
between the Anapos and Syracuse. On the very next day a 
battle was fought, which the Syracusans had not expected 
so soon. The excellent tactics and skill of the Athenians 
gained the victory over their enemies, who fought with the 
greatest courage ; and a complete defeat was averted only 
by their cavalry. Such a defeat would have been followed at 
once by the fall of Syracuse. The Syracusans lost 250 men, 
the Athenians only 50. Yet, as it was winter, the latter 
thought it advisable to withdraw towards Catana, to provide 
themselves with money, provisions, and horses. Hermocrates 
made a prudent use of this defeat ; he encouraged the army, 
and by his advice the number of military commanders, which 
had hitherto been fifteen, was reduced to five, of whom he 
was one. During the winter, the army was well drilled, and 
envoys were despatched to their kinsmen of Corinth and 
Sparta, to solicit succours. The Athenians in the meantime 
endeavoured to gain over Messana to their alliance, but in 
vain. They then formed a fortified camp in the neighbour- 
hood of Naxos, and while wintering there waited for supplies 
of money and horses from Athens. 

By enclosing the quarter called Temenites within the wall 
running along the western side towards Epipolae, the Syra- 
cusans increased the extent of the city, and thereby rendered 
it more difficult for the enemy to invest. They also strength- 
ened the fort Megara, and the one situated near the Olympi- 
eum, and by fixing poles in the ground on all points of the 
coast where the enemy might attempt to land, they en- 



430 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXIV, 



deavoured to render that operation as troublesome as possible. 
But above all things, they tried to increase the number of 
their allies, and especially to gain over to their side the town 
of Gamarina, whose inhabitants had concluded a treaty with 
Laches, during the first Sicilian war, and were still sus- 
pected of favouring the Athenians. Hermocrates cautioned 
them against the ambitious schemes of the Athenians, the 
natural enemies of all the Sicilians, and especially of the 
Dorian population. He put to them the alternative, either 
to become the subjects of Athens, if the Athenians should 
succeed, or to draw upon themselves the vengeance of Syra- 
cuse, if Syracuse should be victorious. The Athenian Eu- 
phemus, on the other hand, defended the conduct of Athens 
towards her allies and subjects, and excused the severity of 
her measures and rule, by adducing the extent of her do- 
minion. The Camarinaeans, who were anxious to avoid 
offending either party, declared that they wished to remain 
neutral during the war. 

The Athenians also now began to bestir themselves again : 
they left Naxos, and again pitched their camp at Catana ; 
they sent envoys round Sicily, to Carthage, and to the Tyr- 
rhenian towns of Italy to gain allies or subsidies for the war, 
and were busily engaged in preparing the materials for the 
siege, which was to commence at the beginning of spring. 
The less the Syracusans could rely upon the assistance of the 
rest of the Sicilians, who were restrained by their fear 
of the all-engrossing power of Syracuse, the more actively 
were they supported by a state from which they had least 
expected it. 

Alcibiades had sailed over to Cyllene in Elis, and thence 
had proceeded to Sparta, where he was received with marks 
of friendship. Not long afterwards, Syracusan ambassadors 
accompanied by others from Corinth arrived at Sparta, for 
Corinth had at once declared itself ready to assist its kins* 
men in the west. They were joined by Alcibiades, and what 



chap. xxiv. BATTLE OF EPIPOLAE. 



431 



their representations were unable to effect, was brought about 
by the cunning speech of the exile. He plainly told the 
Spartans what were the plans of Athens, the fanciful vastness 
of which had probably no other origin than his own imagi- 
nation, — that after the conquest of Sicily, of Italy, nay of 
Carthage, Athens would exert all her power to conquer Pe- 
loponnesus. In order to check her victorious progress, the 
Spartans, he said, ought to send troops to Syracuse, and 
more especially an able commander, who could discipline and 
control her untrained and reluctant troops ; they ought to 
divide the power of Athens by establishing themselves in 
Attica, making themselves masters of Decelea, and thus carry- 
ing into effect what had long been dreaded, and would be 
most painfully felt by the Athenians. 

The Spartans trusted Alcibiades, for his advice was 
plausible, and they at once resolved to act according to his 
suggestions. They sent Gylippus with a small force to the 
Syracusans, and made preparations for supplying them with 
further assistance. The plan of fortifying Decelea, and es- 
tablishing themselves in the heart of the enemy's country, 
was taken up immediately. Thus ended the seventeenth 
year of the war. 

At the beginning of the spring of b. c. 414, the Athenians 
broke up from Catana to lay siege to Syracuse ; but a con- 
siderable time yet passed away, before the city could be 
completely invested. They first proceeded to lay waste the 
country north of Syracuse, received reinforcements of cavalry 
from Segesta and their other allies, which, with what were 
brought from Athens, increased their cavalry to 650 men. 

The first conflict occurred on the heights of Epipolae ; for 
as the western part of the city was most open to attack, the 
Syracusans had resolved to occupy the heights, which com- 
manded the city on that side, with a body of picked troops, 
under the command of Diomilus. But at the same hour, the 
Athenians had landed near Leon, had disembarked their land- 



432 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXIV. 



army, and withdrawn their fleet to Thapsos, where the 
naval troops remained in a fortified camp. The land-army 
immediately mounted Epipolae at full speed, and reached the 
top called Eryelos, before Diomilus with his force could ar- 
rive from the south. The Syracusans, notwithstanding this, 
advanced in haste and disorder, the Athenians having the 
advantage of the rising ground. The Syracusans were de- 
feated, and Diomilus himself was among the slain. After this 
victory, the Athenians erected a fort on a height called Lab- 
dalon, west of Epipolae, for the security of their baggage 
and treasure. They then advanced against the north- 
western quarter of the city called Syke or Tyche, and 
began actively to carry on the work of circumvallation. 
The besieged, struck with alarm at their rapid progress, en- 
deavoured to interrupt the work by force ; but they were 
defeated a second time, and now directed all their thoughts 
to erecting a counterwork across the line of the intended 
circumvallation. This too was destroyed by the Athe- 
nians, who in the meantime continued their wall south- 
ward through the marshy plain towards the great harbour. 
The besieged, not yet wholly disheartened, carried a new 
counterwork, south of the first, across the plain. This again 
was taken and pulled down by the Athenians. Lamachus,, 
who commanded the right wing, and wished to cut off the 
flight of the enemy's left wing across the Anapos, was slain. 
The Syracusans, encouraged by this event, even attempted to 
surprise the Athenian lines on Epipolae ; but Nicias, quickly 
hastening with his men to the spot, prevented it : the Athe- 
nian fleet had at the same time sailed from Thapsos round 
Achradina and Ortygia, and had entered the great harbour. 
At this moment the whole army of the besieged threw itself 
into the city, and the circumvallation was completed. This 
success gained over many of the Sicilians as allies of Athens, 
and even some Tyrrhenians were induced to join them. Pro- 
visions arrived from all parts, and the army, now under the 



chap. xxiv. ARRIVAL OF GYLIPPUS. 



433 



sole command of Nicias, was animated by the hope of certain 
victory. The spirits of the besieged, on the other hand, were 
so depressed, that they began to think of peace, and in their 
despondency they became unjust, for Hermocrates and two 
of his colleagues were deposed, and three new men, Hera- 
clides, Eucles, and Tellias, were appointed their successors. 

Such was the state of affairs when Gylippus, the Lacedae- 
monian, was on the point of sailing with a few ships from 
Leucas to Syracuse. On receiving intelligence of the con- 
dition of that city, he gave up all hope of saving Sicily, and 
only thought of reaching Italy. A storm, which considerably 
injured his ships, delayed his voyage. At Locri, however, he 
learnt that it was still possible to reach Syracuse, and he ac- 
cordingly determined to fulfil his mission. He escaped from 
the four ships which Nicias had sent out against him, and 
landed near Himera, on the north coast of Sicily. Great 
numbers soon gathered around him ; his very arrival excited 
the hope of a vigorous support from Sparta, and Dorians as 
well as Sicels flocked to his standard. Having gathered an 
army of about 3000 men from Himera, Selinus, and other 
Sicilian towns, he marched southward towards Syracuse. 
His arrival had already been announced by Gongylus, a 
Corinthian commander, who had hastened to Syracuse from 
Leucas, where the Corinthian fleet was assembled. His re- 
presentations had changed the minds of the Syracusans, and 
put aside all thoughts of peace. The Syracusans boldly went 
out to meet Gylippus, who succeeded in gaining the heights 
of Epipolae, and having effected a junction with the Syra- 
cusans, he marched against the fortifications of the Athenians. 
Towards the great harbour the works were nearly completed, 
and in the north, towards the port of Trogilos, all the ne- 
cessary materials were in readiness for use. 



u 



434 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxv. 



CHAPTER XXV. 

THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION, FROM THE ARRIVAL OF GYLIPPUS TO ITS 

CLOSE. 

At the time when Gylippus arrived befor.e Syracuse, hos- 
tilities had also commenced between Sparta and Athens on 
the continent. The Lacedaemonians made a predatory ex- 
pedition into the territory of Argos, and the Athenians 
coming to the assistance of the Argives with thirty ships, 
ravaged Epidaurus Limera, and Prasiae - — the most manifest 
breach of the peace that had yet been committed. The La- 
cedaemonians no longer hesitated ; Decelea was soon after- 
wards in their hands, and fortune began to favour them 
decidedly. 

The arrival of Gylippus changed the aspect of affairs in 
Sicily no less decisively, to the disadvantage of the Athenians. 
They were not only interrupted in completing their walls, 
but lost their stores at Labdalon, and Nicias soon discovered 
that the war carried on by land would not lead to the desired 
issue, and that the decision must now depend upon the fleet. 
The part of the wall extending towards the great harbour, 
which was already completed, was raised higher, and oc- 
cupied by a number of troops sufficient to defend it. But 
Nicias also fortified the headland of Plemmyrion, and there 
he assembled his army, his fleet, and his stores. By this 
operation he entirely gave up the land side of Syracuse. 
The Syracusan cavalry commanded the whole district, and 
did much mischief to the Athenian sailors whenever they 
went on shore to provide themselves with water or wood, the 
third part of the cavalry being stationed near Polichae, south 
of the Olympieum, for the purpose of preventing the enemy's 
predatory excursions. Gylippus, in the meantime, vigo- 



chap. xxv. DIFFICULTIES OF THE ATHENIANS. 435 

rously prosecuted the building of a counter-work, which was 
to be carried across Epipolae, and to cut off the double wall 
of the Athenians. In addition to this he trained his troops 
and drew them up every day in battle array. In the first 
battle which the Athenians accepted, they gained a victory, 
because the Syracusan cavalry could not operate in the 
narrow space between the walls. But in the second engage- 
ment, the Athenians were driven back into the fortifications 
of Plemmyrion, in consequence of which the counter-wall of 
the Syracusans was completed without further interruption ; 
so that it now became impossible for the Athenians wholly 
to invest the city. 

The successes of the Syracusans since the arrival of Gy- 
lippus induced the Sicilians and Siceliots, who had previously 
been hesitating, or even hostile, to embrace the cause of the 
Syracusans. The allies of the Athenians were almost con- 
fined to Naxos and Catana, which were too weak to afford 
any active assistance. Moreover, thirty galleys from Corinth, 
Leucas, and Ambracia, arrived unmolested and safely in the 
harbour of Syracuse. The Syracusans themselves also 
manned their ships for the approaching and decisive contest, 
and again sent to Sparta and Corinth to solicit reinforce- 
ments. 

All these events had placed Nicias in a most dangerous 
position. His ships being obliged to be constantly out at 
sea, became leaky; a number of his soldiers and marines 
deserted, and the naval service had to some extent to be 
entrusted to inexperienced slaves. Nicias felt that he and 
his army which had come to lay siege to Syracuse, were 
themselves besieged. In this distress he wrote to the people 
of Athens, requiring them to send him reinforcements at the 
beginning of spring. He himself desired to be recalled, 
because -the state of his health rendered him unfit to discharge 
the duties of a commander. The latter request was refused 
by the people, but they appointed Demosthenes and Eury- 

u 2 



438 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXV. 



medon as his colleagues, and immediately despatched the 
latter with ten galleys and twenty talents of silver to Sicily, 
while the former began to raise a larger army for the spring. 
The report of the fresh preparations of Athens at length de- 
termined the Lacedaemonians to act, and having got every- 
thing ready during the winter, they invaded Attica in the 
be ginning of B.C. 413, under the command of their king 
Agis. They first laid waste the fields in the neighbourhood, 
and then established themselves at Decelea, so that their for- 
tifications could be seen from Athens. This was a second 
great blow for Athens, and a more troublesome one than the 
defeat of Syracuse, which was soon to be added to their mis- 
fortunes. Athens was, as it were, in a constant state of 
siege, and the Athenians were obliged to be continually in 
arms to guard the walls. The incessant ravages of the 
country produced a dearth of provisions, and the supplies 
which had formerly been brought from Euboea by Oropos 
and Decelea, became more expensive, in consequence of being 
conveyed round Sunion. The double war increased the ex- 
penditure enormously, while the revenues were diminished. 
In short, Athens was soon reduced to a sad condition, and 
the influence of its outward misfortunes was manifested in 
discontent with the internal affairs of the state. The conse- 
quence of this was the overthrow of the existing constitution. 

For the purpose of making some reprisals, Charicles sailed 
with thirty galleys to the coast of Laconia, where he was 
soon joined by the army of Demosthenes, which was destined 
to proceed to Sicily. They succeeded in establishing them- 
selves in a place opposite to the island of Cythera, and in 
raising a fort like that still maintained at Pylos. After this 
Demosthenes sailed to Corcyra to collect reinforcements, but 
before he arrived at Syracuse, Nicias had suffered another 
severe loss. 

Gylippus, who during a visit to the interior of Sicily had 
found new resources for Syracuse, was joined by Hermocrates 



chap. xxv. NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS AT SYRACUSE. 437 

in urging upon the Syracusans the necessity of venturing 
upon a naval engagement. They yielded to these repre- 
sentations and made the attempt, sailing with thirty-five 
galleys out of the great harbour, while forty-five others were 
ordered to come round from the lesser harbour, north of 
Ortygia. The Athenians quickly manned sixty galleys, and 
sailed out with twenty- five to meet the thirty-five Syracusan 
ships, while the rest were to operate against those which 
were coming round Ortygia. The battle was fought at the 
entrance of the great harbour; the Athenians gained the 
victory and sunk eleven ships : but when the conquerors 
sailed back to their station near Plemmyrion, they found 
Plemmyrion itself in the hands of G-ylippus, who had set 
his army in motion at the same time as the fleet sailed out, 
and had surprised the Athenian land forces, which were 
anxiously intent upon the issue of the naval engagement. 
Large quantities of provisions and military stores fell into 
the hands of the conquerors ; but the worst result of these 
events was, that the obtaining of provisions by sea now 
became extremely difficult, and not to be accomplished 
without fighting. The Syracusans, notwithstanding their 
first defeat, had become emboldened at sea, and did serious 
injury to the besiegers by successful predatory excursions. 
The Athenians, indeed, succeeded in destroying the palisades 
made by the Syracusans for their own protection, but new 
ones were forthwith constructed ; nay, the zeal and eagerness 
of the besieged to encounter the naval power of their enemies 
had become so ardent, that soon afterwards, but before the 
arrival of Demosthenes, they fought a second naval battle, 
which lasted several days, and at last obliged the Athenians 
to retreat behind their fortifications. The loss of the latter, 
and the injury done to their fleet, were not inconsiderable, but 
the worst result of the engagement was that they had lost the 
reputation of being invincible at sea, for the Syracusans now 
felt certain that their fleet would soon be a match for that of 

u 3 



438 



HISTORY OP GREECE. chap. xxv. 



the Athenians ; and there was good reason for expecting to 
overcome them by land. The Athenians, indeed, still main- 
tained their fortifications south of Temenites, but the vi- 
gorous attacks of Gylippus, who carried on his operations 
not only during the sea-fights, but at all other times, ren- 
dered their situation extremely difficult and dangerous. The 
influx of reinforcements also to Syracuse from all parts of 
Sicily increased daily, and became very formidable. 

At this critical moment Demosthenes and Eurymedon 
arrived with a fleet of 73 galleys and 5000 heavy-armed, 
about 1200 of whom were Athenians, many light-armed 
troops, and a sufficient quantity of supplies. The alarm of 
the Syracusans was great, as they had not thought it possible 
for Athens, involved as she was in two wars, to send out 
such a force. The hopes of the Athenians revived ; Demos- 
thenes resolved to attack the enemy at once, in order to avoid 
falling into the condition of Nicias, who, he thought, had 
ruined the reputation of Athens. Still some days passed 
away, during which the valley of the Anapos was laid waste ; 
an unsuccessful attack was then made upon the cross wall of 
the Syracusans, and Demosthenes at length determined to 
recover Epipolae, which Gylippus had taken from Nicias. 
He began the attack shortly before midnight, and the army 
victoriously mounted the height, no great resistance being 
offered by the enemy, who were surprised and stupified by 
the suddenness of the assault. A portion of the wall was 
already pulled down, and the victory seemed decided ; but 
the army advanced in too much disorder, imagining that all 
might be gained by one bold stroke. Some Boeotians among 
the Syracusan forces were the first to make a stand and repel 
the advancing enemy ; fortune now turned, and the joyous 
hope of victory was destroyed. The darkness of the night, the 
wild shouting of the combatants, the betrayed watchword of 
the Athenians, the same war-cry (for Dorians were fighting 
on both sides), and especially the restoration of order among 



chap. xxv. DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS. 



439 



the forces of Gylippus, produced incredible confusion in the 
army of the Athenians, who injured and hindered one another 
more than the swords of their opponents. Thus this noc- 
turnal battle ended in the complete defeat of the auxiliary 
army of the Athenians ; those who did not know their way 
were cut down by the scattered horsemen, but the older 
soldiers escaped to the camp. The loss of arms was greater 
than even that of men, because the fugitives were obliged to 
throw themselves down the heights of Epipolae. 

This new and unexpected piece of good fortune increased 
the courage of the Syracusans to such a degree, that they 
even began to think of making conquests in Sicily. The 
Athenian generals, on the other hand, were disheartened, 
and diseases among the troops added to the hopelessness of 
their condition. Demosthenes, therefore, was of opinion that 
it was expedient to raise the siege, and return home before 
it was too late, and to assist in driving the enemy from 
Attica. Nicias, too, would have been glad to adopt this 
plan, but he did not conceal from his colleagues that it was 
dangerous to allow the army to see their despondency, or to 
appear before the fickle people at Athens without having 
achieved something brilliant ; he added, that their men, 
however ready to return home, would be sure afterwards to 
come forward as their accusers. He also knew and said, that 
the finances of Syracuse were in a bad condition, and that it 
could not possibly sustain the siege much longer; that a 
party of the Syracusans, favourable to the cause of Athens, 
wished the Athenians to remain ; and lastly, that reliance 
might still be placed on the fleet. Although his colleagues 
yielded to these arguments, yet Demosthenes, with the con- 
currence of Eurymedon, recommended that they should quit 
their narrow and unfavourable position, and continue the 
siege from the north, where it would be easier to obtain 
supplies of provisions ; but neither did this plan meet with 
the approval of Nicias. The discussion lasted for some time, 

U 4 



440 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXV. 



but the army and fleet remained where certain destruction 
awaited them. 

Soon afterwards, however, Nicias also changed his mind, 
for Gylippus had obtained new and important reinforce- 
ments from Sicily ; from Peloponnesus, too, heavy-armed 
men had arrived, and the Syracusans at once prepared for a 
fresh attack. The signal was given for departure, which 
was to take place without the knowledge of the enemy, when 
an eclipse of the moon took place, and superstition prevented 
that which all desired. Moreover, the Syracusans had re- 
ceived information of the design of the Athenians, and they 
were now so confident of their own superiority, that they 
determined not to allow the enemy to escape. They actively 
drilled their sailors and soldiers, and then advanced with 
seventy-six galleys against the place where the Athenians 
were stationed, whilst the land-army marched against their 
fortifications. The Athenian fleet, amounting to eighty - 
seven ships, was completely defeated. Eurymedon, who 
commanded the left wing, endeavouring to evade the ene- 
mies' ships, approached too near the coast, his retreat was 
cut off, and he himself was slain. The other ships fled in 
confusion towards their protected naval camp. In order to 
destroy these also, Gylippus sailed along the coast, but the 
Tyrrhenians, who kept watch there, offered a brave resist- 
ance, until the Athenians, hastening to the spot, defeated 
and routed the army, and succeeded in protecting the rem- 
nant of their fleet, and rendering a fireship, which was sent 
against it, harmless. 

But their loss was, nevertheless, great ; eighteen ships had 
been taken, and all their crews put to death : the army was 
nearly in despair. The state of things had been so much 
changed, that the besieged now aimed at nothing short of 
annihilating the army of the besiegers. They conceived the 
bold hope of liberating the Athenian allies and subjects, of 
overthrowing the most powerful state, and of gaining for 



CHAP. xxv. PREPARATIONS FOR FINAL CONFLICT. 441 



themselves that glory and power which would raise them to 
the rank of a state of the first order. 

Immediately after their naval victory they determined to 
close the entrance to their great harbour by a line of galleys, 
transports, and small boats, and made active preparations for 
another sea-fight. The Athenian commanders held a con- 
sultation ; they knew that the approaching struggle would 
determine their fate, and made their arrangements accord- 
ingly. The fortifications which they had erected farther 
inland were given up ; all the implements, and those who 
were unable to take part in the battle, were conveyed to a 
place as near as possible to the ships. A great part of the 
land-army was ordered to embark in the fleet ; for it was 
Nicias' plan to change the sea-fight into a land-fight. With 
this view he took precautions against the dangerous batter- 
ing poles of the enemies' ships, and provided his own galleys 
with grappling irons, or iron hands, to detain the adversaries' 
vessels till they should be boarded and taken. When all the 
fleet, amounting to 110 galleys, was manned and ready for 
the contest, Nicias exhorted his troops to do their best, since 
everything, both there and in Attica, was at stake. 

Gylippus had been informed of all these arrangements, 
and also knew that it was the plan of the land-army, in case 
of a defeat, to take refuge in some town that might be 
favourably disposed towards Athens. He furnished his 
ships with hides to render the grappling irons useless ; and 
before the beginning of the battle he cheered his men on to 
the last contest with an army which had already lost its 
courage and confidence in itself, which deserved no mercy, 
but only vengeance and punishment, and which, owing to the 
great number of ships, would probably work its own ruin in 
the limited space it had for its operations. 

After Nicias, in his fear and alarm, had once more ad 
dressed each officer separately, the battle commenced. He 
himself remained with the land-army, which was drawn up 

u 5 



442 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxv. 



in a long line on the coast. Gylippus, with his Syracusans, 
was stationed near the harbour, and the exhortations and 
threats of the hostile commanders could be distinctly heard. 
The contest, which was carried on with the greatest exas- 
peration on both sides, was for a long time undecided; at 
length, the Athenian ships retreated towards the coast. The 
marines were here and there seen leaping from the ships, and 
hastening towards the camp. The land-army broke up in 
utter confusion ; some amid wailing and lamentations hurried 
to assist the ships, others sought shelter behind the remnants 
of the fortifications, but most of the men fled at random. 
Never before had an Athenian army been in such a state of 
dissolution. Nearly half the fleet was destroyed ; and the 
Athenians even forgot to ask for the surrender of their dead 
and their wrecks ; all they wished was to depart as speedily 
as possible. But the Syracusan fleet of eighty sail had 
been reduced to fifty ; and hence Demosthenes urged the ex- 
pediency of attempting to force their way out to sea with the 
remaining ships ; but the crews refused to return on board, 
and thus at last all agreed to retreat by land. 

Hermocrates, by a stratagem, induced the Athenians not 
to commence their retreat that same night. By this means, 
the Syracusans gained time to occupy all the roads an& 
passes through which the enemy must march. At the same 
time they took possession of the fleet, of which the Athenians 
in their hurry had burnt only a small part. It was not till 
the third day after the sea-fight, that the Athenian army 
broke up : what a contrast between its first starting from 
Piraeus and this last and desperate attempt to escape with 
their lives ! Even the dead remained unburied — a thing 
unprecedented in Greek history — -and the wounded, who 
were left behind, envied the dead. This was the most fear- 
ful reverse ever sustained by a Greek army. Nothing was 
so heart-rending as the parting from the wounded and the 



chap. XXV. RETREAT OF THE ATHENIANS. 



443 



sick, whose cries and lamentations filled the air. But the 
army still amounted to 40,000. 

Nicias comforted and encouraged his men, and restored 
order as well as he could ; the army marched in the form of 
a hollow square, Nicias commanding the van. and Demos- 
thenes the rear, the baggage being in the centre. They 
forced the passage of the Anapos, and marched that day about 
five miles to the west ; during the night they encamped 
on an eminence. On the following day they advanced 
only half as far as on the first, but in the same direction, 
and pitched their camp in a cultivated plain, for the sake 
of collecting provisions and laying in a supply of water. 
The Syracusans, who throughout the march had greatly 
harassed them, now occupied a hill which the Athenians had 
to pass. On the next day, the latter suffered much from 
the Syracusan cavalry, and were obliged to retreat to the 
place where they had encamped during the preceding night. 
The cavalry also cut off their supplies. For two days they 
endeavoured to storm the hill and the enemy's fortifications, 
but were always repulsed. Nicias and Demosthenes then 
resolved to lead the army by another road towards the 
coast. In the night after the last engagement, they kindled 
many fires, and departed in a south-eastern direction. During 
this retreat more than half of Demosthenes' troops dispersed ; 
Nicias and the rest reached the coast about daybreak, and took 
the road of Heloros, with the view of afterwards proceeding 
up the river Erineus into the interior of the country. At the 
dawn of day, the Syracusans, discovering that the enemy had 
escaped, hastily broke up, and before noon overtook the 
division of Demosthenes. He was forced to draw up his 
troops in order of battle ; the pursuers had shut him up in a 
narrow district, and attacked him incessantly on all sides. 
When the Syracusans perceived that the enemy was suffi- 
ciently weakened, they, by a proclamation, invited all the 

u 6 



444 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXV. 



Sicilians to come over to them, promising that they should 
retain their liberty. Few, however, accepted this offer. 
Demosthenes and the other troops were then summoned to 
surrender their arms, on condition that none of them should 
suffer a violent death. All, 6000 in number, accepted these 
terms, and laid down their arms. Nicias, who was some- 
what in advance of Demosthenes, crossed the Erineus on the 
same day, and encamped on an eminence. On the following 
day, he was overtaken by Gylippus, and learnt the fate of 
Demosthenes. At first he did not believe the report, and 
made another proposal ; but the Syracusans refused to listen 
to it, attacked his army on all sides, and continued doing so 
throughout the day. In the night, the Athenians endeavoured 
to proceed on their march, but the enemy observed their 
movements, and only 300 succeeded in leaving the camp ; and 
even they were afterwards captured with the rest. Next day, 
Nicias continued his march, and hastened towards the river 
Assinaros, partly to escape from the pursuing enemy, but 
more especially to quench the burning thirst of the soldiers. 
In their eagerness to drink, they rushed into the river 
in the greatest disorder ; the wildest confusion arose ; the 
men fought for the water and crushed one another, while 
the enemy on the banks attacked them with showers of 
missiles. 

At length, Nicias also surrendered to Gylippus at discre- 
tion. The army had by this time become greatly reduced ; 
for during the last few days incredible losses had been sus- 
tained, and many had deserted. The captive Athenians and 
their allies were sent into the quarries at Achradina and 
Epipolae ; their treatment was most cruel : they lived 
crowded together in a pestilential atmosphere (for the dead 
were not removed), and the scanty food they received only 
increased their torments. After seventy days, the survivors, 
except the Athenians and the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, 
were sold as slaves. The whole number of prisoners had 



chap. xxv. DEATH OF NICIAS AND DEMOSTHENES. 445 

amounted to about 7000. The generals, Nicias and Demos- 
thenes, notwithstanding the efforts of Gylippus to save 
them, were put to death. Both, especially Demosthenes, 
were men worthy of a better fate. 

Thus ended an undertaking, which, in the opinion of Thu- 
cydides, was the greatest, not only in the Peloponnesian war, 
but in any war that had ever been carried on. The defeat 
of the Athenians was fearful and far beyond all precedent. 



446 



HISTORY OP GREECE. chap. xxvi. 



CHAPTER XXVI. 

FROM THE CLOSE OF THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION TO THE RESTORATION 
OF ALCIBIADES. 

When the news of this irreparable loss reached Athens, it 
was at first disbelieved. Plutarch relates that the matter 
was first mentioned by a stranger in a barber's shop in 
Piraeus. The barber hastened to the archons, and repeated 
before them and the assembled people what he had just heard. 
The archons ordered him to be tortured as an impostor who 
could not state his authority ; but at length the soldiers, 
who had escaped from Sicily, brought full and accurate 
information. When the Athenians were thus forced to 
believe that all was lost, they became desponding and dis- 
heartened, and the orators who had recommended the expe- 
dition, the priests and soothsayers who had inaugurated it, 
were the first that were made to feel the indignation of the 
people. It was the most critical moment in the whole his- 
tory of Athens. A few months before, she had been at the 
height of her power and hopes ; but now she felt powerless 
and unable to resist a direct and bold attack of any enemy. 
Her enemies, however, were the slow and cautious Dorians, 
while the Athenians were easily comforted and roused to 
cherish new hopes and plans. Thus it happened that 
Athens, although in a most deplorable condition, yet thought 
of continuing the war, and preserving the power she still 
possessed. The people showed themselves great and mode- 
rate ; in all that had to be immediately done they trusted to 
the counsel of older men, and consented to make several 
economising arrangements in the administration, in order to 
supply the place of the lost fleet and army. The tribute was 



ch. xxvi. DISPOSITION OF THE ATHENIAN ALLIES. 447 

raised to one-twentieth*; but even this did not suffice, and 
at last the 1000 talents, which Pericles had laid aside as a 
reserve-fund, were appropriated. 

Thus the war which Sparta did not venture to bring to a 
close by a bold stroke, was continued, with varying success, 
for nine years longer. This last act of the great drama is 
commonly called the Decelean war, from the uninterrupted 
occupation of Decelea by the Lacedaemonians. The prin- 
cipal scenes of the war, however, were the sea and the coasts 
of Asia Minor, for through the Sicilian war Sparta had be- 
come a maritime power, and henceforth her intention was to 
destroy the naval resources of Athens, and above all things to 
deprive her of her allies and her fleet. Under the command 
of Lysander, who soon began to act a prominent part, Sparta 
quickly reached the height of her maritime power. 

The influence of the Sicilian calamity upon the relation 
between Athens and her allies, very soon became manifest. 
The latter felt themselves relieved from the threatening 
danger of being reduced to the condition of subjects ; and 
believing Athens to be too weak and too near her downfal to 
present much resistance to their wishes, they were ready to 
revolt. While the two leading states were preparing for the 
renewal and energetic continuation of the war, and the active 
king Agis directed his attention particularly to the formation 
of a great fleet, several of the most powerful allies of Athens 
were negotiating with him during the winter about their 
revolt. Agis was applied to especially by the Euboeans, 
whose fidelity to Athens was a matter of the highest im- 
portance, and by Lesbos. The Spartans gladly promised 
and prepared to support them* Chios and Erythrae on the 
opposite coast referred their case at once to the government 
of Sparta. With them there also appeared envoys of Tissa- 
phernes, the Persian satrap of the maritime provinces (Ionia, 

* ElKovr-f]. The dKofXToXoyoi were the collectors of this odious tax. 



448 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxvi. 



Lydia, and Caria), and of Pharnabazus, satrap on the Helles- 
pont. Both proposed to deprive Athens of the towns tributary 
to her, and to gain over the Spartans to the interest of the 
king of Persia, hoping to be thereby enabled to pay to the king 
the arrears of their tribute. The Lacedaemonians resolved 
to send succours first to the Chians and to Tissaphernes ; but 
the execution of the decree was delayed till the following 
year, B.C. 412, and would perhaps not have been carried into 
effect at all,, had not Alcibiades urged them to quick and 
resolute action ; for as the Athenians had in the meantime 
defeated the Corinthian fleet, and Gylippus on returning 
from Syracuse had had a severe encounter off Sunium, and 
reached Corinth with difficulty, the Spartans had again lost 
their confidence. Alcibiades sailed with five ships under the 
command of Chalcideus to Chios, where the oligarchical 
party had made all the necessary preparations. By repre- 
sentations of a larger fleet which was to follow, the small 
force of the Spartans succeeded in inducing the people to 
renounce their alliance with Athens. Their example was 
soon followed by Erythrae and Clazomenae, which forthwith 
commenced military preparations. The news of the revolt 
of Chios, one of their most important allies, roused the Athe- 
nians, who were at first somewhat cast down, to take active 
measures. Yet neither Strombichides, who pursued Chal- 
cideus with eight ships, nor Thrasycles, who came up with a 
reinforcement of twelve galleys, was able to check the 
progress of the skilful Alcibiades. Teos surrendered to 
Erythraean and Clazomenian troops, and lost its walls ; be- 
fore the Athenian fleet could approach, Miletus was in the 
hands of Alcibiades, who in his unbounded ambition en- 
deavoured to gain over all, or most of the allies of Athens, 
before the arrival of the great Peloponnesian fleet. Imme- 
diately after these events the first treaty between the Persian 
king and Sparta was concluded by Tissaphernes and Chal- 



c iap. xxvi. THE WAR IN ASIA MINOR. 449 

cideus ; it was directed against Athens, and restored to the 
king the tributary towns of Asia Minor. Thus had Sparta 
completely forgotten the Persian wars and their object. 

A new reinforcement of sixteen galleys, commanded by 
Diomedon, arrived from Athens, Although a Chian fleet 
was put to flight by them, yet the Chians did not cool in their 
zeal, but tried to get as many associates as possible in their 
revolt from Athens. They first gained over Lebedos and 
Erae, two coast-towns north of Samos, and soon afterwards 
Lesbos also joined them. Meantime, off Piraeon, the Pelo- 
ponnesian fleet had successfully fought its way through the 
surrounding ships of the Athenians, and under the command 
of Astyochus had sailed to Chios. But the Athenians, too, 
were active ; they had gradually sent a considerable fleet and 
army into those quarters, and by a series of rapid attacks 
they compelled most of the revolted towns to return to their 
allegiance. In this manner they first recovered Lesbos, and 
Teos was forced to observe at least a sort of neutrality. 
Clazomenae surrendered after its citadel, Polichna, had 
been taken by the Athenians. Chalcideus, the Lacedae- 
monian commander, also was defeated and slain by them near 
Panormos, in the territory of Miletus ; the wealthy and 
flourishing island of Chios was laid waste, and the Chians 
themselves were beaten in several engagements. Late in the 
summer a large force arrived at Samos from Athens, under 
the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironides, who 
forthwith proceeded to attack Miletus. A battle ensued, in 
which Tissaphernes and Alcibiades took part ; each party 
claimed the victory, for the Athenians routed the Pelo- 
ponnesian auxiliaries, while the Milesians and Alcibiades 
defeated the Argives, the allies of the Athenians. The 
Athenians were already preparing for a siege and blockade 
of the city, when an auxiliary fleet arrived from Syracuse. 
Phrynichus now thought it advisable not to venture on a 



450 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxvi. 



decisive contest, and retreated to Samos, a step which, in the 
opinion of Thucydides, was wise. The Argives, however, 
mortified by their recent defeat, returned home. 

On the continent of Asia, the Spartans and their allies 
remained in possession of Miletus, and at the instigation of 
Tissaphernes made themselves masters of lasos, a coast-town 
south of Miletus. Afterwards they succeeded in gaining 
over Ehodes also. Tissaphernes gave the pay which he had 
promised, and a new treaty was concluded between him and 
the Spartans, in which the supplies in money to be provided 
by the king were expressly mentioned, but which in other 
respects was the same as the first. At sea, the Athenians 
had, on the whole, the ascendancy ; they prevented a second 
revolt of Lesbos, and established themselves in Delphinion, not 
far from the city of Chios, which they reduced to a state of 
extreme distress. Another part of the fleet appeared several 
times before Miletus, without gaining any particular advan- 
tage. But their superiority at sea was somewhat checked by 
the arrival of a new fleet from Sparta. This fleet brought 
eleven commissioners to examine the treaties, and at the 
same time to watch the conduct of Astyochus. They found 
the two treaties concluded with Tissaphernes unsatisfactory, 
and considered it impossible to carry them into effect ; 
Lichas, one of the eleven, urged the conclusion of a fresh 
treaty, which should secure the independence of the Greek 
towns. A third agreement was soon afterwards actually con- 
cluded ; in it Asia alone was described as the property of the 
king, who promised his allies provisions, and the support of 
a Phoenician fleet. But although the new Lacedaemonian 
fleet, commanded by Antisthenes, seemed to commence a 
victorious career by defeating Charminus and conquering 
Rhodes, yet the state of things soon assumed a different 
aspect. Even Tissaphernes had become dissatisfied, because 
the commissioners refused to ratify the treaty which had been 
concluded ; but presently a still more powerful friend deserted 



chap. xxvi. INTEIGUES OF ALCIBIADES. 



451 



the Spartans and went over to the Athenians. This was 
Alcibiades. Hated by Agis on account of a personal injury, 
and suspected by the Peloponnesians ever since the battle of 
Miletus, he made his escape, fled to Tissaphernes, and easily 
persuaded him to diminish the support and subsidies which 
he had hitherto given to the Spartans. He convinced him 
that it was not to his own and the king's interest to allow the 
Spartans to gain the upper hand, but that it would be much 
more advantageous to allow them and the Athenians to weaken 
each other by a protracted war. Tissaphernes followed the 
counsel of his prudent adviser, and the rising naval power of 
Sparta received a severe check from the equivocal conduct of 
the Persian satrap. 

Alcibiades, however, in giving this advice to the barbarian 
had been thinking chiefly of himself and of his return to 
Athens. His object was to see his own country so far 
weakened and humbled as to consider it necessary and useful 
to recal him from exile. With this view he had taken care 
to let the Athenians at Samos see on what intimate terms he 
was with Tissaphernes, and had proposed to them to gain the 
satrap over to their side, and to return to Athens if an oli- 
garchical government were instituted, under which he himself 
could take a part in the management of affairs. These over- 
tures were not displeasing to the Athenian nobles at Samos : 
many already fancied themselves at the head of an oligarchy, 
and even the men of the popular party, who were present, 
were tempted by the prospect of Persian gold to sacrifice the 
sovereignty of the people. Phrynichus, the commander-in- 
chief, was alone against the scheme, for he saw through the 
selfish designs of Alcibiades, who in reality cared nothing 
about any particular form of government, but only about his 
own return ; and it was clear to Phrynichus that by such a 
change Athens would undermine her power and influence 
with her remaining allies, while those who had already re- 
volted could hardly be recovered by such an event. 



452 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxvi. 



But when Phrynichus saw that his opinion was overruled, 
and that Pisander was already fixed upon to proceed to 
Athens and make the necessary preparations, he endeavoured 
to render Alcibiades suspected in the eyes of Astyochus and 
Tissaphernes. But in this, too, he failed, and plunged him- 
self into great difficulties, while Alcibiades contrived to win 
over Tissaphernes entirely to the side of Athens, for it was 
just at this time that the satrap felt annoyed at the pro- 
ceedings of Lichas. 

Pisander now went to Athens to communicate the terms 
proposed by Alcibiades. The people were somewhat sur- 
prised and reluctant indeed ; the nobles too, and especially 
the priestly families of the Eumolpidae and Ceryces, were 
vehemently opposed to the return of the man who had 
violated the mysteries. But Pisander persevered, trying to 
persuade every one individually that the prosperity of Athens 
depended solely upon Alcibiades, and on the assistance of the 
king of Persia, the support of both being entirely contingent 
on the adoption of the oligarchical form of government. The 
people yielded, though not without a lurking hope that a 
change might soon occur. Pisander and ten other envoys 
were sent to Tissaphernes and Alcibiades. Phrynichus, who 
had been slandered by Pisander, was deposed, Diomedon and 
Leon being appointed his successors. Immediately on their 
arrival they made an attack upon Rhodes, and then fixed 
their head-quarters in the island of Cos. But Alcibiades, 
acting on behalf of the king of Persia, made such extrava- 
gant demands, that the Athenian commissioners indignantly 
put an end to the negotiation, and returned to Samos. It 
was, in fact, the intention of Alcibiades to prevent the actual 
conclusion of the treaty, but at the same time he did not wish 
Tissaphernes to enter into a new arrangement with the Lace- 
daemonians. Tissaphernes had taken particular notice of 
that portion of Alcibiades' advice which recommended him 
to maintain the balance between the contending parties. 



chap. xxvi. THE OLIGARCHY AT ATHENS. 



453 



Amid these transactions the twentieth year of the war came 
to its close, towards which Oropos in Attica was taken by 
the Boeotians. 

At the very beginning of the following year, b. c. 411, the 
oligarchical government was established at Athens. The 
revolution proceeded very rapidly, and on the whole without 
bloodshed, for the leaders of the movement were men of ac- 
knowledged energy and eminent talent. Pisander and his 
party wished to set up the oligarchy, not only at Athens, but 
also in the allied states. In many places the revolution was 
accomplished, but the consequence was, that those towns be- 
came estranged from Athens, and openly strove to gain entire 
independence. Pisander, according to an understanding with 
the oligarchs at Samos, went to Athens itself, accompanied 
by five other envoys. They no longer reckoned upon Alci- 
biades, who, in the negotiations with Tissaphernes, had acted 
so equivocal a part ; and he, as we shall hereafter see, had 
already formed different plans. 

Meantime, those who were of the same mind, had made 
all the necessary preparations at Athens. Although their 
measures were not marked by any particular violence, they 
had put to death several opponents and popular leaders, who 
openly counteracted their designs, or had contrived to get 
rid of them in other ways. The people were intimidated and 
discouraged, especially because they believed the conspirators 
to be more powerful and numerous than they actually were. 
The latter accordingly found it very easy to spread and in- 
crease the distrust and fear that prevailed among the people. 
All being thus ready, and every hostile demonstration kept 
down, Pisander, as soon as he arrived, came forward with his 
proposals ; ten men with unlimited power were elected, who 
were to submit a series of new laws to the assembled people. 
They summoned the people to meet at Colonos, and decreed 
first of all, that any one should be entitled to propose, with 
impunity, any change in the constitution. Pisander then 



454 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxvi. 



proposed to appoint five presidents, who were to select one 
hundred men, each of whom was again to nominate three. 
The 400 thus elected were to take possession of the senate- 
house, to rule with unlimited power, and to convene the 
5000 citizens, to whom the franchise was limited, whenever 
they should think fit. Pisander, the celebrated orator An- 
tiphon, Phrynichus, and Theramenes, were the chief pro- 
moters of this oligarchical scheme, which was imposed upon 
the free people of Athens exactly 100 years after the ex- 
pulsion of the Pisistratids. The Four Hundred, meeting with 
no resistance, took possession of the senate-house, paying 
to the 500 senators their full salary for the remaining period 
of their oifice, divided themselves into prytanies, observed 
the customary religious ceremonies, and carried on the 
government with great energy. All their thoughts and efforts 
were directed towards a speedy conclusion of peace with 
Sparta. King Agis, to whom they applied first, had no con- 
fidence in the recent political arrangements ; he even made 
an expedition against the city, but was repulsed, and found 
out that, after all, the new government was well organised. 

At the same time, the oligarchs deputed ten of their num- 
ber to Sam os to gain over the army to the new order of 
things ; but it was there that the first impulse was given to 
the measures for the restoration of democracy. The oligar- 
chical party at Samos, three hundred in number, harboured 
the design of overthrowing the popular government. They 
were supported in this scheme by Charminus, the Athenian 
commander, and some others. But the popular party applied 
to the generals of the Athenian army, Leon and Diomedon 
(the successors of Phrynichus and Scironides) ; who, in con- 
junction with Thrasybulus, then commanding a galley, and 
Thrasyllus, an officer in the army, both decided friends of the 
popular cause, prevailed upon the army, especially the crew 
of the Paralos, to defend the cause of the Samian as well as 
of the Athenian people. When, therefore, the Three Hundred 



chap. xxvi. DEMOCRATIC REACTION AT SAMOS. 455 

made the contemplated attack, they were overcome by the 
Samians and Athenians : thirty were killed, three only were 
exiled, the rest submitted to the popular government. A 
galley despatched to Athens with the news of these events, 
did not arrive there until the Four Hundred were already in- 
stalled. The crew of the galley were apprehended, some 
were thrown into prison, and the others were sent to a fort 
in Euboea. Chaereas, the commander of the galley, how- 
ever, escaped to Samos, and there gave a fearful descrip- 
tion of the blood-thirsty conduct of the Four Hundred ; he 
thus led the fleet and the army to bind themselves by a 
solemn oath to remain faithful to the old constitution : they 
moreover resolved, that, as they were strong enough by them- 
selves, they would, if necessary, renounce Athens and con- 
quer a new home. At the same time, Thrasybulus and 
Thrasylius, who were the soul of the whole democratic move- 
ment, were appointed generals ; great hopes were also placed 
in the support of Alcibiades. As matters had thus assumed 
a serious aspect, the envoys of the Four Hundred remained at 
Delos, instead of proceeding to Samos. 

When the Peloponnesian army at Miletus heard of the 
political disturbances at Athens and Samos, it was greatly 
inclined to come to close quarters with the enemy ; and As- 
tyochus, being obliged to yield to the loud murmurs of the 
soldiers, advanced with -his fleet towards Mycale. The 
Athenians, however, retreated to Samos ; and did not accept 
battle till Strombichides had returned from Abydos with his 
squadron, which increased their fleet to 108 sail. The Pe- 
loponnesians in their turn now withdrew to Miletus, without 
striking a blow. In this manner they wasted their time, 
and neither the subsidies nor the Phoenician fleet promised 
by Tissaphernes came to their support. But, although the 
Peloponnesian s on the whole undertook very little, still the 
Athenians sustained many losses during the period preceding 
the recall of Alcibiades by the army in Samos. Abydos and 



456 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXVI. 



Lampsacos had revolted some time before ; their example 
was followed by Thasos, as soon as it had received an oligar- 
chical government, by Byzantium, and many other cities. 
Even Euboea, respecting which Athens was most apprehen- 
sive, and the defection of which was felt most painfully, was 
lost in the same year. But now Alcibiades was placed at 
the head of the Athenian army assembled in Samos, and 
this one event and its consequences were an ample compen- 
sation for all those losses. 

Thrasybulus had at length so far prevailed upon the army, 
that the majority of the soldiers demanded the recall of Al- 
cibiades, and he himself brought him over from Tissaphernes. 
The cunning exile contrived to display his patriotism before 
the soldiers, by bitterly lamenting the misfortune of his 
banishment, and was particularly eloquent respecting his 
unlimited influence with Tissaphernes. The soldiers elected 
him their commander, along with Thrasybulus and Thra- 
syllus ; intrusted him with the management of every thing, 
and entreated him to sail without delay with them to Piraeus 
But this did not suit the plans of the ambitious man, who 
wished to appear at Athens, not as a usurper, but as a general 
crowned with victory, and longed for by the people. When, 
therefore, he was invested with his new dignity, he returned 
to Tissaphernes, and succeeded in inspiring him with the 
highest opinion of his present position. 

The Peloponnesians were now at complete variance with 
Tissaphernes ; and the army, enraged at the inactivity of 
Astyochus, openly charged him with being bribed. Soon 
after this, Mindarus arrived from Sparta to take the place 
of Astyochus as commander of the fleet. Matters, however, 
had not yet come to an open rupture, nor did Tissaphernes 
intend undisguisedly, and at once, to give his support to the 
Athenians ; he only wanted to gain time, and by delay to 
weaken both the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. 

In the meantime, the envoys of the Four Hundred had, after 



chap. xxvi. OVERTHROW OF THE OLIGARCHY. 457 



all, arrived in Samos ; where they endeavoured to justify the 
new.form of government in the eyes of the exasperated army, 
and to prove its moderation and mildness in opposition to 
the exaggerations of Chaereas. But they were not listened 
to, and the army tumultuously demanded to be led against 
Athens. Alcibiades, however, restrained their impetuosity, 
and that wisely ; for, if the Athenians had returned home, 
they would evidently have lost Ionia and the Hellespont : his 
eloquence encouraged all to continue the war with energy. 

It was not, however, the well-meant advice of Alcibiades, 
nor the prospect of a reconciliation with the Samian army, 
but quarrels among the leaders of the oligarchy and new 
reverses, that put an end to the short-lived government of 
the Four Hundred. Theramenes in particular changed his 
views, and placed himself at the head of a counter-revolution ; 
while Phrynichus, Pisander, Antiphon, and Aristarchus, 
zealously adhered to their own system. The building of the 
fortress of Eetionea at the entrance of Piraeus, and the ap- 
pearance of a Lacedaemonian fleet in the Attic Sea, drew 
great suspicion upon them, and they lost many of their par- 
tisans. Heavy-armed Athenian citizens themselves pulled 
down the fortifications. Phrynichus was murdered ; and it 
was not without great difficulty that the Four Hundred, by 
making concessions, succeeded in rendering the people more 
tractable. But it suddenly became known that Agesandridas 
had sailed with his fleet round Sunium towards Euboea ; the 
internal strife was immediately forgotten, and the people 
hastened to their ships. But fortune did not favour them : 
the Athenians lost twenty-two ships off Eretria, and Euboea 
was wrested from them. This threw the people into despair, 
and again a moment had arrived when a quick and resolute 
attack by the Lacedaemonians might have crushed Athens. 
But the people speedily regained courage ; they hastened to 
the pnyx, deposed the Four Hundred, and restored power to 
the Five Thousand, who included all the heavy-armed Athe- 

x 



458 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXVI. 



nians. No officer was in future to have any salary; legislators 
were appointed, and many salutary regulations were made. 
It was resolved to recal Alcibiades and others, and commis- 
sioners were forthwith sent to Samos. This moderate mix- 
ture of oligarchy and democracy is praised by Thucydides, 
and was beneficial to the state. Pisander, and some others, 
sought refuge among the Lacedaemonians at Decelea ; and 
Aristarchus, by an act of treachery, put the small frontier 
fortress of Oenoe into the hands of the Boeotians. 

Alcibiades had, in the meantime, continued his ambiguous 
policy towards Tissaphernes ; he had followed him to As- 
pendos with thirteen ships, hoping thereby to alienate the 
Lacedaemonians still more from him ; and the latter becom- 
ing at length tired of waiting for the arrival of the Phoeni- 
cian fleet, Mindarus at once proceeded to Pharnabazus on the 
Hellespont ; but he was detained by a storm, and anchored 
at Chios. Thrasyllus followed him, and landed at Lesbos, 
in order to prevent the enemy from continuing his voyage, 
and to recover the revolted Eressos. But while Thrasyllus 
was engaged in Lesbos, Mindarus sailed along the coast of 
the continent, and reached the Hellespont in safety. The 
Athenians, who perceived too late that the enemy had passed 
by, arrived in the Hellespont one day later ; anchored near 
Elaeos, and prepared for battle, which, after the lapse of five 
days, was fought near Cynossema. The fleet of the Pelo- 
ponnesians, amounting to eighty-eight galleys, had at first 
an advantage over the enemy's armament, which consisted of 
only seventy-six ships ; but the confidence of success, and 
the cautious management of Thrasybulus, gained the victory 
for the Athenians, though it was dearly purchased. The 
Athenians, however, derived fresh courage from their suc- 
cess, and their belief in their superiority at sea was revived. 

A few days later, the Athenians recovered the revolted 
city of Cyzicus ; but Antandros, which was severely oppressed 
by one of the lieutenants of Tissaphernes, surrendered to a 



CHAP. XXVI. 



BATTLE OF ABYDOS. 



459 



Peloponnesian force which had been invited from Abydos. 
Tissaphernes now thought that he had lost the friendship of 
the Peloponnesians, and in his jealousy of Pharnabazus, he 
proceeded through Ionia to the Spartan fleet to complain of 
their conduct, and at the same time to justify himself, for 
Cnidos and Miletus also had expelled the Persian garrisons.* 
Meanwhile, Mindarus sent Epicles to Euboea for the ships 
which were stationed there. A squadron of fifty galleys was 
soon assembled ; but it was utterly destroyed by a storm 
near Mount Athos, and only twelve men were saved. After 
some insignificant engagements of separate detachments of 
ships, in which the Lacedaemonians were successful, a second 
great naval battle was fought off Abydos. The struggle had 
lasted till the evening without any decided result, when Al- 
cibiades appeared with eighteen galleys, and the Pelopon- 
nesians fled to Abydos. Pharnabazus, indeed, came to their 
assistance from the shore, and they succeeded in getting the 
remaining ships safely into port, but their loss was great. 
Tissaphernes, also, now arrived on the Hellespont, and Al- 
cibiades sailed to meet him for the purpose of endeavouring 
to gain him over by presents ; but Tissaphernes seized him, 
on the pretext that .the king of Persia wished to continue the 
war against Athens, and Alcibiades was conveyed a prisoner 
to Sardis. After a detention of thirty days, however, he made 
his escape. From Clazomenae he again joined the fleet, which 
had retreated before Mindarus to Cardia. He accordingly 
waited at Sestos until the ships came round, and until The- 
ramenes and Thrasybulus had returned, the former from 
Macedonia, the latter from Thasos, with fresh treasures. He 
then sailed with a fleet of eighty-six galleys to Parion, at the 
entrance of the Propontis, and thence to the island of Pro- 
connesus. He there learned that Mindarus had already been 
joined at Cyzicus by the land-army of Pharnabazus. He de- 

* We here lose the guidance of Thucydides, for these are the last events 
mentioned in his great work. 

X 2 



460 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxvi. 



termined upon giving battle for various reasons ; one of which 
was that want of supplies urged him to bring matters to a de- 
cision. Intending to take the enemy by surprise, he carefully 
concealed his design, and his object was favoured by a heavy 
rain and a thick mist, in which he set sail for Cyzicus. As 
he approached the harbour, the sun suddenly broke through 
the clouds, and he perceived 60 Spartan galleys engaged in 
manoeuvring so far out at sea that the Athenians intercepted 
their retreat to Cyzicus. They were immediately attacked, 
and fled toward the shore. But Alcibiades sailed around 
their flank with twenty ships, and effected a landing. Min- 
darus also landed, and an engagement ensued on shore. 
Mindarus fell, and his men were put to flight ; the entire 
fleet becoming the prize of the victors. The Syracusans 
alone prevented their ships from falling into the enemy's 
hands, by setting fire to them ; those of the Peloponnesians 
were taken to Proconnesus. 

This occurred in the twenty-second year of the war, b. c. 
410. How completely the Peloponnesians were defeated, and 
how hopeless their situation was, is evident from a laconic 
letter of Hippocrates, a lieutenant of Mindarus : — " Our good 
luck is gone ; Mindarus is dead ; the men are starving, and 
we know not what to do." 

The consequences of the battle were brilliant. Cyzicus 
and Perinthos were recovered ; Selymbria was obliged to 
pay subsidies, and a custom-house was built for ships coming 
from the Euxine at Chrysopolis, where Theramenes and 
Eubulus stationed themselves with thirty ships to exact the 
duties. The Peloponnesians indeed had in Pharnabazus an 
active friend, for he gave to the fugitives money and timber 
from Mount Ida, to build new ships ; but even he was unable 
to check the victorious career of Alcibiades, and the Athe- 
nians soon became masters in that region of the sea and on its 
coasts. The sudden change in the state of affairs made such 
a discouraging impression upon the Spartans, that a proposal 



CHAP. XXVI. 



THRASYLLUS. 



461 



of peace from them, which is mentioned by Diodorus, is not 
at all improbable. But it is no less probable that the Athe- 
nian people were again flushed with victory and insolent : so 
that they yielded to the counsels of their warlike leader Cleo- 
phon, and rejected all such proposals*; for in Attica, also, an 
attack made by Agis from Decelea, had been successfully 
repelled by Thrasyllus, who, happening to be at Athens, 
whither he had brought intelligence of the victory of Cyzicus, 
placed himself at the head of the men capable of bearing arms. 
The loss of Agis was not very great ; but he began to see that 
the siege of Athens, in the manner in which it had hitherto 
been conducted, was useless, unless Piraeus also was block- 
aded ; and as this could not be done, he sent the ships sta- 
tioned upon the Attic coast to the scene of the war in the 
Propontis. 

But Thrasyllus, who had risen in popular favour, easily 
obtained a new fleet of fifty (according to Diodorus, thirty,) 
ships, with 1000 heavy-armed, 100 horse, and 5000 peltasts. 
He first sailed to Samos, thence proceeded to the coast of the 
continent, effected several successful landings, and invaded 
Lydia ; but during an attack upon Ephesus, he was defeated 
by Tissaphernes and his allies, among whom were the brave 
Syracusans, who had distinguished themselves in the battle 
of Abydos. At length he joined the fleet at Sestos with his 
army. From Sestos, the whole force sailed over to Lamp- 
sacos, and besieged it during the winter. Pharnabazus was 
defeated by Alcibiades in an engagement of the cavalry near 
Abydos ; and in the course of the winter, the Athenians 
made several ravaging incursions into the interior of the 
country. 

In the beginning of the spring, b. c. 409, the Athenians 
sailed to Proconnesus, and thence to Chalcedon, around which 
they formed a circumvallation ; and Alcibiades, having got 



* Diodor. xiii. 52, &c. 
X 3 



462 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



CHAP. XXVI. 



possession of all the property which the inhabitants had car- 
ried into Bithynia, defeated its garrison which had made a 
sally. As Pharnabazus was unable to relieve the town, it 
surrendered. Byzantium on the opposite shore was delivered 
up to the Athenians by traitors, and a treaty was concluded 
with Pharnabazus, in which he promised to pay to the Athe- 
nians 20 talents, and to provide a safe passage for an em- 
bassy, consisting of Athenians and Argives, to the king of 
Persia. The envoys did indeed set out on their mission, but 
never reached the king. They were detained in Phrygia, 
and under all manner of pretexts, were kept almost as pri- 
soners for a period of three years,, and then dismissed. For 
the king had promised the Peloponnesian envoys to assist 
the Spartans, and had appointed Cyrus, his younger son, 
governor and commander of his forces in Asia Minor. Cyrus 
displayed great zeal in the cause of the Peloponnesians, as 
we shall hereafter see. 

The time had now come when Alcibiades could return to 
his country as the victorious and admired conqueror of 
its enemies. This was the year b. c. 408. He had restored 
the dominion of Athens in the islands, on the Hellespont, 
and on the coast of Thrace ; he had enriched the army with 
booty, and had thus completely reconciled the people to him- 
self. His reception was enthusiastic. He had been appointed 
commander with unlimited power, his colleagues being Thra- 
sybulus and Conon. When he landed in Piraeus loaded with 
booty and money, and with 200 captured ships, he was met 
by the whole population. Every one in the crowd was 
anxious to catch a sight of him, as if he were returning alone, 
as if he alone had achieved those exploits, although his col- 
leagues, and especially Thrasybulus, had no small share in 
them. The exulting multitude showered wreaths of flowers 
upon him, and accompanied him in triumph to the city* 
Every thing that had been laid to his charge was forgotten. 
And if the recollection of the unfortunate expedition to Sicily 



chap. xxvi. RETURN OF ALCIBIADES. 



463 



called forth tears amid the general rejoicings, the Athenians 
shed them with sorrow for their own blindness in having de- 
prived themselves of such a commander. Alcibiades knew 
how to turn these emotions of the excitable people to good 
account ; he spoke in the popular assembly in such a manner, 
that there was no one who did not weep, or did not feel in- 
dignation against those who had caused his exile. So 
quickly had the people changed its mind ; but with the same 
rapidity it soon afterwards allowed itself to be led by the 
enemies of Alcibiades to rash measures against its own 
favourite. 



464 



HISTORY OP GREECE* chap, xxvii. 



CHAPTER XXVII/ 

FROM THE RETURN OF ALCIBIADES TO ATHENS TO THE END OF THE 
PELOPONNESIAN WAR. 

Soon after his return, Alcibiades conferred upon the people 
a benefit which furnished his enemies with fresh means of 
attack, and brought about his second exile. Ever since the 
fortification and occupation of Decelea by the Spartans, it 
had been found necessary to discontinue the processions from 
Athens along the sacred road to Eleusis, in celebrating the 
Eleusinian mysteries. Alcibiades now accompanied his fellow- 
citizens with an armed force to Eleusis, and thus enabled 
them once more to perform the ancient and sacred rites. The 
enemy did not stir ; and this brilliant act of piety inspired 
the army and people with such enthusiasm, that, as Plutarch 
states, they offered Alcibiades the tyrannis itself. Whether 
this was what he wanted, is uncertain ; but the oligarchs 
thought it advisable to get him speedily removed from 
Athens. He had been at Athens scarcely three months, when 
he was appointed to command a fleet of 100 galleys. He 
first sailed against Andros, which had revolted from Athens. 
After a victory over the Andrians, he blockaded their town, 
but did not succeed in reducing the island. This furnished 
his enemies with the first handle against him, for the people 
believed that he could succeed in whatever he really wished, 
and every failure was ascribed to his want of will. From 
Andros he sailed to Samos, where he intended to continue 
the war. 

Sparta, too, had now found the hero who was destined to 
bring the last act of the great drama to a close. This was 
Lysander, a man who can be compared with Brasidas and 
Gylippus, the true Spartan heroes of the first and second 



CHAP. XXVII. 



LYSANDER. 



465 



periods of the war, only in regard to his valour and success ; 
for the fundamental features of his character were faithless- 
ness, cunning, and falsehood. He was, moreover, proud, 
domineering, cruel, and ready to risk anything to promote 
the greatness of Sparta; — a worthy adversary of Alcibiades, 
though he was less talented. He equalled him at least in 
the desire to rule his country. As the successor of Min- 
darus in the office of navarchus, he proceeded to the late 
scene of the war with a fleet of seventy ships. He landed in 
Cos and at Miletus, and waited at Ephesus for the arrival of 
Cyrus. The latter was favourably disposed towards Sparta, 
if for no other cause than his hatred of Tissaphernes ; besides 
which, he thought that the Spartan land-army would be of 
greater service to him than the Athenian navy. Lysander 
did his best to strengthen this feeling, and contrived in par- 
ticular to obtain from Cyrus high pay for his soldiers. 

While Lysander was staying at Ephesus with his fleet, 
which had now been increased to ninety ships, Alcibiades 
had joined Thrasybulus, who had come from the Hellespont 
to lay siege to Phocaea, b. c. 407. Alcibiades left the fleet 
at Notion under the command of his lieutenant, Antiochus, 
with orders to undertake nothing against Lysander. But 
notwithstanding his instructions, Antiochus with a few ships 
sailed from his station into the harbour of Ephesus, chal- 
lenging the fleet of Lysander. This occasioned an engage- 
ment, in which all the Athenian galleys ultimately took 
part. The Athenians lost fifteen ships and some prisoners, 
Antiochus himself being slain or drowned ; the remainder of 
their fleet sailed to Samos. On his return to assume the 
command, Alcibiades endeavoured to repair the loss which 
had been sustained, but Lysander did not accept the battle 
which was offered, and Alcibiades was obliged to return to 
Samos. The Athenians were indignant against him, as- 
cribing their defeat to his carelessness ; he was accordingly 
deposed, and ten generals named in his stead. He now left 

X 5 



466 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chaf. xxvii. 



the army a second time, and went to Chersonesus, where he 
had property. Among his successors, Conon, who had been 
appointed by the people to the supreme command, was no 
doubt the ablest. The present exile of Alcibiades was vo- 
luntary, he dreaded the inconstancy and cruelty of the people, 
and never saw his ungrateful country again. His patriotism, 
however, remained undiminished ; of that his conduct before 
the unfortunate battle of Aegospotami is a proof. After 
that catastrophe, not feeling himself safe in Thrace, he went 
to Pharnabazus in Phrygia ; but the hatred of the Spartans 
pursued him thither, and Pharnabazus abandoned him to his 
enemies, who murdered him.* This happened soon after 
the downfal of Athens, which was the unavoidable conse- 
quence of his second deposition ; for it showed the influ- 
ence of the fearful party spirit to which everything, and 
in the end the state itself with all its power and glory, was 
sacrificed. 

Conon and his colleagues remained throughout the year in 
the sea about Samos, making several predatory expeditions. 
In the following year, b. c. 406, Lysander, whose period of 
office had expired, was succeeded as admiral of the Pelopon- 
nesian fleet by Callicratidas, a youthful hero, of the same 
kind as Brasidas ; he was noble-minded, humane, winning, 
and unquestionably brave. He was indignant at being 
obliged to pay court to barbarians for the sake of obtaining 
pay, and would rather have made peace with the Athenians 
at once. After having received subsidies from Miletus, and 
increased his fleet to 130 sail (afterwards it amounted even 
to 170), he took Methymna in Lesbos by storm, and showed 
great humanity on that occasion. Conon, who wished to 
relieve Lesbos, was obliged to flee, but as Callicratidas cut 
off his retreat to Samos, he with Leon and Erasinides took 
refuge in the port of Mytilene. Thither he was followed by 

* The manner of his death is variously related. See Pint. Alcib. 38. 
foil. ; Diodor. xxiv. 11. ; Corn. Nep. AlciL 10. 



CHAP. XXVII. 



BATTLE OF ARGINUSAE. 



467 



Callicratidas, who compelled him to fight, and took thirty 
ships ; the others were blockaded while the Spartan obtained 
reinforcements from Methymna and Chios. Diomedon, who 
came to the assistance of Conon with twelve ships, was de- 
feated, and escaped with only two galleys. In this desperate 
situation Conon sent out two ships, one of which succeeded 
in reaching Athens. The Athenians with all possible haste 
equipped a fleet of 110 sail, armed slaves as well as freemen, 
and in thirty days everything was ready. On its way, at 
Samos, the armament was reinforced, so that the number 
of galleys amounted to 150. Callicratidas, being informed of 
the arrival of the fleet at Samos, left fifty ships before 
Mytilene, for the Athenians had already reached the Ar- 
ginusae, a cluster of islands between Cape Malea, the 
southernmost headland of Lesbos, and the mainland. Calli- 
cratidas with his remaining 120 ships sailed from Malea to 
attack the enemy. The Athenians accepted the battle ; Cal- 
licratidas fell in the course of the engagement, soon after 
which event victory declared for the Athenians. The Pelo- 
ponnesians lost upwards of seventy ships, but the conquerors, 
too, lost twenty-five. Eteonicus, Callicratidas' lieutenant, 
concealing the defeat, immediately ordered the fleet stationed 
at Mytilene to sail to Chios, and led the land-army to Me- 
thymna. Conon, on the other hand, joined his colleagues. 

Soon after this battle, the other generals were recalled to 
Athens : Conon and Philocles alone remained, and were soon 
joined by Adeimantus, who had been newly appointed their 
colleague. Protomachus and Aristogenes did not return to 
Athens ; but the other six obeyed the summons, and went to 
their destruction. A violent storm, which occurred immedi- 
ately after the battle of Arginusae, had rendered it impossible 
to collect the wrecks, the shipwrecked, and the corpses of the 
dead, although the generals had given orders that it should 
be done. Accusers now came forward at Athens charging 
them with various crimes, and especially with that of not 

x 6 



468 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxvii. 



having collected and buried the dead after the battle. Among 
the accusers was Theramenes, who had himself fought in the 
battle as commander of a galley, and ought to have executed 
the command of the generals. The trial was put off in con- 
sequence of an intervening festival. This delay gave the 
enemies of the unfortunate men, who may perhaps have been 
suspected by the democratic leaders of favouring oligarchical 
schemes, time to mature their plans, and to make all the ne- 
cessary preparations. Callixenus and Euryptolemus, es- 
pecially, urged the necessity of putting the generals to death, 
and false witnesses were hired to establish and aggravate 
their guilt. The people, thus deceived, demanded vengeance, 
and once more was determined to see its will carried into ex- 
ecution. It was in vain that the better men, such as Socrates, 
exerted themselves to shake the resolution of the people. 
The six were condemned to death. Repentance followed 
immediately after the act, and the reckless advisers of the 
people had to pay for their evil counsel with their lives. In 
this manner, the people raged against its own vitals. The 
ochlocracy, or government of the populace, was at its 
height. It is possible that the Spartans again turned their 
thoughts towards peace, but under the circumstances it is 
quite natural that their proposals were not listened to.* 

After the death of Callicratidas, the Peloponnesian fleet 
demanded the appointment of Lysander as admiral, and their 
demand was supported by Cyrus. This, however, being con- 
trary to law, Lysander obtained only the office of lieutenant 
(e-n-KTroXevg) of the admiral Aracus, but by secret orders of the 
government he was invested with supreme authority. In the 
following year, B.C. 405, he proceeded to the fleet at Ephesus, 
joined Eteonicus, and reinforced himself in other ways. He 
went in person to Cyrus to obtain money. Cyrus, who was 
evidently anxious to win the friendship of the Spartans, 

* Proposals of peace on the part of Sparta are mentioned by Aristoph. 
Ban. 1532. 



chap, xxvii. BATTLE OF AEGOSPOTAMI. 



469 



readily granted the request, for just at this time he was 
summoned to attend his dying father, and foresaw the con- 
sequences of his death. 

Lysander soon left Caria and the coasts of Asia Minor, 
and sailed to the Hellespont. From Abydos he made an at- 
tack upon Lampsacos, which was allied with Athens. The 
town was taken, and his army obtained rich booty. Imme- 
diately afterwards, the Athenian fleet, amounting to 180 sail, 
arrived. It touched at Sestos, and having taken in provi- 
sions there, proceeded about fifteen stadia farther to Aegos- 
potami, opposite Lampsacos, at some distance from any 
harbour or town, so that in order to obtain provisions the 
men were obliged to leave their ships. Alcibiades, who was 
living in the neighbourhood, observed this ; he directed the 
attention of the commanders to their unfavourable position, 
and advised them to go to Sestos, it being unsafe to quit 
the ships for ever so short a time. This advice was scorned ; 
but what he had predicted, came to pass. For four days 
Lysander had refused a battle, which was daily offered by the 
enemy, who in consequence began to despise him. At length 
on the fifth day when they had left their ships, he suddenly 
gave the signal of attack. Conon saw the enemy approach- 
ing, but it was impossible to gather his scattered troops with 
sufficient quickness. He himself fled with eight ships and 
the state galley, Paralos, which alone were fully manned. All 
the rest fell into the hands of Lysander, and their crews were 
cut to pieces on shore or taken prisoners. Conon, seeing that 
all was lost, fled with his eight galleys to Evagoras in Crete, 
while the Paralos carried the melancholy tidings to Athens. 
Lysander sent to Sparta a despatch, giving an account of 
his victory. Two of the Athenian generals, Philocles and 
Adeimantus, were among the prisoners. Their fate was 
discussed, and all the Athenians, with the exception of 
Adeimantus, Were put to death at Lampsacos. 

After this glorious victory, Lysander destroyed the power 



470 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxvii. 



of Athens by subduing her allies one after another. Byzan- 
tium and Chalcedon were the first that surrendered ; their 
garrisons were sent to Athens, for it was Lysander's intention 
to produce want and famine in the city, by thus crowding 
the people together. He then sailed to Lesbos, which like- 
wise surrendered. Eteonicus gained over the towns of 
Thrace, and thus, within a very short time, all renounced the 
alliance of Athens, except Samos, where the people main- 
tained their ascendancy. Lysander now sent information to 
Agis, that he was approaching with a fleet of 200 sail. By 
the command of king Pausanias all the forces of Pelopon- 
nesus, except the Argives, assembled in Attica and encamped 
in the Academy, before the city. At Athens itself prepara- 
tions had been made with all possible speed ; the worst was 
apprehended, and the people dreaded a fate like that which 
they themselves had so often inflicted upon revolted towns. 
As he approached, Lysander restored to the Melians and 
Aeginetans their islands ; Salamis was ravaged, and with a 
fleet of 150 sail he appeared before Piraeus. 

Athens was thus invested by land and by sea; she was 
without ships, without allies, without provisions. Still her 
people did not surrender immediately ; their fear of a cruel 
fate deterred them from such a course. The two parties in 
the state agreed to recal the exiled, and to set free those who 
were undergoing punishment. Many died of hunger, but the 
city held out to the last extremity. At length, when the 
famine had reached its height, they sent to Agis and offered 
to treat with him, if he would promise that the city and the 
long walls should be preserved. Agis referred them to the 
ephors at Sparta. But even before they reached the Laco- 
nian frontier, they were received at Sellasia by Spartan 
messengers, bidding them return home and come back with 
better proposals. They now learnt their fate: one of the 
terms of peace was that the long walls should be pulled down, 
those walls which they had built with such joy, with which 



chap, xxvii. TERMS PROPOSED BY SPARTA. 



471 



the most glorious recollections were connected, and which 
were viewed as the bulwarks of democracy. This thought 
was not to be endured, and it was expressly forbidden to be 
mentioned in the assembly. At last, Theramenes offered 
to go to Lysander, hoping at least to discover why the enemy 
laid most stress upon this one condition. Having obtained 
permission, he went, and remained with Lysander for more 
than three months, until Athens, completely exhausted, was 
obliged to comply with any demand that might be made. 
This faithless act, the consequence of his effeminate heart, 
afterwards received its reward under Critias. On his return 
in the fourth month, he asserted that Lysander had detained 
him all that time, and at length referred him to the ephors. 
Ten envoys now were sent to Sparta with unlimited powers, 
and one of them was Theramenes. When the negotiations 
commenced, the Corinthians and Thebans, the sworn enemies 
of Athens, and the deputies of many other states, proposed the 
destruction of the city. The Lacedaemonians opposed this 
plan ; they wished only to humble their enemy, whose ser- 
vices in the common cause of Greece they still acknowledged, 
not to reduce them to slavery. Peace was accordingly to be 
concluded on the following terms : the long walls and those 
round Piraeus were to be pulled down ; all ships, with the 
exception of twelve, were to be given up ; the exiles, mostly 
oligarchs, were to be recalled ; henceforth the Athenians 
and Spartans were to have the same friends and the same 
enemies ; lastly, Athens was to recognize the supreme com- 
mand of Sparta by land and by sea. The allies, moreover, 
who had not yet revolted, were to become independent. 

With these terms the envoys returned to Athens. The 
exhausted people were ready to submit to anything ; all they 
had been afraid of was, lest this last embassy also should be 
sent home without an answer. On the following day the 
hungry multitude was informed of the offered terms, w r hich 
Theramenes advised it to accept. Some still refused to 



472 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxvii. 



yield, but the majority had at length become submissive, and 
all the demands were complied with. 

Lysander now entered Piraeus, the exiles returned, and a 
great part of the walls was pulled down, while flute players, 
brought from the camp and the city, accompanied the work 
of destruction with their music ; for this day was said to be 
the beginning of the liberty of Greece. What a delusion ! 
the self-styled deliverers were far more unfeeling and selfish 
tyrants than the Athenians had ever been. These events 
occurred on the 18th of Munychion, B.C. 404, a few days 
before the end of the twenty- seventh year of the war, on the 
very day on which the glorious battle of Salamis had been 
fought. 



chap, xxvni. THE THIRTY TYRANTS. 



473 



CHAPTER XXVm. 

FROM THE END OF THE PELOPONNE SI AN WAR TO THE RE-ESTABLISH- 
MENT OF DEMOCRACY AT ATHENS. 

As soon as the walls were destroyed, the Athenian people, as 
Xenophon says, but in reality Lysander, elected thirty men, 
who were to govern the state in accordance with the revised 
laws.* Among these Thirty, the most notorious for cruelty 
were Critias, the degenerate disciple of Socrates, though a 
man of talent, Melobius, Peison, Theognis, and Eratosthenes. 
Diodorus relates that the people elected Theramenes, in order 
that he might counteract the cruel measures of his colleagues ; 
but Lysias seems to be better entitled to belief, and he describes 
the mildness of Theramenes as cowardice and simulation. 
When the election of the Thirty was completed, Agis at length 
led his army from Decelea, and disbanded it ; while Ly- 
sander went with his fleet to Samos. This island was soon 
compelled to surrender ; its free citizens obtained permission 
to quit their native land, but were obliged to leave their pro- 
perty behind. The old citizens, who had been exiled by the 
Athenians, returned, and a body of ten men was appointed 
to undertake the government. After this, Lysander dis- 
banded his allies, and towards the end of the summer he 
himself returned to Sparta with immense booty, the Athenian 
galleys, and 470 talents, the remainder of the tribute which 
he had collected, and which had formerly flowed into the 
state treasury of Athens. 

The Thirty, who proclaimed themselves the restorers of 
order, soon began to act in such an arbitrary, insolent, and 

* A real revision of the laws was not undertaken till after the expul 
sion of the Thirty. (Andoc. De Myst p. 39.) 



474 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxvim 



cruel manner, that they became the most violent of tyrants.* 
At first, indeed, their rigour was directed against those only 
who were notoriously bad, but this rule of procedure was soon 
forgotten, or made a mere pretext, and the noblest men, such 
as Niceratus, the son of the celebrated Nicias, Leon, who 
had been a commander in the war, and Polemarchus, the 
philosopher and brother of the orator Lysias, were put to 
death to gratify the ambition and cupidity of the tyrants ; 
for it was especially the wealthy whom they picked out for 
their victims. The number of exiles was still greater, and 
their property was confiscated. Among these was the noble 
Thrasybulus ; the orator Lysias fled to Megara, and lost the 
whole of his property, which was considerable. The bru- 
tality of the tyrants went so far, that they did not spare 
even women ; Melobius, for example, while plundering the 
house of Polemarchus, tore the gold rings from the ears of 
his wife. We still possess a most eloquent description of all 
these horrors in the speeches of Lysias against Eratosthenes 
and Agoratus. 

As a means of enabling them to manage public affairs in 
their own way, and without difficulty, the Thirty requested 
Lysander to send them a band of mercenaries, and the 
harmost Callibius, who was commissioned to command these 
troops at Athens, supported them in their doings. The 
council and all public officers were merely their creatures ; 
from among the citizens they selected 3000, who alone were 
to enjoy the franchise, and be permitted to bear arms. All 
the rest were disarmed, and placed beyond the protection of 
the law, for the Thirty assumed the right of putting any of 
them to death, without a judicial verdict. They were also 
assisted in their bloody executions by a body of cavalry 
formed of young nobles. Nearly 1400 Athenians fell 
victims during this fearful period, and 5000 emigrated, leav- 

* This year in the history of Attica is not marked by the name of the 
archon, but is styled " the year of anarchy." (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3. § 1.) 



chap, xxvnr. DEATH OF THERAMENES. 



475 



ing behind # all that they possessed. Even the cities hostile to 
Athens, such as Thebes and Megara, took pity, like Argos, 
upon the unhappy exiles, although the Spartans threatened 
to exact a fine of five talents from any one who should not 
hand the fugitives over to the Thirty. In order to destroy 
the very foundations of Attic democracy and power, the noble 
embankments and fortifications of Piraeus, which had cost 
the state 11,000 talents, were sold for three talents to be 
demolished ; instruction in oratory was forbidden, and the 
hustings for the orators in the Pnyx was turned inland, in 
order that the sight of the sea might not awaken a longing 
for the lost palladium of democracy. 

Theramenes, who at first walked in the same path as his 
colleagues, and whose cruelty was branded by his contempo- 
raries no less than that of the others, at length abandoned 
his bloody career, either from a feeling of humanity, or 
from jealousy and hatred of Critias, who seemed to possess 
more power and influence ; for such, according to Thucy- 
dides, is always the case in oligarchies. Theramenes came 
forward especially against Critias, advising him to act with 
moderation. In return for this, Critias did not scruple to 
destroy him. He kept ready an armed band ; a meeting of the 
council was convened, and Nicias openly charged Theramenes 
with treason against the established constitution. It was in 
vain that Theramenes attempted to defend himself, and when 
he described the unjust and inhuman conduct of his col- 
leagues, he only made things worse. Critias at once effaced 
his name from the list of citizens, and thereby declared him 
an outlaw. Theramenes fled to the altar, but none of his 
colleagues or of the senators attempted to protect him. The 
ministers of penal justice, headed by Satyrus, the most 
shameless among the satellites of the tyrants, dragged him 
from the altar, and hurried him across to a prison. There he 
drank the hemlock in a cheerful spirit, which might have been 
the crowning grace of a nobler life. 



476 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxviii. 



After this the recklessness of the Thirty bdfcame even 
greater; but their days were already numbered. Thrasybulus, 
one of the heroes of the Peloponnesian war, had quitted his 
place of refuge in Thebes, and being supported by the noble 
Theban Ismenias, he and 70 companions in exile had taken 
possession of the small border fortress of Phyle. On being 
informed of this, the Thirty with their 3000 and their cavalry 
made an attack upon Phyle ; but they were driven back, and 
as a heavy fall of snow prevented them from laying siege 
to it, they were obliged to content themselves with posting 
a corps of observation in the neighbourhood. Meantime, 
the 70 had increased to 700; with these Thrasybulus fell 
upon the enemy at day-break, and put them to flight. The 
Thirty now began to feel unsafe at Athens, and resolved to 
establish themselves at Eleusis. Three hundred horsemen, 
whom they suspected, were murdered. Thrasybulus, whose 
band continued to increase, proceeded to Piraeus ; but as he 
did not think he could maintain himself there, and as his 
opponents had advanced from the city, he first occupied 
Munychia. A battle was fought in the streets of Piraeus. 
The exiles fought for their lost property, for their country, 
and their freedom ; and animated by these powerful motives, 
they gained the day. Critias fell fighting bravely, and with 
him Hippomachus, one of the Thirty, besides seventy of their 
followers. The conquerors took only the arms, and abstained 
from injuring the property of their fellow -citizens who had 
been forced to fight against them. The vanquished retreated 
into the city, and on the following day the tyrants, with the 
exception of Pheidon and Eratosthenes, fled to Eleusis. The 
3000 were not agreed among themselves : many, whose con- 
sciences were not clear, dreaded those in Piraeus, and accord- 
ingly refused to admit them into the city at once. They chose 
ten men, one from every phyle, to form a government, which 
was equally opposed to the fugitives at Eleusis and to Thrasy- 
bulus. But as the army of Thrasybulus was ever increasing, 



CH. xxviii. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY. 477 



the oligarchs, both of Eleusis and of Athens, sent envoys to 
Sparta for succour. Lysander immediately led an army 
against the city, while his brother Libys blockaded Piraeus 
with a fleet. The cause of the patriots was thus in a most 
precarious condition, when the Spartan king Pausanias, jea- 
lous of Lysander, and wishing to prevent his conquering 
Athens a second time, obtained another army from the 
ephors, and advanced to Piraeus. He did indeed attack 
the Athenians, and several engagements took place ; but he 
wished the city to be saved, and peace to be restored. He, 
accordingly, caused the hostile parties to send deputies to 
him ; and as the two ephors, who were with him, likewise 
favoured the restoration of peace, an understanding was come 
to. The Thirty, their ministers (the Eleven), and the ten 
archons in Piraeus, were the only persons exempted from 
the general reconciliation, which was secured by a complete 
amnesty. Pausanias then disbanded his army, and Thrasy- 
bulus, with his forces, marched in arms from Piraeus to the 
city, and offered sacrifices in the acropolis to Athena. 
Thrasybulus advised his countrymen to maintain peace 
and unity, and return to their ancient constitution. The 
people followed his advice ; but when they heard that the 
Thirty at Eleusis were preparing for a renewal of the civil 
war, they marched out in a body, and the oligarchical leaders 
were put to death ; the other seceders were prevailed upon 
to return to the city and accept the offer of reconciliation. 
At length a new and general amnesty, which was extended 
even to the children of the Thirty, reconciled all minds. 
Democracy was re-established, and to this day, says Xeno- 
phon, they continue to live under it, and remain faithful to 
their oaths. A law was passed, that any attempt to over- 
throw it should be punished with death. Thus ended the 
tyranny of the Thirty and the year of anarchy, b. c. 403. 

This year is that of the archonship of Eucleides. His 
name marks an epoch in the political history of Athens, 



478 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxviii. 



for the Solonian constitution, which was restored and ex- 
tended under him, henceforth remained unimpugned, until 
long after the time when Athens had lost her political in- 
fluence. A commission of 500 nomothetae or lawgivers was 
entrusted with the revision of the laws, and Mcomachus, 
who however discharged his duties carelessly, was com- 
missioned to draw up a new transcript of the laws. This 
event is remarkable also from the fact, that what is called 
the Ionic alphabet was first used on that occasion ; that is, 
all those letters of the Greek alphabet which are still in use^ 
were then employed at Athens for the first time. 



PRE-EMINENCE OF ATHENS. 



479 



CHAPTER XXIX. 

RETROSPECTIVE SURVEY OF THE INTERNAL CONDITION OF GREECE 
DURING THE PELOPONNE SI AN WAR. 

It is difficult to give a fair and satisfactory estimate of this 
great and stirring period, for the ancient authors themselves 
are diametrically opposed in the views they take of it. If 
we consult modern historians, we shall find in most of them 
a sort of preconceived opinion or conviction, that the Pelo- 
ponnesian war forms the conclusion of the bright portion of 
Greek history. All, however, are agreed, that throughout 
this period Athens is the centre of interest, and that the 
other parts of the Greek world only contribute to complete 
the history of that one state, the type of the intellectual 
culture of all the rest. Every one must feel himself con- 
strained to recognise the undisputed pre-eminence of that 
wonderful city, and to share in the admiration which is so 
cheerfully bestowed upon it ; and this will be done more rea- 
lly by those who judge of the greatness of a state, not from 
the mere display of physical strength, but from the spiritual 
and intellectual influence which always subdues and outlives 
the mere physical strength of man and his institutions. In 
the following pages, accordingly, we shall have mainly to 
speak of Athens. 

The speeches which Thucydides puts into the mouth of 
Pericles, give us a fresh and glowing picture of the greatness 
of Athens, and after the death of that distinguished states- 
man the historian pictures in dark colours the forlorn con- 
dition of an ill-advised people, which became more and more 
reckless and demoralised. Further on, when describing the 
scenes of horror which occurred at Corcyra, he speaks in 
still sadder strains of the demoralisation that broke in upon 



480 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP, XXIX. 



all Greece in consequence of the war. From numerous al- 
lusions we must conclude, that he considered the Peloponne- 
sian war as a malady, the inevitable result of which would 
be the ruin of Athens. His great contemporary, Aristo- 
phanes, was of the same opinion ; in the luxuriant playfulness 
of his imagination, he uttered many a wise and serious ad- 
monition to the men of peace and to the admirers of the great 
times of old, who in vain laboured to withstand, not to say, 
to check the rolling torrent of unbridled democracy. All 
the great minds of Athens, who still speak to us in their 
works, bear witness that the real greatness and the golden 
age of Athens had then departed. This mode of viewing 
things is as old as the human race itself ; but we, to whom 
the Peloponnesian war appears only as an integral part in the 
development of Greece, must confess, that although after 
that time Athens did not advance in her victorious career 
of conquest, yet her political greatness was as yet by no 
means undermined ; while on the other hand, her spiritual 
and intellectual vigour not only did not suffer through her 
unfavourable external circumstances, but on the contrary, 
was to all appearance as steadily progressing and flourish- 
ing as if the political consequences of her long-continued 
struggles had passed by without producing any effect what- 
ever upon the freshness and productive powers of the Athe- 
nian mind. As, therefore, we estimate the life and prosperity 
of a nation by the results of its mental activity, we must 
extend the flourishing period of Greek history down to the 
time when Macedonia exercised its influence and power in 
the affairs of Greece. For the period from the end of the 
Peloponnesian war down to the breaking up of the vast 
Macedonian empire is so rich in products of art and lite- 
rature, that in variety and universality it undoubtedly sur- 
passes the earlier and happier times. There is only one 
characteristic difference, though that is certainly an im- 
portant one, between the two centuries : fancy, imagination, 



chap. xxix. POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE WAR. 



481 



and poetical emotion now give place to the powers of thought 
and reflection, and poetry is supplanted by learning. 

It has often been said, that the struggle between the two 
leading states of Greece not only affected their external 
power, but brought about a thorough change in their cha- 
racter and nature. But if we consider that, in the case of 
Athens, the loss of her supremacy was only transitory, and 
that the momentary change of her constitution cannot be 
taken into account at all, we must avow that Sparta under- 
went far greater changes both in her internal and in her 
external relations, and that her very victory was the cause 
of her decay. 

The Peloponnesian war made Sparta a maritime power, 
and this one fact alone was subversive of the constitution of 
Lycurgus and of the Spartan character. But the course of 
events had rendered it necessary to combat the enemy with 
her own weapons and on her own ground ; yet how slowly 
and with what difficulties had Sparta entered on her new 
career! When, after the glorious struggle with Persia, the 
power of Athens was ever increasing, Sparta was kept back, 
not by wars with the neighbouring states of Peloponnesus 
or with revolted subjects, such as the Messenians, but by 
her natural caution and slowness, which made her wait pas- 
sively until the contests in Boeotia drew attention to the 
relation between Athens and Sparta, and the thirty years' 
peace of Pericles guaranteed their mutual supremacy. But 
while Sparta adhered to the basis of the treaty, and was 
content with the supremacy of Peloponnesus, the ever active 
spirit of the Athenians soon set the terms of the peace at 
defiance, and their power, which assumed a more and more 
threatening aspect, their arrogance and love of conquest, at 
last forced the Lacedaemonians to take up arms. The war 
was commenced for the purpose of delivering the weaker 
Greek states from the dominion and oppression of Athens ; 
but towards the end of it, Sparta aimed at nothing short of 

Y 



482 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxix. 



the annihilation of the power of Athens, and the establish- 
ment of her own supremacy over all Greece. 

The want of decision displayed in the beginning of the 
war is remarkable. It was not till the Sicilian expedition, or 
rather after it, that Sparta made any serious efforts to estab- 
lish her power at sea. This was quite natural; for the Spar- 
tans had neither revenues nor other resources, so long as 
they maintained the ancient constitution of their state. 
When, at length, they aimed in good earnest at the destruc- 
tion of the naval power of Athens, they concluded a treaty 
with the natural enemy of Greece, and paid their marines 
with Persian money. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
foreign manners, luxuries, and effeminacy, of the injurious 
effects of which we read so many complaints, easily found their 
way into Sparta. How little, in fact, the severity of laws can 
do in strengthening or establishing virtue, is clear from the 
fact that the Spartan kings, even in the good old times, were 
so accessible to bribes that their weakness became proverbial. 
We mention this, because in a state of rigid principles, 
such things lead to the worst possible consequences ; since 
any transgression of the narrow limits fixed by law can rarely 
be remedied by openly retracing one's steps, and therefore 
leads to hypocrisy. Throughout this period the external 
forms of the old constitution were, generally speaking, strictly 
observed, but the power of the ephors, in their relation to the 
kings, had been immensely increased. They were more 
powerful and influential than the Eoman tribunes of the 
plebs ; and during the Peloponnesian war the executive 
appears to have been chiefly in their hands. They con- 
vened and conducted the popular assemblies, gave audiences 
to foreign ambassadors, and sent embassies to foreign 
states ; they arranged the campaigns, appointed the com- 
manders, and were furnished with constant reports of the 
proceedings in the camp and in the field. Formerly, the 
king who went out at the head of his army, had been ab- 



SPARTAN CONSTITUTION. 



483 



solute commander; in B.C. 418 the ephors gave him ten 
assessors as his counsellors, and towards the end of the war, 
two ephors accompanied the king during the campaign. In 
addition to this it must be observed, that the two royal 
families, instead of uniting to resist the influence of the 
ephors, endeavoured, in their perpetual disputes, to injure 
each other, and were thus obliged to court the favour of the 
ephors. The ephoralty had thus entirely lost its original 
democratic character, for which it is praised by Plato, Aris- 
totle, and others, who have held up the constitution of Sparta 
as the model of a wise mixture of all forms of govern- 
ment; it had become a despotic power, which could not 
always aim at the public good in its efforts to preserve its 
own importance. 

The magnitude of the war rendered the creation of new 
offices indispensable ; harmosts (ap/xoorcu) were appointed 
to govern conquered towns, admirals (vavap^oi) and vice- 
admirals (£Tri(TTo\e~ig) were chosen to command the fleet, the 
former originally for one year, and only once ; but we have 
seen how, in the case of Lysander, this law was evaded.* A 
far greater change, however, was brought about by the in- 
troduction of coined money. Plutarch and others mention 
Lysander as the first who made it known at Sparta. This 
much at least is certain, that before the war the state had no 
public treasure, although the weakness of the Spartan kings 
in reference to bribery may have made the people familiar 
with money long before this time. But now, as Plato says, 
Sparta soon became the richest state in Greece. Private 
citizens naturally imitated the example of the state ; for the 
equality of property established by Lycurgus among the 
citizens of Sparta had been set aside. The perpetual wars 
had reduced the number of Spartans, and the accumulation 
of several estates in one family had created disproportionate 



* See above, p. 468. 

Y 2 



484 



HISTORY OF GliEECE. 



CHAP. XXIX. 



wealth. This tendency was promoted by a law passed soon 
after the war by Epitadeus, which forbade the transfer of 
property by sale indeed, but allowed every one to dispose of 
it by gift or will in any way he pleased. It began to be 
customary to give large dowries, which was likewise con- 
trary to the laws of Lycurgus ; aud the wealthy intermarried 
and left their property to one another, which gave rise to 
distinctions of rank according to the amount of property. 
The poorer citizens soon found themselves excluded from 
the active exercise of their civic rights, as they w T ere no 
longer able to defray the expenses of the syssitia, and in 
general could not compete with the rich in their mode of 
living, nor fulfil the indispensable conditions which had 
been imposed by Lycurgus upon every Spartan citizen. 
Thus it came to pass that instead of the 9000 Spartans men- 
tioned in the legislation of Lycurgus, the number had been 
reduced to 700, and of these only 100 were in the full en- 
joyment of all civic rights. 

One consequence of these irregularities on the one hand, 
and of the obstinate clinging to the ancient forms on the 
other, was, that even as early as the time of Aristotle, two- 
fifths of all the landed property were in the hands of heiresses ; 
and considering their Spartan education, the ascendancy thus 
conferred upon women could not possibly work for the public 
good. The small number of Spartan citizens produced other 
evil effects also. It naturally increased the fear entertained 
of the Helots, and rendered necessary greater harshness and 
severity towards them. During the war, Helots had been 
employed in the armies, for which purpose they were eman- 
cipated. Brasidas made his successful expedition to the 
distant Chalcidice with such an army. Subsequently, 
perioeci and neodamadeis only were sent out to remote 
countries, as in the case of Gylippus' expedition to Sicily. 
Spartans generally had the command, though perioeci also 
are mentioned as commanders of galleys. When a king took 



chap. xxix. POLITICAL STATE OF ATHENS. 



485 



the field he was accompanied by thirty Spartans, who formed 
a sort of honorary body-guard. Notwithstanding all this, 
however, the few Spartan families remained in proud and 
strict seclusion from the rest of the population, and thereby 
endangered the safety of the state itself ; the conspiracy of 
Cinadon, for example, whose object was to overthrow the 
existing constitution, was frustrated only by the prudent 
caution of Agesilaus. 

This conflict between external circumstances and the in- 
flexibility of the ancient institutions, does not exhibit Sparta, 
successful as she had been in the war, in a very brilliant or 
enviable light. The fact that notwithstanding all this, the 
state maintained its supremacy for several years, and its in- 
dependence even for centuries, arose from circumstances, 
respecting which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter. 

Athens had come forth from the long contest outwardly 
humbled, but not internally broken. Its constitution, the 
very opposite of the stiff and inflexible institutions of Sparta, 
capable of any development and reforms for good as well as 
for evil, had passed through several crises, and had finally 
returned to its Solonian type. It cannot be denied that the 
state sustained momentary injuries from its many political 
convulsions ; for it is certain that the banishment of Alci- 
biades, and the deplorable infatuation of the Athenians after 
the battle of Arginusae, were followed by the most melan- 
choly consequences for the fickle and cruel people ; but with 
all its errors and faults, Athens displays extraordinary vi- 
tality, and a high degree of skill in accommodating itself 
to new circumstances, or returning, if required, to its an- 
cient institutions. The most important element in main- 
taining this state of things through all the phases of political 
change, was no doubt the fact that the number of Athenian 
citizens was never allowed to decrease, but was constantly 
filled up. If we suppose with Boeckh, that the number 
of citizens was, on an average, 20,000 {for according to 

y 3 



486 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxix. 



Thucydides, they amounted at the beginning of the Pelo- 
ponnesian war, to nearly 30,000), the admission to the Attic 
franchise must have been liberally granted in those times, 
when war and pestilence carried off so many, and when the 
cleruchiae, or assignments of land in conquered districts drew 
away considerable numbers from Athens. It is true, the 
cleruchi (persons who received assignments of land), who 
were generally of the poorer classes, might let their lot to farm 
and remain at Athens ; but there can be no doubt that many 
settled in the districts thus distributed, and remained there 
to protect their new acquisitions as the real lords of the land. 
We are not informed of the exact manner in which the number 
of citizens was kept up ; some allusions, however, justify the 
supposition that the Athenians were not very scrupulous in 
conferring the franchise, and that they admitted to the en- 
joyment of it citizens of allied states as well as resident 
aliens at Athens, and even slaves. Thus in the first years 
of the war, the Plataeans, driven fiom their homes, were ad- 
mitted in a body ; and although such things were not done 
without considerable formalities, still such admissions must 
have been so numerous and so irrespective of the previous 
circumstances of those receiving the favour, that Andocides 
was probably right in saying, " I see you give the franchise 
to slaves and all kinds of foreigners." This custom of raising 
strangers to the rank of citizens was unknown at Sparta, and 
Athens, in this respect, had an unquestionable advantage over 
her rival. 

The property-classes of the Athenian citizens, as esta- 
blished in the Solonian constitution, had ceased to mark civil 
distinctions and privileges ; but the natural distinction 
between the rich and the poor had, if possible, become greater, 
and was now injurious to the public weal. Generous and wise 
statesmen, like Cimon and Pericles, had endeavoured to remedy 
the evil by personal liberality or legal enactments ; but the 
demagogues stirred up the masses, who possessed no property* 



CHAP. XXIX. 



THE THEORICON. 



487 



to acts of injustice and insolence against the rich, who formed 
the minority, and naturally entertained almost exclusively 
oligarchical, or at least anti-democratical sentiments. Lar- 
gesses of corn and money to the poorer classes occur even in 
the earlier times ; we need only remember the distribution of 
the produce of the silver mines of Laurion, which continued 
until the time of Themistocles ; nor had the cleruchiae any 
object except the relief of the poorer citizens. But Pericles 
went still farther, and the introduction of the theoricon or 
theatre-money is ascribed to him. Boeckh thinks it probable 
that even previously to Olymp. 70, B.C. 500, when the 
building of the great stone theatre was commenced, money 
was paid for admission to the theatre, and that Pericles in- 
troduced only its payment by the public treasury, at first 
only for the poorer citizens. The theoricon amounted to two 
oboli, but was subsequently raised by Agyrrhius to three ; it 
was distributed in an assembly of the people, held in the 
theatre before the beginning of the festival. In the time of 
Demosthenes the wealthier classes also availed themselves of 
it. The lessee of the theatre, of course, paid back to the 
treasury only a small portion of his receipts. It became cus- 
tomary to give the same sums under the name of theoricon 
on other festive occasions also, when there were no per- 
formances in the theatre ; and if, according to Boeckh's 
calculation, the expenditure for every holiday is to be esti- 
mated at one talent (supposing there were 18,000 recipients), 
it is quite clear that the theoricon must have swallowed up 
all the money destined for war and the civil administration ; 
for the holidays were very numerous, and Pericles increased 
the popular taste for them. His personal character and in- 
fluence, indeed, exercised a salutary check, but in a few^ years 
every thing was altered. The sovereign people paid itself 
also for several other things. Thus we may mention the pay 
for attending the popular assembly {fiiadoQ kKtcX^maGTiKoo) 
which was introduced in the time of Pericles, but not by him. 

Y 4 



488 



HISTORr OF GREECE. chap. xxxx. 



It consisted at first of one obolus, but in B.C. 360 it was in- 
creased to three by Agyrrhius, who generally squandered the 
public revenue in an unpardonable manner. His object was 
to indemnify the citizens for the losses occasioned by the 
interruption of their occupations, caused by attending the 
popular assemblies. In like manner* the pay for attending 
the courts of justice (jjuadog Succlcttikoq), the introduction of 
which is ascribed to Pericles, and which at first amounted to 
one obolus, and afterwards to three, was intended as a com- 
pensation. Idleness, pettifogging, and public speaking, 
gradually became the characteristic features of the Athenian 
people, for which, even during the first period of the Pelo- 
ponnesian war, it was chastised by the muse of Aristophanes. 
A complete enumeration of all the arrangements made for 
the pleasure and comfort of the people, in and after the time 
of Pericles* would lead us beyond the limits of the present 
history. But we may remark, that Pericles neglected no 
lawful means by which he might maintain his supreme in- 
fluence over the poople ; whose ingratitude, however, he was 
made to feel towards the end of his life. His successors were 
in every respect unlike him : they flattered and crouched 
before the people, whom he had guided according to his own 
will ; and the factions which he had kept down assailed one 
another with more openness and bitterness than they had 
ventured to display during his lifetime. The unfortunate 
events of the war had a direct influence upon the relative 
position of these factions. The oligarchs were gainers, 
whenever the fleets or armies of their country perished ; and 
the ascendancy of the people at home went hand in hand with 
the victories abroad. Eeal political operations and intrigues 
were carried on by the oligarchs alone, who through their 
clubs* kept up connections with kindred spirits, even far 
beyond the boundaries of their own country, and whose 

* 'Ercupeicu or awco/jLoa-iai. They were originally intended only for 
mutual support at elections and in the courts of justice. 



CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS. 



489 



reckless tendencies are manifest from their oath preserved in 
Aristotle, " to hurt and injure the people as much as possible." 
The conquerors in this intestine strife were invariably cruel, 
but the oligarchs, though belonging to the higher classes, 
were always more cruel than the victorious people. 

The violent changes that were made in the Athenian con- 
stitution during the war have been already mentioned. The 
moderate democracy which succeeded the oligarchy of the 
Four Hundred, began with such strict principles, that it can- 
not possibly have existed until the downfal of Athens. Those 
who then restored democracy abolished all salaries, which 
may refer especially to the pay for attending the assemblies 
and courts of justice. The clubs continued to be as busy 
as before, and Alcibiades, who returned about that time, soon 
fell a victim to their machinations. But the people acquired 
a new leader in Cleophon, a worthy successor to Cleon and 
Hyperbolus. It was he and Theramenes, who managed the 
disgraceful accusation of the conquerors in the battle of Ar- 
ginusae. The government of Athens seems to have now be- 
come a perfect ochlocracy ; but the more infatuated the 
people, the more confident were the oligarchs, and the defeat 
of Aegospotami brought the oligarchs and friends of Sparta 
into power. The abolition of the rule of the Thirty by 
Thrasybulus, and the restoration of democracy under the 
archon Eucleides, seem to have been followed by a radical 
change in the attempts of the oligarchs. The people were 
so much in earnest in returning to the Solonian constitution, 
that they again placed it under the superintendence of the 
Areopagus. 

Thus, at the end of the Peloponnesian war, Athens ap- 
pears weak in her foreign relations indeed, but internally, 
the party struggles had brought her to a better and purer 
condition, and we may take it for granted that during the 
next generation the Athenians continued to act with a 
certain degree of moderation. The party feuds began again, 

Y 5 



490 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXIX. 



when Philip of Macedonia interfered in the affairs of Greece, 
or, as Justin remarks, "with the death of Epaminondas the 
virtue of the Athenians disappeared." 

It is a wonderful phenomenon that during this period of 
misfortune and internal distraction, there flourished at 
Athens the greatest minds that ever graced the history of 
any nation with the highest productions of poetry, art, and 
philosophy. This shows the extraordinary vitality and im- 
perishable vigour which so remarkably distinguished Athens 
from all other states. The golden age of Attic art and 
literature extends from the beginning of the Persian wars 
down to the time of the successors of Alexander, that is, to 
the end of the fourth century before Christ, and conse- 
quently lasted nearly 200 years. No other nation has 
ever presented a similar spectacle. During the former of 
these two centuries, poetry and art were fostered with 
warmth and care, and Pericles raised the drama, the 
crown of all poetry, to the highest degree of popularity. 
The richness and perfection displayed in sculpture and ar- 
chitecture during the Periclean and the subsequent age, 
awakened and developed a general sense of the beautiful, 
which no doubt distinguished even an ordinary Athenian, 
when abroad, as the son of a classic land. During the 
second century of this golden age, the drama, tragedy as well 
as comedy, maintained its influence, although the productive 
power disappeared, or at least did not meet in later times 
with that sympathy and appreciation which are necessary for 
its preservation. The public taste seems, on the whole, to 
have inclined more towards comedy, as we may infer from 
the extraordinary fertility of Menander, Diphilus, and the 
numerous other comic writers. The extant fragments of 
Menander are specimens of the unrivalled refinement of the 
Attic dialect. But it is more especially the perfect develop- 
ment of Attic prose, in oratory and philosophy, that charac- 
terises the latter century. 



chap. xxix. THE ATTIC DRAMA. 



491 



The period of the Peloponnesian war, to which we must 
here more particularly direct our attention, may without 
hesitation be called the most flourishing season of that long- 
continued golden age. For to it belong Sophocles and Euri- 
pides, two of the triad of great tragic poets ; of the comic 
poets, above and besides many others, Aristophanes ; of the 
historians, Thucydides, whose pre-eminence over those of 
both earlier and later ages no one has ever disputed ; lastly, 
of the philosophers, Socrates, the wisest of all the Greeks, 
whose merits have been immortalised in the works of his 
great disciples Plato and Xenophon. 

According to a tradition founded on later authorities, 
Euripides was born on the day of the battle of Salamis, in 
which Aeschylus, the eldest of the three tragic poets, fought 
for his country's independence among the foremost and the 
bravest, and around the trophies of which victory Sophocles 
danced in the chorus of boys. Whatever opinion we may 
entertain as to the truth of this story, we cannot deny that 
it expresses a proud consciousness of the excellence of the 
Attic poets, who are here brought into connection with the 
most glorious event in the history of Greece. Both Sophocles 
and Euripides lived till the end of the Peloponnesian war. 
The aged Aeschylus died in the year preceding that in which 
Euripides, at the age of twenty-five or twenty-six, came 
forward with his first production, B.C. 455. Thirteen years 
previously, in B.C. 468, Sophocles had gained the victory with 
his first play. Each of the three was the offspring of his own 
time, and their productions reflect their respective ages as 
faithfully as the comedies of Aristophanes do. Aeschylus, a 
hero of the Persian war, was the favourite at once of Ares and 
of the Muses : rough warriors, heaven-storming giants, and 
beings of superhuman characters, are his chief dramatis per- 
sonae. " Their very sight," he himself is made to say, " in- 
spired the spectators for war and victory." The early youth 
of Sophocles belongs to the period through which Aeschylus 

y 6 



492 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXIX. 



passed as a man, and as one of the most distinguished citi- 
zens ; but he was more under the influence of the subsequent 
age, during which Athens was in the ascendant, and enjoyed 
the fruits of the noble efforts she had made against the bar- 
barians. His dramas are the reflex of a glorious and peace- 
ful time, which was not yet distracted and undermined by 
evil passions. His characters are human, but noble and pure, 
so that he himself could say of them, " I describe men as 
they should be." 

Euripides, his younger contemporary, shows the enormous 
progress which the Athenian people had made in intellectual 
culture within a short period ; and how this culture at once 
brought forth all the dark features of human nature. The 
subjects of his tragedies are taken from the same mythical 
and heroic cycles ; but we see neither the Titan-like figures 
of Aeschylus, nor the lofty and pure characters of Sophocles 
we hear the ancient heroes speak like ordinary mortals ; we 
see in them all the little sufferings of human frailty, all the 
passions and sophistries which every educated Athenian 
knew but too well from his own experience. If we were to 
adopt the judgment of Aristophanes, a most able though not 
impartial critic, we should at once condemn Euripides ; but 
a fairer opinion, probably, is that of Aristotle, who regards 
him as at least the most affecting tragic poet. Euripides 
described men as they were in his days ; and it is a noble 
proof of the good taste of the Athenians, that although 
Euripides composed about ninety dramas, he was only five 
times honoured with the prize. In comedy, the Athenians 
delighted to see men represented in their actual characters 
and circumstances ; but, in tragedy they looked for the ideal 
men of an age which they were accustomed to regard with 
veneration. 

While we must thus acknowledge that the moral condition 
of the age exercised an unmistakeable influence upon the deve- 
lopment and changes of the drama, we can ascribe only a very 



CHAP. XXIX. 



ATTIC COMEDY, 



493 



slight and insignificant influence to the passing political 
occurrences of the time. The few political allusions met 
with in the extant tragedies scarcely justify the attempt to 
discover more ; nay, it would be unfair towards tragedy, even 
that of Euripides, thus to degrade it by connecting it with 
the petty events of the day. If we examine such tragedies 
as the Oedipus in Colonos or Philoctetes, and remember when 
they were composed and performed, we must own,, that the 
drama remained faithful to its principles and dignity, which 
required it to be superior to party feelings, and free from 
their perverting influence. 

Comedy, on the other hand, performed the office of the 
free press of Athens, sometimes giving a faithful image of 
the period, sometimes a caricature. Even before the first 
appearance of Aristophanes, comedy, notwithstanding the 
liberty of the democratic institutions, had been confined 
within the bounds of moderation. These restrictions, how- 
ever, appear to have fallen into disuse, at least at the be- 
ginning of the Peloponnesian war ; for the youthful poet 
came forward at once with the greatest boldness and bitter- 
ness against the most influential persons, until, about the 
middle of the war, a law of Syracosius forbade the practice 
of ridiculing any one by representing him on the stage under 
his real name. This practice, however, did not cease during 
the period of what is called the ancient comedy, of which 
Aristophanes was the great Coryphaeus, and which continued 
to flourish even for some time after the Peloponnesian war ; 
but the persons attacked were less powerful than Cleon or 
Alcibiades had been. The eleven plays of Aristophanes 
which have come down to us, and are the only complete 
specimens of Greek comedy extant, contain a somewhat 
caricatured representation of Athenian life ; and in them the 
leading men of the period are ridiculed along with, and on 
account of, the men of an inferior order. We may safely 
assert, that there was at that time no poet, statesman, or 



494 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



public character of any kind at Athens, who was not obliged 
to submit to the exhibition of his great or small foibles in 
some of the plays of Aristophanes. The noble and pure 
greatness of Sophocles alone is always mentioned by him 
with admiration, because he knew nothing respecting him that 
he could censure. With Aeschylus he finds fault for his un- 
co utlmess and inflexibility ; at least, he puts this criticism into 
the mouth of Euripides. But Euripides, Cleon, and Socrates 
were regarded by him as the incarnations of all the sins com- 
mitted in poetry, politics, and philosophy. Besides Euripides, 
a vast multitude of smaller minds received severe rebukes 
from the dramatic satirist. Among the statesmen, men 
who were otherwise very respectable, such as the brave 
Lamachus, were often lashed by Aristophanes, because 
they advocated the continuance of the war. As he regarded 
Euripides and his followers as spoilers of tragedy, Cleon 
and the other members of the war-party as preparing the 
ruin of their country, so he saw in Socrates and his doctrines 
the destruction of religion, and of the faith of the ancient 
Athenians. Aristophanes everywhere condemns the dege- 
nerate state of his country ; everywhere manifests his attach- 
ment to the good old times of proud simplicity and noble 
enthusiasm ; everywhere exhibits the heroes of Marathon as 
models of virtue and valour. He does not hesitate to attack 
the leading propensities of the whole people, such as their 
fondness for sitting in judgment upon others, while they 
neglected their own domestic affairs. 

His treatment of philosophy and Socrates is most sur- 
prising, and has been the subject of much discussion ; for 
we must observe, in the outset, that he himself treated the 
ancient religious dogmas very unceremoniously, and tried 
the dangerous experiment of endeavouring to cure unbelief 
by unbelief. In the Clouds, which was performed about 
twenty-four years before the death of Socrates, he attacks 
the great philosopher very unsparingly, but he is evidently 



CHAP. XXIX. 



SOCRATES. 



495 



more concerned about his doctrines than about his person. 
It seems sufficiently clear from Plato's Symposium, that 
Aristophanes was not a personal enemy of Socrates, and 
Xenophon makes no allusion to any such hostility. The 
examination of the question, whether Socrates was justly 
condemned to death, would lead us too far. He had to 
pay the penalty for propagating the new ideas, which, in 
the advanced state of Athenian culture, were struggling 
into light. He disregarded the sensuous character of the 
popular religion, and aimed at a true and spiritual know- 
ledge of the divine Being. He led his disciples to self-know- 
ledge and self-culture above all things, leaving untouched 
their religious feeling and their natural faith. But as he 
inculcated upon them the necessity of trying to comprehend 
the essence of all things, and the nature and destiny of man, 
he naturally led them to reflect upon the nature of the deity 
and to doubt the correctness of the faith of their ancestors. 
The scepticism which thus sprang up cannot be laid to the 
charge of Socrates ; it was the unavoidable consequence of 
the thoughts which he had awakened, and he himself out- 
wardly complied with established customs. Being of a pious 
disposition, and adhering to the ancient worship, he always 
performed the customary sacrifices and holy rites, and ad- 
vised his disciples also to do the same. His accusation 
belongs to the time of the restoration, immediately after the 
Peloponnesian war, when the Athenians seem to have been 
most anxiously endeavouring to give new stability to the 
commonwealth by reviving their old institutions. This 
attempt and the belief that, by restoring the ancient forms 
they could resuscitate the ancient spirit, were probably the 
chief causes of the condemnation of Socrates. He did not 
withdraw from its consequences, for he had always lived in 
obedience to the law, and he regarded any attempt to evade 
it as inconsistent with his teachings. The charge brought 
against him was threefold ; that he did not worship the gods 



496 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxix. 



recognised by the state, that he introduced new divinities,, 
and that he corrupted the young. He spent the short pe- 
riod between his condemnation and execution in prison, 
surrounded by his friends and disciples, and drank the hem- 
lock with the greatest calmness and cheerfulness of mind. 
This happened in b. c. 399, when Socrates had attained the 
age of seventy. No sooner was the deed done, than the 
Athenians, as after their condemnation of the victors of Ar- 
ginusae, began to repent of their rashness. Melitus, one of 
the accusers, was put to death, and the two others, Anytus 
and Lycon, were sent into exile. 

These few observations are sufficient to give some idea of 
the moral and intellectual condition of Athens. We must 
bear in mind that the master-works of men, like Sophocles 
and Aristophanes, were thoroughly understood, enjoyed, and 
appreciated by the Athenian public ; a fact which indicates 
the possession by it of an extraordinary degree of mental 
culture, and of a vast amount of knowledge. 



CHAP. XXX. 



CYRUS THE YOUNGER. 



497 



CHAPTER XXX. 

FROM THE EXPEDITION OF CYRUS THE YOUNGER TO THE PEACE OF 
ANTALCIDAS. 

The most important of the events preceding the appearance 
of the great Spartan king Agesilaus, and what is called the 
Corinthian war, was that adventurous expedition of the 
Greeks under the command of Cyrus the younger against 
Artaxerxes, king of Persia. This enterprise shows the sad 
and deplorable condition of the affairs of Greece itself, for 
here we see malcontents and exiles from all parts of Greece 
enlisting in the service of a barbarian and an avowed 
enemy of Greece. The long war had demoralised thousands 
of men, who now found it unbearable to live in peace and to 
support themselves by honest labour, and therefore looked 
to war and booty for the means of subsistence. 

Cyrus was a son of Darius II., and governor of the mari- 
time districts of Asia Minor. His eminent qualities as a 
man and a ruler endeared him so much to his mother Pary- 
satis, that she preferred him to his elder brother Artaxerxes, 
the legitimate heir to the throne, who was now king of Persia. 
Parysatis, wishing to raise Cyrus to the throne, urged him to 
rebel against his brother. Cyrus resolved to follow her advice, 
and his knowledge of the Greek cities in Asia, his connec- 
tions, especially with Lysander and the Spartans, but above 
all, his money, enabled him to assemble a considerable number 
of Greeks from Asia Minor, Chersonesus, Thessaly, and 
various other parts of Greece. His most intimate friends 
alone knew of his great scheme, while all the rest were made 
to believe that he was merely preparing an expedition 
against the rebellious Pisidians. From the account given 



498 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxx. 



by Xenophon of a review held by Cyrus, we learn that 
there were assembled 10,400 heavy-armed Greeks, and 2500 
peltasts, who, together with 100,000 barbarians and 20 
scythe-chariots, marched against the army of Artaxerxes, 
amounting to 1,200,000 men and 200 scythe-chariots. In 
the summer of B.C. 401, Cyrus set out from Sardis, and it 
was not till the army reached Thapsacus that he informed 
the Greeks of what they had long suspected, that they were 
marching against the king of Persia. Their reluctance to 
proceed any farther was overcome by liberal pay and still 
more liberal promises. The army then crossed the Euphrates 
and advanced, meeting with no resistance, until in the neigh- 
bourhood of Cunaxa they encountered all the forces of the 
king. In the ensuing battle, the Greeks, who occupied the 
right wing, gained the victory. Cyrus, after having for 
some time observed the enemy's movements, vehemently 
attacked the centre, where Artaxerxes stood, but fell in the 
first onset after a short struggle. Artaxerxes himself was 
wounded. The death of Cyrus decided the defeat of the 
barbarians, and this one battle put an end to the whole in- 
surrection. But the Greeks were still unconquered, and had 
not lost a single man in the engagement. When they learnt 
the death of Cyrus, they offered the command to his companion 
and friend Ariaeus, who afterwards faithlessly deserted them ; 
and they were so much encouraged by their victory, that 
when the Persian king required them to lay down their arms, 
they refused to give this mark of submission. Their heroism, 
however, had to pass through severer trials. Under the 
pretence of friendship, and the promise to lead them back 
into Ionia, Tissaphernes and the king drew them still farther 
into the interior, as far as the river Tigris ; their commanders 
were ensnared and put to death, in the hope that the army 
might thus be overcome more easily. But fortune did not 
forsake the Greeks ; it was Xenophon, the disciple of Socrates, 
and the historian of this extraordinary expedition, who was 



chap. xxx. RETREAT OF THE TEX THOUSAND. 499 



chiefly instrumental in restoring their sinking courage, and 
exhorted them to persevere and return home under all cir- 
cumstances. Cheirisophus, a Spartan, began the memorable 
retreat, he commanding the van, and Xenophon the rear. 
They did not take the known road by which they had come, 
for they could not force the passage over the Euphrates ; 
and moreover, the districts through which the immense army 
had passed, had been too much drained and exhausted to 
furnish them again with necessaries, and they therefore went 
northwards, through unknown mountainous countries. After 
encountering unspeakable difficulties, being pursued by the 
forces of Tissaphernes as far as the country of the Carduchi, 
where they were attacked by the warlike mountaineers, and 
underwent all the hardships of a severe winter in Armenia, 
they at length reached a height from which they saw the sea. 
With indescribable joy they hastened down to it, and when 
they entered Trapezus, the first Greek town they came to, for- 
getting all their sufferings, and again feeling as Greeks, they 
indemnified themselves by festive games for all the hardships 
of their retreat : 8000 were still surviving ; they marched 
along the coast, while the sick and infirm embarked in ships. 
They had still to encounter many dangers, but they were 
trifling compared with those they had already escaped from. 
No sooner, however, had they reached the countries in which 
they felt confident and safe, than disputes and quarrels arose 
among the leaders, as well as among the men. It was with 
difficulty that Xenophon kept the army together, and suc- 
ceeded in bringing them to the western coast of the Euxine ; 
5000 of them then entered the service of Seuthes, a Thracian 
prince, the successor of Sitalces ; but they were soon after- 
wards summoned back into Asia by two Spartan commis- 
sioners, fresh, hostilities having a short time previously 
broken out between Sparta and Tissaphernes. 

The whole expedition lasted fifteen months, from the 
summer of B.C. 401, till the autumn of B.C. 400. We are 



500 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxx. 



fortunate enough to possess an excellent and detailed account 
of the march into the interior of Asia and of the retreat, 
written by the brave and able Xenophon himself.* 

The remainder of the 10,000 Greeks were incorporated 
with the troops of Thimbron, the Spartan harmost, who had 
been appointed to conduct the war against Tissaphernes. By 
the death of Cyrus the relation subsisting between Sparta 
and Persia had become altered. Tissaphernes had obtained 
from Artaxerxes the satrapy of Cyrus, as a reward for his 
fidelity ; and on his return from the interior of Asia, he was 
immediately involved in quarrels with the Greek towns, 
which refused to submit to his authority. The situation of 
the Greeks in Asia had been rather unfavourable during the 
late wars ; the fruits of the ancient successes over the Per- 
sians, and especially of Cimon's victories, had in a measure 
been lost during the unfortunate contests in the mother 
country. The undertakings of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus 
during the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, against the 
freedom of the Greek cities in Asia, show that the power 
of Persia was reviving, at least relatively to the Greeks, for 
in the interior it may have been weak enough. We have 
no accurate information about the condition of the Asiatic 
colonies, and from Xenophon's description we can only infer 
that the majority of them, especially the less important towns, 
had been reduced to subjection by the Persian satraps, and 
that the larger cities, from fear of a similar fate, invoked the 
assistance of Sparta. Thimbron accordingly went into Asia 

* For having taken part in the expedition, Xenophon was exiled from 
Athens, which was then on terms of friendship with Persia. He went to 
Sparta, accompanied Agesilaus on his Asiatic expeditions, and afterwards 
lived on an estate in Elis, which the Spartans had given him. The decree 
of his exile was repealed in b.c. 399, but he was not recalled till B.C. 371. 
He remained at Corinth, however, and died there, ins.€. 355, at the 
advanced age of 90. His partiality towards Sparta has been severely 
censured ; but all Greece honoured him at Olympia as the deliverer of 
the 10,000 Greeks. 



chap. xxx. DERCYLLIDAS IN ASIA MINOR. 



501 



with 4000 Peloponnesians, 1000 Neodamodeis (freed men), 
and 300 Athenian horse. The Greek cities in Asia also 
furnished their contingents, for all had now to obey the com- 
mands of Sparta. Thimbron's success was not very great, and 
being soon afterwards succeeded by the cunning Dercyllidas, 
he was banished, because he had neglected the discipline of his 
army, and had not spared the countries of the friends of 
Sparta. The war now at once assumed a different aspect. 
Dercyllidas, wishing to direct all his forces against his 
personal enemy, Pharnabazus, entered into negotiations with 
Tissaphernes. Within eight days he took or obtained the 
adhesion of nine towns of Aeolis, which belonged to the 
satrapy of Pharnabazus, and then concluded a truce with 
the barbarians, as he intended to spend the winter in Bithynia, 
so as not to be a burden on the friendly towns. In the spring 
of the following year, b. c. 398, he went to Lampsacus, and 
after having renewed the truce with Pharnabazus, proceeded 
to Chersonesus, at the request of the tow T ns of that peninsula, 
whose application had been forwarded to him from Sparta. 
There he caused a wall to be built across the isthmus, to 
protect the country against the inroads and ravages of the 
Thracians. He completed the structure during the summer, 
then returned to Asia, and laid siege to Atarnae, opposite to 
Lesbos, which was in the hands of Lesbian exiles, and served 
them as head-quarters during their piratical expeditions. 
After a siege of eight months he took the place, and pro- 
ceeded thence to Ephesus. There he received orders from 
Sparta to attack the possessions of Tissaphernes in Caria, 
and thus to accelerate the liberation of the Greek colonies. 
Meantime Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus had become recon- 
ciled; they had made all necessary preparations in Caria, 
and had crossed the Maeander. The hostile armies faced 
each other for some time, and then a truce was concluded 
until the terms of peace should be ratified on both sides ; for 
Dercyllidas demanded the independence of the Greek towns, 



502 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



chap, xxx. 



the evacuation of which the satraps promised only on con- 
dition that the Greek armies and harmosts should be with- 
drawn from them. This happened in b. c. 397. 

During these operations of Thimbron and Dercyllidas, 
Sparta had been engaged in a war with her north-western 
neighbours of Elis, which lasted for two years, b. c. 399 and 
398. During the summer, Agis invaded the enemy's country 
twice. The first time his campaign was frustrated by an 
earthquake, but the second time his success was complete. 
The Eleans had joined the alliance between Athens and 
Argos, and had even excluded the Spartans from participation 
in the Olympic games and sacrifices. In accordance with 
the mission Sparta had undertaken, but which she often 
abused, she now required the Eleans to restore the towns 
within their territory to independence, and as the Eleans 
did not comply with this demand, Agis ravaged their territory 
up to the very walls of their capital, and compelled them to 
accept a humiliating peace. They were obliged to demolish 
their fortifications, to recognize the independence of the 
towns in Triphylia, and to form an alliance with Sparta. 
They retained, however, the superintendence of the Olympic 
games and of the temple of the Olympian Zeus. 

The aged king Agis died soon after the conclusion of 
peace with Elis, and was succeeded by his brother Agesilaus. * 
In his personal appearance he had no advantages, for he was 
of small stature, and lame in one foot ; but his mind was all 
the greater, and Sparta had never had a more intelligent ruler. 
He possessed an intellectual culture which enabled him to 
look far beyond the narrow views of the earlier Spartans, and 
which was the result of the civilisation recently introduced 
at Sparta. Xenophon, in his eulogy on Agesilaus, mentions, 
as occurring in the first year of his reign, the conspiracy of 
Cinadon, or of the poor, against the few wealthy Spartans. 

* Leotychides, the son of Agis, was excluded from the succession, 
because his parentage was doubted. (Plut. Alcib. 23.) 



chap. xxx. AGESILAUS IN ASIA MINOR. 



503 



This conspiracy is an unmistakeable symptom of the decay 
of the ancient Lycurgian institutions. Its discovery, and the 
punishment of Cinadon, could not heal the disease from which 
the state was suffering. It was not till information was brought 
to Sparta of fresh preparations being made by the Persians, 
and of the approach of a large Phoenician fleet, that, by the 
advice and according to the plans of Lysander, Agesilaus 
undertook an expedition with 2,000 Neodamodeis and 6,000 
allies. He was accompanied by Lysander himself and 30 
Spartans. He wished to set out from Aulis, like Agamem- 
non ; but the Boeotarchs showed so much hostility towards 
him, that he went to Geraestos, in Euboea, and after having 
ordered the army and fleet to assemble there, sailed across 
to Ephesus. Tissaphernes, not thinking himself strong 
enough to oppose the Spartans openly, induced the unsus- 
pecting Agesilaus, who announced himself as the deliverer 
of the Greeks, to conclude a truce, under the pretext that he 
would in the meantime endeavour to obtain the king's sanc- 
tion of the independence of the cities. The truth, however, 
was that he sent out messengers to collect an auxiliary 
force. 

Meantime, Lysander and Agesilaus quarrelled. The 
former had perhaps hoped to domineer over the king whom 
he had assisted in raising to the throne. His acquaintance 
with the cities, obtained in former campaigns, made him 
appear in the eyes of the multitude as the more influential 
of the two. Agesilaus, however, contrived with so much 
prudence and vigour to put things in their true light, that 
Lysander, feeling himself crushed, desired to be discharged, 
and was sent by the king to the Hellespont, where he soon 
found fresh opportunities of showing his skill. When at 
length Tissaphernes, trusting to his reinforcements, openly 
threatened Agesilaus with war unless he withdrew from 
Asia, the latter also began seriously to prepare for the 
contest, and drew reinforcements from the cities of Asia 



504 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXX. 



Minor. He announced to all that lie contemplated an expe- 
dition into Caria, and thereby deceived the satrap; for he 
marched into Phrygia, and ravaged a portion of it. Yet 
this first undertaking was not followed by any great results, 
because he was deficient in cavalry ; and the army returned 
to Ephesus, where the men were kept in constant exercise 
and fully armed. He then marched again into Phrygia, and 
even into the very neighbourhood of Sardis, while Tissa- 
phernes, being again deceived, was protecting Caria with 
his infantry. On the river Pactolus a battle was fought with 
the Persian cavalry, in which Agesilaus gained a complete 
victory. This loss the Persians ascribed entirely to Tissa- 
phernes, who remained at Sardis during the battle. In con- 
sequence of this, he fell into disgrace and was deposed, and 
his successor, Tithraustes, ordered him to be put to death. 
The new satrap immediately concluded a truce with the 
Spartan, and by a bribe of thirty talents induced him to con- 
tinue the war against the neighbouring satrap, Pharnabazus. 
So strange and so perilous was the relation of the satraps to 
one another, and to their sovereign! While Agesilaus was 
on his march, he received news from Sparta, that he had 
been appointed admiral also, in order that he might be able to 
carry on his operations more vigorously with both the army 
and the fleet. The fleet, however, did not yet exist. At his 
command the Asiatic cities willingly fitted out an armament 
of 120 sail, and Agesilaus appointed the courageous but inex- 
perienced Pisander, his wife's brother, admiral of the fleet, 
b. c. 395. He then advanced farther into the province of 
Pharnabazus : he was victorious everywhere, ravaged the 
greater part of the satrapy, and soon made himself master 
of the whole; so that he was enabled to spend the winter 
there, and to make preparations for penetrating, in the be- 
ginning of the following spring, b. c. 394, into the interior 
of the Persian empire. 

His great plan, however, was not executed, for in the 



CHAP. XXX. 



LEAGUE AGAINST SPARTA. 



505 



midst of his victorious career he was obliged to quit the 
scenes of his glory. At the commencement of spring, when 
he was on the point of setting out, he was called back to his 
distressed country. For while he had been gathering laurels 
in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, the circumstances of Greece 
underwent a change much to the disadvantage of Sparta. 

Tithraustes, the new satrap, contrived by Persian gold to 
stir up a general war in Greece against Sparta ; he hoped 
thus to stop the successful progress of the Spartan king, and 
to remove him from Asia as soon as possible For this pur- 
pose he sent Timocrates (or Hermocrates), of Rhodes, with 
fifty talents to Greece. Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, ac- 
cepted the money, for they had good reasons to be indignant 
with Sparta ; but the Athenians joined the league against 
her, unsolicited and unbribed. The Spartans had ren- 
dered themselves odious to all the Greek states ; for during 
the Peloponnesian war they had proclaimed themselves the 
deliverers of Greece, and now they acted as its tyrants by 
the agency of their harmosts. 

As the Lacedaemonians at first took no notice of the new 
alliance, the contest, at the instigation of the Thebans, be- 
gan between the Locrians and the Phocians. The Thebans 
supported the former, and the Phocians called upon Sparta 
for assistance. The Spartans granted the request the more 
readily because they were displeased with the Thebans, who 
were least inclined to acknowledge their supremacy. First, 
Lysander was sent out to assemble the tribes of mount Oeta for 
the ensuing struggle, and he succeeded in drawing the power- 
ful Orchomenians over to the side of Sparta. King Pausa- 
nias, who was assembling the allies at Tegea, was to follow 
him. Lysander, however, did not wait for his arrival, but 
with the army he had just raised, made an attack upon Ha- 
liartos, b. c. 395, after having in vain tried to induce it to 
revolt from Thebes. The Thebans hastened to its assistance, 
and Lysander fell under the walls of the town. In him 

z 



506 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxx. 



Sparta lost a man who in heroism equalled the best of her 
sons, but in intrigue and faithlessness surpassed even Alci- 
biades, to whom he was not inferior in his love of dominion. 
The period of Sparta's greatest power was his work, but the 
means he employed to strengthen that power were calculated 
only to bring about its speedy downfal. 

The victorious Boeotians, being too eager in the pursuit, 
suffered a great loss, but still their enemies acknowledged 
themselves vanquished, and retreated. This was the first 
conflict in that unhappy war, which is commonly called the 
Boeotian or Corinthian, and the consequence of which was 
the ascendancy of Persia in Asia Minor. After these occur- 
rences, king Pausanias arrived ; but when he heard what had 
happened, thinking a fresh conflict would be perilous, he 
contented himself with demanding the surrender of the dead ; 
nay, he even consented to evacuate Boeotia, if the slain were 
given up to him. This retreat, which the insolence of the 
Boeotians rendered still more disgraceful to the Spartans, 
brought a capital charge upon the king ; but he withdrew 
from punishment, and died at Tegea in exile. He was suc- 
ceeded by his son Agesipolis, who was yet under age. 

After this victory, the enemies of Sparta displayed still 
greater zeal. The Corinthians, Argives, Boeotians, and 
Athenians, held a congress at Corinth, in which the con- 
tinuance of the war was discussed, and new allies were gained, 
the league being joined by the Euboeans, Leucadians, Aear- 
nanians, Ambracians and Chalcidians. Medius, tyrant of 
the Thessalian Larissa, with their assistance took Pharsalus 
from the Lacedaemonians. The Boeotians and Argives took 
Heracleia, and restored it to the Trachinians. Ismenias, the 
Theban, who distinguished himself above the others, induced 
some of the Oetaean tribes to revolt ; in a bloody battle near 
the Locrian town of Naryx, he defeated the Phocians, who 
were commanded by a Spartan, and then retreated to Co- 
rinth, where an army of 15,000 men and 500 horse, as- 



CHAP. xxx. THE BATTLE OF CORINTH. 



507 



sembled, and was soon afterwards increased by the arrival of 
additional forces. 

The king of Persia too bad made an acquisition dangerous 
to Sparta, in the person of Conon, the celebrated Athenian 
admiral, who, by the advice of Pharnabazus, had been ap- 
pointed by the king commander of the Persian fleet, as early 
as the time when Agesilaus went over to Asia ; and he was 
now entrusted with unlimited power to equip a fleet against 
the Spartans. 

Amid these unfavourable circumstances, Agesilaus re- 
ceived orders to return home. He had spent the winter at 
Dascylion, and had just evacuated the satrapy of Pharnaba- 
zus in accordance with an amicable agreement He obeyed 
the orders with a heav} r heart, and, followed by a splendidly 
equipped army, took the road which Xerxes had once occu- 
pied six months in traversing, and by quick marches reached 
Greece in thirty days. Before he arrived in Boeotia, the war 
had broken out afresh. Aristodemus, the guardian of Agesi- 
polis, had undertaken the command of the army. The Corin- 
thians and their allies were at Nemea, intending to commence 
hostilities as soon as possible, in order to prevent the Spartans 
from assembling a greater number of allies. Thus a battle 
ensued near Nemea, the two armies being of almost equal 
strength. The Lacedaemonians gained the victory, but their 
success was due to the 600 Spartans who were in the army. 
They fought with such good fortune, that only eight of 
them fell on the field of battle. The first news of this battle, 
commonly called the battle of Corinth, reached Agesilaus 
while he was at Amphipolis ; he immediately sent Dercyl- 
lidas, the bearer of it, to the Asiatic Greeks, to inform them 
of the victory, and continued his march. The Thessalian 
towns harassed Agesilaus greatly as he marched past them, 
but he boldly and successfully forced his way, and on the 
fourteenth of August, b. c. 394, a day marked by an eclipse 
of the sun, he reached the borders of Boeotia. There he re- 

Z 2 



508 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxx. 



ceived intelligence of the defeat of the Spartan fleet and of 
the death of Pisander. The Graeco-Persian fleet, under 
Pharnabazus and Conon, had gained a victory off Cnidos, 
and this destruction of the Spartan navy produced conse- 
quences of incalculable advantage to Athens. Agesilaus 
concealed the sad news from his men, and in order to keep 
up their courage, told them that the Spartan fleet was victo- 
rious although Pisander had been killed. Some days later, 
a battle took place on the banks of the Cephissus, between 
Agesilaus and the confederates, who had been joined by the 
Locrians and Aenianians, and whose forces extended along 
the foot of mount Helicon. In the plain of Coroneia, 
Greeks arrayed against Greeks fought with rage and hatred, 
animated by a real desire to destroy one another. Agesilaus 
was wounded several times ; finally, he gained the victory, but 
could not make use of it to pursue the enemy. Immediately 
after the battle he visited Delphi, and there dedicated to the 
god the tenth part of his Asiatic booty, 100 talents, He 
then went to Sparta by sea, and his army was disbanded, the 
soldiers returning to their homes. ^dl J.h % 

The war, which now ceased for a time, was continued for 
the most part in the territory of Corinth, the Lacedae- 
monians and their allies infesting Corinth from Sicyon. 
Many Corinthians, the best, as Xenophon says, desirous of 
putting an end to the war, sought to bring about a peace 
with Sparta. But the war-party at Corinth took fearful and 
unprecedented revenge upon them. A festival was chosen 
as the day for the massacre of the men of peace, and sup- 
pliants were murdered even at the altars of the gods whose 
protection they implored. But those who escaped, being 
anxious to bring this insupportable state of things to a speedy 
termination, negotiated with the Lacedaemonians, and opened 
to them the gates of the port-town of Lechaeon. On the 
following day the Argives hastened to the place, but were 
repelled after a murderous fight, and the Lacedaemonians 



CHAP. XXX. 



IPHICRATES 



509 



remained in possession of the port. Praxitas, the conqueror, 
ordered part of the walls to be demolished, then led his army 
towards Megara, and having taken the towns of Sidos and 
Crommyon, in which garrisons were placed, he disbanded 
his army, as the time of the campaign had expired. This 
occurred in b. c. 393. The struggle in the Corinthian and 
neighbouring territories, however, did not cease. Both 
parties engaged mercenaries, and the Athenian general Iphi- 
crates, by a change in the armour of the peltasts, enabled them 
to fight successfully, even against heavy -armed men. In the 
following summer Agesilaus made another (his last) expe- 
dition against Corinth, which was protected by Iphicrates ; 
but this time he was repelled with great slaughter, and 
was forced to quit the Corinthian territory. All the places 
that had been lost in the preceding year, with the excep- 
tion of Lechaeon, were recovered through the skill of Iphi- 
crates. i thiqioG. betizW aif olttccf aiii 

While Sparta was thus engaged in Peloponnesus, Athens 
was reaping the fruits of her naval victory off Cnidos. First 
of all, the Greek cities in Asia were delivered from their 
harmosts, and by the promise of independence were gained 
over to Pharnabazus and Conon. Pharnabazus then pro- 
ceeded by land to Abydos, which Dercyllidas had kept faithful 
to the cause of Sparta ; and Conon appeared with his fleet 
before Sestos. The attempt to take Abydos failed. Conon, 
however, assembled a fleet in the Hellespont, and in the 
spring of the following year, b. c. 393, he sailed with Phar- 
nabazus to Melos, one of the Cyclades, and thence across to 
the coast of Laconia. After having landed in several places, 
ravaged the coasts, and made himself master of Cythera, he 
sailed to the Isthmus, while Pharnabazus exhorted the Greeks 
to persevere in the war against Sparta, and supplied them with 
money. He readily consented to Conon's plan of restoring the 
walls of Athens, and thus to inflict a wound which Sparta 
would feel most severely. For this purpose too he gave 

z 3 



510 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXX, 



money. Conon now went to Athens, and the walls were 
restored with Persian gold. All heartily assisted in the re- 
building, even the crews of the fleet lent a helping hand. 
The influence of Athens in the towns and islands which had 
been so quickly recovered, and the no less rapid restoration 
of the walls — for at the beginning of the following year, b. c 
392, the w ork was completed — at once convinced Sparta, 
that her short-lived maritime supremacy was at an end, and 
that Athens was on the point of recovering her former po- 
sition. The Spartans immediately directed their policy 
against Conon, endeavouring to get rid of him by intrigues, 
and with the aid of the natural enemy of Greece, whom sel- 
fish interests had long since ceased to regard in that light. 
The cunning Spartan Antalcidas went to Tiribazus with pro- 
posals of peace ; Conon also was sent thither from Athens, and 
they were joined by other envoys from Thebes, Corinth and 
Argos. The terms of the peace proposed by Antalcidas, and 
which were afterwards actually adopted, sacrificed the Asiatic 
towns to the king of Persia, but for the other towns and the 
islands independence was demanded. Tiribazus was, of course, 
pleased with this plan, but all the envoys except Antalcidas 
opposed it; for no one was willing to give up what he pos- 
sessed; and thus the negotiations were, for the present, broken 
off. The Lacedaemonians, however, obtained from Tiribazus 
money to build a fleet, it being hoped that this would make 
the Athenians more willing to yield ; but Conon, who had 
spoken against the peace, and consequently against the king, 
was taken prisoner. He soon succeeded, indeed, in making 
his escape from captivity, but took no further part in the 
■war, and died in Cyprus. While Tiribazus was laying the 
disgraceful proposals of Antalcidas before the king, Struthas, 
who filled his place in his absence, inclined towards the 
Athenians, and accordingly, the Lacedaemonians, under the 
command of Thimbron, continued the war against Struthas. 
The war, originally confined to Corinth, had become a general 



CHAP. XXX. 



TELEUTIAS. 



511 



one, which was carried on simultaneously in Greece and on 
the coasts of Asia Minor. 

One year after the last-mentioned expedition against 
Corinth, Agesilaus, in conjunction with the Achaeans, whose 
possession of Calydon was in danger, set out against the 
Acarnanians, who were allied with the Athenians and Boeo- 
tians. By a successful campaign, and the threat of a fresh 
invasion, he induced the Acarnanians to conclude peace 
with the Achaeans, and form an alliance with Sparta, B.C. 
390. 

In the same year Agesipolis made a predatory incursion 
into the territory of Argos, and committed great havoc, but 
while he was besieging Argos he was induced to retreat by 
unfavourable signs in the victims offered up as sacrifices. 

The events which followed the renewal of the maritime 
war were of much greater importance, and were connected 
in the first instance with a revolution in Rhodes. The 
popular party having gained the upper hand in that island, 
the Spartans endeavoured to deprive the Athenians of the 
advantages which they might derive from that change. The 
Spartan Teleutias had at length collected a fleet of twenty- 
seven sail, and having met Philocrates, who was hastening 
with ten ships from Athens to the assistance of Evagoras ? 
captured or destroyed all the Athenian ships. " Both parties," 
says Xenophon, " were doing the very opposite of what they 
should have done ; for the Athenians, the allies of the king 
of Persia, sent assistance to Evagoras of Cyprus, the king's 
enemy, and Teleutias, although Sparta was at war with the 
king, destroyed the ships which were going to fight against 
him." So completely had the political relations of Greece 
been perverted by jealousy and hatred, that Sparta would 
rather aid her natural enemy than allow Athens to gain an 
advantage. 

Teleutias was successful in Rhodes, and the Athenians, 
dreading the growing maritime power of Sparta, sent out the 

z 4 



512 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



chap, mm 



aged hero Thrasybulus to check it. Leaving Teleutias un- 
molested in Rhodes, he sailed with forty ships to the Hel- 
lespont, reconciled Seuthes and Amadocus, two princes of 
the Odrysians, and concluded an alliance with them ; he then 
made himself master of the towns on the coast, and restored 
to Byzantium its democratic form of government; he also 
re-established the impost of a tenth on vessels coming out of 
the Euxine. After this he expelled the Laconian garrisons 
from Lesbos, and levied contributions at Aspendos, intend- 
ing thence to proceed to Rhodes. But the Aspendians fell 
upon his camp in the night, and killed him in his tent, 
B.C. 390. 

Thrasybulus was succeeded by Agj'rius, or Agyrrhius, the 
effeminate and reckless squanderer of the public treasures, 
who increased the pay for attending the popular assembly to 
three oboli. The Spartans now sent Anaxibius to the Hel- 
lespont, where he was successful, until the arrival of Iphi- 
crates, by whom he was defeated at Abydos, in B.C. 389. 

In the following year the Spartans succeeded in establishing 
themselves in the island of Aegina, and attacked the fort still 
occupied by the Athenians so vigorously, that the latter 
withdrew their garrison from it. The Spartan commanders 
harassed the Attic territory from Aegina in various ways ; 
they were sometimes beaten, as Gorgopas was by Chabrias, 
but sometimes they succeeded, as for example, when Teleutias, 
the idol of the soldiers, boldly surprised Piraeus, and loaded 
with booty, returned to Aegina before the very eyes of the 
astonished Athenians. While these events were going on, 
Antalcidas had again gone to Tiribazus, determined to con- 
clude a treaty with the king, if the opponents of Sparta 
would not consent to his terms of peace. At the same time 
he was active as a commander, near Abydos, and by rein- 
forcements from the Ionian cities and Syracuse, increased 
the Spartan fleet to upwards of eighty ships, which gave him 
so much power at sea, that he prevented the ships coming 



chap. xxx. THE PEACE OF AKTALCIDAS. 513 

from the Euxine from sailing to Athens. The Athenians, 
seeing that their enemy was thus gaining the ascendancy, 
now began to think of peace. The other states, too, the 
Corinthians as well as the Argives, were tired of the war, 
and all the belligerents were present by their envoys when 
Tiribazus proclaimed the peace in terms dictated by the 
king himself. This peace ran as follows; — "King Arta- 
xerxes thinks it right that the Greek cities in Asia, and 
the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, should belong to 
himself; but that all the other Greek cities, both small and 
great, should be left independent, with the exception of 
Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, and that these should, as of old, 
belong to the Athenians. If any state refuse to accept this 
peace, I will make war against it." The Thebans and 
Argives were little pleased with these terms, for the former 
were unwilling to give up their supremacy over the Boeotian 
towns, and the Argives refused to withdraw their garrison 
from Corinth. The Thebans wanted to swear to the treaty 
in the name of all the Boeotian towns, but when Agesilaus 
threatened them with war, they yielded. In like manner the 
Argives were compelled to retire from Corinth, and the exiles 
returned. u moil aosiiiBg liad 

The peace of Antalcidas was concluded in b. c. 387. The 
Spartans, who had to carry it into effect, derived the greatest 
advantages from it ; they gained the Corinthians as their 
allies, they humbled the Argives, and, what they had desired 
most, they destroyed the supremacy of Thebes in Boeotia. 
Sparta itself, on the other hand, retained its sovereignty over 
the Laconian towns and Messenia. This disgraceful peace, 
the work of Sparta, completely destroyed the fruits of the 
noble efforts of the Greeks during the Persian war, and 
sacrificed the freedom of the Greek cities in Asia. Even at 
this time we find only isolated traces of that great national 
feeling which breathes in the w T orks of Herodotus and 
Aeschylus, and which inspired the whole nation to fight for 

z 5 



514 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxx. 



its independence. But this too was one of the consequences 
of high intellectual culture ; for the comparatively narrow 
feeling of nationality becomes more and more weakened as 
the mind of an individual or of a nation rises to more com- 
prehensive views, and recognises the universality of the laws 
of human existence ; and it would seem that martial bravery 
decreases in the same proportion. 



chap. xxxi. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE. 



515 



CHAPTER XXXI. 

FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS TO THE DEATH OF EPAMINONDAS. 

The division of all Greece into a number of small inde- 
pendent states, which had been the object of the peace of 
Antalcidas, was never completely effected; for the Lace- 
daemonians themselves, who were appointed to see the terms 
of the treaty carried into effect, not only tacitly retained 
their supremacy in Peloponnesus, but manifested a desire to 
extend their dominion over the whole of Greece, and the 
more openly, the more the sad condition of the different 
states favoured the realisation of such selfish schemes. The 
only pleasing event of this period was the restoration of 
Plataeae in B.C. 386, forty years after its destruction by the 
Lacedaemonians. Those states, the capitals of which had 
exercised their rights of supremacy with any degree of 
harshness, such as Boeotia and Elis, were now most divided, 
in consequence of the general desire of independence on the 
part of the separate towns. The notorious weakness of such 
isolated towns naturally led to their speedy subjugation by 
their more powerful neighbours. 

Sparta itself was least inclined to comply with the terms 
of the peace ; it fostered disputes within the smaller towns 
and states, then took a part in them, and having subdued 
them, at length attempted to do the same with the more 
powerful ones. The Spartans first commanded the Man- 
tineans to demolish their walls, in order that in future they 
might have the less to fear from them. They alleged as a 
pretext the understanding which existed between Mantinea 
and Argos, the imperfect manner in which the Mantineans 
had discharged their duties as allies, the expiration of the 
thirty years' truce, which had been concluded in b,c. 418> 

z 6 



518 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXI. 



after the battle of Mantinea, and lastly, the hostile disposition 
manifested by Mantinea towards Sparta. The Mantineans 
having refused to comply with this demand, Agesipolis (for 
Agesilaus from a private feeling declined to conduct the 
operations) advanced with an army, and at length compelled 
the town to surrender by diverting the stream Ophis into it, 
and thus laying it under water. Those of its citizens who 
were favourably disposed towards Argos, as well as the 
leaders of the popular party, obtained a free departure, 
through the mediation of Pausanias, who was living at Tegea ; 
but Mantinea lost its political existence ; its inhabitants were 
distributed among the four villages out of which they had 
been collected into the capital ; " and in the course of time," 
says Xenophon, "the aristocratical Mantineans were quite 
satisfied to live near their estates, and to have got rid of the 
troublesome popular leaders, so that they cheerfully contri- 
buted their contingents to the Spartan levies." In B.C. 384, 
Phlius was compelled in a no less cruel manner to recal the 
exiled oligarchs, who had applied to Sparta for assistance. 

Thus Sparta established, by violent means, her supremacy 
in Peloponnesus, and Argos alone kept independent of it. 
Athens allowed her to act as she pleased, and did not even 
send succour to the Mantineans, who implored it. But 
Sparta's love of dominion soon went beyond the limits of 
Peloponnesus ; other states also were commanded to yield 
the same ready obedience as the Peloponnesians. The 
Spartans, well known and dreaded as arbitrators, soon inter- 
fered in disputes in the most distant parts of Greece. 
Envoys from Acanthos and Apollonia appeared at Sparta to 
solicit aid against Olynthos, which had become overbearing. 
It had united the Greek towns of Chalcidice into an alliance 
which was directed against Amyntas of Macedonia, and was 
endeavouring to compel the two above-mentioned towns to 
take part in the alliance and in the expedition against Ma- 
cedonia. A report that the Athenians and Boeotians would 



CHAP. XXXI. 



CAPTURE OF THEBES. 



517 



likewise join the confederacy, was the principal cause that 
induced the Spartans to act with quick determination. The 
allies, to please Sparta, displayed great zeal> and Eudamidas 
at once set out with a force of 2000 men, and occupied 
Potidaea, from which he prepared to make war upon 
Olynthos. This was the beginning of what is called the 
Olynthian war, which lasted about five years, from b. c. 383 
till 379. The great army of the Peloponnesian allies having 
assembled, set out under the command of Phoebidas. On 
its march through Greece, it arrived at Thebes at a time 
when that city was agitated by factious feuds, in which the 
democratic party under Ismenias had gained a victory over 
the oligarchs, and had resolved to take no part in the war 
against Olynthos. Leontiades, the leader of the oligarchs, 
now proposed to betray Thebes into the hands of the Spartans, 
and Phoebidas accepted his offers. In broad daylight, while 
the women were celebrating the Thesmophoria in the 
Cadmea, and the council was assembled in the market-place, 
Leontiades conducted him to the Cadmea, and delivered to 
him the keys of the gates. He then hastened to the market- 
place, and having informed the council of what had happened,, 
ordered his opponent Ismenias to be arrested. He afterwards 
hastened to Sparta, and excusing Phoebidas' violation of the 
peace of Antalcidas, induced the Spartans to sanction the 
occupation of the Cadmea. At the same time he caused 
Ismenias to be tried and condemned to death by a packed 
court of the allies, as an old friend of Persia, and as a se- 
ditious citizen. Thus fell Ismenias, whose generosity and 
great talents were much esteemed; but about three hundred 
of his followers escaped to Athens, and among them was 
Pelopidas, the future deliverer of Thebes. His intimate 
friend, the still more celebrated Epaminondas, was allowed 
to remain at Thebes, as, not being possessed of property, it 
was believed that he would not be dangerous. 

The Spartans now displayed still greater zeal in the Olyn- 



518 



HISTORY OF GBEECE. 



CHAP. XXXI. 



thian war. Teleutias, the liarmost and brother of Agesilaus, 
assembled a large army by acting with the prudence and hu- 
manity of a Brasidas. Derdas, Prince of Elymia, also joined 
him. In the spring of the following year, b. c. 382, the Lace- 
daemonians were not successful ; they were first defeated in 
an engagement of the cavalry, and soon afterwards the brave 
Teleutias fell, his army again sustaining a severe reverse. 
Notwithstanding these misfortunes, however, the Spartans 
still maintained their ground. The year after, b. c. 381, 
Agesipolis, with a newly-formed army, and accompanied by 
thirty Spartans, marched against Olynthos, and the old 
allies, Amyntas, Derdas, and the Thessalian horse, took part 
in the campaign, so that the Olynthians, no longer venturing 
upon battle in the open field, confined themselves to little 
sallies and the defence of their walls. While matters were 
in this state, Agesipolis was attacked by a violent fever, the 
consequence of excessive heat. He caused himself to be 
carried to the shady grove of Dionysus near Aphytos in 
Pallene, and died there in B.C. 380. He was succeeded by 
Cieombrotus, but the conduct of the war was entrusted to 
the liarmost Polybiades, who at length, when all provisions 
in the town were consumed, compelled the Olynthians to sue 
for peace. Their envoys concluded a treaty with the con- 
queror, and recognised the supremacy of Sparta in B.C. 379. 

At the same time Agesilaus had humbled Phlius also. 
The exiles who had been restored a few years before through 
the mediation of Sparta, felt themselves aggrieved by their 
fellow-citizens, and again solicited her protection. Agesi- 
laus, in spite of the disapproval of many, and especially 
of his brother-king Agesipolis, marched against Phlius, de- 
manded as a security for its fidelity the surrender of the 
citadel, and forthwith began to lay siege to the town. His 
anger was increased by the fact, that when the Phliasians 
began to suffer from famine, they entered into direct com- 
munication with the government of Sparta. He contrived 



CHAP. XXXI. 



LIBERATION OF THEBES. 



519 



to. obtain the grant of unlimited power, and when at length 
the town surrendered, he composed a court-martial of fifty 
exiles and fifty citizens, to bring the guilty individuals to 
trial. New laws were to be introduced, and until all should 
be completed, a garrison remained in possession of the 
citadel. The operations against this insignificant town had 
lasted one year and eight months, from B.C. 381 to 380. 

After the termination of the Olynthian war, the Spar- 
tans exercised undisputed supremacy in Greece, and the 
year b. c. 379 marks the highest pinnacle of their power. 
The rebellious and reluctant allies had been compelled to 
yield obedience, Thebes and Boeotia were subject to their 
will, the Athenians remained quiet, the Corinthians and 
Argives had suffered too severely in the preceding war to 
venture to oppose her ; in short, Sparta ruled throughout 
Greece, and her power seemed everywhere to be firmly es- 
tablished. But how soon had she to descend from her lofty 
position! The year of her greatest prosperity was at the 
same time the beginning of her downfall. 

The deliverance of Thebes came from Athens. In concert 
with a certain Phyllidas, Pelopidas*, Mellon, and some other 
Theban exiles, went from Phyle to Thebes. It was late in 
the autumn, and under cover of night, and in the disguise of 
huntsmen, the exiles succeeded in reaching the house of 
Charon, one of their most resolute partisans. Thence the 
conspirators proceeded to the mansion of Phyllidas, who en- 
joyed the confidence of the oligarchs, and was at that moment, 
according to a plan previously arranged with the exiles, en- 
tertaining Archias and Philippus, two of the polemarchs, at 
a banquet. Phyllidas introduced them in the disguise of 
hetaerae, and the polemarchs were murdered. Thence the 
conspirators hastened to the house of Leontiades, another of 
the polemarchs, who was likewise put to death. The pri- 

* Xenoph. (HeUen. v. 4. § 2.), in his partiality, does not mention Pelo- 
pidas, but assigns the chief share in this transaction to Phyllidas. 



520 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXI, 



soners were set at liberty, and the citizens of Thebes called 
upon to assert their freedom. As soon as the day dawned, 
all who were capable of bearing arms assembled, and the 
Athenians, 5000 foot and 500 horse, who had been waiting 
on the frontier, hurried to Thebes by quick marches, to assist 
Pelopidas and his party. The Spartan harmost, who was in 
the acropolis, first sent to Thespiae and Plataeae for assistance ; 
but an armed band of Plataeans, which came at his summons, 
was defeated, and the garrison of the Cadmea was soon 
obliged to capitulate. It obtained leave to depart unmolested, 
but those Thebans who had made themselves most odious to 
their countrymen, were put to death, and even their children 
were not spared. 

When the news of these events reached Sparta, the harmost 
was condemned to death, and an army was sent against 
Thebes. This was the beginning of the Theban war, which 
lasted upwards of sixteen years, from B.C. 378 to 362, in 
which all Greece took part more or less, and which greatly 
contributed to increase its weakness against foreign enemies. 
Thebes, in the first instance, contended for the supremacy in 
Boeotia only; its attempt to obtain the same position in 
reference to all Greece, was the result of subsequent victories, 
and the work of Epaminondas. But Athens recovered her 
supremacy at sea. 

The war was commenced by Cleombrotus in the beginning 
of the year b. c. 378. Chabrias, the Athenian general, obliged 
him to take the road into Boeotia by Plataeae and Thespiae, 
and Cleombrotus so studiously abstained from doing any 
damage during the short time that he remained in the 
Theban territory, that his men were at a loss to understand 
whether they had been at war or at peace with Thebes. But 
notwithstanding this, the Athenians, from fear of the Lace- 
daemonians, were on the point of giving up the alliance 
which they had concluded with Thebes. In order to prevent 
this, the Thebans bribed Sphodrias, whom Cleombrotus had 



CHAP. xxxi. NEAV ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY. 



521 



appointed harmost of Thespiae, to invade Attica. He did 
not indeed get beyond the Thriasian plain, and the Athenians 
even had the satisfaction of seeing Sphodrias condemned to 
death for his act of wanton aggression ; but still this circum- 
stance inclined them to remain faithful to their treaty with 
Thebes, and the more so, as Agesilaus obtained the pardon 
of Sphodrias ; accordingly, they now zealously prepared for 
war. They completed the fortifications of Piraeus, built 
ships, and formed a close alliance with the Boeotians. They 
went still further ; concluded alliances with the most powerful 
maritime towns against Sparta, and thereby re-established 
their own supremacy at sea. They were joined first by Chios 
and Byzantium, whose example was followed by seventy 
other towns, among which were Rhodes and Mytilene. 
Euboea, with the exception of the northern part and His- 
tiaea, likewise joined them. The seat of the council of this 
new confederacy was at Athens, every state had a separate 
vote, and Athens had the supreme command in war. 
The Thebans also were admitted, but Aegina remained 
faithful to the Lacedaemonians. The Athenians endeavoured 
to win confidence by wise moderation ; two of their measures 
which had this object in view, were the restoration of the 
cleruchiae to their former owners, and the decree that no 
Athenian should acquire landed property out of Attica. 
Their navy, as in the period of their greatest prosperity, was 
again increased to 300 galleys. 

In the meantime Agesilaus made two predatory expe- 
ditions against Thebes ; in the first he advanced up to the 
very walls of the city; then, having appointed Phoebidas 
harmost of Thespiae, he returned to Sparta. His second 
inroad in the spring of b. c. 377, before which time Phoebidas 
fell in a battle against the Theban Gorgidas, was without any 
great result, the Thebans keeping for the most part behind 
their fortifications, and on one occasion, when a battle had 
been fought, each party claimed the victory. 



522 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxxi. 



In the following spring, as Agesilaus was ill, Cleombrotus 
led an army from Peloponnesus into Boeotia, but was unable 
to force his way through the passes of Cithaeron, which were 
occupied by the Athenians and Boeotians, and was obliged 
to return without having effected anything. 

Although these invasions distressed Thebes so much that 
provisions began to be scarce, yet in other respects it was 
benefited, and under the exemplary management of Pelopidas, 
an excellently trained army was raised. The most illustrious 
among these warriors formed what was called the " sacred 
band " (lepdg \6xoq), which had been founded by Gorgidas, 
and consisted of noble-minded youths, united by patriotism 
and friendship. With this band is connected the greatness 
and glory of Thebes down to the battle of Chaeronea. 

After so many useless campaigns, the Lacedaemonians 
began to feel the necessity of employing a fleet against the 
maritime power of Athens, and also for the purpose of trans- 
porting their army in case of need to Boeotia. But in this 
attempt, too, they were unsuccessful ; their fleet of sixty sail 
was defeated off Naxos by the Athenians under Chabrias, and 
the latter were again the undisputed masters of the sea, 
B.C. 376. Soon afterwards the scenes of the Peloponnesian 
war were renewed, for at the request of the Boeotians, the 
Athenians sent the bold and fortunate Timotheus with a 
fleet of sixty ships to the coasts of Peloponnesus, one of their 
objects being to prevent the Spartans from venturing upon 
an expedition - against Thebes. Timotheus gained over 
Corcyra, and induced Cephallenia, Acarnania, and several 
Epirot tribes, to join the Athenian confederacy. He defeated 
the Spartan fleet under Nicolochus near Alyzia, , and even 
Xenophon owns that Timotheus far surpassed his enemies 
at sea. 

While Athens was recovering her maritime power, the 
Thebans also gained their immediate object, and established 
their supremacy in Boeotia. When no longer harassed by 



chap. xxxi. SUCCESSES OF THE THEBANS, 



523 



the invasions of the Lacedaemonians, they proceeded without 
hesitation against the neighbouring states, and compelled 
them to recognize their sovereignty. They had made an 
attack upon Thespiae as early as b. c. 378, but until about 
b. c. 375, the Boeotian towns remained under the sway of 
Sparta ; in that year, however, Sparta's influence was broken 
by a battle near Orchomenos, in which the valour of the sacred 
band of the 300 gained the victory for Thebes. 

But the growing power of Thebes alarmed the Athenians, 
and made them inclined to conclude peace. The Persian 
king, in the hope of obtaining a Greek army for an expe- 
dition against Egypt, advised the Greeks to renew the peace 
of Antalcidas, the terms of which had in reality never been 
entirely carried into effect. The Thebans alone refused to 
become a party to this arrangement. Guided and supported 
by their great generals, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, and Gor- 
gidas, they were irresistibly advancing towards supremacy in 
Boeotia. Plataeae which, as before, sympathised with Athens, 
and had formed a new alliance with her, was taken by sur- 
prise and changed into a heap of ruins, after having scarcely 
been completely rebuilt. Its exiled citizens again took 
refuge at Athens, and there obtained the franchise. Thes- 
piae, which until then had sided with Sparta, had to suffer 
the same fate ; and Orchomenos, the last refuge of the oli- 
garchs, w r as given up as a prey to the flames, the men were 
put to the sword, and the women and children sold as slaves. 

The peace between Sparta and Athens was not of long 
duration ; but in the war which ensued Athens acted inde- 
pendently, and thus Sparta, which would not have been able 
to resist the combined efforts of Thebes and Athens, suc- 
ceeded in maintaining the contest on something like equal 
terms. The rest of Greece, however, did not by any means 
act the part of a mere spectator in the war between the three 
most powerful states. The ever-renewed contests between 
oligarchy and democracy had only received fresh fuel from 



524 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxxi. 



the recent peace. It was especially in Peloponnesus and in 
the islands that the intestine struggles immediately recom- 
menced. In most instances, the oligarchical party, being no 
longer supported by Sparta, had to submit, and the people, 
on recovering their ascendancy, exercised their power with 
all possible harshness and cruelty. But the renewal of the 
war between Athens and Sparta was occasioned by the 
former. Timotheus, on returning from his victorious expe- 
dition, restored the exiles of the popular party at Zacynthos. 
The favourers of oligarchy immediately solicited and obtained 
succours from Sparta, which at the same time supported its 
partisans in Corcyra. This war, called by Demosthenes o va-Tepoq 
nroXe^og, ended unfortunately for the Spartans. While their 
general Mnasippus was closely besieging Corcyra, and levying 
contributions in the island, the Athenians sent against him 
Stesicles, who with his peltasts succeeded in getting into 
the town. Timotheus was also ordered to equip a fleet 
of sixty ships ; but as he seemed to be rather slow in carry- 
ing this command into effect, he was deposed, and Iphicrates 
received the commission. The latter had, in the meantime, 
B. c. 374, made an expedition with the satrap Pharnabazus 
against the rebellious Nectanebis in Egypt, and had com- 
manded an army of 20,000 Greek mercenaries ; but as the 
army of the satrap, amounting to 200,000 men, was very ineffi- 
cient, and he himself was thwarted in his undertakings by the 
satrap's jealousy, he had secretly disbanded his army and re- 
turned to Athens. He now quickly assembled the fleet, and 
with Callistratus and Chabrias sailed to Corcyra. Meanwhile 
Mnasippus had been defeated and killed in a desperate sally 
of the Corcyraeans, and the Spartan fleet, from fear of that 
of the Athenians, had retreated to Leucas, b. c. 373. On his 
voyage to Corcyra Iphicrates, whose great talents as a 
general are acknowledged by Xenophon, subdued the island 
of Cephallenia, captured a fleet of ten ships, which had been 
sent by Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, to assist the 



CIIAP. XXXI. 



BATTLE OF LE*JCTRA. 



525 



Spartans, and reinforced his own fleet with ninety Corcyraean 
galleys. 

But before Iphicrates could continue this glorious cam- 
paign, and begin his operations against Peloponnesus itself, 
negotiations for peace were again commenced. On this 
occasion, too, the king of Persia proposed the terms of the 
peace of Antalcidas, and they were accepted by Sparta and 
Athens; whereas Thebes was excluded, because it would not 
give up its claims to supremacy over Boeotia. Thus ended 
another act of this long war, which was accompanied, to the 
horror of the superstitious, by extraordinary phenomena in 
the heavens as well as on the earth. An earthquake and an 
inundation of the sea swallowed up two towns on the coast 
of Achaia, and in the following year a great comet made 
its appearance. But the widely-spreading custom of em- 
ploying mercenaries, which began to supply even the 
place of the Spartan symmachy, was a still more extra- 
ordinary phenomenon. The allies now paid money in 
order to be exempt from serving in campaigns beyond 
the sea. 

Thebes was to be punished immediately after the conclu- 
sion of the peace, and accordingly king Cleombrotus re- 
ceived orders from the ephors to leave his position in Phocis, 
and to march into Boeotia. On the 15th of Hecatombaeon 
(the 8th of July), b. g. 371, the Thebans, who were now 
entirely without allies, accepted a battle against far more 
numerous forces, in the neighbourhood of Leuctra. They 
formed an army of 6000 men, commanded by the Boeotarch 
Epaminondas, the sacred band being headed by Pelopidas. 
Epaminondas endeavoured to bring his mass of infantry to 
bear upon the enemy's right wing, where Cleombrotus with 
the Spartans was posted. But when Cleombrotus also began 
to change his position, Pelopidas with his band broke into 
his lines, which were already thrown into disorder by the 
defeated cavalry, and amid a fearful carnage put them to 



526 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXI. 



flight. Cleombrotus fell in the battle, and with him 400 
out of the 700 Spartans. The Lacedaemonians lost 4000 
men altogether ; the Thebans only 300. When this fearful 
catastrophe was announced at Sparta, the people happened to 
be celebrating the last day of the festival of the Gymnopaedia. 
The ephors did not allow the solemnity to be interrupted, 
and the news of the irreparable loss was received, as Xeno- 
phon says, with great composure. 

This battle, one of the most remarkable and important in 
the history of Greek warfare, was the first great exploit of 
Epaminondas, whose merits are concealed by Xenophon, 
who does not mention even his name. But other autho- 
rities place his prudence and personal courage beyond all 
doubt. When the fight had continued for a long time with- 
out any decisive result, his encouraging word, " Only one 
step forward !" led his men on to victory. How vehement 
and hot the contest was, is clear from the statement that the 
Spartans, contrary to their ancient custom, ordered their 
flute-players to be silent during the fight. The Thebans 
were so proud of this victory, that they commemorated it by 
an annual festival at Lebadeia ; and as Epaminondas had de- 
cided the issue of the battle with the left wing, the com- 
mander-in-chief henceforth always conducted that wing. 
Whether Archidamus, the son of the second Spartan king, 
took part in the battle of Leuctra is uncertain. Diodorus 
speaks of a meeting of the two kings before the battle ; while 
Xenophon is silent on this point. At any rate, it would 
have been an irregularity to send both kings into the field. 
The question whether Jason, the tyrant of Pherae in Thes- 
saly, was present, is likewise somewhat doubtful. According 
to Diodorus, he joined the Thebans before the battle; but 
Xenophon states, that he came immediately after it, at the 
request of the Thebans, and that through his interference 
the fresh army of Archidamus, which was approaching, re- 
turned, and a treaty was concluded. 



chap. xxxi. FOUNDATION OF MEGALOPOLIS. 



527 



At Athens, the intelligence of this victory was received 
very coldly. Xenophon says that the Athenians were 
greatly vexed at it, and would not listen to any proposal 
that they should lend their assistance against Sparta. But 
neither did they feel any sympathy with Sparta ; and in 
order to show to the belligerents their independence, they 
thought it best to call upon the other states to comply with 
the terms of the peace of Antalcidas. This summons was 
obeyed, and the peace was again sworn to. The Eleans 
alone refused to give up their supremacy over the small 
towns in their neighbourhood. 

In the battle of Leuctra Sparta had lost her military 
glory and her power. The supremacy in Peloponnesus 
which Sparta had possessed for 500 years, and which, in spite 
of the peace of Antalcidas, she had claimed and retained, 
was now gone. The Arcadians were the first people of 
Peloponnesus that began to stir. The Mantineans again 
united in one city ; the Arcadians assisted them in building 
their walls, and even the Eleans aided them with a present 
of three talents. In b. c. 371 all the Arcadian districts 
united into one state, though this was not effected without 
violent party struggles, which were particularly bloody at 
Tegea. The building of a capital of the Arcadian union 
was resolved upon, and forthwith commenced. Ten thou- 
sand representatives of the members of the confederacy were 
to reside in the new city, which was called Megalopolis. 
Lycomedes, of Mantinea, was particularly active in calling 
this confederation into existence. The Spartans endeavoured 
to prevent its growth, and to check its proceedings ; but the 
expedition of king Agesilaus, in b. c. 370, produced no 
effect ; the Arcadians remained quiet, looking forward to the 
powerful assistance of the Thebans. 

Thebes had in the meantime strengthened herself by the 
acquisition of new allies ; she had become mistress of Orcho- 
menos, and had been joined by Phocis, Aetolia, and Locris ; 



528 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



and in B.C. 369 the Thebans, being now at the head of a con- 
federacy embracing the Boeotians, Phoeians, Euboeans, Lo- 
crians, Acarnanians, Heracleans, and Malians, invaded 
Peloponnesus under the command of Epaminondas and 
Pelopidas. Here they were joined by Arcadians, Argives, 
and Eleans. An army of 7000 men advanced against 
Sparta ; which was allied only with the remaining cities 
of Peloponnesus, Corinth, Epidauros, Troezen, Hermione, 
Haliae, Sicyon, and Pellene. The magnitude and urgency 
of the danger induced the Spartans to enlist the Helots in 
their army, under the promise that they should be freed if 
they deserved well of their country. But as this prospect 
induced more than 6000 to come forward, the Spartans 
themselves began to be afraid of them. From Sellasia, in 
Arcadia, where the armies had assembled, the Thebans 
penetrated into Laconia, and advanced to the immediate 
vicinity of Sparta, which had never seen an enemy so near. 
The attack upon the city, which was preceded by a very 
difficult passage of the rapid river Eurotas, made no im- 
pression. Epaminondas accordingly proceeded southward 
as far as the coast- towns Helos and Gythion, which he 
set on fire. Great numbers of perioeci and Helots deserted 
to him, and this circumstance was felt most painfully by 
Sparta. But the restoration of Messenia was the main 
blow aimed at the enemy. Epaminondas invited the Messe- 
nians scattered over all parts of Greece to return to their 
country, and the new capital Messene, of which the ruins 
still exist, was built on the site of the ancient Ithome, which 
had so bravely stood out in the second and third Messenian 
wars. Epaminondas accomplished all this within the space 
of eighty days, and having left a garrison in Messenia, and 
arranged the affairs of Arcadia* he returned with the allied 
army to Boeotia, b. c. 369. 

Sparta being cast down, especially by the revolt of her 
subjects, now applied to Athens for assistance. The Athe- 



chap. xxxi. WAR IN THE PELOPONNESUS. 



529 



nians, forgetting their eternal enmity against Sparta, their 
national antipathy, and the manner in which they had been 
treated at the end of the Peloponnesian war, generously 
sent Iphicrates into Peloponnesus. But before he went, a 
treaty was concluded between Athens and Sparta, which 
provided that the supreme command should belong to them 
alternately. In the following year, the almost impracticable 
clause was added that the command should alternate every 
five days. Iphicrates, however, was unable to cut off the 
retreat of Epaminondas' army from Peloponnesus. For this 
he is severely censured by Xenophon, on the ground that 
it would have been easy to stop the passage by the Isthmus. 

In the following year, b. c. 368, Epaminondas undertook 
a second expedition against Sparta. The Arcadian union 
had already had opportunities of trying its strength. Lyco- 
medes, the commander of the confederates, with 5000 chosen 
men, had laid waste the Laconian town of Pallene, before 
the Spartans could come to its assistance. In accordance 
with the treaty between Athens and Sparta, Athenians under 
Chabrias occupied the Isthmus conjointly with Peloponne- 
sians. Epaminondas forced his way into the peninsula by a 
victory over the Athenians and Spartans, and then, being 
joined by the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans, attacked 
Sicyon, Pellene, Epidauros, and Troezen, ravaging their 
territories. Sicyon, Phlius, and other towns, overpowered by 
the sudden attack, were forced to surrender. An attempt 
upon Corinth failed ; the Corinthians gained a victory, and 
the allies of Sparta took fresh courage. About the same 
time there arrived to the assistance of the Spartans, from 
Dionysius of Syracuse, upwards of twenty triremes, and the 
fifty horsemen, who had come with them, greatly harassed 
the Thebans. Soon after this the belligerents withdrew 
from the Isthmus. Another circumstance improved the 
position of Sparta. The successful efforts of the Arcadians 
under the command of the bold Lycomedes, and their aiming 

A A 



530 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXI. 



at an independent position, or rather at the supremacy over 
Peloponnesus, alienated from them the Thebans as well as 
their Peloponnesian allies. Every one now desired to be in- 
dependent. At Sicyon, Euphron established even a tyrannic. 
But notwithstanding all this, the proposals of peace which 
just then arrived from the court of Persia were not listened 
to, and the Thebans insisted upon maintaining their supre- 
macy in Boeotia. The war continued, and the Thebans had 
now to combat a second enemy in the north, who was not 
less powerful than their southern foe. 

A movement had commenced in the fertile plains of 
Thessaly, similar to that in the heart of Peloponnesus. 
Jason the tyrant of Pherae, powerful and experienced in 
war, had already subdued many Thessalian towns, and being 
Tagus (commander-in-chief of the Thessalian towns), he 
even aimed at the supremacy over the rest of Greece. In 
b. c. 374, he thought the time had come for carrying his 
ambitious schemes into effect, for Sparta was weakened, 
Athens desired only maritime supremacy, Thebes seemed to 
be unworthy of being at the head of Greece, and Argos was 
distracted with internal disputes. With these views he in- 
terfered in the contest between Thebes and Sparta, and 
seems to have taken part in the battle of Leuctra. But just 
after that battle, when the most favourable moment for the 
realisation of his plans seemed to have arrived, he was 
assassinated while reviewing his cavalry, b c. 370, and his 
murderers were honoured as the deliverers of the Greeks. 
He was succeeded by Polydorus and Polyphron, both of 
whom were murdered in rapid succession. They were sue- 
ceeded by the fratricide Alexander, who thus became both 
Tagus of Thessaly, and tyrant of Pherae, and distinguished 
himself by his cruelty and love of dominion. He too, after 
ruling eleven years, was assassinated by his brother-in-law, 
at the instigation of his own wife. Alexander's undertakings 
were successful ; he took the town of Larissa, and marching 



chap. xxxi. DEATH OF PELOPIDAS. 



531 



into Macedonia, concluded an alliance with king Alexander, 
who had succeeded Ainyntas in b. c. 370, and whose brother 
Philip he received as a hostage. In the year b. c. 368, 
Pelopidas entered Thessaly a second time, but both he and 
his brave friend Ismenias were made prisoners by the tyrant 
of Pherae. In order to obtain his liberation, a powerful 
army was sent into Thessaly, which compelled Alexander to 
solicit the speedy assistance of Athens. Thirty ships were 
sent to his aid, and this time the Thebans effected nothing. 
But in a second campaign, conducted by Epaminondas, the 
Thebans succeeded in liberating Pelopidas. The design of 
overthrowing the tyrannis of Alexander was not, however, 
given up. Some years later, Pelopidas, being again implored 
by the towns struggling for their liberty, made his last ex- 
pedition. He ended his heroic career in the bloody battle 
of Cynoscephalae ; but the Thebans gained the victory, and 
its fruits were not lost, for Alexander, after being defeated a 
second time, was obliged to recognise the independence of 
the Thessalian towns. Phthiotis and Magnesia allied them- 
selves with the Boeotians, and the tyrant himself, being con- 
fined to Pherae, was compelled to enter into an alliance with 
Thebes, in b. c. 364. How much the Thebans appreciated 
Pelopidas > the worthy friend of Epaminondas, is clear from 
the fact, that they elected him every year for their com- 
mander, and that they regarded the victory of Cynoscephalae 
as a defeat, because it had been purchased by the death of 
their hero. 

Meantime, the brilliant period of the Arcadian union 
had come to an untimely end. The Arcadians already 
felt strong enough to carry on the war without the aid of 
the Thebans. But Archidamus, supported by the troops 
of Dionysius of Syracuse, defeated them, b. c. 367, near 
Midea in what is called " The Tearless Battle," because up- 
wards of 10,000 Arcadians and Argives fell in it, while not. a 



532 



HISTORY OF GREECE, .chap. xxxi. 



single Lacedaemonian is said to have been killed. This was 
the first successful event for Sparta since the battle of 
Leuctra, and Xenophon thinks that the allies of the Arca- 
dians, the Thebans and Eleans, who had long looked with 
envy upon their growing power, rejoiced at their defeat. So 
completely was Greece distracted by party-spirit and selfish- 
ness ! The same party-spirit also led the Greeks again to 
the throne of the Persian king, who was to act as mediator 
in bringing about a peace. Pelopidas contrived to win the 
king's favour for Thebes, and the clauses of the peace ratified 
by Pelopidas, the object of which was the independence of 
Messenia, and the destruction of the Athenian navy, or in 
other words, the establishment of the supremacy of Thebes, 
were laid before the other envoys to be accepted and sworn 
to. All of course refused, and the war was continued. 

In the following year, b. c, 366, Epaminondas made his 
third expedition into Peloponnesus, where he gained over 
Achaia, and restored some towns to independence. But this 
new acquisition was soon lost, because the Thebans, without 
the knowledge of Epaminondas, had sent harmosts into the 
Achaean towns. The Achaeans now allied themselves with 
the Lacedaemonians, and pressed upon Arcadia from the 
north. 

Next year the Arcadians formed a new alliance with 
Athens, which had become estranged more and more from 
Thebes, one of the principal causes of oiFence being that the 
Thebans had refused to restore to the Athenians the town of 
Oropos, which had been committed to their keeping by the 
usurper Themison, the tyrant of Eretria in Euboea. At 
the suggestion of Lycomedes, the Arcadians now concluded 
an alliance against Thebes with the Athenians, who other- 
wise stood isolated. This changed the position of the minor 
states; Phlius, which had hitherto remained faithful to its 
alliance with Sparta, and which had also received active 
assistance from the Athenians under Chares, now felt itself 



chap. xxxi. WAR BETWEEN ARCADIA AND ELIS. 533 

constrained to conclude peace with Thebes. The Corinthians 
did the same, and Sparta herself advised them to keep aloof 
from the war, which she had still to carry on. The Argives 
also felt inclined to put an end to the war. 

These peaceful prospects, however, were soon overcast by 
a war which broke out between Arcadia and Elis. The 
quarrel began in b. c. 365 about Lasion, a strong town of 
Triphylia, which had originally belonged to Elis, but was 
now tributary to Arcadia, The Arcadians victoriously 
penetrated into Elis, which they traversed and plundered, 
leaving garrisons in all places, except the capital, which was 
protected by the Achaeans. The Lacedaemonians imme- 
diately allied themselves with the Eleans, and in the fol- 
lowing year, when the Arcadians renewed their predatory 
incursions, and had already defeated their weak opponents 
between Elis and Cyllene, Archidamus appeared with an 
auxiliary force. But in the neighbourhood of Cromnos he was 
defeated by the superior numbers of the Arcadians, and he 
himself was wounded. The inhabitants of Pisatis availed 
themselves of the presence of the victorious Arcadians for the 
purpose of recovering the superintendence of the Olympian 
games which had lawfully belonged to them from early times. 

In b. c. 364, the Arcadians occupied Olympit and allowed 
the games to commence. The Eleans, disregarding the re- 
ligious peace which was always observed during the festival, 
made a vigorous attack and put the Arcadians and Argives to 
flight, but still were in the end obliged to succumb. In con- 
sequence of this, they effaced the festival of that year from 
the list of the Olympiads. 

Soon afterwards, Olympia and the treasures of its temple 
became the cause of dispute and hostility among the Arca- 
dian towns. The party favourable to Sparta, with Mantinea 
at its head, opposed the employment of the treasures taken 
from the temple in paying the army of the allies ; and in the 

a a 3 



534 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXI, 



end, all who were interested in the future prosperity of Pelo- 
ponnesus, saw that it was the evident desire of the Thebans to 
make the peninsula as weak as possible in order to gain the 
mastery over it the more easily. The partizans of Thebes, 
on the other hand, with Tegea at their head, were unwilling, 
like the Mantineans, to give up the treasures, and called in 
the aid of the Thebans. Still the parties apparently came to 
an understanding, and most of the Arcadians made a peace, 
which was sworn to by those Thebans also who were present. 
But during the celebration at Tegea of the solemnities at- 
tending the conclusion of the peace, the Theban harmost 
suddenly ordered the envoys and the most distinguished 
persons to be arrested. Most of the Mantineans, at whom 
this blow was principally aimed, made their escape. The 
Mantineans now called all their countrymen to arms, de- 
manding reparation and the liberation of the prisoners. 
But Epaminondas, who approved of the harmost's conduct, 
was already approaching. 

Epaminondas, steadily pursuing the object of his life, the 
establishment of the supremacy of Thebes, had, throughout 
these struggles in Peloponnesus, endeavoured to make Thebes 
a maritime power. By his advice the Thebans resolved to 
build 100 galleys, and he himself took the maritime towns 
and the islands of Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium from the 
Athenian commander Laches. His premature death, how- 
ever, prevented the further development of the maritime 
power of Thebes. 

When fully prepared for war, he entered Peloponnesus for 
the fourth and last time ; but fear had induced many to abandon 
the cause of Thebes. The only Greeks that accompanied him 
were the Euboeans and Thessalians ; the Phocians refused 
to do so. In Peloponnesus he was joined by the Argives 
and Messenians, as well as by the Tegeatans, Megalopolitans, 
Pallantians, and a few other less important Arcadian towns, 
The Lacedaemonians were supported by the other Area- 



<?hap. xxxi. BATTLE OF MANTINEA. 535 



dians, the Athenians, Achaean s, and Eleans. Eparninondas 
chose Tegea as the head -quarters of his operations ; the 
army of his allied enemies was encamped at Mantinea. An 
attempt to take Sparta by surprise from Tegea failed by a mere 
accident. For king Agesilaus had already reached Pellene, 
on his march to Mantinea with his whole army, when he 
was informed by a Cretan that Eparninondas was approaching 
Sparta. He immediately returned, and repelled the attack 
of the Thebans. 

After this, Eparninondas sent his cavalry on a predatory 
excursion to Mantinea, but it was put to flight by the cavalry 
of the Athenians, which had j ust arrived. After these 
failures, he resolved to venture upon a decisive battle, for 
the time of his command had nearly expired, and he could 
not quit Peloponnesus without a victory. The men learned 
his determination with joy ; all prepared and adorned them- 
selves, burnishing their armour as for a festival. The army 
halted at the foot of the hills near Mantinea. It was just 
about harvest time (the 8th of July, B.C. 362). The enemy 
was not prepared to meet him, for they imagined that he 
intended merely to encamp there. On being suddenly at- 
tacked, they hurried to their arms and horses, w r hile Eparni- 
nondas, at the head of his best troops, made so vehement an 
onset, that all resistance was overpowered and a general 
flight ensued. But the hero of the day fell, and the con- 
querors were so terrified by this disaster that they could not 
follow up their victory, and some troops were cut to pieces 
by the Athenian cavalry. A spear had pierced the breast 
of Eparninondas, and the shaft was broken off. It is said 
that he would not allow the fragment of the weapon to be 
extracted from the wound until he was assured that the 
Thebans had gained the victory; on being informed of 
which, he almost immediately expired. After the battle 
each party claimed the victory. Fifty thousand Greeks had 



536 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXI. 



fought against one another! So great a battle had never 
before been fought, nor had so many renowned generals ever 
met on the same field of battle. And what was the result ? 
Xenophon says, that every thing remained as it had been 
before ; while Diodorus asserts, that through this battle the 
Spartans lost their supremacy. The truth is, that the death 
of her great general caused Thebes to sink from the height 
on which she had stood; but at the same time Sparta's 
power was broken. Both parties, weakened by their mutual 
efforts, remained inactive for a short while ; but this did not 
pave the way for peace and tranquillity, but rather led to 
confusion and fresh struggles, which, in fact, became more 
alarming after the battle than they had been before. 

This is the last event related by Xenophon in his Greek 
History, the only contemporary authority that has come 
down to us. His undisguised partiality for Sparta and Age- 
silaus, and his equally open aversion to Epaminondas and 
Pelopidas, cannot but make his readers mistrustful, especially 
as Diodorus, who followed other authorities, and Plutarch, 
speak with enthusiasm of the Theban heroes. Nay, the 
ancients believed that Epaminondas fell by the hand of 
Gryllus, the son of Xenophon, who fought among the Lace- 
daemonians at Mantinea. The orator Aeschines also fought 
on that day in the Athenian cavalry. 

In the following year, B.C. 361, a general peace was con- 
cluded, by which independence was secured to the Mes- 
senians. Sparta alone refused to join in it, that she might 
not be obliged to recognise the independence of a state over 
which she had for centuries exercised absolute power. Thus 
Sparta alone, of all the Greek states, cherished its implacable 
hatred, and remained in: the attitude of war. 

This year also was the last of the great Spartan hero, 
Agesilaus, the worthy opponent of Epaminondas. At the 
age of eighty he went out with an army of 10,000 merce- 
naries, to support the rebels Tachus and Nectanebis in 



chap. xxxi. DEATH OF AGESILAUS. 



537 



Egypt, and thus, at the same time, to weaken Persia. Cha- 
brias, the Athenian admiral, commanded the fleet of Tachua. 
On his return home in the winter, with a treasure of 230 
talents, Agesilaus landed at a port on the Libyan coast, and 
there died, after a reign of thirty-eight years. He had raised 
the power of his country to the highest point, and had at 
the same time seen its deepest humiliation. He was suc- 
ceeded by his valiant son, Archidamus III. 



A A 5 



538 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAF. XXXIf, 



jt&tecjo ml iwfip v.i'f<)f)ivif\ : *r?oonr; tun fj mo i >xlJo ^gterugv 
CHAPTER XXXII. 

FROM THE DEATH OF EPAMINOND A S TO THE BATTLE OF CHAERONEA. 

Justin appears to express a well-founded opinion, when he 
says that*" with the death of Epaminondas the virtue of the 
Athenians also perished. For after the loss of him in whom 
they had, for a time, had a rival, the Athenians sank into 
idleness and a state of insensibility ; and began to spend 
their revenue, not as formerly, upon their fleet and armies, 
but upon the celebration of festivals and public games. 
Having the most distinguished actors and poets, they visited 
the theatre more frequently than the camp, and prized verse 
makers higher than generals. The public revenues with 
which formerly soldiers and rowers had been paid, now 
began to be distributed among the population of the city." * 
What is here said of Athens is more or less applicable to 
the minor states also, nay to the whole of Greece. It cannot 
be asserted that the valour of the Greeks was lost, or that 
their love of war had decreased ; it was only the mode of 
warfare that had undergone a change. While the Athenians 
at home led a luxurious life, and frequented the theatres and 
law-courts, bands of mercenaries were engaged in fighting 
for the honour of Athens, and for the preservation of its 
power. Mercenaries, it is true, had been employed even in 
the Peloponnesian war, partly as rowers in the galleys, partly 
both as hoplites and as light-armed men, in the land armies ; 
but it was not till about the time of the death of Epami- 
nondas, that it became a regular custom to hire men, who, 
as Isocrates observes, would readily have marched against 

Athens, if any one had offered them higher pay. And this 

lo 889ne«oiD8no» 9vhoB 9*1* f.slBU ntdwix) it>dto sdt 

•039iO 1o X Jhoh9(iuj u | flH }^%»}ru odi lo fm» ,-iuonoti 

a a a 



CHAP. XXXII. 



STATE OF ATHENS. 



539 



custom became prevalent at a period when the revenue of 
the republic was reduced, and the treasury exhausted by a 
variety of other circumstances. It moreover often happened, 
that when the people had voted money for fresh troops, the 
commanders cheated either the soldiers or the state, by re- 
ceiving payment for forces which were not raised, and after- 
wards bribing the public examiners of their accounts and 
reports. Ten or twenty thousand mercenaries were often 
believed to have been enlisted, while they existed only on 
paper, though the people had to pay for them. Of all the 
higher officers appointed to command the armies, one only 
used to set out ; the others remaining at home, and amusing 
themselves with sacrifices and games. Under such circum- 
stances, it is not surprising to find that capital charges of 
embezzlement, treachery, and bribery, were of frequent oc- 
currence. In addition to all this, the old custom of engaging 
an army for only one campaign, then disbanding it and 
engaging a fresh one, was still observed. Even Demosthenes 
proposed to his countrymen to keep a standing army, the 
fourth part of which should consist of Athenian citizens, in 
order that greater reliance might be placed in it. 

But notwithstanding all these symptoms of internal decay, 
our authorities mention efforts and displays of power, such 
as occur only during the most flourishing period of Athenian 
history. Demosthenes calculates, that as late as B. c. 355, 
Athens had at her disposal 300 triremes, 1000 horsemen, 
and hoplites to any amount. The orator Lyeurgus induced 
his countrymen even to equip 400 galleys, and that at a time 
when Athens was assisting Byzantium with a fleet of 120 sail ; 
and shortly before the battle of Chaeronea, 200 galleys were 
ordered to be fitted out. 

All these proofs, however, of the extraordinary vitality 
of Athens cannot conceal the fact, that there, as well as in 
the other Grecian states, the active consciousness of national 
honour, and of the intellectual superiority of Greece gra- 

A a 6 



540 HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxtr. 

dually died away. How different was the state of things 
when a Macedonian king coveted the honour of being called 
a Greek ! At that time Greek nationality was still definable 
and clearly contrasted with every thing foreign. Philip of 
Macedonia not only became a Greek himself, but it was one 
of the objects of his life to give to his Macedonians a Greek 
culture, which newly-acquired civilisation his great son 
Alexander carried to the far distant east and south. But 
the old external political power of Greece was lost amid this 
diffusion of Hellenism ; and it almost seems as if the mother 
country had exhausted herself in the effort to elevate other 
less civilised nations. 

The absence of a feeling of national honour displays itself 
most conspicuously in the relation that sprang up between 
Athens and Philip of Macedonia. We do not mean to say 
that because Cleon or Hyperbolus did not actually sell their 
country, they were any better as guides of the people ; but the 
fundamental ideas of the position and importance of Athens 
had become so completely altered, that the demagogues here 
mentioned can scarcely be compared to such men as Eubulus 
and Demades. The latter and the other contemporary 
leaders were fully conscious that they were working the ruin 
of Athens ; they betrayed their country to Philip, after 
having previously well weighed and calculated the conse- 
quences of their measures. The people looked on with 
indifference, delighting only in festivals, spectacles, and 
largesses, which the impudent Demades used to call the 
cement of democracy. The money, however, was furnished 
by Philip ; who well knew what use to make of that power- 
ful demagogue, and how to increase his influence in all direc- 
tions. The Pythia at Delphi was as venal, and as suspected 
of favouring Philip, as the demagogues of Athens and the 
leaders of parties in other states. 

When, at times, the people's eyes were opened, and in the 
face of the most threatening clanger, they willingly buckled 



CHAP, xxxii. THE ATHENIANS IN THRACE. 



541 



on their armour, and risked their lives and all that they pos- 
sessed, for the defence of their country's liberty, we again 
see the imperishable power of true intellectual culture, 
which, though it suffered the people to become effeminate in 
preferring festive solemnity and pomp to the hardships of 
the camp, yet roused them to manly energy when the hour 
of need arrived. 

We have first to give an account of three wars, — the 
Social War, and the two so-called Sacred Wars. In the 
first, Athens lost her allies, the best support she had; and 
by the two last Philip succeeded in securing his influence in 
the affairs of Greece. The towns on the Thracian coast 
were the cause of the first conflict between Philip and the 
Athenians. The latter had taken many steps to maintain 
or increase their maritime power ; but the good fortune of 
earlier times seemed to be gone. A fleet which was sent, 
under Leosthenes, to assist the island of Peparethos, was 
defeated by Alexander, the tyrant of Pherae ; and even 
Timotheus was no longer successful, for he was unable to 
save Amphipolis, the ancient colony of Athens, from falling 
into the hands of the Olynthians. It was there that Philip 
commenced his operations against Greece. The power of 
Athens on the coasts of Thrace had been increased by the 
acquisition of the Thracian Chersonesus, which Cersobleptes, 
a prince of the Odrysians, had given to the Athenians, to 
reward them for the assistance they had afforded him in a 
contest with two other pretenders. According to Diodorus, 
the Athenians did not take possession of that peninsula until 
b. c. 353. At the same time, Perdiccas, of Macedonia, fell in 
a war against the Illyrians, in consequence of which event 
Philip, the son of Amyntas, who was living as a hostage at 
Thebes, escaped to Macedonia to establish his claims to the 
throne. The kingdom was in a most dangerous condition : 
it was threatened by the victorious Illyrians, who had de- 
stroyed a great part of the Macedonian army, and also by 



542 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXI li 



the Paeonians. In addition to this, Philip was opposed by 
two pretenders, Pausanias and Argaeus; the former being 
supported by the Thracians, the latter by the Athenians. 
Pausanias was induced by presents to withdraw his claim ; 
and Argaeus with his allies w r as defeated near Methohe. 
Immediately after this, Philip, whose most anxious desire 
was to prevent the Athenians from gaining possession of 
Amphipolis, sent envoys to Athens : a peace and an alliance 
were concluded, and the independence of Amphipolis was 
guaranteed, or rather the town was left in the hands of the 
Olynthians, b. c. 359. With the Paeonians, too, peace was 
made through the instrumentality of bribery and persuasion ; 
but soon afterwards, on the death of their king, Philip 
violated the peace and subdued the country. He was equally 
successful against the Illyrians, his western neighbours, and 
in B.C. 358 he conquered all the country as far as Lake 
Lychnitis. 

After these brilliant successes, Philip, disregarding the 
peace which he had just concluded, directed his arms against 
Amphipolis, and after a short siege made himself master of 
the town, which may be regarded as the key to the Thracian 
coast. With a view to indemnify the powerful Olynthians, 
with whom for the present he wished to remain on good 
terms, he assigned to them Potidaea and Anthemos, which 
had been taken from the Athenians. Pydna, which until 
then had likewise belonged to the Athenians, he retained for 
himself. Notwithstanding all this, he treated the Athenians 
very politely, and sent the expelled Athenian garrisons home 
in the most friendly manner. He then marched against the 
town of Crenidae, at the foot of Mount Pangaeos, the gold 
mines of which had been neglected by the Thracians, whose 
king was obliged to cede that district to him. The insig- 
nificant town of Crenidae afterwards became the populous 
city of Philippi, and the mines were worked so vigorously, 
that they yielded a yearly produce of 1000 talents. With 



chap. xxxn. ORIGIN OF THE SOCIAL AVAR. 



543 



the gold thus obtained, Philip paid not only his armies, but 
also the traitors in various parts of Greece ; with it he 
opened the gates of towns, broke the power of rival kings, 
and undermined the freedom of Greece. 

How did Athens act towards this cunning prince, who left 
no means untried to accomplish his ambitious objects? De- 
mosthenes in his speeches describes with pain and bitterness 
the want of decision and the fickleness of the Athenians, who, 
unconcerned about the future, thought only of their present 
enjoyments ; and is not less severe on the deplorable influence 
of bribed popular orators. His glowing orations on behalf of 
Athens and Greece, and his vigorous efforts to rouse the 
people from their lethargic indolence were unavailing, his 
influence being paralysed by Aeschines. To the struggle 
between these two men we are indebted for the most splendid 
monuments of Attic eloquence, which make the downfall of 
such a people all the more tragic. 

But Athens could not effectually oppose the victorious 
commencement of the career of Philip, for it was already in- 
volved in an unfortunate war. Scarcely had Timotheus 
prevented the revolt of Euboea to Thebes, by a quick and 
skilfully managed expedition, and concluded an alliance with 
the Euboeans, when the powerful island of Chios, supported 
by Byzantium, Rhodes, Cos, and Mausolus of Caria, revolted 
from Athens. The war which hence arose, is commonly 
called the Social War, and lasted three years, from B.C. 357 to 
355. A fleet and an army, under Chares and Chabrias, 
were first sent against Chios, and while the former with his 
army besieged the town, Chabrias fought a naval battle, in 
which he was unsuccessful, and lost his life, as he refused to 
save it by retreating or abandoning his vessel. The war 
however, continued without any decisive result, though both 
parties made great efforts. The allies had collected a fleet of 
100 galleys, with which they ravaged and plundered Imbros, 
Lemnos, and Samos. The Athenians, on the other hand, 



544 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXII. 



increased the fleet of Chares to 120 sail, and appointed Iphi- 
crates and Timotheus his colleagues in the command. As 
the Athenian fleet sailed to Byzantium, the siege of Samos 
was given up, and the two fleets met in the Hellespont. 
Chares wished to offer battle, although a violent storm had 
begun to rage ; but as the more cautious Iphicrates and Ti- 
motheus refused to do so, nothing was done. In consequence 
of this Chares charged his colleagues with treachery, and 
they were deposed and fined ; Timotheus ended his life in 
exile at Chalcis, but Iphicrates was afterwards declared 
innocent. Athens thus deprived herself of her best generals. 
Chares, the most incapable of all, being now sole commander, 
formed connections with the" satrap Artabazus, who had 
revolted against his master. But when Artaxerxes III. 
threatened to support the allies with a fleet of 300 ships, 
Chares received orders to suspend hostilities, and a peace was 
concluded, by which Athens lost her most powerful allies, 
and with them the greatest part of her revenue. The tribute 
of the remaining allies henceforth amounted to only forty-five 
talents. But the revolted allies did not long enjoy their inde- 
pendence, for they soon became the subjects of the Carian 
prince. Imbros, Lemnos, and Scyros remained in their 
ancient relation to Athens. Although the islanders had 
suffered very severely in this war, yet Chares extorted from 
them sixty talents. Demosthenes soon afterwards devised 
wiser measures to increase the revenue of his country. 

In the meantime Philip had interfered in the internal 
affairs of Thessaly. Lycophron of Pherae, the murderer of 
the tyrant Alexander, had set himself up as tyrant, and had 
become involved in a dispute with the powerful family of the 
Aleuadae at Larissa. They called in the aid of Philip, for 
whom nothing could have happened more opportunely. He 
acted with such energy as to procure freedom and inde- 
pendence for all the Thessalian towns. They were obliged, 
indeed, to pay him tribute for this service, but still for a 



chap, xxxii. THE SACRED WAR. 545 

long time they sided with him. He allowed the tyrannis at 
Pherae to continue, and was thus the protector of freedom 
and of tyranny, as it suited his interest. His connection with 
Pherae opened to him the road to the south, as Pherae sup- 
ported the Phocians in the struggle in which they were soon 
afterwards engaged, and which was a continuation of the 
Theban war. It is commonly called the Sacred War, and 
was carried on with unparalleled exasperation for ten years, 
from b. c. 355 to 346, and nearly all the states of Greece took 
a part in it. 

The first occasion to it was given by the Thebans, who 
attacked at the same time their neighbours the Phocians and 
the Lacedaemonians ; the former from a love of conquest, the 
latter from hatred and disappointment, because they had not 
been able to obtain the supremacy over all Greece. The 
council of the Amphictions, which had so long been dormant, 
was found a convenient instrument for conferring upon the 
demands of the Thebans at least the appearance of justice. 
Even at an earlier period they had caused Sparta to be 
fined by that court for the manner in which Phoebidas had 
taken possession of the Cadmea, and as Sparta disobeyed 
the verdict, the fine was increased from year to year until it 
amounted to an enormous sum. The Thebans now made a 
similar use of that court against the Phocians, who had 
exasperated them by refusing to accompany Epaminondas 
on his last expedition ; besides w T hich, the Thebans hoped 
to indemnify themselves by the conquest of Phocis for the 
loss of Peloponnesus, and imagined that they would have 
easy work with that small country. The Phocians accord- 
ingly were charged with having robbed the temple of Delphi, 
simply because they had taken into cultivation a tract of 
land between the Cephissus and mount Thurion, which had 
until then been a barren district. They were condemned 
and required to pay an enormous fine, as well as to destroy 
the work of their own industry. 



546 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXII* 



The Phocians bad long discovered the plans of the Boeo- 
tians for the subjugation of their country, with the assistance of 
the Thessalians, and for the renewal of the war against Sparta. 
Foreseeing the fate which awaited them, the Phocians, as 
early as b. c. 357, had taken possession of Delphi ; for they 
were aware that Thebes felt a strong inclination to seize the 
treasures of the temple. When the Amphictions had pro- 
nounced their verdict, and the Thebans, Thessalians, Locrians, 
and the tribes about mount Oeta, as members of the Am- 
phictionic league, began to execute the sentence, the Phocians 
took up arms, and soon gained Athens and Sparta as their 
allies, b. c. 354. It is not impossible that from the very 
beginning they were secretly supported by king Archi- 
damus, who was bribed by the Phocian Philomelus. The 
latter, a bold and eloquent man, was the soul of the contest. 
He had at first endeavoured, but in vain, to bring about a 
peaceful settlement of the dispute, and excused the seizure 
of the treasures of the temple, by referring the Thebans to 
the very ancient right of the Phocians to watch over the 
temple. The Locrians and Thebans conjointly began the 
war for Apollo. In the first conflict, near Delphi, the 
Locrians were defeated, and Philomelus, who now could not 
retrace his steps, ordered the bronze tables containing the 
condemnations of the Phocians and Spartans to be destroyed, 
and loudly proclaimed that he only wished to protect the 
integrity of Phocis against the unjust verdict of the Am- 
phictions, but did not intend to rob the god of any part of 
his property. However, as he was but feebly supported by 
his allies, he soon found himself obliged to make use of the 
sacred treasures for raising and maintaining an army of 10,000 
mercenaries, and in addition, to levy a war contribution upon 
the wealthy Delphians. As a justification of his doings, he 
ordered the Pythia to declare that the conqueror of Delphi 
might do any thing he pleased. 



chap, xxxn. DEATH OF PHILOMELUS. 



The war was carried on with unexampled cruelty, for even 
the surrender of the dead was refused, contrary to the uni- 
versal practice of the Greeks ; and as all Phocian captives 
were put to death, as being guilty of sacrilege, Philomelus 
naturally retaliated. During the long continuance of the 
war, the treasures of the temple gradually disappeared, the 
Phocians having coined the enormous sum of 10,000 talents 
to defray the expences of the contest. 

After Philomelus had been successful for a time, and had 
severely chastised the Locrians, he was defeated in a bloody 
battle near Neon, by the overwhelming numbers of his 
enemies. As the mountainous country rendered a retreat 
impossible, Philomelus, who was severely wounded, threw 
himself down a rock, in order to escape from his pursuers 
and from an ignominious death. His brother Onomarchus 
now undertook the command, for the Phocians were deter- 
mined to fight to the last. He was as courageous and skilful 
as his brother, but in order to gain the object of the war, he 
spared nothing and squandered the treasures of the temple, not 
only in paying his mercenaries, but also in distributing bribes 
at Thebes and in Thessaly. He also acted violently and cruelly 
towards those Phocians who were inclined to make peace. 
He subdued Thronion in Locris, reduced the Amphissians to a 
state of dependence, and then entered Boeotia, where he con- 
quered Orchomenos ; but, being afterwards defeated by the 
Boeotians, he was obliged to retreat into Phoeis. He soon 
marched out again, however, and this time his operations 
were directed against Philip in Thessaly. 

While this war was going on, Philip had continued his 
conquests. He had subdued Pagasae, and destroyed Methone. 
During the siege of the latter place he had lost one eye. 
The Thessalian towns then called upon him for assistance 
against Lycophron of Pherae, who had been gained over by 
the bribes of Onomarchus ; which circumstance had in- 



548 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxit. 



duced the other Thessalians also to remain quiet for a time. 
Phayllus, the brother of Onomarchus, came with a force 
of 7000 men to the support of Lycophron, but was defeated 
by Philip. Soon afterwards, Onomarchus followed with his 
whole army, and routed Philip and the Thessalians in two 
battles. Philip returned to Macedonia, intending soon to 
come back to the scene of the war with fresh forces. Ono- 
marchus, in the meantime, was victorious in Boeotia and 
took Coroneia. When Philip reappeared in Thessaly, and 
Lycophron again requested succours, Onomarchus for the 
second time hastened northward with an army of 25,000 
men. Philip had called all the Thessalians to arms, and had 
assembled a force of 23,000 men, among whom there were 
3000 horsemen. A bloody battle was fought near Magnesia: 
the Macedonians, who, as the champions of Apollo, were 
adorned with laurel wreaths, gained the victory through 
their Thessalian cavalry. Six thousand Phocian mercenaries 
were slain, and Onomarchus, who, along with others, had 
endeavoured to swim to the Athenian fleet stationed near 
Thermopylae, under the command of Chares, was among the 
dead. Three thousand Phocian prisoners were put to death. 
Philip immediately directed his attention to the best mode of 
turning this victory to his own advantage, but he succeeded 
only partially. Lycophron gave up Pherae to him, on con- 
dition of obtaining a free departure ; and with 2000 mer- 
cenaries he joined the army of Phayllus, who succeeded his 
brother Onomarchus as commander-in-chief of the Phocians. 
Philip was unable this time to penetrate any farther into 
Greece ; he attempted indeed to force his way through 
the pass of Thermopylae, but the Athenian fleet prevented 
him, and he returned to Macedonia in rather an ill humour. 
He had, however, gained much by his victory, especially the 
right to take part in the war against the enemies of the 
god, and consequently to interfere in the internal affairs of 



CHAP. XXXII. 



BATTLE OF CORONEIA. 



549 



Greece, whose period of decline had now commenced. In 
this year, b. c. 352, Demosthenes delivered his first Philippic, 
in which for the first time he directed the attention of the 
Athenians to the designs of their most dangerous enemy. 

Phayllus continued the war with renewed vigour. He had 
been joined by 1000 Lacedaemonians, 2000 Achaeans, and 
5000 Athenians, and the Delphic treasures were not yet ex- 
hausted. He penetrated into Boeotia, but was thrice defeated 
at Orchomenos, on the Cephissus, and near Coroneia ; and 
after he had gained some advantages over the Epicnemidian 
Locrians, the Boeotians defeated him a fourth time near 
Abae ; soon after which an illness terminated his life, b. c. 
351, He was succeeded by Phalaecus, who at first was like- 
wise unsuccessful. The war raged for many years longer, 
and Boeotia suffered so much from the invasions and ravages 
of the Phocians, that the Thebans w T ere obliged to look about 
for new allies and fresh resources. They received 300 talents 
from the Persian king, and thereby estranged Philip from 
their cause. In the end, the Phocians gained the upper 
hand ; the Boeotians w r ere defeated at Coroneia, and many 
Boeotian towns, such as Orchomenos and Coroneia, fell into 
the hands of the enemy, b. c. 346. Philip's aid was now 
again called in, and he was not slow in giving it. 

He had in the meantime greatly increased his power. 
Euboea was now the scene of his operations against 
Athens ; there he established tyrants in all the towns ; 
but two of them, Plutarchus of Eretria, and Callias of 
Chalcis, having rebelled against him and joined Athens, the 
incorruptible Phocion was sent over by the Athenians to 
support them against Philip. But on the eve of the battle 
which was to decide the issue, he was faithlessly abandoned 
by them, and saved his army only with great difficulty. 
Philip maintained his power over Euboea, nay, he even en- 
croached upon Attic ground, and having landed at Marathon 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXII. 



. in b. G. 350, carried off the sacred galley. It was Olynthos, 
however, that occasioned the open outbreak of the war be- 
tween him and Athens. 

Olynthos, alarmed at the progress of Philip, had concluded 
an alliance with Athens as early as b. c. 353, and the other 
Chalcidian towns had likewise joined it against their common 
epemy. After his return from Thermopylae, Philip for a 
time remained quiet, and was apparently inactive at Pella. 
But when the Athenians, thus lulled into security, again 

• began to give themselves up to their usual pleasures, he 
suddenly set out with a great army against Olynthos. The 
terrified Olynthians sent three successive embassies to Athens, 
and the three Olynthian orations of Demosthenes induced 
the Athenians, who began to see through the king's designs, 
to send to Olynthos three auxiliary armies under the com- 
mand of Chares, Charidemus, and again under Chares, The 
last contained 2000 Athenian citizens. Nay, Athens now 
endeavoured to form a league of all the states of Greece 
against Macedonia. Neither the voluptuous Chares, nor 
Charidemus, however, was able to check the king's progress. 
He first restored his authority in Thessaly, which had mani- 
fested a spirit of revolt, and then conquered, one after another, 
the Chalcidian towns of Geira, Mecyberna, and Torone ; 
Olynthos also was soon afterwards delivered up to him by the 
traitors Euthycrates and Lasthenes, and, together with up- 
wards of thirty other Thracian and Chalcidian towns, was 
razed to the ground, b. c. 347* Philip now advanced irre- 
sistibly as far as the Thracian Chersonesus, of which the 
Athenians had lately taken possession. Even while nego- 
tiations for a peace were being carried on, he continued his 
conquests. It was in vain that Athens called upon the other 
Greek states to make common cause against the enemy ; 
so great was the power of gold, says Diodorus, that no 
one moved ; it was in vain that Demosthenes cautioned Jiis 
fellow* citizens against Philip, and tried to inflame their 



chap. xxxn. NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE. 



551 



courage ; he himself was in the end deceived, for the king 
kept assuring the Athenians of his friendly disposition to- 
wards them. 

Accordingly, when Philip was invited by the Thebans to 
bring the war to a close, the Athenians also availed them- 
selves of the opportunity to conclude peace with him, for they 
.were tired of the war, which had exhausted their patience 
and resources ; the siege of Olynthos had cost them no less 
than 1500 talents, their commerce on the Euxine was com- 
pletely destroyed, and many Athenians were pining in Ma- 
cedonian captivity. While Philip's envoys were negotiating 
a peaceful settlement of affairs, the Athenians, by the advice 
of Demosthenes and Philocrates (from whom the peace was 
named), sent ten ambassadors to Macedonia, in B.C. 346. 
Among them were the two men who had recommended the 
embassy, and Aeschines.* The king refused, indeed, to give 
up Amphipolis, and also excluded the Phocians from the 
treaty of peace, in order not to offend the Thebans, his old 
allies ; but he feigned friendship for the Phocians, and the 
bribed envoys were unconcerned about the matter. Accom- 
panied by the king's ambassadors, they returned to Athens 
with the terms of the peace, which the people swore to ob- 
serve. A second embassy, headed by the traitor Aeschines, 
now went to Pella, to receive Philip's oath, but he was still 
engaged in his conquests on the Thracian coast. On his 
return he immediately made fresh military preparations ; the 
ambassadors, who were purposely detained, w 7 ere obliged to 
accompany him to Thessaly, and at Pherae he at length 
swore to the peace. But it soon became manifest why Philip 
had dragged the ambassadors with him to Pherae ; he wanted 
to be as near to Boeotia as possible, for as soon as the am- 
bassadors had left him, he passed through Thermopylae with 
his army unopposed. Phalaecus did not trust the decision 

* This embassy is the subject of discussion in the orations of Aeschines 
sind Demosthenes Tl^pl Uapairp^crSetas a.nd Ilepl 2,T$<pdvov. 



552 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxii. 



of the contest to a battle, but betraying bis country, con- 
cluded a treaty with Philip at Nicaea, near Thermopylae; 
and having obtained free departure, he immediately went to 
Peloponnesus. The humbled Phocians now surrendered. 
But Aeschines quieted the alarmed Athenians with the as- 
surance, that Philip entertained no designs but to humble 
Thebes, to restore Thespiae and Plataeae, and to give back 
Euboea to the Athenians. The traitor was believed, not- 
withstanding the efforts of Demosthenes to unmask the base 
hireling. The Phocians, too, who had willingly admitted the 
king, because he had promised to interfere on their behalf 
with the Amphictions, were bitterly disappointed. The 
Amphictionic council, which was hurriedly convened, con- 
sisted only of the most exasperated enemies of the Phocians, 
that is, of the Locrians, Thebans, and Thessalians, and their 
verdict accordingly was of the most merciless severity. The 
Phocians were for ever excluded from the league, their arms 
and horses were to be delivered up, their towns to be de- 
stroyed, the people were thenceforth to live in small villages, 
and to pay annually sixty talents to the temple of Delphi, 
until the god should be completely indemnified. Macedonian 
and Theban troops carried the judgment into execution ; 
twenty-two towns disappeared from the face of the earth, and 
the fertile banks of the Cephissus remained for many years 
a wilderness ; 10,000 captive Phocians were transported to 
the Thracian colonies of Philip, Philippopolis and Cabyla. 
The rest of the people were compelled to cultivate their de- 
vastated country for the purpose of raising the fine imposed 
upon them. This happened in b. c. 346. 

On this occasion Corinth lost its presidency at the Pythian 
games, because it had latterly assisted the Phocians ; and the 
Boeotian towns which were hostile to Thebes, such as Or- 
chomenos, Coroneia, Thespiae, and Plataeae, were given up 
to the vengeance of the Thebans. They lost their walls, and 
their citizens were sold as slaves. The Thebans thus carried 



chap, xxxii. WAR IN PELOPONNESUS. 



553 



into effect the intentions with which they had commenced 
the war. 

Philip now stepped into the place of the Phocians in the 
Amphictionic league, and had two votes. At the same time 
Jie obtained the superintendence of the Delphic temple, and 
the presidency at the Pythian games. Thus he already held 
in his hands the fate of a large portion of Greece. 

The king's breach of faith, and the terrible fate of the 
Phocians, created the greatest exasperation and alarm among 
the Athenians ; but they were unable to oppose force by 
force. Demosthenes himself advised them to keep the peace 
and to be cautious ; at his suggestion they at length resolved 
to recognise the decrees of the Amphictions. They showed 
their feelings, however, by kindly receiving the fugitive 
Phocians, and by abstaining from sending deputies to the 
Pythian games. 

In Peloponnesus, too, war had been raging throughout the 
period of the Phocian struggle, and continued even after the 
close of the latter. Sparta had maintained the contest in 
the hope of thereby recovering her supremacy in Pelopon- 
nesus. Accordingly, in B.C. 353, the Spartans invaded the 
territory of Megalopolis, the capital of the Arcadian con- 
federacy. The Megalopolitans called upon the Argives, 
Sicyonians, and Messenians, for assistance. Ambassadors 
were also sent to Athens, where they met Spartan envoys 
who had come with the same intention* Demosthenes ad- 
vised his fellow-citizens to conclude an alliance with Mega- 
lopolis, pointing out to them how necessary it was for Athens 
to keep Sparta in a state of weakness, and to reduce Thebes 
to the same condition. The Spartans also marched against 
Argolis. The Argives were routed near Orneae, and that 
town itself was taken by the Lacedaemonians ; who retreated 
however when the Thebans came to the assistance of Argolis. 
Soon afterwards, the allies were successful in several engage- 
ments, but the Spartans in the end gained the victory in & 

B B 



554 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxii. 



decisive battle. This was followed by a cessation of hostili- 
ties, which lasted for several years ; at the expiration of 
which the war was renewed, and continued until after the 
close of the Sacred war, when Philip began to interfere in 
the affairs of Peloponnesus, B.C. 344. His gold had found 
its way into the peninsula also, and Sparta apprehended an 
invasion as early as b. c. 346, for she well knew that the 
Argives and Messenians were willing to join the Macedo- 
nians, and that her enemies were already supported with 
money and mercenaries. In order to deprive Philip of every 
pretext for intervention, Athens hastened by an embassy to 
bring about a peace, Demosthenes himself being one of the 
ambassadors. About the same time , he delivered at Athens 
his second Philippic (b. c. 344) ; in which, by his thundering 
eloquence, he roused the people from their indolence, which 
he said was as fatal as the existence of traitors within their 
walls, or the lurking policy of Philip abroad, the first object 
of which was the overthrow of the Athenian democracy. 
He at length succeeded in opening their eyes to the fact, 
that Philip had never honestly wished for peace, and that 
he did not intend to keep any of its terms. 

While Philip kept all Greece in inactivity, and fostered 
internal discord by a complete system of bribery, which 
spread over the whole country like a net, he enjoyed for a 
time the fruits of the peace. He was engaged in establish- 
ing colonies, in increasing the productiveness of the mines, 
and in embellishing his capital of Pella; he borrowed the 
money necessary for these purposes from Greek capitalists, 
who were thus drawn into his interest. He then undertook 
a successful expedition into Illyricum, and annexed to his 
kingdom the country from lake Lychnitis to the Ionian Sea. 
Thence he proceeded to Thessaly, putting an end to the 
tyrannis of Pherae, and placing a garrison in the town; 
and in order to secure the possession of Thessaly, he divided 
it into four districts or tetrarchies, over each of which an 



chap. xxxn. 



PHOCION. 



555 



archon or governor was set. As he had no pretext for in- 
vading Greece from that quarter, he tried to do it from the 
extreme west, from Illyricum and Epirus. His arms were 
in the first instance directed against Ambracia, but it was 
not difficult to see what ulterior object he had in view. The 
Athenians were on their guard ; they prepared themselves, 
and at the same time sent an embassy headed by Demos- 
thenes, whose eloquence succeeded in preventing the king 
from advancing any farther. Philip, however, continued his 
conquests on the coast of Thrace, where he was master of 
every place as far as the Chersonesus, for Cersobleptes had 
been subdued by him. But there he again came in contact 
with the Athenians, and Demosthenes once more exerted 
himself to rouse his countrymen to an energetic war against 
the king, who had never yet observed the terms of any peace, 
and now came forward more openly and in a more threaten- 
ing manner than ever. It was manifest that Philip wished 
to stir up war : he attempted to remove the garrison of the 
small island of Halonesus, which belonged to the Athenians ; 
and he desired them to recall Diopeithes, whom they had sent 
out with colonists (Kkrjpovxoi) to protect the Chersonesus. 
In b. c. 342 he remained for about ten months in those dis- 
tricts, in order to be always within reach of the Chersonesus. 
But Demosthenes was unable to rouse the Athenians to act 
with decision and vigour. Worse things were yet to come 
before they would move. 

About this period, Phocion of Athens, who, though aris- 
tocratic in his views, deserved the praise, great and rare in 
those times, of being incorruptible, had overthrown the 
tyrants set up and supported by Philip in Euboea, and had 
recovered the island for Athens. In Megara, also, he suc- 
ceeded in breaking the power of the party favourable to 
Macedonia, which until then had maintained the upper hand. 
Meanwhile Philip pursued his conquests, acting with undis- 
guised hostility against Athens. Selymbria was compelled 

B B 2 



556 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxxrr. 



to surrender to him, and the ships of the Athenians, which 
were to fetch grain from the Hellespont, were captured. 
When at length, in b. c. 340, Philip laid siege to Perinthos 
and Byzantium, the latter a place of extreme importance to 
the Athenians in their commerce with the corn-growing 
countries on the Euxine; when even the king of Persia 
himself began to be alarmed ; then at length the Athenians 
bestirred themselves. They now made every possible effort : 
they prevailed upon Cos, Rhodes, and Chios to support By- 
zantium, and at their request the king of Persia sent an 
auxiliary force thither. All the states of Greece, especially 
the Peloponnesians, Euboeans, and Acarnanians, were called 
upon, though to no purpose, to form a general coalition 
against Macedonia. Chares was despatched first, but of 
course could effect nothing; Phocion, who succeeded him, 
however, compelled Philip to retreat. In point of fact the 
war was thus begun by the Athenians, who were now re- 
solved to prosecute it with vigour. In the spring of b. c. 339, 
the pillar on which the terms of the peace of B.C. 346 were 
engraved, was thrown down in accordance with a law proposed 
and carried by Demosthenes ; the burden of the trierarchy 
was more fairly and equitably distributed, and the people 
resolutely set to work to equip a fleet. 

In the autumn of the same year, Philip proceeded from 
Bj^zantiiim to the mouths of the Danube, to make war upon 
a Scythian prince. On his return he lost, in an engagement 
with the TYiballians, all his booty, consisting of 20,000 pri- 
soners, and a still greater number of noble horses, which he 
had destined to improve the Macedonian breed. He himself 
was lamed by a wound in the thigh ; but the valour of his 
son Alexander, who was then seventeen years old, saved him 
and his army. While yet on his march homeward, he was 
met by ambassadors from the Amphictions, who informed him 
that he was appointed commander-in-chief of their forces, 
and requested him to return to Greece without loss of time. 



chap, xxxii. WAR AGAINST AMPHISSA. 



557 



A fresh war had broken out; a fact which did not surprise^ 
Philip, for he himself had a hand in it, and Aeschines, the 
Athenian, was his agent. The latter was present, in the 
spring of this year, at the meeting of the Amphictions at 
Delphi, in the capacity of pylagoras. He there became in- 
volved in a quarrel with a Locrian of Amphissa, and in order 
to take revenge, and at the same to promote the designs 
of Philip, he charged the Locrians of Amphissa before the 
assembly with having taken into cultivation the plain of 
Cirrha, which 300 years before had been consecrated by the 
Amphictions to Apollo. His eloquent speech led the as- 
sembly to adopt the rash resolution to destroy all the houses 
and plantations of the Amphissians on the sacred ground. 
The decree was immediately carried into execution by the 
Delphians, but as they were returning from their work of 
destruction, they were attacked by Amphissians, who way- 
laid them, and cut them to pieces, The Amphictions now 
outlawed the Amphissians, and at an extraordinary meeting, 
the Thessalian Collyphus obtained the command of an army 
to invade the territory of Amphissa. But as he had no 
success, king Philip was appointed commander-in-chief at 
the next meeting, which was held in the autumn. The 
Athenians, by the advice of Demosthenes, had sent no de- 
puties to the meeting at which this resolution was adopted. 
Philip readily accepted the new dignity, for the whole war 
had been stirred up to further his interests, and he advanced 
with an army far larger than was necessary to wage 
w r ar against Amphissa alone. The Athenians sent an aux- 
iliary force to the Locrians, but Proxenus, the commander of 
the mercenaries, turned traitor. Philip heard of the efforts 
which Athens was making to bring about a league against 
him, and before going any further, he contrived for the 
present to prevent an alliance being concluded between 
Athens and Thebes, and to stir up the old mutual antipathy 
of the two states. He promised the Athenians a truce if 

B b 3 



558 



HISTOKY OF GREECE. chap. xxxn. 



they would deliver up to him his personal enemies; and 
with Thebes he actually succeeded in renewing his alliance. 
During these negotiations Philip fulfilled his mission, but he 
nevertheless remained during the following winter in Locris, 
and by his sudden occupation of Elatea and Cytinion in the 
spring, he at once revealed to the astonished Greeks his 
object in remaining. The alarm was particularly great at 
Athens, and for the moment no one knew what to do. De- 
mosthenes alone was undaunted ; he exhorted his country- 
men to hasten the conclusion of an alliance with Thebes, and 
with inspiring eloquence called upon them again to make a 
resolute stand for the freedom and honour of Athens and of 
Greece. He himself with others was sent as ambassador to 
Thebes, and although the Boeotarchs were favourably dis- 
posed to Macedonia, although the Macedonian orators had 
made many promises, and had endeavoured in various ways 
to rekindle the old animosity, yet the impressive words of the 
great orator and the urgency of the moment prevailed, and 
the alliance was concluded; the Athenians indeed were ready to 
make any sacrifice ; they consented to bear two-thirds of the 
expenses of the war, and satisfied the ambition of the Thebans 
by guaranteeing to them the supremacy over Boeotia. Chares 
and Lysicles were elected commanders of the army, which 
was reinforced by a considerable number of troops from 
Corinth, Leucas, Achaia, Euboea, Megara, and Corcyra. 
Other states, though favourable to Macedonia, refused to 
serve under Philip, in order that they might not be obliged 
to fight against their own countrymen. The two hostile 
armies were of about equal strength, for that of the Greeks, 
independently of the citizens serving in it, amounted to 
15,000 mercenaries and 2000 horsemen; while Philip had 
assembled upwards of 30,000 men. At first the Greeks were 
successful ; they advanced as far as Phocis, and succeeded in 
restoring some of the towns. Philip was defeated in two 
battles, and already began to be apprehensive of the issue of 



chap, xxxii. BATTLE OF CHAERONEA. 559 

the war. But at length, in the autumn of B.C. 338, a decisive 
battle was fought on the plain of Chaeronea. The Athenian 
commanders were either men of no ability, as Chares and 
Lysicles, or they were bribed. The Macedonians, on the 
other hand, had most excellent commanders in Philip, his 
heroic son, the young Alexander, and the experienced An- 
tipater. For a long time the issue was uncertain ; at first 
the Athenians under Lysicles, who faced the king, gained 
the upper hand, and in their joy advanced too far. But the 
vehement attack of Alexander and the Thessalian horse upon 
the Thebans, and the charge of the Macedonian phalanx, 
decided the day. The Athenians lost 1000 slain, and 2000 
prisoners. Many of the Thebans also fell, and the sacred 
band was cut to pieces to a man. Philip honoured the dead, 
the bodies of the sacred band being treated by him with 
special respect. On the whole, it must be owned that he 
showed great moderation and prudence after his victory. 
He abandoned himself indeed to his joy so unrestrainedly, 
and with such ridicule of the fomer boasts and threats of 
the Athenians, that the notorious orator, Demades, who was 
among the captives, though a partisan of Philip, asked him 
why he acted the part of Thersites, while fate had assigned 
to him that of Agamemnon. But he treated his prisoners 
with humanity, restored them without ransom, and even left 
them their baggage. He refused to listen to those advisers 
who tried to persuade him to inflict severe 1 punishment upon 
the Athenians. On the contrary, he offered them peace, on 
condition that next spring they should send deputies to a 
general congress of the Greeks at Corinth, that they should 
give up the island of Samos, the main stay of their maritime 
power, that they should receive as a compensation the town 
of Oropos, and that Athens should retain her political con- 
stitution. The people of Athens, indeed, after recovering 
from the first consternation, were ready to defend themselves 
and continue the war, and Demosthenes and Hyperides zea- 

B B 4 



560 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXII, 



lously encouraged this warlike spirit; Demosthenes, more- 
over, in his capacity of superintendent of the fortifica- 
tions, caused the walls to be repaired at his own expense; 
and Lycurgus, the orator, by his accusation of Lysicles, 
roused the excitable people to such a pitch, that they 
dragged the wretched man to death. But the actual state 
of things obliged them to accept the terms of the peace; 
their warlike disposition and their patriotic hatred of Philip 
were of no avail. On the proposal of the Areopagus, Phocion 
was placed at the head of affairs, and an embassy, headed by 
the straightforward Demochares, was sent to Philip to ratify 
the peace. The people now again showed their amiable 
character, for Demosthenes, the implacable enemy of Ma- 
cedonia, was commissioned by the relatives of the slain whom 
he had urged on to the unfortunate war, to deliver the 
funeral oration over the dead. In these sad times Athens, 
as formerly on similar occasions, had the happiness to possess 
men of true greatness of character and noble sentiments at 
the head of the administration ; men like Phocion, Demos- 
thenes, and Lycurgus, preserved the state from instantaneous 
ruin, in spite of all the forces which dragged it downwards. 
Athens remained, without a rival, the first among the Greek 
states, although the kings of Macedonia were the real and 
acknowledged masters of Greece ; and the wise financial 
administration of Lycurgus, from B.C. 338 to 326, restored 
Athens, comparatively speaking, to her former prosperity. 

Thebes was not treated so mildly as Athens, because it 
had faithlessly renounced the alliance with Philip. The 
Thebans were obliged to ransom both the dead and the 
living with money, to give up Oropos to the Athenians, to 
surrender the authors of the revolt to be put to death, and 
to restore the exiles, 300 of whom were appointed by the king 
as judges and rulers of the state. The Cadmea, moreover, 
was occupied by a Macedonian garrison, and Thebes, of 
course, lost her supremacy over Boeotia. Orchomenos and 



chap. xxxn. PHILIP COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF. 



561 



Plataeae rose again from their ruins as free towns. Philip 
interfered in the affairs of Peloponnesus also, as if he had 
been absolute ruler ; the Corinthians, Achaeans, Eleans, and 
the towns of Argolis submitted to him ; he defined the 
boundaries between Argos, Messenia, Tegea, and Megalopolis 
on the one hand, and Sparta on the other. Sparta was weak, 
and with suppressed indignation yielded to the power of the 
conqueror. But its lot was more fortunate than that of any 
other state except Athens, for all the rest had lost even 
the appearance of freedom. The beautiful epitaph on those 
who had fallen at Chaeronea*, and the opinions expressed by 
orators and historians, show that the Greeks themselves knew 
quite well that the day of Chaeronea was the end of Greek 
liberty. 

In the spring of the following year the deputies of all the 
Greek states— Sparta alone sent none — met on the Isthmus 
of Corinth, by the command of Philip. There the king an- 
nounced that the true and final object of his undertakings 
was the subjugation of Persia. The Ephesian Dius, by an 
enthusiastic speech, induced the Greeks to elect Philip com- 
mander-in-chief, with unlimited power, and to entrust to 
him the management of the great national war. The Ar- 
cadians alone refused to sanction this election. The con- 
tingents to be furnished by all the Greeks for this war was 
fixed at 200,000 foot, and 15,000 horse. Philip himself 
made preparations on the largest scale. Attalus and Par- 
menio were sent on before ; and without effecting anything 
of importance, they awaited in Aeolis the arrival of the 
main body of the army, But a war in Illyricum, and 
domestic disturbances, prevented Philip himself for the 
present from following his two generals. His son Alexander, 
seeing his mother Olympias treated with disrespect, had 
quarrelled with his father. When a reconciliation had been 



* See Demosth. Be Cor. 322. 
bb 5 



562 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxix. 



brought about, and the king's son and wife had returned 
to court, Philip, in order to strengthen the reconciliation by 
a new family tie, gave his favourite daughter Cleopatra 
in marriage to king Alexander of Epirus, the brother of 
Olympias. In the autumn of the year b, c. 336, the most 
brilliant festivals were celebrated at Aegae. The Greek 
states vied with one another in honouring the kings with 
presents and distinctions ; but the splendour and pomp were 
disgraced by insolence on the one hand, and by adulation on 
the other. In the midst of these festivities a sudden end was 
put to the life of the king, to whom a mysterious oracle of the 
Pythia had already foretold the approaching termination of his 
career. Having gone to the theatre without an escort, to show 
the Greeks how safe he felt among them, he was murdered 
at the entrance by Pausanias, one of his own body-guards. 
This man had been grievously wronged, and had been unable 
to induce the king to punish the offender. For this he took 
vengeance on the king ; but it is also possible that he was 
bribed by the Persians. Philip died in his forty- seventh year, 
the twenty-third of his reign. The people and the army de- 
manded the succession of Alexander, who was then twenty 
years old, and who ascended the throne with the energy and 
intelligence of mature manhood. The circumstances of the 
time required just such a ruler as he was ; for the sudden 
death of Philip seemed to undo all that had hitherto been 
gained. Greece was in commotion, Athens showed its 
pleasure without disguise, and Demosthenes did everything 
he could to stir up all the states to cast off the yoke of 
Macedonia. The barbarous tribes in Macedonia which had 
been recently subdued, likewise began to stir, and at the 
court there were conspirators against the throne and life of 
Alexander. But the young prince overcame all difficulties. 



chap. xxxm. DIFFUSION OF GREEK CIVILISATION. 563 



CHAPTER XXXIII. 

FROM THE BATTLE OF CHAERONEA TO THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER. 

What would have become of Greek civilisation, if Darius 
had succeeded in subduing Athens and Greece ? Like all his- 
torical inquiries to which no certain answer can be given, this 
question is a useless one, and we here put it only to point out 
the wonderful ways of a benevolent Providence. An admirer 
of Hellenic culture reaches the summit of political power, and 
his son, the grateful disciple of the most universal genius that 
Greece ever produced, becomes himself a perfect Greek, and 
carries the civilisation of his spiritual fatherland to the most 
distant countries in the East and South ; and by this exten- 
sion renders it imperishable for all time to come. When the 
physical power of Greece began to sink, her mental con- 
quests commenced. Her conquerors in battle became her 
mental subjects ; the empire of Greek civilisation survived 
for many centuries, and Greek culture became the connecting 
link between Pagan antiquity and Christianity. 

During the period from the end of the Peloponnesian war 
down to the accession of Alexander the Great, Greek culture 
gradually rose to the character of universality. Conscious 
speculation was superadded to the productions of unconscious 
genius and pure inspiration. The ever varying political 
condition of that period produced the artistic perfection of 
oratory, and the uncertainty of religious belief led to philo- 
sophical speculation. In the earlier and happier days of 
victorious greatness, the dramatists and historians of Athens 
reached an unrivalled perfection, and now again, in the same 
city, oratory and philosophy attained the highest point 
probably which the human mind is capable of reaching. In 
the speeches of Pericles and others reported in Thucydides, 

B B 6 



564 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxiii. 



we find the first specimens of an eloquence regulated by the 
principles of art. His and Socrates' contemporaries, the 
sophists, were the teachers of the artistic form of eloquence, 
without regard to its substance. Hence the greatest orators, 
from Antiphon down to Demosthenes and Hyperides, were 
either the greatest friends or the most obnoxious enemies of 
their country. It would lead us too far to characterise the in- 
dividual orators. There are but very few among them whom 
history represents as true friends of their country, and we 
cannot mention one who was its real saviour. Who could 
resist the power of circumstances ? or who could do so in 
all emergencies ? Although Demosthenes, when compared 
with any of the others, stands forth as a great, noble, and pure 
character, can we altogether clear him from the charge of 
having accepted bribes, which his enemies Dinarchus and 
Aeschines brought against him ? He who wishes to excul- 
pate Aeschines, who openly betrayed his country to Mace«^ 
donia, must believe that in Aeschines' opinion the only 
means of saving Athens lay in her joining Macedonia, and 
that he was wiser than Demosthenes, who in his noble en- 
thusiasm overvalued the power of his country, and in his 
indignation at the encroachments of the Macedonian, over- 
looked the weakness and apathy of his countrymen. For the 
Athenian people had arrived at that stage of intellectual 
culture, in which the conscious enjoyment of life is of greater 
importance than all political questions. Once during this 
period, when the question as to voting money for the building 
of a fleet was discussed in the assembly, the orator Demades, 
who had the administration of the Theoricon, said, that there 
was no money to spare for such purposes, because if a fleet 
were built nothing would be left to expend upon festivals and 
games — and no fleet was built.. The art of acting on the 
stage had at that time reached the highest perfection. Paint- 
ing and sculpture displayed their powers, not in the produc- 
tion of grand and sublime works like those of Phidias, but 



chap, xxxin. ACCESSION OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT. 565 



in exhibiting the charming beauty of the noblest human 
forms. All learning and knowledge were concentrated in 
Aristotle, w r hose influence on the fate of mankind was in- 
creased by the circumstance of his being the teacher of Alex- 
ander, and thus he indirectly contributed towards the diffusion 
and preservation of Greek civilisation. In consequence of 
this extraordinary diffusion, we shall be obliged in the re- 
maining part of this work to confine our attention to the 
history of Greece proper, for otherwise we should have to 
write a universal history. 

When the news of Philip's death reached Athens, Demos- 
thenes and Charidemus exerted themselves energetically 
to stir up the people, who immediately passed a decree to 
honour his murderer with a crown, and not to allow Alexander 
to assume the supremacy over Greece. The people were 
once more in a state of intoxicating joy, and thought that 
they would have easy work with " the boy of Pella." They 
knew not how soon they were to feel his rapid and energetic 
mode of action. He first settled his domestic affairs. At- 
talus, who was in Asia, was not disinclined to usurp the 
regal dignity, which he claimed for his nephew, the son of 
his niece Cleopatra, Philip's second wife, for he did not con- 
sider Alexander to be a son of Philip. In consequence of 
this scheme, he was condemned as guilty of high treason ; 
and as he neither submitted to punishment, nor sued for par- 
don, he was despatched by an assassin. After this, the young 
king went to Thessaly in order to assert his right to the su- 
premacy over Greece sword in hand. He found the passes 
of Thermopylae and Callipeuce occupied by the Thessalians, 
and accordingly had to force his way over the rocky heights 
of Ossa into the plain of Thessaly, by which movement 
he turned the enemy's rear. The Thessalians offered no 
further resistance, and recognising his supremacy they pro- 
mised to send their contingent whenever he should require it. 
He found the passes of mount Oeta unguarded, for the 



566 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxxm. 



Greeks, and especially the Athenians lulled into security by 
Demosthenes, had not expected that Alexander would act 
with such rapidity. At Thermopylae, the Amphictions ac- 
knowledged his supremacy, but the votes of Thebes, Sparta, 
and Athens, were wanting. In order to obtain them also, he 
proceeded farther south, traversing Boeotia, without meeting 
any resistance, and encamped before the walls of Thebes. 
This at once induced the Athenians to change their minds, 
and they sent ambassadors to beg his pardon. Demosthenes 
himself was one of the ambassadors, but while on his road to 
Thebes, he secretly returned, for he dreaded the anger of 
Alexander, which he had provoked by his hostile conduct. 
His motive, perhaps, was the generous desire not to damage 
the cause of Athens by appearing before the king. Alex- 
ander complied with the prayer of the Athenians, demanding 
only that they should send deputies to the congress of Corinth, 
whither he himself now proceeded for the purpose of regula- 
ting the affairs of Greece. Sparta alone sent no deputies, but 
all the other Greek states accepted the king's terms of what was 
emphatically called "a general peace and alliance." Henceforth 
a permanent congress of deputies from the different states of 
Greece was to have its seat at Corinth, where all the com- 
mon affairs of the country were to be decided. Alexander 
was appointed commander-in-chief to continue the war 
against Persia, for which the states had to furnish their con- 
tingents according to the king's commands. No change, 
however, was to be made in their constitutions, nor was their 
independence to be impaired. The congress had to watch 
over the preservation of peace ; without its sanction no exiles 
could be recalled, no one could be banished, no distribu- 
tion of land could be made, no slaves could be publicly eman- 
cipated. Thus, in spite of the guarantee of independence, 
the treaty aimed at suppressing the free life and intercourse 
of the states of Greece. Until the death of Alexander this 
congress actually continued to exercise its functions, 



chap, xxxiii. REVOLT OF ATHENS AND THEBES. 567 



After pacifying the Greek states in this manner and giv- 
ing them proofs of his energy, the king, in the spring of the 
following year, b. c. 335, undertook an expedition against the 
northern and western neighbours of Macedonia. These ex- 
peditions into distant countries were made with the most 
astonishing rapidity and energy. Directing his march from 
Amphipolis across mount Haemus, he humbled the Triballi, 
dwelling between that mountain and the river Ister; and 
having crossed the latter he terrified the G-etae who dwelt on 
its left bank. There, we are told by Arrian, he received 
embassies from the most distant nations, even from the Celts, 
who offered him friendship and gold. He then returned, 
directing his armies westwards against the rebellious Illy- 
rians, and by his extraordinary quickness and personal bra- 
very, he not only rescued his army from a most perilous 
position amid the Blyrian mountains, but compelled the con- 
quered princes to do homage to him, and send contingents 
for his expedition against Persia. 

Alexander's difficult situation in Illyricum gave rise to 
various reports of defeats, and even of his death. This 
caused great commotions in Greece, and the party hostile to 
Macedonia was particularly active. Ten thousand darics 
also, which the Athenian Ephialtes brought from Persia, were 
not without effect. The Aetolians and Eleans rose in arms, 
and the army of the Arcadians had already advanced as far 
as the Isthmus of Corinth. But Thebes and Athens distin- 
guished themselves above all by their eagerness to cast off 
the Macedonian yoke. In the latter city Demosthenes and 
Lycurgus were the foremost in calling upon Greece and 
Athens to assert their liberty, since by the king's death the 
treaties were annulled, and the king of Persia would support 
the Greeks with troops and money. War was decreed, but 
first of all the revolt of Thebes had to be secured. Thither 
the exiles returned, the Macedonian garrison was blockaded 
in the Cadmea, and two of its captains were put to death. The 



568 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxm. 



Athenians sent arms and promised succours ; but the troops 
did not leave Attica, as they prudently wished first to see the 
result of the struggle at Thebes. Suddenly, even before the 
Cadmea had surrendered, the king, whom all believed to be 
dead, appeared at Onchestos in Boeotia with an army of 
23,000 men. On receiving the news of the revolt of Thebes, 
he had marched in the incredibly short period of twelve days 
from the Illyrian town of Pellion through the valley of the 
Haliacmon and the Perrhaebian passes into Thessaly, and 
through the pass of Thermopylae towards Onchestos. On 
the following day, he was at the gates of Thebes, before 
any of the Greek allies had arrived. Alexander first 
proposed an amicable arrangement, and a return to the 
terms of the peace of the preceding year ; but as the Boeo- 
tarchs and the exiles rejected every offer, he took the 
city by storm, after an heroic defence by its citizens. 
He penetrated into the city by the southern gate along with 
the fugitive Thebans who had been defeated in front of their 
fortifications. The massacre which now ensued was caused 
not so much by the Macedonians as by the old enemies 
of Thebes, who were serving in Alexander's army : the Pho- 
cians, Orchomenians, Thespians, and Plataeans took fearful 
vengeance upon the unfortunate city. On the following day 
the king left it to his allies to decide upon the fate of Thebes. 
The Greeks determined to keep possession of the Cadmea, 
but to raze the city to the ground, to distribute its territory, 
except that which belonged to temples, among the allies, and 
to sell for slaves all its inhabitants, without distinction of 
sex or age, excepting only the priests, priestesses, and those 
who were connected with the king by ties of hospitality. 
This decree was literally and mercilessly executed by the 
Greeks. The temples and the house of the Theban poet 
Pindar alone were spared, the latter by the express com- 
mand of the king : 20,000 men were made slaves, 6000 had 
fallen in the battle, and many had saved themselves by 



chap, xxxin. SUBMISSION OF ATHENS. 



569 



flight. The ancient Cadmea stood alone amid a heap of ruins. 
This was a fearful retaliation for the merciless destruction of 
Plataeae in the time of the Peloponnesian war, and for the 
faithless conduct of Thebes during the Persian invasion. Had 
Alexander been allowed to follow his own inclinations he 
would no doubt have acted more mildly. Plutarch relates 
that he restored to freedom Timocleia, the sister of Thea- 
genes, who had fallen at Chaeronea, together with her chil- 
dren, on learning that she had thrown into a well and stoned 
to death a brutal Thracian captain who had attempted to 
violate her honour. At a subsequent period, when Alex- 
ander found Thebans among the captive mercenaries of the 
king of Persia, he treated them kindly. 

The news of the fall of Thebes made a deep impression 
upon all the Greeks, and the Athenians were the first to 
alter their plans. It was during the celebration of the great 
mysteries that they were informed of the fearful catastrophe, 
and they forthwith determined to send ten ambassadors to 
implore the king's mercy, and permission to show to their un- 
happy brethren of Thebes the kind offices of hospitality. The 
king granted this request, but he first demanded that they 
should deliver up to him ten of the leading orators who were 
hostile to him, among whom Demosthenes and Lycurgus 
were especially mentioned. But owing to the mediation of 
Demades, who had received from Demosthenes a bribe of five 
talents, he was satisfied with the surrender of Charidemus 
alone, who, however, escaped to Asia. Alexander was evi- 
dently anxious to win the goodwill of the Athenians by every 
means in his power ; nay he even condescended to flatter a 
city which would not have been able to offer greater resist- 
ance than Thebes. His object in general was, by benevo- 
lence and kindness, to keep the Greeks quiet and faithful 
during his absence in Asia ; but, at the same time, he felt a 
natural reverence for the unrivalled greatness of Athens in 
past times, which prevented him, as it did all subsequent con- 



570 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxiii. 



querors, from approaching the sacred buildings of the acro- 
polis with a destructive hand. 

Thespiae and, for the third time, Plataeae, now rose from 
their ruins, in accordance with a decree of the congress at 
Corinth ; but in the autumn of b. c. 335 Alexander quitted 
Greece, which he had apparently quieted by fearful severity, 
as well as by mildness. During the winter, he was occupied 
in Macedonia with preparations for the war against Persia, 
and in the spring of the following year his army amounting 
to about 30,000 foot and 5000 horse was on its march. From 
Aegae he proceeded along the high road, which Philip had 
so often traversed, to Amphipolis, and thence to Sestos on 
the Hellespont. The fleet there transported the army to the 
coast of Asia ; for the expedition was accompanied by 160 
triremes, 20 of which had been furnished by Athens. With 
such a comparatively small army, he confidently set out 
against the myriads of the Great King, knowing from the 
history of Greece the real value of those myriads, which 
were driven to battle with scourges. He set out like a true 
conqueror, feeling certain of his victory. He took with him 
scarcely seventy talents in money, having distributed his 
treasures among his friends before his departure. When he 
was asked what he meant to keep for himself, he answered 
"hope." 

We can accompany the youthful hero, who never returned, 
only thus far, although as the commander-in-chief of the 
united Macedonians and Greeks, he may to some extent be 
regarded as a successor of Themistocles, Cimon and Agesilaus. 
Upon the history of Macedonia we can enter only where it 
comes in contact with that of Greece itself. The share of 
the Greeks in the Asiatic expedition, moreover, was a 
very small one. From the contradictory statements of the 
ancients we may gather this much, that the total number of 
Greeks serving in Alexander's army was about 7000, of 
whom 2000 were horsemen, including 1,500 Thessalians. 



CHAP. XXXIII. 



BATTLE OF GRANICUS. 



571 



Among the Persians, on the other hand, we find many 
Greeks serving as mercenaries against Alexander ; for in 
order to thwart their nearest and most dangerous foe the 
enemies of Macedonia had recourse to any means, and even 
went so far as to assist the natural enemy of Greece, the 
Persians, who during the last century had ceased to be 
looked upon in that light. Demosthenes too had accepted 
money from Persia, to employ it against Macedonia. Ac- 
cordingly, hosts of Greeks now went into the service of the 
Persians, in order to fight in their ranks against Alexander, 
totally disregarding the decrees of the Corinthian congress, 
which continued to exert itself for the interests of Macedonia, 
The connection with Persia was kept up by constant embas- 
sies also, so that Alexander had good reasons for fearing a 
fresh revolt during his absence. In the first decisive battle 
on the river Granicus, a Greek of great military fame, the 
Rhodian Memnon, was at the head of the whole Persian 
army, in which there were no less than 20,000 Greek mer- 
cenaries, a circumstance which rendered Alexander's victory 
all the more bloody. Alexander, however, still remained 
faithful to his mission as commander-in-chief of the Greeks, 
for the result of that battle was the liberation of the Ionian 
cities in Asia, in which he restored the democratic form of 
government. Memnon, his most dangerous enemy, who, as 
commander of the Persian fleet and governor of the coast of 
Asia, conquered the islands and formed connections with the 
Greeks on the continent, especially with the Lacedaemo- 
nians, died in the following year, b. c. 333 ; and his successors 
Pharnabazus and Autophradates, who endeavoured to carry 
out his plans and made preparations for an expedition into 
Greece, were defeated the year after. Nothing now checked 
the king's victorious career. 

While Alexander was subduing Asia, Agis II., king of 
Sparta, who in b. c. 338 had succeeded Archidamus III, put 
himself at the head of a Peloponnesian confederacy, the 



572 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxiii. 



object of which was to cast off the Macedonian yoke. Ac- 
cordingly, the Arcadians, with the exception of Megalopolis, 
the Eleans, and the Achaeans, took up arms ; they were 
joined by homeless Thebans, and connections were formed 
with the above-mentioned satraps, Pharnabazus and Auto- 
phradates, whose fleet had already advanced as far as the 
island of Siphnos, and who furnished the Greeks with money 
and ships. Agis had sent his brother to Crete to maintain 
the influence of Sparta there. The Athenians, also, were 
soon prevailed upon to support the insurrection with a hun- 
dred galleys. But Demades, the frivolous and voluptuous 
manager of the theoricon, declared that by such military 
preparations the people would be deprived of the money 
required for the games and festivals; and the Athenians, 
more concerned about their amusements than about their 
liberty, cancelled the decree ; so that Athens, which Alex- 
ander had captivated by his insinuating civilities, remained 
quiet. In consequence of this, after the battle on the Grani- 
cus, he sent a report of his victory to the Greeks, and es- 
pecially to the Athenians, to whom he also made a present of 
300 suits of Persian armour, as an ornament for the temple 
of Athene ; and from Susa he sent back the statues of Har- 
modius and Aristogeiton, which had formerly been carried 
off by the Persians. But in b. c. 331, Agis having assem- 
bled an array of 20,000 foot and 2000 horse, laid siege to 
Megalopolis, and a victory which he gained there increased 
the courage and the hopes of the Greeks. Antipater, who 
had been entrusted with the administration of the kingdom 
of Macedonia during the absence of Alexander, was at this 
time engaged against the rebellious governor of Thrace. 
But soon after this, he received from Asia a sum of 3000 
talents with orders to quell the insurrection in Peloponnesus. 
He now quickly arranged matters with Memnon, and with 
an army of 40,000 men invaded Peloponnesus. In the 
neighbourhood of Aegae, not far from Megalopolis, a decisive 



CHAP, xxxiii. DEATH OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT. 573 



battle was fought, in which the Lacedaemonians behaved in 
a manner worthy of their ancient renown, but were unsuc- 
cessful. They were overpowered by the numbers of their 
enemies, and lost 5,300 men, among whom their king fell 
fighting bravely, and covered with many wounds. This new 
blow completely disheartened the Greeks. Eudamidas, the 
successor of Agis, gave up all thoughts of further resistance, 
and the Spartans sent ambassadors to Alexander to implore 
his pardon. Antipater however referred the case of the con- 
quered to the congress at Corinth ; there it was decreed that 
Sparta should join the Greek confederacy, and pay 120 
talents as an indemnification to the faithful city of Mega- 
lopolis. 

Greece, thus again humbled, remained quiet for a time. 
But the death of Alexander was the signal for fresh struggles, 
not only in the other parts of his vast empire, but also in 
Greece, which again began to long for freedom and inde- 
pendence. The immediate consequences of his death render 
that event one of the most important in the history of the 
world. His mighty arm had united under one sway coun- 
tries and nations of the most different characters and dis- 
positions ; but his early death prevented him from binding 
them firmly together as parts of one great empire : he was 
carried off in the midst of new and vast undertakings, as well 
as in the midst of Oriental luxuries, to which he had aban- 
doned himself. After his successful campaign in the Pentapo- 
tamia (the Punjaub), he had scarcely begun making plans 
and arrangements for establishing his power in the newly 
conquered countries, when he died of a fever at Babylon, in 
June B.C. 323, at the youthful age of thirty-two years. 
Until the very last days of his life he made the most ex- 
traordinary efforts, never giving the reins of government 
out of his own hands. Death itself had no power over him; 
for Curtius relates the extraordinary fact, that his body 
lay for seven days exposed to the burning sun, before the 



574 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxm. 



Egyptians and Chaldaeans commenced embalming it, without 
presenting any indications of decomposition. The detailed 
reports of his death, the rumour of his having been poisoned, 
his last regulation that the worthiest should be his successor, 
the giving of his ring to Perdiccas ; — all these circumstances 
are so unauthenticated, and some of them show such manifest 
traces of being inventions of later or even contemporary 
writers, that we may here pass them over in silence. 

Alexander had been the idol of his army, but among the 
higher officers many had been ill-disposed towards him, 
and thought that he had too great a disposition and inclina- 
tion to become an eastern despot. Conspiracies were dis- 
covered and punished with inexorable severity; the chief 
offenders being the Greeks in his own army. That he was 
of a passionate nature and inflicted punishment on the spur 
of the moment, will not excite our surprise, if we recollect 
his position, which demanded quick decision and energy at 
every step. We cannot refrain from directing attention to 
one thing, which became of greater importance in the his- 
tory of civilisation than even his conquest of the Persian 
empire and his colonies in the distant East. We allude to 
the foundation of Alexandria in Egypt, in B.C. 332; there 
the treasures of Greek literature were collected and care- 
fully preserved and cherished; there grammatical studies, 
the beginnings of which appear in Greece itself about a 
century earlier, were cultivated with the greatest success ; 
and there, under the mild sceptre of the Lagidae, art and 
literature found an asylum, while in Greece they would, 
perhaps, have been neglected and become extinct. We of 
modern times must feel the more grateful for the foundation 
of that city, because the Museum of Alexandria and its 
celebrated library were among' the principal means of pre- 
serving and multiplying the copies of the Greek classics that 
have come down to us. 

Alexander's body was conveyed with regal pomp to that 



chap, xxxni. FATE OF ALEXANDER'S FAMILY. 575 



city, which preserved his memory longest and most bene- 
ficially, and which down to this day bears his name. As 
his empire broke to pieces during the violent struggles of 
his ambitious generals, so also all the members of his own 
family died a violent death. In B.C. 317 his mother Olym- 
pias killed his immediate successor, his half-brother Arrhi- 
daeus, together with his wife Eurydice, a step-sister of 
Alexander. Two years later, Olympias was made prisoner 
by Cassander at Pydna, and put to death. The same person 
also killed, in B.C. 311, Alexander's posthumous son Alex- 
ander, and his mother Eoxana ; lastly, in the year b. c. 309, 
Polysperchon killed Heracles, a son of Alexander by Barsine. 
We pass over the various motives for these several acts of 
violence, but we may remark that they all arose from the 
ambition of the generals, and from the desire of each to 
establish himself in the possession of royal power. Scarcely 
a trace is found of affection or attachment to the family of 
Alexander^ or of reverence for his name and memory. 



576 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxiv. 



CHAPTER XXXIV. 

FROM THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER TO THE TIME OF THE ACHAEAH 

LEAGUE. 

Of the three principal kingdoms, Macedonia, Syria, and 
Egypt, which were formed by the successors of Alexander, 
the first from its geographical position naturally came into 
frequent, and for the most part hostile, contact with Greece. 
Alexander himself had shortly before his death been the cause 
of a fresh war. At the celebration of the Olympian games in 
B.C. 324, which was attended by a great number of exiles 
and oligarchs favourably disposed towards Macedonia, Ni- 
canor 5 a commissioner sent by Alexander, read the following 
message of his master to the exiles from the Greek cities. 
" We were not the author of your exile, but we will re- 
store you to your homes, — all except those who are under 
a curse. And we have written to Antipater on the 
subject, that he may compel those cities which are unwilling 
to receive you." The Thebans alone were excluded from 
this dictatorial amnesty, the object of which evidently 
was to strengthen the Macedonian party in those Greek 
cities, whose fidelity and peaceful disposition were always 
doubtful. There were present at the festival about 20,000 
exiles from all parts of Greece. Their property had long 
been in the hands of others ; Athens, for example, had dis- 
tributed the land in the island of Samos among cleruchi ; 
Aetolians had again taken possession of the town of Oeniadae. 
This message, accordingly, caused exasperation and oppo- 
sition. The Athenians and Aetolians refused to comply 
with it, and, together with other Greeks, sent an embassy to 
Babylon, which, however, did not gain its end with Alex- 
ander. The thought of open resistance was fostered by 



CHAP. XXXIV. 



HARPALUS. 



577 



other circumstances. Harpalus, Alexander's treasurer, had 
some time before, in B.C. 324, secretly quitted Asia with 
30 ships, 6000 mercenaries, and 5000 talents, the greater 
part of which he deposited at Taenaron in Laconia, and 
then came to Athens. He succeeded in forming a party 
among the most influential demagogues and leaders, and 
even Demosthenes was charged by his enemies with having 
received bribes from Harpalus, though it is probable that 
this charge against him, as well as that against Phocion, was 
unfounded. But Antipater having demanded that Harpalus 
should be given up, and Demosthenes, in consequence, as he 
said, of a sore throat, being unable to speak, the people of 
Athens resolved to arrest Harpalus, who, however, escaped, 
and taking with him his treasures from Taenarum, went to 
Crete, where he ended his life in a miserable manner, 
being slain by a Lacedaemonian who fled with his money 
across the sea to Gyrene. His book-keeper, however, was 
taken with the books containing accounts of the manner in 
which the money had been spent and the names of those 
who had received it, and he was delivered up to the king's 
treasurer Philoxenus. The Athenians, from fear of Anti- 
pater, now determined to institute a strict inquiry to ascer- 
tain who had accepted bribes from Harpalus, and thus began 
the famous Harpalian inquisition. Demosthenes was unable 
to give a satisfactory account of a sum of money which he 
had received from Harpalus, nominally to take care of it * 
and he was sentenced to pay a fine of fifty talents. Noi 
being able to raise that sum, he fled to escape imprisonment, 
going first to Aegina and thence to Troezen. Many other 
most distinguished citizens were exiled on similar grounds. 
Demosthenes, however, even in his exile continued to exert 
himself for the freedom of Athens, and when, after Alex- 
ander's death, Greece rose to engage in a fresh struggle for 
its independence, he spoke in the assembly of the Arcadians. 
When the war was at its height and seemed to promise a 

c c 



578 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxiv. 



favourable termination for Athens, his fellow-citizens re- 
called him in the most honourable manner, and paid the fine 
of fifty talents for him. 

When the news of Alexander's death reached Greece, 
the Athenians especially were overjoyed, and ready to take 
up arms at once without listening to the warnings of Phocion, 
who, although an aristocrat, was a patriotic man. Persons 
of property, in general, were favourable to Macedonia, and 
dissuaded their fellow-citizens from war ; but the people, 
believing that their policy was founded on selfishness, sent 
many of them into exile. The above-mentioned decree of 
Alexander had exasperated the Greeks and prepared their 
minds for war. Leosthenes, a man of great military expe- 
rience, had just returned from Asia with 8000 mercenaries, 
and had landed at Taenaron. The Athenians now sent to 
him desiring him to retain those troops under some pretext 
or other, until after the arrival of the official news of Alex- 
ander's death, when preparations would be carried on openly. 
This request was complied with. The orator Hyperides and 
some others, enthusiastic in the cause of freedom, undertook 
the administration of affairs after the removal of the friends 
of Macedonia. The people resolved to equip a fleet of 240 
ships ; all the Greeks were called upon to assert their inde- 
pendence, and most states obeyed the summons. In Pelo- 
ponnesus, the Achaeans, Arcadians, and Spartans refused 
to co-operate with the rest, the latter, from jealousy of 
Athens; in Central Greece, the Boeotians declined taking 
part in the general rising, chiefly because they dreaded the 
restoration of Thebes, the territory of which had fallen into 
their hands. An army of 30,000 men, however, was raised, 
to which the Aetolians and Athenians furnished the largest 
contingents, the Aetolians sending into the field 7000 men, 
Athens 5000 hoplites, 500 horse, and 2000 mercenaries. 
The fleet amounted to 200 sail. Leosthenes, the commander- 
in-chief of the allies, after having defeated the Boeotians, 



chap, xxxiv. DEATH OF LEOSTHENES. 



579 



who refused to allow his army a passage through their 
country, took possession of the pass of Thermopylae. The 
Illyrians and Thracians also rose against the detested rule 
of Macedonia. Antipater, who, after the death of Alexander, 
acted as supreme military commander in Macedonia, in place 
of the weak-minded Arrhidaeus, quickly invaded Thessaly 
with a considerable army, sending at the same time demands 
for reinforcements to Craterus, who was returning from Asia 
with an army of 10,000 men, and to Leonnatus, the go- 
vernor of Phrygia on the Hellespont. The hostile armies 
met in the neighbourhood of the Trachinian Heraclea. The 
Thessalian horse went over to Leosthenes, and Antipater 
was obliged to retreat. It seems that he was cut off from 
returning to Macedonia, for he threw himself into the town 
of Lamia on the Malian gulf, and there waited for the arrival 
of reinforcements. But Leosthenes having invested the 
town with circumvallations, Antipater at length made over- 
tures of peace. 

These successful undertakings created such enthusiasm 
at Athens, and the Athenians became so elated, that, 
flushed with victory, they demanded the unconditional sur- 
render of Antipater. Phocion alone did not partake of the 
general enthusiasm. But Antipater refused to surrender ; 
and fortune now forsook the arms of the Greeks. The first 
misfortune which occurred was, that the Aetolians left the 
confederate army, under the pretext that they must look to 
the affairs of their own country. A still greater loss was 
the death of Leosthenes, who had been wounded during a 
sally from Lamia. The Athenians honoured him as they 
had honoured their great heroes in former times. Hyperides 
delivered the funeral oration over him and his companions 
in arms who had fallen, and all were buried near the road 
leading to the Academy, by the side of Pericles, Conon, and 
Chabrias. Leosthenes was succeeded by the youthful An- 
tiphilus, for Phocion was at the advanced age of eighty. 

cc 2 



580 



HISTORY OF GEEECE. 



CHAP. XXXIV. 



Meantime, Leonnatus had entered Thessaly with 20,000 
foot and 2500 horse ; the army of the confederates had been 
reduced to 22,000 men and 3500 horse. Thus threatened in 
rear as well as in front, Antiphilus raised the siege of Lamia, 
and in the neighbourhood of the town defeated in a bloody 
battle the troops of Leonnatus, who was himself killed. 
But still Antipater was relieved, and having joined the 
remainder of the conquered army and the forces of Craterus 
who had just arrived, he took up a strong position in the 
north of Thessaly. There a decisive battle was fought near 
Crannon, in the autumn of b. c. 322. Antipater's army had 
been increased to 48,000 men, and the Macedonian phalanx 
gained the day. The Thessalian cavalry fought in a manner 
worthy of its great reputation, but unsuccessfully. The 
Athenian fleet of 170 galleys, commanded by Eetion, was 
likewise defeated twice by that of the Macedonians under 
Cleitus. Micion even effected a landing near Rhamnus in 
Attica, but Phocion overpowered him, and the invader was 
slain. Thus the war suddenly took a turn unfavourable to 
Greece, and especially to the liberty of Athens. The towns 
of Thessaly surrendered immediately, the confederate army 
dispersed, and the smaller towns hastened to accept the not 
very severe terms offered by Antipater. The Aetolians 
and Athenians alone were resolved to continue the war. 
Antipater quickly advanced against Athens, and having en- 
camped in the Cadmea, he first demanded of Athens the 
surrender of the enemies of Macedonia ; whereupon Demos- 
thenes, Hyperides, and many other patriots fled from the 
city. The impudent Demades, who had been branded with 
infamy in consequence of having been found guilty of re- 
ceiving bribes in the inquisition about the proceedings of 
Harpalus, was now released ' from the punishment of his 
.rime, and actively supported the cause of Macedonia. He 
and Phocion were sent to Antipater to obtain favourable 
terms; a second embassy headed by the aged philosopher 



CHAP, XXXIY. 



THE L AMI AN WAR. 



581 



Xenocrates, also made earnest representations, but it was all 
in vain ; Antipater insisted upon their surrendering at dis- 
cretion, delivering up the enemies of Macedonia, paying the 
expenses of the war and an additional sum of money, re- 
ceiving a Macedonian garrison into the port of Munychia, 
and establishing a timocratic oligarchy in the place of demo- 
cracy. Athens at last yielded on every point. At the 
festival of the great Eleusinian mysteries in September or 
October, b. c. 322, a Macedonian garrison took possession of 
Munychia. The franchise was retained only by those citizens 
whose property amounted to 2000 drachmae ; the rest, 12,000 
in number, quitted the city. Although the census was very 
low, yet the number of those who remained did not amount 
to more than 9000. Some of the exiles were transported 
as colonists to Thrace. The patriots and enemies of Ma- 
cedonia were to be surrendered, as Antipater obstinately 
persisted in his demand. On the proposal of Demades, they 
were summoned to appear in court, and, as they did not 
come, they were sentenced to death. Hyperides and some 
others were seized in Aegina by one Archias, an actor, and 
sent to Antipater, who was at Cleonae, and ordered them to 
be tortured and put to death. Demosthenes had taken 
refuge in the temple of Poseidon in Calauria, near the coast 
of Argolis ; when he learned the intentions of Archias, who 
had come to entrap him, he took poison, which he carried 
about with him in a reed ; for he well knew that his asylum 
would be no protection against the band of barbarians by 
whom Archias was assisted in his hunt. 

This war, which is commonly called the Lamian, thus de- 
prived Athens, for the second time within a century, of her 
freedom and her constitution ; with which she lost also her 
noblest citizens, the indefatigable champions of freedom. 
When a few years later she recovered her ancient free con- 
stitution, she had at least no longer to dread a Demades ; 
that vile traitor, after having for a time enslaved his country, 

c c 3 



582 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxiv. 



in conjunction with other friends of Macedonia, among whom 
Phocion was the only noble character, was sent in B.C. 318 
to Antipater, to effect the removal of the Macedonian gar- 
rison from Munychia. But Antipater, knowing that he had 
been engaged in secret negotiations with Perdiccas to bring 
about his own downfall, ordered him to be seized and put to 
death with his son. About the same time the contemptible 
Archias also died in poverty and disgrace, B.C. 319. 

After having humbled Athens, Antipater and Craterus 
marched against the Aetolians, but before they were able to 
effect anything decisive, they were obliged to give up the 
war in consequence of the disturbances in Asia. 

The other generals and satraps were allied against the in- 
solent Perdiccas, the first guardian of young Alexander. 
After the murder of Perdiccas at Memphis, in B.C. 321, 
Antipater became guardian, and at Trisparadeisos in Syria 
a new distribution of the conquered countries was made 
among the generals of Alexander, who had already become, 
to some extent, independent sovereigns. While the armies 
of Antigonus were fighting in Asia against Eumenes, 
Antipater died at the age of eighty, in B.C. 318, and in his 
place Polysperchon was appointed guardian. But Cassander, 
Antipater's son, took up arms to oppose the new regent, and 
to obtain for himself possession of Macedonia ; during this 
struggle the family of Alexander the Great was extirpated. 
After this Cassander took part in the general war against 
Antigonus, which ended in B.C. 311, when a peace was made, 
by which the empire of Alexander was divided among four 
rulers. Cassander having obtained the government of Ma- 
cedonia only temporarily, and in the character of the guardian 
of young Alexander, soon caused his dangerous rival to be 
despatched ; and in b. c. 306, the governors of the provinces 
had made such progress, that Antigonus, Demetrius, Cas- 
sander, Ptolemaeus, and Lysimachus could assume the title 
of king. In the peace concluded after the battle of Ipsus, 



chap, xxxiv. NICAKOB OCCUPIES TIIIAEUS. 



583 



B. C. 301, in which Antigonus lost his throna and his life, the 
countries of Macedonia, Thrace, Syria, and Egypt, were re- 
cognised as four independent kingdoms. During these wars 
among the successors of Alexander, which lasted till B.C. 301, 
Athens suffered much ; it experienced several times a change 
of masters, and was even obliged to alter its constitution. 

When Polysperchon, who was advanced in years and ex- 
perienced in war, but possessed little energy, had been ap- 
pointed by Antipater guardian of the royal family, Cassander 
immediately formed the plan of overthrowing him, but as the 
war called him into Asia,, he sent for the present his friend 
Nicanor to take the command of the garrison at Munychia* 
He was received at Athens before Antipater's death was 
known there. Polysperchon, on the other hand, in order to 
increase his power by attaching Greece to himself, pro- 
claimed, in the name of the kings, the freedom of the Greek 
states, the restoration of the democratic form of government, 
and the recall of the exiles. Samos was to be given back to 
the Athenians, and the Macedonian garrisons were to be, 
withdrawn from all the towns. The aristocrats, w^ho were 
in favour of Macedonia, were naturally dissatisfied with this 
measure ; they were, however, obliged to yield. But Ni- 
canor, in spite of the commands of Polysperchon, did not 
evacuate Munychia, and Phocion intentionally remained in- 
active, though he had received orders to dislodge Nicanor by 
force. Nay, the latter, probably w r ith the knowledge of 
Phocion, even took possession of Piraeus, cutting off the 
communication between Athens and the sea. A command 
from Olympias, who had been recalled by Polysperchon from 
Epirus, was as ineffectual as an expedition commanded by 
Alexander, the son of Polysperchon. Alexander himself 
formed the design of establishing himself as tyrant at Athens, 
and it is not improbable that Phocion may have promised to 
assist him. But the people thwarted this scheme. The 
orator Agnonides accused Phocion and his partisans of high 

c c 4 



584 



HISTORY OP GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXIV. 



treason ; they fled to Polysperchon, who, however, delivered 
them up to the Athenians to be tried. Phocion did not deny 
the charge brought against him, and the Athenians, though 
many no doubt pitied the old man, condemned him to death. 
In the spring of B.C. 317, Phocion, with a composure and 
cheerfulness worthy of his whole life, drank the hemlock. 
His policy, which saw no safety except in joining Macedonia, 
was unfortunate, but he carried it out honourably and consis- 
tently till the very hour of his death. 

Soon afterwards Cassander, a brave but revengeful man, 
appeared before the gates of Athens. His father Antipater 
had raised him only to the rank of chiliarch. Dissatisfied 
with this, he had fled to the powerful Antigonus in Asia, 
from whom he obtained thirty-five galleys and 4000 mer- 
cenaries. With this force he now entered Piraeus ; Aegina 
fell into his hands, and Salamis was threatened. At the 
same time Polysperchon appeared before Athens, but did not 
himself venture upon anything decisive ; leaving his son 
Alexander to carry on the siege of the port towns, he marched 
into Peloponnesus with an army of 20,000 men and 65 ele- 
phants. The peninsula, with the exception of Megalopolis, 
was subdued. In order to deliver themselves from two hostile 
armies, the Athenians concluded a peace on tolerable terms 
with Cassander ; their territory and their independence were 
restored. The census previously established was reduced 
one-half, that is, to 1000 drachmae, and Demetrius of Pha- 
leron, celebrated both as an orator and as an author, and 
popular on account of his affability, was appointed admi- 
nistrator or governor * of Athens. Under his administration 
Athens visibly revived. A census of the people, which was 
held either at the beginning or at the end of his admi- 
nistration, which lasted for ten years (from B.C. 318 till 307), 
showed that there were at Athens 21,000 citizens, 10,000 



CHAP, xxxiv. [REBUILDING OF THEBES. 



585 



resident aliens, and 400,000 slaves. Demetrius knew so well 
how to win the affections of the excitable people, that on one 
day 360 statues were erected to him, to make up which 
number the artists had in some instances to alter previously- 
made statues ; a proof of the flourishing condition of the 
arts. Subsequently the Athenians may have repented of 
their excessive admiration, for his extravagance rendered 
Demetrius more odious to the people than any tyrant had ever 
been. Greece was always the bone of contention among 
the successors of Alexander. In order to make friends for 
himself during the great war against the other generals, 
Antigonus had proclaimed the freedom of Greece, and he 
generally appeared to act as if he had undertaken the war 
in the interest of the royal family and of Greek liberty. At 
the same time, in B.C. 314, his enemy Ptolemy also declared 
the Greeks to be free. But of course neither he nor An- 
tigonus did anything to realise his promises. Cassander 
gained more than either of them by his command, in B.C. 315. 
to rebuild Thebes, which caused great delight among all the 
Greeks, and especially among the Athenians. That city had 
now lain in ruins for twenty years, and the Athenians dis- 
tinguished themselves above all others by their active as- 
sistance in restoring the city of their ancient enemies. 
Cassander had to engage in various struggles for the purpose 
of maintaining the union of Greece with Macedonia ; first 
with Polysperchon and his son Alexander ; then, when the 
latter had died, and Cassander had gained over the aged 
Polysperchon by giving up to him the supreme military 
command in Peloponnesus, with the troops of Antigonus, 
whose generals destroyed the Macedonian power in all parte 
of the peninsula, with the exception of Corinth and Sicyon, 
which remained faithful to Polysperchon. In addition to 
this, Ptolemy, in B.C. 312, took Euboea, Boeotia (where he 
was immediately joined by the Boeotians, who were in- 
dignant at the rebuilding of Thebes), Phocis, and Locris ? 

c c 5 



586 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxiv. 



from Cassander, who for the present was obliged to abandon 
Greece, Antigonus having threatened to attack Macedonia. 
It is true that in the peace of B.C. 311, which first sanctioned 
the division of the vast Macedonian empire, the freedom and 
independence of Greece were expressly guaranteed ; but the 
terms of the peace were adhered to only while each con- 
tracting party felt it his interest to do so. Cassander, the 
ruler of Macedonia, possessed a predominant influence until 
the year b. c. 307 ; he contrived to keep Polysperchon in a 
dependent position as military commander in Peloponnesus, 
and in b. c. 308 he came to an arrangement with the powerful 
Ptolemy of Egypt, who again strove to make himself master 
of Greece, and had conquered Corinth and Sicyon; ac- 
cording to this agreement both parties to it were to retain 
what they had conquered. 

Meantime a new hero had appeared on the scene, who was 
more dangerous to his enemies, especially to Cassander, than 
all who had preceded them. This was Demetrius, the son 
of Antigonus, who afterwards obtained the surname of Po- 
liorcetes, "the conqueror of cities." During the war of 
Antigonus against the other generals, he had, for the first 
time, been entrusted with the command of a detachment, 
being then only twelve years old. Having been left to 
protect Syria, he allowed himself to be tempted to undertake 
an expedition against Ptolemy of Egypt, but was defeated 
near Gaza in Phoenicia, B.C. 312. Six years later he com- 
pletely wiped off this disgrace by a victory off Cyprus. 
When Demetrius of Phaleron had governed Athens for about 
ten years in the name of Cassander, and had by his reckless 
extravagance become as detested by the Athenians as he 
had at first been admired for his affability and his great 
talents, Demetrius, the son of - Antigonus, suddenly appeared 
at the entrance of Piraeus with a fleet of 250 galleys, an- 
nouncing to the Athenians that he had come to restore their 
freedom and their democratic government. The people re- 



CHAP, xxxiv. DEMETKIUS POLIOKCETES AT ATHENS. 587 

ceived its deliverer with immense enthusiasm. The Pha- 
lerean negotiated with the conqueror, and obtained free 
departure and safe conduct to Thebes, whence he afterwards 
went to Ptolemy in Egypt. Munychia was not taken till 
after a siege, and its commander, Dionysius, was made 
prisoner. At the same time Megara fell into the hands of 
the conqueror, and now the youthful hero entered Athens, 
where he was received with the greatest joy. He restored to 
the people its ancient freedom and constitution, which had been 
lost after the unfortunate Lamian war, and Antigonus, his 
father, gave to the people 150,000 bushels of corn, timber 
for 100 galleys, and restored to them the island of Imbros. 
The grateful people overwhelmed both father and son with 
honours : they presented them with golden crowns ; erected 
statues and altars to them as to their deliverers ; ordered their 
names to be annually woven, by the side of those of Zeus 
and Athena, into the garment (peplos) of Athena ; sent to 
them, as to gods, not ambassadors, but theori (Seiopol, deputies 
sent to the gods) ; and lastly, to make them entirely their 
own, they added two new phylae to the ten instituted by 
Cleisthenes, calling them Antigonis and Demetrias. In ac- 
cordance with this, the number of senators was increased 
from 500 to 600. This joyous enthusiasm, however, did not 
last long ; for when Antigonus was dead, and Demetrius fell 
from the height of his power, these honours and the names 
of those two phylae disappeared, the names Ptolemais and 
Attalis being substituted for them. Demetrius, who was as 
handsome as Alcibiades, w r as no doubt the most extraordinary 
character of his time, for he possessed in an unusual degree 
all the virtues and vices of the age. The Athenians loved 
him, and his affability and regal dignity made them forget 
his vanity and love of pleasure. With him they spent a 
short but delightful dream, and the year b. c. 307 is perhaps 
the most happy in the whole history of Athens. Demetrius 
soon quitted the scene of his purest triumph : he hurried from 

c c 6 



588 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxiv. 



one enterprise to another, and at the end of his career had 
gained nothing, although Macedonia, the object of his am- 
bition, was for a time in his hands. Demetrius Poliorcetes 
died as a captive exile in Syria. 

Being called away by Antigonus before he had expelled 
the garrisons of Ptoletny from Corinth and Sicyon, and the 
Macedonian ones from other towns, he was obliged to give up 
the work of delivering Greece, and to engage in war against 
Ptolemy. The latter, having advanced to protect Cyprus, 
was defeated in b. c. 306 in a naval engagement, and the 
island was conquered by Demetrius. Antigonus now as- 
sumed the diadem, and taking the title of king, he allowed 
his son to do the same. The other generals not wishing to 
be inferior to them, Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and 
Cassander, likewise assumed the regal title. 

When Athens recovered the appearance of her democratic 
freedom, political parties also began to raise their heads 
again, and the friends of Macedonia and the patriots or de- 
mocratic party renewed their mutual attacks. The most 
conspicuous among their leaders were Stratocles, impudent 
and false, a cringing flatterer of those who happened to 
have power in their hands ; and Demochares, a son of the 
sister of Demosthenes, surnamed Parrhesiastes, that is, the 
frank and open-hearted, a sincere lover of his country and 
its constitution. Along with the orators, the comic poets, as 
of old, exercised a decided influence upon parties, for at 
Athens comedy always exerted the same power as in modern 
times belongs to a free press. Thus the poet Philippides 
sided with Demochares, and Archedicus with Stratocles. 
Political strife extended over all the spheres of life, as we 
see from a law passed by Demochares, enacting that no one 
should be allowed to keep a philosophical school without the 
sanction of the council and assembly. Most of the philo- 
sophers then residing at Athens w^ere strangers and friends 
of Macedonia ; and some of them, it must be confessed, were 



CHAP, xxxiv. RETURN OF DEMETRIUS TO GREECE. 589 



men of loose moral principles. By such means of coercion, 
Athens endeavoured to protect her constitution against hostile 
elements ; but bygone times could not be recalled by mea- 
sures of this kind. 

The dream of freedom soon vanished : in e. c. 304, De- 
metrius besieged Rhodes, which was allied with Ptolemy; 
and notwithstanding a most obstinate resistance, at length 
compelled it to conclude a peace, which secured to the 
Rhodians freedom and independence, and required them only 
to send their contingent to the army of Antigonus (though 
not against Ptolemy). But while Demetrius was thus en- 
gaged, the Macedonians recovered the ascendancy in Greece. 
Polysperchon conquered the greater part of Peloponnesus, and 
Cassander invading Attica laid siege to Athens. Demochares 
saved the city, and Olympiodorus, a distinguished general, 
hastened to Aetolia to fetch reinforcements. But at this 
moment Demetrius concluded peace with the Rhodians, and 
with a fleet of 330 galleys sailed to Greece. He landed at 
Aulis, and succeeded, in a short time, and by the most bril- 
liant and victorious expeditions, in putting an end to the go- 
vernment of Cassander. The delivered towns received him 
with the greatest enthusiasm. Sicyon for a short time changed 
its name into Demetrias, and Athens even went beyond the 
honours she had already conferred upon him : Athena was 
called his sister, and her temple was assigned to him as his 
residence. At a congress held at Corinth he was entrusted 
with the supreme command over all Greece as far as Ther- 
mopylae, which had been liberated by him. But Demetrius 
was no longer what he had been : he had become an insolent 
and voluptuous tyrant, and the hearts of the Athenians 
became estranged from him. He did not, indeed, interfere 
with the constitution, but with the assistance of Stratocles 
he sent the noble and gallant Demochares into exile. His 
short stay at Athens was not calculated to regain for him the 
affection of the fickle and excitable people. 



590 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxiv. 



He was already on the point of penetrating into'Thessaly, in 
b. c. 301, when Antigonus again recalled him. Cassander, 
being hard pressed, had concluded a fresh alliance with 
Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lysimachus. Demetrius having 
sailed to Ephesus, joined Antigonus, and at Ipsus in Phrygia 
a decisive battle was fought. King Antigonus, who, not- 
withstanding his advanced age of eighty-one, had all along dis- 
played the greatest activity, lost his throne and his life ; and 
his kingdom was divided between Lysimachus and Seleucus. 
After this defeat, Demetrius wanted to return to Athens, 
where he had left his wife, his treasures, and his ships, and 
intended to indemnify himself for the loss of Asia Minor by 
establishing for himself a kingdom in Greece. But the 
Athenians were already estranged from him: when he 
reached the Cyclades, ambassadors brought to him a decree 
of the people, declaring that the Athenians would not admit 
a king within their walls. Severely hurt by the ingratitude 
and inconstancy of the Athenians, he sailed towards the 
Isthmus to maintain his Peloponnesian conquests ; but these 
too had, for the most part, embraced the cause of Cassander. 
Demetrius accordingly quitted Greece : he conquered the 
Thracian Chersonesus from Lysimachus, allied himself with 
the powerful Seleucus of Syria, who became his son-in- 
law, and took Cilicia from Pleistarchus, the brother of 
Cassander, who had obtained possession of that country 
after the battle of Ipsus. While he was thus successful 
in Asia, Lachares supported by Cassander, who had again 
acquired power and even invaded Attica, had set himself 
up as tyrant, and had established a reign of terror in 
the unhappy city; for he surpassed every one in blood- 
thirstiness and wickedness. Being informed of this, De- 
metrius quickly appeared before Athens, and stormed the 
city, which was suffering from famine. The tyrant, how- 
ever, had escaped with his plunder into Boeotia, where he 
was murdered by the people of Coroneia. Ptolemy, who 



chap, xxxiv. DEMETRIUS KING OF MACEDONIA. 591 



had come to his assistance with 150 ships, was obliged by 
the superior force of Demetrius to retreat. The Athenians 
were at first determined to resist to the last, but after a time 
their powers of endurance were exhausted ; they surren- 
dered to Demetrius, and awaited their fate, B. c. 299. Deme- 
trius having ordered the people to assemble in the theatre, to 
their great astonishment, pardoned their offence, reproached 
them in a friendly manner for their conduct, and made the 
famished people a present of 100,000 bushels of corn. How- 
ever, he occupied the port-towns of Munychia and Piraeus 
with garrisons, and fortified the Museum, which was situated 
on an eminence at Athens, in order to prevent a fresh revolt, 
and to check the democratic spirit of the people. After this, 
he proceeded into Peloponnesus, and having gained a victory 
over king Archidamus, he appeared, like Epaminondas, at 
the gates of Sparta, when he was again obliged to stop short 
in his victorious career and to quit Greece. It was not the loss 
of his Asiatic possessions which Lysimachus took from him, 
nor that of Cyprus, which was conquered by Ptolemy, that 
led him to engage in new enterprises, but the affairs of 
Macedonia. 

After the death of Cassander in b, c. 296, Philip IY. had 
ascended the throne of Macedonia ; but he died the year 
after, and the succession was disputed between his brothers, 
Antipater and Alexander. Antipater had killed his mother, 
and fled to Lysimachus in Thrace for assistance ; Alexander 
allied himself with Pyrrhus of Epirus and with Demetrius. 
The latter arrived when affairs were already settled, and his 
appearance therefore was inconvenient. Alexander tried to 
get rid of his powerful and dangerous guest, but was anti- 
cipated by Demetrius, who killed him and mounted the throne 
of Macedonia, in b. c. 294. He maintained himself in this 
kingdom for seven years, during which nearly all Greece paid 
homage to him, and submitted to the commands of his son 
Antigonus. His haughtiness and domineering spirit, how- 



592 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXIV. 



ever, alienated the minds of the Macedonians from him, and 
the Athenians also revolted. He formed the reckless plan 
of waging war at one time against Lysimachus, Seleucus, 
and Ptolemy, and for that purpose had assembled an army of 
ten myriads, and 500 galleys. But before he set out he was 
obliged to employ his army against Pyrrhus, who had been 
induced by the threatened kings to take up arms against 
Macedonia. When the hostile forces met, the troops of 
Demetrius went over to Pyrrhus, who had become very 
popular among the Macedonians on account of the simplicity 
of his manners and his bravery. He now took possession of 
the throne without opposition, but after the lapse of seven 
months he too was expelled by Lysimachus, b. c. 286. De- 
metrius, however, never recovered his former power ; after 
various adventures and misfortunes he died, b. c. 283, in 
Syria, a prisoner of Seleucus, his own son-in-law. In the 
same year Demetrius of Phaleron ended his life as a prisoner 
in Egypt. 

When Demetrius Poliorcetes was defeated by Pyrrhus? 
Athens again rose to assert her freedom ; young and old took 
up arms, and commanded by the brave Olympiodorus stormed 
the Museum, which was occupied by Macedonians ; the port- 
towns were recovered, and the Macedonians were conquered 
near Eleusis. Pyrrhus assisted the Athenians, who once 
more enjoyed their ancient freedom ; the people honoured 
those who had fallen, like the heroes of the Persian war, and 
buried them on the road leading to the Academy. De- 
mochares returned from exile, and during his administra- 
tion, which lasted till about B.C. 280, he promoted in every 
possible way the good of the state, which had been so se- 
verely tried and was in a condition of great exhaustion. The 
re-establishment of law and order, a sensible administration 
of the finances, treatise of friendship with the liberal kings, 
Lysimachus and Ptolemy, and the restoration of the Eleu- 



chap, xxxiv. INVASION OF GREECE BY THE CELTS. 593 

sinian mysteries, allowed the Athenians for a short period 
to enjoy the happiness of former and better times. 

The dominion of Greece and the throne of Macedonia 
were now contested by Antigonus Gonatas, the son of De- 
metrius, and by Ptolemy Ceraunus, the eldest son of Ptolemy 
Soter. Within the space of one year, Macedonia had three 
pretenders or kings. After a reign of five years, Lysimachus, 
at the age of seventy-four, was defeated and killed by Seleucus 
at Cyrupedion, in the neighbourhood of Sardis, b. c. 281 ; 
this was the last struggle among the generals and companions 
of Alexander the Great. Seleucus, however, was soon after- 
wards assassinated by Ptolemy Ceraunus, whose father also 
died about this time. After a short reign Ptolemy Ceraunus 
himself was attacked, and lost his kingdom and his life. 
Macedonia now fell into a state of anarchy and desolation, 
which lasted during a considerable period. 

About the time when some Celtic tribes were inundating 
the plains of Lombardy, others proceeded farther east to the 
countries about the Danube, and southward into the penin- 
sula of Mount Haemus. In b. c. 280, a Celtic host, under 
Belgius, invaded Macedonia, where king Ptolemy w r as con- 
quered by them and lost his life ; but the noble-minded 
Sosthenes repelled the victorious enemy, whose successes had 
made them careless. Another army of 150,000 foot and 
15,000 horse (each of the latter being attended by two 
mounted followers), commanded by Brennus and other chiefs, 
then marched southward with the view of plundering the 
temple of Delphi, while another host of the barbarians turned 
westward against Aetolia. Even now the Greeks were re- 
solved to defend themselves, and collected all their forces. 
Megaris, Phocis, Locris, Boeotia, Aetolia, Thessaly, and more 
particularly Attica, raised an army of 23,000 foot and several 
thousand horse. The Athenian Callippus had the supreme 
command in this war, and Athens? for the last time, enjoyed 



594 



HISTORY OF GKEECE. chap, xxxiv. 



lier supremacy. In b. o. 279, the Celts crossed the Spercheios, 
intending to march southwards through Thermopylae. But 
finding the pass occupied and defended, they advanced across 
the mountain as far as the neighbourhood of Delphi. There 
a brave band of Delphians, trusting to the aid of the God, 
fought against the barbarians. Justin states that huge 
blocks of stone rolling down Parnassus and a fearful thunder- 
storm terrified the barbarians and made them take to flight. 
Brennus himself fell, and his routed army suffered immensely. 
One portion of the Celts settled in the country between 
the Danube and the Save, another established a kingdom 
in Thrace, and a third crossing the Hellespont formed 
settlements in the eastern part of Phrygia, which from them 
received the name of Galatia. 

Antigonus Gonatas now ascended the throne of Macedonia, 
and maintained possession of it until his death in b. c. 239, 
with the exception of a period of two years (b, c. 274 — 272), 
during which Pyrrhus, after his return from Italy, was again 
king of Macedonia. As soon as peace and order were restored, 
Antigonus undertook a war against Athens, which through 
the victory of Olympiodorus had recovered its independence. 
The occasion of this war, which broke out in b. c. 269, seems 
to have been the refusal on the part of Athens to admit a 
Macedonian garrison. The Athenians were supported by 
king Areus of Sparta, and Ptolemy Philadelphus, a great 
admirer of the Greeks, also sent a considerable fleet under 
the command of Patroclus, while in the north Macedonia was 
again threatened by the Celts, But it was all in vain. For 
seven years the Athenians held out against the besieging 
Macedonians, but in B.C. 262, they were compelled by 
famine and complete exhaustion to surrender. Munychia, 
Piraeus, and the Museum again received Macedonian gar- 
risons. Those who had encouraged and guided the people 
in their defence, were sent into exile. Among them was 
Chremonides, who afterwards entered the service of Ptolemy 



chap, xxxiv. INTELLECTUAL CONDITION OF ATHENS. 595 



Philadelphia. Athenaens * speaks of a Chremonidean war, 
and Niebuhr has shown that in all probability this war is 
meant. It was the last great effort of Athens, which had 
now become utterly powerless. Antigonus acted more mildly 
than his father Demetrius ; he may have been influenced by 
the glorious recollections connected with the city, as well as 
by the prayers of the philosopher Zeno, who was highly 
esteemed by him. Accordingly, the garrison was soon re- 
moved from the Museum, and the constitution remained 
democratic. But still Athens continued to be dependent on 
Macedonia, and the garrisons of Munychia and Piraeus daily 
reminded her of her real position. This state of affairs 
lasted until the year b. c. 229,, when by a bribe of 150 talents 
Aratus prevailed upon the Macedonian commander, Diogenes, 
to depart with his men. Then Athens again began to feel 
free, but it had become politically so weak, that it could not 
show its gratitude to Aratus by joining the Achaean league 
of which he was the head. 

Throughout this whole period of decay, Athens yet con- 
tinued to be the centre of intelligence, and the arts still 
flourished in Greece, especially at Corinth and Sicyon. Much 
indeed of what had made the Greeks so great, had already 
disappeared, for there were no more tragic poets, and what is 
called the " new comedy " was fast coming to a close. But 
the scenic art was far from being extinct, and the dramas of 
the great masters were still highly esteemed. Demetrius of 
Phaleron and Demochares were the last great orators ; but 
the models of eloquence which Athens had produced, have 
served as patterns to all succeeding generations. The philo- 
sophical schools, which were flourishing during the time of 
Alexander the Great, likewise declined both in zeal and 
celebrity ; but the seeds which they had sown were not lost, 
for Athens became the training school of other towns and of 



VI. p. 250. 



596 



HISTORY OP GREECE. chap, xxxiv. 



whole nations. The fact that during this period literature 
and philosophy began a new and active life in Egypt and 
Asia Minor, especially at Rhodes and Apollonia, was owing 
in a great measure to the influence of Athens, which had 
given the first impulse to all that was great, good, and noble. 
Greek art and literature owed it only to their own unrivalled 
excellence, that they were fostered and cherished at the 
courts of Alexandria, Antioch, and Pergamus. The ex- 
travagances of the plastic art, which manifested themselves 
on the one hand in such colossal works as the Apollo of 
Rhodes, and on the other in the miniature smallness of many 
productions, may be compared to the luxuriant weeds of an 
over-fertile soil. What subsequent times and even the Ro- 
mans produced, is sufficient to show that those extravagances 
did not render it impossible to return to the classical sim- 
plicity and noble forms of an earlier period. With what 
pride must the friend of Greece have looked upon Egypt, 
Syria, and Asia Minor, which countries, renouncing their 
own civilisation, became entirely Hellenised ! and with what 
still greater pride must he have observed that even the 
Romans considered it necessary to ennoble their minds by 
means of Greek culture, literature, and art ! Yet notwith- 
standing all the assistance they derived from this source, 
the Romans never could outstrip the Greeks, or rise to a 
higher degree of perfection than that which had been reached 
by the Greeks. Such is the reward which Athens then 
gained and still enjoys. 



chap. xxxv. CONDITION OF SPARTA. 



597 



CHAPTER XXXV. 

THE ACHAEAN AND AETOLlAN LEAGUES DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF 
SELLASIA. 

When Athens had already withdrawn from the scene of 
great historical events, and in her weak retirement presented 
the appearance of profound peace, Sparta had yet to pass 
through a series of violent revolutions and convulsions. 
The fate of Sparta shows the danger of a stern and inflexible 
constitution, which cannot be reformed so as to harmonise 
with the altered circumstances of the nation/ That state 
which, according to the varying interests of its polity, was 
sometimes the avowed enemy of the tyrannis, and at other 
times supported it, but had always favoured oligarchic 
tendencies and opposed democratic forms of government, was 
itself destined to try all these forms of government, and to 
end as a tyrannis and a democracy. 

The constitution of Lycurgus with its fundamental prin- 
ciples, equality of property and a careful preservation of 
the national character, had now degenerated into mere 
forms. The kings were simply the representatives of two 
families ; for after the time of the great Agesilaus, the 
ephoralty had, without opposition, become the highest au- 
thority in the state. In earlier and better times, the 
kings took the field only in defence of Sparta and her 
national honour ; but afterwards, and that even as early 
as the time of Alexander the Great, they went out at the 
head of bands of adventurers, and sold their services to 
foreign rulers. They also indulged themselves in various 
ways at foreign courts ; whereas formerly, a king was not 
allowed to quit Sparta except in times of war. The number 
of Spartans had become so much reduced, that immense and 



598 



HISTORY OF GREECE, chap, xxxv 



illegal wealth existed by tlie side of unlawful poverty, and 
destroyed the ancient ideas of simplicity and equality. Even 
since the time of Philip, the external power of Sparta had 
sunk so low that it could do nothing for the deliverance of 
Greece from the usurpation of the Macedonians ; nor did it 
take any part in the war against the hosts of Celtic invaders. 
It made no opposition of any kind to the aggressions of 
Cassander, Polysperchon, and Demetrius ; and it was owing to 
a mere accident that it did not fall into the hands of the 
latter. The fact that Sparta was then fortified is a proof 
that the warlike spirit and the courage of its citizens were 
no longer what they had been. But during the invasion 
of Pyrrhus, who was called into Laconia through family 
disputes, the Spartans, supported by the heroic courage 
of the women, showed themselves worthy of their ancient 
renown, and Pyrrhus was obliged to retreat after sustaining 
severe losses. 

The distressing internal condition of the state induced 
king Agis IV., the noble son of Eudamidas, to endeavour 
to bring about better times by a thorough reform of the 
constitution. He was supported by the younger ge- 
neration of the Spartans; the elder men and the women, 
on the other hand, headed by his colleague, Leonidas II., 
were hostile to his innovations. In conjunction with the 
ephor Lycurgus, a man of congenial mind, he carried laws 
enacting that the debts, under the weight of which the poor 
people were suffering, should be cancelled ; that a fresh 
division of Laconia should be made ; that 4500 lots (icXr/poi) 
should be assigned to the Spartans, whose number was to 
be supplemented by perioeci, and 1 5,000 to the perioeci. With 
great generosity, the king gave up to the state all his pro- 
perty (600 talents, independently of his landed estates). 
His colleague and opponent Leonidas was declared by the 
ephors to be the son of a foreign mother, and incapable of 
holding the regal dignity ; he was, therefore, deposed, and 



CHAP. xxxv. REFORMS AND MURDER OF AGIS IV. 599 

Agis escorted him safely to Tegea. All obstacles thus 
seemed removed ; but during the king's absence on an 
expedition to the Isthmus against the Achaeans, the selfish- 
ness of the ephor Agesilaus, who had been entrusted with 
the distribution of the land, spoiled every thing. When he 
returned home, Agis learnt that Leonidas had come back, on 
hearing which he fled into the temple of Athena Chalcioecos ; 
but when he left the asylum, he was treacherously seized, 
and the new ephors ordered him, together with his mother 
and grandmother, to be put to death, B.C. 241. This crime 
was more revolting than even that formerly committed 
against Pausanias in the same place. It was a strange cir- 
cumstance that the son of the murderer Leonidas, Cleo- 
menes III., the last Heracleid king, having been married by 
his father to Agiatis, the beautiful and rich wife of Agis, who 
had exercised considerable influence upon the high-minded 
plans of her husband, now completed, by force, the reforms 
which had been commenced by Agis. Warned by the fate 
of Agis and his betrayal by the ephor Agesilaus, Cleomenes 
began his reforms in the year b. c. 226 with the overthrow 
and murder of the ephors, whose arbitrary and excessive 
powers justly appeared to him as the cause of all the misfor- 
tunes of Sparta. After this, he undertook the cancelling of 
debts and the distribution of land, without any opposition. 
The ancient discipline was restored, the Macedonian mode of 
warfare was adopted, and Sparta was on the point of seeing 
the good old times return, and of recovering her supremacy 
over Peloponnesus, when the war with the Achaean league 
brought about the speedy downfall of Cleomenes and of 
Sparta. 

This leads us to give some account of the leagues formed 
by the Achaeans and Aetolians. It cannot be stated with 
certainty when these confederacies were first entered into ; 
they resemble each other in their tendency, but not in their 
character. Community in religious matters had existed in 



600 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap. xxxv. 



Achaia, and perhaps also in Aetolia, for a long period ; and 
it is probable that at the time of the Macedonian domination, 
the loose bond between the several towns was drawn tighter; 
for in b. c. 280 four Achaean towns united for the common 
purpose of expelling the Macedonians from Peloponnesus, 
and of securing their liberty and ancient constitutions. In 
b. c. 275 other towns, as Aegion, Bura and Cerynea, whose 
tyrants were expelled or abdicated, joined the league ; but its 
flourishing period and its political importance began in b. c. 
251, when the Sicyonian Aratus became strategus of the 
league. Its central point was Aegion with the temples of 
Zeus Hoinagyrios and Demeter Panaehaia. There the 
assemblies, which lasted for three days each, were held 
every year in spring and autumn ; extraordinary meetings 
might be summoned to any other of the confederate towns. 
The officers of the league were elected at the meeting in 
spring. The league was originally headed by two strategi ; 
but subsequently to b. c. 255 by one only, who was assisted 
by another officer bearing the title of hipparchus ; to them 
was added a secretary (ypafifiaravg). We also find mention 
of an hypostrategus. The strategus had the right of con- 
vening extraordinary meetings, had the supreme command 
in war, called in the contingents and contributions in money, 
carried on all negotiations with foreign states, and kept the 
public seal of the confederacy. The functions of the hippar- 
chus seem to have resembled those of a Roman master of the 
horse ; the hypostrategus was perhaps the same officer as the 
hipparchus. A senate was entrusted with the supreme 
management of all the affairs of the league ; its members 
were called demiurgi (Z-qpiovpyoi), and together with the two 
highest officers formed a college of twelve, the representa- 
tives, as it were, of the twelve free towns of Achaia. They 
prepared all measures to be brought before the general as- 
sembly, in which every Achaean w T ho had attained the age of 
30 had a right to sit and vote. The senators were at the 



CHAP. xxxv. ACHAEAN AND AETOLIAN LEAGUES. 601 

same time the coadjutors of the strategus, with whom they 
decided on any sudden emergency and on matters of small 
import. The towns composing the league formed a political 
union, possessing the right of coining money, and of deter- 
mining weights and measures ; its representatives could con- 
fer the franchise, and decided upon disputes among the states 
which were members of the confederacy, as well as upon 
those with foreign powers ; for which purpose, however, 
special judges were appointed. No confederate state was 
permitted to accept presents from a foreign power, nor allowed 
to withdraw from the league, which was to be binding for 
ever. The confederation thus constituted in every respect a 
single indivisible state ; in this spirit it acted, and the excel- 
lence of its strategi contributed to secure for it the esteem of 
the Greeks and a comparatively long duration. 

The object of the Aetolian league was not so much the 
promotion of the common good of Greece, as to further the 
interests of Aetolia itself; hence we find the Aetolians 
forming alliances with the avowed enemies of Greece ; and 
they never could conceal the fact that, in point of intellec- 
tual culture and moral principles, they were semi-barbarians. 
After the death of Alexander, they distinguished them- 
selves among the Greeks by their bravery and energy. The 
strength and influence of their confederacy are manifest 
from the active part they took in the Lamian war; from 
their brave resistance amid their own mountains, after its 
unfortunate termination ; from their subsequent mode of 
acting against Cassander by occupying Thermopylae ; and 
lastly, from their victory over king Areus of Sparta, in 
what is called the last Amphictionic war. At the time of 
this victory, the Aetolians were in possession of Phocis and 
the Ozolian Locris, and had compelled Heraclea at the foot 
of mount Oeta to join their league. They also took part in 
the war against the Celts, and gained great credit in the 
defence of Thermopylae. The constitution of their con- 

D D 



602 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXV. 



federacy resembled that of the Achaeans, and was, perhaps, 
an imitation of it ; both were essentially democratic. The 
meetings of the Aetolians v^ere held regularly in the autumn 
near the temple of Apollo at Thermos; there the office- 
bearers of the confederacy were chosen, consisting of a stra- 
tegus, an hipparchus, and a secretary. A commission called 
the Apocleti (d7ro/c\^rot) formed the council of the league ; 
the administration in each town was in the hands of a Po- 
lemarchus. Extraordinary meetings of the Aetolians (Pan- 
aetolia) also assembled at Naupactos, Lamia, and Hypata, 
and at a later period usually at Thermopylae. The confe- 
deracy had reached its highest power and prosperity at the 
time when it came into conflict with Macedonia and the 
Achaean league ; for Boeotia was humbled, and the Cephal- 
lenian islands were in its possession as well as a portion of 
Acarnania, whose hostile inhabitants had long checked the 
progress of the confederacy ; a great part of Thessaly and 
Peloponnesus likewise belonged to it, and Elis was on terms 
of friendship with the Aetolians. But notwithstanding this 
great extent, the league, on the whole, cannot be said to 
have had a Greek character ; it possessed neither taste for 
nor susceptibility of Greek culture, although it fought for 
the freedom of Greece and against foreign influence. In 
comparison with the Achaean league, it appears rude and 
strong, fond of plunder and quarrelsome, treacherous even 
against what was sacred ; the conduct of the Aetolians 
towards the Romans was obstinate and impolitic, frank even 
to recklessness, and unsparing in unmasking secret plans and 
intrigues. 

The Achaean league possessed in Aratus of Sicyon a leader 
who was excellent in every respect. Aratus is one of the 
noblest characters in Greek history, and worthy to be placed 
by the side of Pericles. His father Cleinias had liberated 
Sicyon, his native city, from a tyrannis, but had been slain 
by the hand of the tyrant Abantidas. Aratus, then seven 



CHAP. XXXV. 



AKATUS. 



603 



years old, was taken to Argos, where some friends kindly 
received him and procured for him an excellent education. 
At the age of twenty, fired by love of liberty and hatred of 
tyranny, he in conjunction with exiled Sicyonians delivered 
his native city from the tyrant Nicocles, and induced it to join 
the Achaean confederacy, b.c. 251. He was twelve times 
appointed to the office of strategus, and even when nominally 
not in power, he was virtually always at the head of affairs ; 
the object which he restlessly struggled for until the day of 
his death was to destroy the power of tyrants, and to unite all 
the states of Peloponnesus under one free constitution. His 
most striking virtues were a disinterestedness rarely to be 
met with in those times, love of justice, and great powers of 
eloquence and persuasion. Through this talent he effected 
more than by force of arms, for as a general he was wanting, 
as Plutarch says, in resolution, nor had he much personal 
courage. When once at the head of the league, he quickly 
increased both its power and extent. In b. c. 243 he ex- 
pelled the Macedonian garrison from the citadel of Corinth, 
and persuaded the Corinthians, and soon afterwards the 
Megarians also, to join the Achaean confederacy. The 
Aetolians showed themselves hostile even at that time, and 
had already concluded a treaty with Antigonus Gonatas 
about a division of Achaia. The example of Corinth was 
loon followed by Troezen and Epidauros. The eloquence 
)f Aratus prevailed upon Lydiadas, the tyrant of Megalopolis, 
o lay down his power ; the tyrants of Phlius, Hermione, 
md Argos, likewise abdicated, when Aratus was strategus 
for the eleventh time, and all these towns joined the Achaean 
league about b. c. 226. In b. c. 229 Athens got rid of Dio- 
genes, the commander of the Macedonian garrison, who was 
bribed by Aratus, but, as we have already observed, the city 
did not join the confederacy. 

But now the Lacedaemonians, together with the Messe- 
nians, the Eleans, and those Arcadians who favoured the Aeto- 

DD 2 



604 



HISTORY OF GREECE, 



CHAP. XXXV. 



lians, made preparations to oppose the powerful league and 
check its extension. King Cleomenes, partly of his own 
accord, and partly commissioned by the ephors, who began 
to fear for the integrity of Sparta, made himself master in 
b. c. 226 of the fort Athenaeon, situated in the territory of 
Megalopolis near Belmina, and compelled the towns of 
Tegea, Man tinea, and Orchomenos, which were members of 
the Aetolian league, to form an alliance with Sparta. The 
Aetolians, from hatred of the Achaeans, not only gave those 
towns up to Cleomenes, but themselves concluded a treaty 
with him. In the following year B.C. 225, when Aristo- 
machus was strategus of the Achaeans, Cleomenes took 
Methydrion in Arcadia, and although the Achaeans met 
him with a far superior force near Pallantion, yet by the 
advice of Aratus they did not commence hostilities, but re- 
treated. This induced Lydiadas to bring forward an accu- 
sation against Aratus; but notwithstanding this, Aratus 
was elected strategus for the following year. But when 
Cleomenes had rejected the terms proposed by Aratus at 
a meeting in Argos, for a peaceful settlement and for forming 
a union of all the states of Peloponnesus, the Achaeans at 
last, in B.C. 224, resolved upon war. Aratus had even 
before been in negotiation with Antigonus Doson, who was 
king of Macedonia from B.C. 229 till 220, and the Mace- 
donian had promised his assistance. But Aratus wished to 
try what the Achaeans alone could effect against Sparta ; 
the brilliant success of Cleomenes, however, soon compelled 
the Achaeans to avail themselves of Macedonian aid. Cleo- 
menes defeated them in three battles in the neighbourhood 
of Megalopolis, near the Lycaeon, in the Laodician plain, 
and near the Hecatombaeon ; the towns of Caphyae, Rheneos, 
Pellene, Phlius, Cleonae, Argos, Epidauros, Hermione, 
Troezen, and Corinth fell into his hands, and he laid siege 
to Corinth. Immediately after his victories he had com- 
menced negotiations with the Achaeans ; peace was nearly 



chap. xxxv. ANTIGONUS IN PELOPONNESUS. 



605 



concluded, and Cleomenes would have obtained the supre- 
macy, but a change took place in the state of affairs. In his 
distress, Aratus called in the assistance of Antigonus Doson, 
and surrendered to him the citadel of Corinth, which the 
king had demanded as a pledge and as a point from which 
he could carry on his military operations. This request was 
complied with the more readily, as the Achaeans w^ere 
already despairing of being able to maintain Acrocorinthos. 
Aratus had thus been led to take a step which was totally 
opposed to his efforts for the liberty and unity of Greece ; he 
had been driven to it by his fear of the progress of the 
Spartan king, who was on the point of gaining the supre- 
macy in Peloponnesus, and would then certainly have brought 
about the dissolution of the league. Aratus' confidence in 
the personal character of the Macedonian king had also 
made him overlook the dangerous nature of this measure. 
Antigonus came towards the Isthmus with an army of 
20,000 foot and 1400 horse from Thessaly by way of Euboea. 
The Aetolians, by occupying Thermopylae, had compelled 
him to take this roundabout way. His arrival changed the 
fortune of the war. Cleomenes, indeed, offered a brave re- 
sistance on the Isthmus, but Argos again joined the Achaeans, 
and a portion of Arcadia was reconquered. In the meantime 
Cleomenes was obliged to return to Sparta, where the death 
of his wife Agiatis caused him much deeper grief than the 
loss of his conquests. 

Antigonus, after having wintered at Corinth and Sicyon, 
set out for Arcadia in the spring of b. c. 223 ; at Tegea he 
joined the Achaeans and occupied Tegea, Orchomenos, Man- 
tinea, and Heraea, Cleomenes not being able to prevent it. 
Antigonus spent the following winter among the Achaeans 
at Aegion and Argos, having sent his Macedonians home, 
and keeping with him only his mercenaries. But Cleomenes 
did not let this winter pass without profiting by it ; he un- 
expectedly attacked and conquered Megalopolis, and Man- 

D D 3 



606 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXV. 



tinea, which was occupied by Achaeans, surrendered to him 
of its own accord. Thence, in the spring of B.C. 222, he 
made an incursion into Argolis, and ravaging the country 
advanced as far as the walls of Argos. Antigonus, who had 
not yet assembled his army, could not, to the great vexation 
of the Argives, undertake anything against his bold op- 
ponent. But soon afterwards he invaded Laconia with an 
army of 30,000 men. Cleomenes, having foreseen this, had 
pitched his camp near Sellasia, north of Sparta, where the 
river Oenus flows through a valley between the mountains, 
and had occupied the heights of Evas and Olympus. The 
other passes leading into the interior of Laconia were pro- 
tected by outposts, ditches, and abattisses, so that Antigonus 
was obliged to take the road through the valley of the Oenus. 
The first attack was made upon the eastern hill, which was 
occupied by Eucleidas. The victory was undecided, and 
the assailants were attacked in their rear, and hard pressed 
by the light-armed troops of Cleomenes. At length the 
bold assault of the cavalry under young Philopoemen of 
Megalopolis, who, however, was not a commander on that 
day, decided the victory. And while Philopoemen with the 
Achaean cavalry defeated the Laconians in the valley, Anti- 
gonus with his phalanx took Olympus by storm. Cleomenes, 
who was stationed there himself, fled with a few horsemen 
to Sparta, and despairing of his safety, proceeded in the 
same night to Gythion on the coast, embarked, and sailed to 
his friend Ptolemy III. in Alexandria, from whom he hoped 
to receive support in continuing the war. But Ptolemy 
died soon after, B.C. 220, and his successor, Ptolemy Philo- 
pator, was unlike his father in every respect ; he was a 
voluptuous man, unconcerned about the affairs of his state, 
and entirely dependent on his- courtesans and favourites. 
Cleomenes, who was not only disappointed in his hopes, but 
was kept like a prisoner, excited an insurrection against the 
debauched king ; but he was deserted by the people, and in 



CHAP. xxxv. DEATH OF CLEOMENES. 



607 



order to escape a still more miserable fate, he and his friends 
made away with themselves. Polybius and Plutarch relate 
marvellous events which occurred at his death. "When 
Ptolemy ordered the king's body to be suspended on the 
gallows, a snake wound itself round his head and covered 
his face; Ptolemy was frightened at the prodigy, and the 
people of Alexandria, who crowded round the scene, called 
Cleomenes a hero and the son of a god. The mother and 
children of Cleomenes, who had come to Alexandria as 
hostages, were, by the command of Ptolemy, put to death 
together with other Laconian women, and died with true 
Laconian heroism. Thus ended the life of the last king of 
Sparta, a worthy descendant of the Heracleids. 

After the battle of Sellasia, Antigonus took Sparta with- 
out any resistance ; he treated the ancient heroic city very 
mildly, restored the ancient constitution by reviving the 
ephoralty, and established a Macedonian garrison in the 
place. A few days after this, he broke up and quitted Pelo- 
ponnesus, for he had received intelligence of an inroad of the 
Illyrians into Macedonia. 

The defeat of Sellasia had broken the power of Sparta ; 
but the victorious Achaeans too had lost their independence ; 
they were henceforth obliged to admit and keep Macedonian 
garrisons. Acrocorinthus and Orchomenos remained in the 
hands of the Macedonian, the former being one of u the three 
fetters of Greece." The Achaean league could undertake or 
decree nothing without the consent of Antigonus ; and Ara- 
tus, whose influence had once been so paramount, now had 
no power, except that of his own personal vote. But still, 
a happier time was once more to come for the confederacy 
of the Achaeans. 



DD 4 



608 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxvi. 



CHAPTER XXXVI. 

FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLA SI A TO THE DESTRUCTION OF CORINTH. 

Immediately after the death of Cleomenes and of king An- 
tigonus Doson, who was succeeded by Philip V., the son of 
Demetrius II., a youth of seventeen years, Greece was shaken 
by a fresh convulsion, known by the name of the Social war. 
Its consequences were ruinous to the independence of 
Greece, inasmuch as they enabled the Romans, who had 
shortly before reduced Sicily to the condition of a Roman 
province, to interfere in the internal affairs and disputes of 
Greece. The occasion to this war was given by Sparta. 
After the death of king Cleomenes the last descendant of the 
Eurysthenidsj Agesipolis III., who was yet under age, had 
ascended the throne under the guardianship of his uncle Cleo- 
menes. Lycurgus, who was not a Heracleid, purchased from 
the ephors the place of second king, and then expelled his 
young colleague, who was afterwards killed by robbers. In 
this manner, Lycurgus made himself sole king of Sparta. 
The ephors, from hatred of the Achaeans and Macedonians, 
had even before commenced secret negotiations with the 
Aetolians ; but they now openly concluded an alliance with 
them, although the Aetolians had already violated the gene- 
ral peace, having invaded Messenia from Phigalea, a con- 
federate town in Arcadia, and trespassed even upon the 
territory of the Achaeans. For this reason, Aratus in b. c. 
220 entered upon the office of strategus five days earlier 
than the legal period, and attacked the Aetolians near Ca- 
phyae, in the territory of the Arcadian Orchomenos ; but as 
he was not favoured by fortune, and did not possess great 
talents as a general, he was defeated. The Aetolians now 



chap, xxxvi. THE SOCIAL WAR. 



609 



met with no further opposition, and plundering the country 
returned across the Isthmus. 

This was the beginning of the Social war, for the 
Achaeans immediately followed up the event by a declara- 
tion of war, which was forthwith accepted by the Aetolians, 
to whom war and plunder were always welcome, and who 
hated the Achaeans on account of their having availed them- 
selves of the assistance of Macedonia. Supported by Philip, 
the Achaeans, Boeotians, Phocians, Epirots, Acarnanians 
and Messenians, fought against the Aetolians, Spartans and 
Eleans. In B.C. 219, Philip himself went with 10,000 
heavy-armed phalangites, 5000 peltasts and 800 horse, 
through Thessaly and Epirus into Aetolia. He ravaged and 
traversed the country as far as Oeniadae, at the mouth of the 
Achelous, which, together with other towns, he captured. 
In the following winter he invaded Eli .-. nnd destroyed Pso- 
phis in Arcadia, the stronghold of the plundering Aetolians. 
Meantime, the Aetolians made predatory incursions into Epi- 
rus, and from Elis into Achaia. In the spring of b. c. 218 
Philip renewed his invasion of Aetolia, and having taken 
its capital Thermos, entered Peloponnesus and traversed La- 
conia to its southernmost point. Lycurgus made a stand 
against him in the neighbourhood of Sparta, but was beaten. 
At the same time the king had ordered a fleet to be equipped 
to attack Cephallenia, which likewise belonged to the Aeto- 
lian confederacy. But when Philip quitted Peloponnesus, 
the Achaeans were thrown into sad distress. The Aetolians 
suddenly fell upon them from Elis, and occupied the Pan- 
achaicon near Patrae. Eparetus, the strategus of the Achaeans 
in b. c. 217, was unable to offer them any effectual resist- 
ance ; for he was a man without ability^ and under him the 
Achaeans were without discipline or power. Aratus indeed 
restored discipline and good fortune, but a change took place 
in the relation of the Achaeans to Macedonia. 

Philip had heard of the success of the great Carthaginian 
D d 5 



610 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxvi. 



Hannibal against the Romans ; he was now forming more 
extensive schemes, and endeavoured to get rid of the war in 
Greece. In the beginning of the summer, b. c. 217, he con- 
cluded a peace with the Aetoiians, through the mediation of 
the Rhodians, Chians, Byzantians, and of the ambassadors of 
king Ptolemy. The terms were that the Aetoiians should 
surrender Acarnania to him ; in all other respects each party 
retained what they had. The Achaeans, who stood alone, 
for no great reliance could be placed upon the other allies, 
were naturally dissatisfied with this peace, and Aratus in 
particular opposed the arbitrary proceedings of the king. 
The consequence was that Philip soon afterwards caused 
his noble friend and excellent adviser to be poisoned, in 
order to get rid of a troublesome monitor. 

Prince Demetrius of Pharos, who had been driven from 
his country in consequence of a war between the Romans and 
Illyrians, and had gone to the court of Macedonia, was in- 
stilling his hatred of the Romans into the heart of the young 
king. Philip first undertook a war against the Illyrians, in 
order not to leave an enemy in his rear, and thus to pave the 
way into Italy. He also prepared a fleet of 100 Illyrian 
ships called lembi (Xefitot). The reports of Hannibal's vic- 
tories in Italy made him more and more warlike, and soon 
after the battle of Cannae a regular treaty was concluded 
between him and Hannibal, in which all the possessions of 
Rome east of the Adriatic were given up to Macedonia. The 
commencement of hostilities had been delayed by the cir- 
cumstance that Philip's ambassadors to Hannibal had been 
twice intercepted. The Romans had set apart a fleet of fifty 
ships for the war against Philip ; and this fleet was stationed 
in B.C. 215 at Tarentum, to prevent the king from crossing 
over into Italy. In the following year, the praetor, M. 
Valerius Laevinus, sailed with a portion of it to Illyricum, 
took the towns of Oricon and Apollonia, which latter was 
besieged by Philip, and compelled the king to flee. The 



chap, xxxvi. THE ROMANS IN GREECE. 



611 



Macedonians however continued to keep possession of 
Illyricum until B.C. 212; for the Romans, being wholly- 
occupied with the war in Italy, operated against him with 
only a small force. But to make up for this, they con- 
cluded a treaty with the Aetolians, for the purpose of keep- 
ing Philip occupied through them, and thereby they in- 
volved all Greece in a fresh war, which was in reality only a 
continuation of the Social war ; for the new alliance with 
Rome was joined by the Eleans, Messenians, Lacedaemonians, 
and also by the kings of Pergamus, Thrace and Illyricum. 
Philip, on the other hand, was supported by the Achaeans, 
Boeotians, Thessalians, Acarnanians, Epirots, Euboeans, Pho- 
cians, and Locrians, and by king Prusias of Bithynia. Thus 
Greeks were fighting for the most part against Greeks, and for 
the interests of foreigners. Plunder and pillage were indulged 
in throughout Greece, the scenes of the war being Acar- 
nania, Thessaly, Euboea and Elis. Philip and the Romans, 
according to their pleasure, took part in the war or retired from 
it, making the Greeks fight for them. In b. c. 211 M. Vale- 
rius Laevinus conquered for the Aetolians, his allies, the 
towns of Oeniadae and Zacynthos, and in b. c. 210 Anticyra ; 
Acarnania saved itself by a desperate resistance. Laevinus 
was succeeded by the praetor P. Sulpicius Galba, who had 
the command till B.C. 206. In b. c. 208. near Lamia, Philip 
twice defeated the Aetolians under their strategus Pyr- 
rhias, but was afterwards defeated in Elis. It was in vain 
that about this time Ptolemy, the Rhodians, Athenians, and 
Chians endeavoured to bring about a peace ; the Aetolians 
were urged to continue the war by the Romans, and by the 
report that king Attalus of Pergamus was approaching. 
During the year b. c. 207 Attalus did take part in the war, 
but nothing of any importance was effected - 9 for although 
Sulpicius Galba attacked the towns of Oreos, Chalcis, Opus, 
and others, yet he was obliged to retreat. Even before the 
end of the year Attalus was called back to his kingdom, 

D D 6 



612 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXVI. 



which was threatened by Prusias of Bithynia. From b. c. 
206, the Romans themselves no longer took any part in the 
war. 

During this period, the Social war had been continued in 
Peloponnesus also. In b. c. 208 Philopoemen, whose first 
exploit in the battle of Sellasia has been noticed above, be- 
came strategus of the Achaean league. He is one of the 
noblest characters in the whole history of Greece, and by 
his brilliant qualities as a statesman and general, by his 
prudence, moderation, valour, love of truth, and generous 
and enthusiastic efforts for the good of his country, he ac- 
quired the most animating influence upon the Achaeans, who 
had become weary and indifferent. He restored military 
discipline, improved the armour, and neglected no honourable 
means to revive the warlike spirit of his countrymen. 
Within eight months, the reorganisation was completed, and 
the first expedition was undertaken against Sparta. After 
the death of Lycurgus, about B.C. 211, Machanidas had as- 
sumed the sovereignty, and had become the first tyrant of 
Sparta. To take revenge for his hostilities against the 
weakened Achaeans, Philopoemen in b. c. 207 marched 
against him, and defeated him near Mantinea after a long 
struggle, in which the Achaean mercenaries were routed. 
Sparta however was not delivered from the tyrannis, for in 
the course of the same year Nabis, an unnatural, blood- 
thirsty monster, usurped the sovereignty, and with the most 
senseless rage and ingenious cruelty caused the noblest 
citizens to be put to death, and changed Sparta into a den of 
robbers. 

When the Romans ceased to take part in the war, the 
Aetolians at length found themselves obliged to conclude 
peace with Philip, and to allow him to dictate his terms. 
After this settlement, the proconsul Sempronius arrived 
with 10,000 men and 35 ships, but the war was not renewed. 
The Epirots also mediated a peace between the Romans and 



chap, xxxvi. PHILIP BESIEGES ATHENS. 



613 



Philip, and between the two confederacies, according to 
which the Parthinians, an Illyrian people, and some Illyrian 
towns were given up to the Romans, and the country of Atin- 
tania to Macedonia. It was further agreed that neither 
party should attack the allies of the other. This peace was 
concluded in b. c. 204. 

Philip from the beginning did not observe its terms ; for 
among the Carthaginian prisoners taken in the battle of 
Zama (b. c. 202) there were Macedonians, who had served 
against the Romans. In addition to this, there were other 
causes which led to the renewal of the war. In conjunction 
with the king of Syria, Philip took from young Ptolemy 
Epiphanes the Thracian coast- districts with their important 
maritime towns, a portion of Asia Minor, and the Cyclades. 
This Ptolemy was allied with Rome, in the same manner as 
the Rhodians and Attalus, who, when attacked by Philip, 
successfully repelled him. They and the Athenians, who 
were besieged by Philip, sent ambassadors to Rome to com- 
plain of the conduct of the Macedonian. The Athenians had 
suffered severely for an act of rashness which they had com- 
mitted. Two Acarnanian youths, who from ignorance had 
taken part in the celebration of the mysteries of Demeter at 
Athens, had been murdered by the Athenians in the excite- 
ment of religious zeal. The Acarnanians exasperated at this, 
and supported by Macedonia, ravaged Attica with fire and 
sword. Upon this the Athenians, being allied with Attalus and 
the Rhodians, resolved to make war against Philip, who was 
then besieging Abydos. Philip sent an army against Athens, 
which was blockaded, but a Roman fleet of twenty ships 
came to its assistance. Soon afterwards the king himself 
appeared ; but his attack also was repelled by the Athenians. 
To revenge himself for this, Philip, before his departure, in 
a truly barbarian spirit, destroyed the buildings and planta- 
tions outside the city, the grove and temple of the Cynosarges, 
the Lyceum, and even the tombs of the heroes. Thence he 



614 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXVI. 



went to Corinth, but immediately returned, and being rein- 
forced by 2000 Thracians and Macedonians, again ravaged 
Attica with such fury, that he even ordered the marble 
blocks and the statues of the gods to be broken to pieces. 
Punishment for these crimes did not at once overtake him, 
for the allies of Athens were, for the moment, too weak to 
assist her effectually. The Romans and Rhodians indeed took 
possession of the fortified town of Chalcis, destroyed the Ma- 
cedonian garrison and its stores, but were unable to maintain 
themselves, and retreated to Piraeus. But the king's pun- 
ishment came from the west. In b. c. 200, the consul Sul- 
picius Galba commenced the second Macedonian war on the 
river Apsos, between Apollonia and Dyrrhachium. The bel- 
ligerent powers had the same allies as before, and Greece was 
again involved in a civil war for the interest of foreign states. 
The victories of Sulpicius did not bring the matter to a de- 
cision, nor was his successor, the consul P. Villi us Tappulus, 
able to carry out his plan of invading Macedonia. But T. 
Quinctius Flamininus, the consul of b. c. 198, seriously and 
successfully attacked the Macedonians. He at once changed 
the position of the Greeks who took part in the war. The 
Achaeans, who had been allied with Macedonia since the 
former wars, were gained over by the consul ; the strategus, 
Aristaenus (Philopoemen being absent in Crete), was the 
more easily prevailed upon to join the Romans, as Philip 
refused to give up Corinth. By this circumstance, and be- 
cause Nabis was always hostile to the Achaeans, the 
Spartans, who in the first Macedonian war had been allied 
with the Romans, were now induced to conclude a treaty 
with Philip. Thus both the Achaean and the Aetolian con- 
federacy for a time fought on the same side, for Philip had 
shortly before, b. c. 201, again provoked the Aetolians by 
attacking their allies on the Hellespont and in Asia Minor. 
But we shall see how soon this union between the two leagues 
was dissolved. 



chap, xxxvi. BATTLE OF CYNOSCEPHALAE. 



615 



Flamininus drove the Macedonians from their position on 
the river Aous in Epirus, and having joined the Aetolians and 
Athamanians, he advanced into Thessaly. Philip retreated 
into Macedonia, and Flamininus, having taken possession of 
Elateia, concluded a truce with the king, and spent the winter 
in Phocis and Locris. Negotiations were commenced, but they 
led to no result. Accordingly, in the following year, B.C. 197, 
Flamininus, as proconsul, broke up with his new allies, and 
set out for Thessaly. Philip, as well as the Eoman, tried to 
occupy Scotussa, and this circumstance quickly and unex- 
pectedly led to a decisive battle. The detachments which 
preceded the main body of the hostile armies became in- 
volved in an engagement on the line of hills called Cynos- 
cephalae. The armies, corning up soon afterwards, continued 
the fight, which ended in the total defeat of Philip. He 
lost 8000 slain and 5000 prisoners. The Aetolians had par- 
ticularly distinguished themselves during the battle. The 
king, in an interview with the proconsul in Tempe, obtained 
a truce, and ambassadors were sent to Rome with the terms 
of peace proposed by the conqueror. It was not till the 
following year, however, that ten commissioners arrived 
from Rome with the ratification of the peace. The first 
condition was, the abolition of the Macedonian supremacy in 
Greece, and Philip was obliged to withdraw his garrisons 
from all the Greek towns, while the Romans reserved to 
themselves the right of occupying the most important for- 
tresses, Acrocorinthus, Bemetrias, and Chalcis. The Athe- 
nians, who were treated with special favour, obtained the 
islands Paros, Imbros, Delos, and Scyros, while Aegina was 
given up to Attains. The Aetolians, who were as blunt and 
frank as they were brave, openly showed their dissatisfaction 
with the arrangements of Flamininus and with the mock 
freedom which he established : they required him first of all 
to break the three fetters of Greece, as Philip used to call 
the three fortresses mentioned above. Flamininus himself 



616 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxvi. 



declared to those who brought the ratification of the peace, 
that all Greece must be restored to freedom, if the bitter 
reproaches of the Aetolians were to be silenced, and if the 
Roman name was to be cherished with true affection among 
all nations ; he urged the necessity of showing that the 
Romans had come across the sea really to liberate Greece, 
and not to assume that dominion which had hitherto been 
exercised by Philip. But notwithstanding these fine words, 
the fetters of Greece remained in the hands of the Romans. 

In B.C. 196, Flamininus proceeded from Elateia to Corinth 
to be present at the Isthmian games. There he solemnly 
proclaimed through a herald, and in the name of the Roman 
people, the freedom of all the Greeks. The joy and enthusiasm 
of the people were so extravagant, that he was almost crushed 
under the weight of the garlands and flowers which were 
showered upon him. The deliverers of Greece, however, 
remained in the country for a considerable time longer ; for 
king Antiochus of Syria, in concert with Hannibal, was 
engaged in vigorous preparations against Rome ; and Nabis, 
the tyrant of Sparta, refused to give up Argos, as he was 
required to do by the terms of the peace. It was also feared 
that he would ally himself with the king of Syria. Flami- 
ninus, therefore, conjointly with the Achaeans, liberated 
Argos by force. He attacked Sparta itself, which appears 
now to have been fortified with w r alls ; another detachment 
of Romans, with the help of a Rhodian and Pergamenian 
fleet, under the command of Eumenes of Pergamus, occupied 
the maritime towns of Laconia, and obtained possession of 
a considerable quantity of military stores in the fortified 
town of Gythion. These circumstances obliged Nabis to 
accept the terms proposed by Flamininus. His dominion 
was confined to Laconia, he was- compelled to give up Argos, 
and was cut off* from communication with the sea. He had, 
therefore, to cede the maritime towns to the conquerors, and 
to surrender all ships except two; he was, moreover, not 



CHAP. XXXVI. 



DEATH OF NABIS. 



617 



allowed to conclude a treaty with any one nor to make war ; 
he was obliged to pay down 100 talents of silver at once, 
and 400 more by eight annual instalments ; and lastly, he 
had to give hostages as a security for his observing the peace. 
But notwithstanding these hard terms, Nabis remained 
tyrant, and under the protection of the Romans, who meant 
by this means to keep the Achaeans in check ; but the latter 
felt the injustice of this arrangement keenly, especially as 
they had assisted in conquering Nabis. The Aetolians openly 
and strongly expressed their disapproval of the conduct 
of the Romans. And it cannot be denied, that although 
in B.C. 194 the garrisons were withdrawn from Corinth, 
Demetrias, and Chalcis, yet Rome did not allow Greece to 
enjoy peace; and civil war soon broke out afresh. Filled 
with hatred of the Romans, the Aetolians stimulated Nabis 
to reconquer the maritime towns which he had ceded to the 
Romans and Achaeans, and thus occasioned a war between 
the tyrant and the Achaeans. While the latter sent suc- 
cours to Gythion, which was besieged by Nabis, the tyrant 
made a predatory inroad into their territory. Near Pleiae, in 
the territory of Gythion, Philopoemen, who was now again 
strategus of the league, attacked Nabis with Cretan mer- 
cenaries and Tarentine horsemen, and after having gained a 
victory over him, blockaded him in Sparta. Meantime, Alex- 
amenus arrived with Aetolian auxiliaries, not with a view to 
assist the tyrant, but to kill him, and to take possession of 
his treasures and city. After the murder was committed, 
Alexamenus retreated into the citadel; but the Spartans 
took it by storm, and he, together with nearly all the Aeto- 
lians, was cut to pieces ; the survivors were sold as slaves. 
The fruits of this deed, however, were not reaped by the 
Spartans but by Philopoemen, for during the confusion he 
seized upon the city, and added it as well as Laconia to the 
Achaean confederacy, which now embraced the whole of 
Peloponnesus B.C. 192. 



618 



HISTORY OF GREECE. chap, xxxvi. 



About this time the war with Antioclms of Syria broke 
out. The Aetolians, ever dissatisfied with the Romans, 
concluded a treaty with him, and in B.C. 192 he arrived 
at Demetrias. His arrival was the signal for a fresh rising ; 
the Eleans, Boeotians, Messenians, and Demetrias joined 
him, and the distant Epirots testified, by an embassy, their 
sympathy with him. But instead of availing himself of 
this favourable disposition of the Greeks, and of quickly 
advancing through Thessaly into Epirus, Antiochus took up 
his winter-quarters in Chalcis, and there with great pomp 
and solemnity celebrated his marriage with a Greek beauty. 
In the spring of B.C. 191, the consul M'. Acilius Glabrio 
invaded Thessaly, and conquered Thermopylae, which was 
occupied by the Syrians and Aetolians. The defeated king 
did not rally his forces till he reached Elateia; with only 
500 men he escaped to Chalcis, whence he immediately 
crossed over to Ephesus. We here omit the sequel of his 
history and the victory of the Scipios. The Aetolians, his 
allies in Greece, shared his fate. Acilius Glabrio, on his 
return from Chalcis, whither he had pursued the king, went 
to Thermopylae, and stormed Heraclea, which was in the 
hands of the Aetolians. This loss broke their obstinate 
courage ; they sued for peace, and after long deliberations 
obtained, in B.C. 190, a truce for six months. But during 
this interval they seem to have changed their mind, for after 
the expiration of the truce, hostilities recommenced; the 
consul, M. Fulvius Nobilior, however, put an end to them in 
B.C. 189, and in his camp at Ambracia dictated to the Aeto- 
lians the terms of peace. They were obliged to recognise 
the majesty and supremacy of the Roman people ; to have 
the same friends and enemies as the Romans ; to allow no 
army a passage through their country against any ally of 
Rome ; to dismiss from their confederacy all the towns which 
had been conquered by the Romans, or had joined them of 
their own accord, together with the island of Cephallenia ; 



CHAP, xxxvi. PHILOPOEMEN AT SPARTA. 



619 



and to pay 500 talents, 200 at once, and 300 in six yearly 
instalments. The power of the Aetolian confederacy and 
its influence upon the affairs of Greece were thus for ever 
annihilated, and internal party feuds soon completely de- 
stroyed the league ; for the Romans availed themselves of 
every opportunity of giving weight to their authority in 
Greece. The war with Perseus of Macedonia enabled them 
to lead the most illustrious of the Aetolians as hostages to 
Rome. When Augustus, after his great victory of Actium, 
founded the town of Nicopolis in commemoration of it, he 
collected the remnants of the Aetolian nation into that place; 
but a kind of Aetolian league still continued to exist, and to 
it Amphissa belonged in the days of Pausanias (about 
ad. 150). 

Let us now return to the Achaean confederacy. Some 
years after the humiliation of Sparta by Philopoemen, the 
war between the two states broke out afresh. The Lace- 
daemonians, contrary to the treaty, had taken by storm the 
town of Las, on the coast south of Gythion, and as they 
refused to deliver up the instigators to the Achaeans, the 
latter, by the advice of Philopoemen, declared war in b. c. 188. 
It was the interest, and also the intention of Rome, to foster 
this civil war rather than to suppress it. The ambassadors 
of both parties at Rome received equivocal answers, so that 
the Achaeans imagined they had received full power over 
Laconia, while the Lacedaemonians refused to concede this. 
At length Philopoemen having prevailed, led back to Sparta 
those who had been exiled by Nabis, and who had not been 
recalled in compliance with the treaty. On that occasion the 
most distinguished of the opposite party, sixty-three in num- 
ber, were put to death, and the city and state had to pass 
through a bloody process of reforms. Philopoemen ordered the 
walls of the city to be demolished, and the mercenaries to be 
dismissed ; by his command many of the citizens recently ad- 
mitted by Nabis to the franchise (emancipated Helots) were 



620 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXVI. 



put to death, and others were removed from the city to the 
villages in the country. He lastly compelled the Spartans to 
abolish the constitution of Lycurgus, under which they had 
lived for 700 years, and to adopt the manners and constitution 
of the Achaeans, that is, to establish a democracy. Sparta, 
thus deprived of its lost power, obeyed the commands of 
Philopoemen with hatred and reluctance, and its urgent 
appeals to the Roman senate produced nothing but vague 
answers and delay, as the Romans were only waiting for a 
favourable opportunity to interfere in a dictatorial manner 
and to destroy both parties. Thus, although they did not 
approve of the conduct of Philopoemen, they expressed an 
opinion that nothing should be done contrary to his pro- 
ceedings ; afterwards they expressly wrote that the demands 
of Sparta were granted. During these intricate negotiations 
which were intentionally protracted, Sparta was not again 
formally incorporated with the Achaean league until b. c. 181. 
The year before, Messenia, probably not without the con- 
nivance of Rome, revolted, under Deinocrates, from the 
Achaean confederacy ; it had been compelled by Flamininus, 
scarcely ten years before, to join it, and had all along been a 
very reluctant member of the league. Philopoemen forth- 
with set out against Deinocrates with his Thracian and 
Cretan mercenaries and a detachment of cavalry, composed 
of the noblest of the Achaeans, but death overtook him. In 
a valley near Corone he was surprised by some Messenian 
horsemen, and after a brave resistance was overpowered. His 
horse fell, and Philopoemen, now at the age of seventy, and 
having scarcely recovered from an illness, was conveyed in a 
dying state to Messene. There Deinocrates quickly withdrew 
him from the sight of the admiring and sympathising people, 
and locked him up for the night in a treasure vault (the- 
saurus). On the following day he was brought to trial, at 
which the bloodthirsty party prevailed. Philopoemen emptied 
the poisonous cup with calmness and intrepidity, for he re- 



CHAP. XXXVI. 



PERSEUS. 



621 



ceived at the moment the cheerful news that Lycortas and 
the select band of cavalry were safe. Under his successor 
Lycortas, the brave father of the historian Polybius, the 
Achaeans took revenge ; Messene was conquered, and those 
who had voted for the execution of Philopoemen were put 
to death. The remains of Philopoemen were conveyed to 
Megalopolis, and buried there with due honours. But the 
disputes continued until the mighty hand of Rome crushed 
the rival states, and suppressed all quarrels by force of arms. 

The influence of Rome had already become so powerful in 
Greece, that when Perseus, the successor of Philip (b. c. 179), 
and a bitter enemy of the Romans, employed the last resources 
of his kingdom for a final struggle with the all-absorbing re- 
public, and formed connections with the kings of Illyricum, 
Thrace, Syria, Bithynia, with the princes and towns of 
Epirus and Thessaly, nay even with Carthage and the Celtic 
tribes on the Danube, the Boeotian towns alone could be 
prevailed upon to conclude an alliance with Macedonia. Even 
from this there were some dissentients, who, when a Roman 
ambassador appeared at the Boeotian congress at Thebes, 
cancelled the treaty, and delivered up those who were fa- 
vourably disposed towards Macedonia. The Boeotian con- 
federacy was dissolved, and each separate town was declared 
an independent state. But Haliartos and Coroneia, which 
alone remained faithful to the treaty with Perseus, were 
razed to the ground, and their inhabitants sold as slaves. 
The Roman senate afterwards, indeed, caused the dispersed in- 
habitants to be recalled, and restored their property to them ; 
but the territory of Haliartos was already in the hands of the 
Athenians, who had received it from the Romans, and the 
restoration of that ancient town was impossible. 

During the third Macedonian war, in which Perseus lost 
his kingdom in the battle of Pydna, B.C. 168, the Achaeans, 
though not without great reluctance, had fought on the side 
of the Romans. This induced the hired traitors, Callicrates 



622 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXVI. 



and Andronidas, who were taunted with their base conduct 
by the very boys in the streets, to traduce the noblest men, 
who were animated by the love of freedom and by patriotism, 
as disaffected and seditious people. Callicrates had been 
busily at work to destroy the league ever since the year 
B.C. 179, and with the help of the Romans had stirred up 
factions within it, to the party spirit of which the most 
eminent men fell victims. After the close of the Macedonian 
war, regular inquisitions were instituted in the towns, and 
upwards of 1000 Achaeans, among whom w T as Polybius, were 
sent to Rome to answer for their conduct, the Strategus 
Xenon having insisted upon being permitted to plead Jiis 
cause in person before the Roman senate. But when they 
arrived in Rome, no opportunity was given them to defend 
their conduct, and they were distributed as hostages among 
the Italian municipia. After what may be termed a free 
custody of seventeen years, from B.C. 167 to 150, the sur- 
vivors, 300 in number, mostly old men, were allowed, by the 
advice of Cato and the younger Scipio, to return to their 
country. These men were among the first who then roused 
their countrymen to engage in their last struggle with Rome. 

The Aetolians, who were suspected of favouring Macedonia, 
experienced a still harder fate, for they were carried to Rome 
with their wives and children, and 550 of the most distin- 
guished were put to death ; few only saw their country again 
after a long imprisonment. Such was the cruelty of the 
Romans towards a country from which they derived the best 
part of their mental culture. 

The final decision of the fate of Greece, after so many and 

>uch severe trials, was brought about by the Athenians. 

During the Macedonian wars, they had been so much re- 
duced, that, as Pausanias relates, from mere want and poverty, 
they plundered their own town of Oropos. The Oropians 
brought a complaint respecting this strange deed before the 
Roman senate, and the Sicyonians were commissioned to 



chap, xxxvi. ATHENIAN AMBASSADORS AT ROME 623 

inquire into the matter. As the Athenians did not obey the 
summons to appear before the commissioners, they were 
sentenced to pay a fine of 500 talents. In consequence of 
this, they sent, in B.C. 1.55, three ambassadors to Eome ; 
they were the philosophers Carneades, Critolaus, and Dio- 
genes, and their object was to induce the senate to cancel 
the severe verdict of the Sicyonians. Their wisdom and 
oratorical powers were greatly admired at Eome, and they 
succeeded in getting the fine reduced to 100 talents. They 
remained at Rome for a time, but were at length ordered to 
quit the city, because it was thought that they exercised a 
bad influence upon the young. 

Soon after this, Athens again committed an act of in- 
justice against Oropos, and the injured solicited the protection 
of the Achaeans. The latter at first refused their assistance 
out of regard for Athens ; but at last Callicrates, who had 
been bribed with five talents, caused a threatening decree 
to be passed against Athens ; in consequence of which the 
Athenians ceased from molesting Oropos. A fresh feud also 
arose between the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians about the 
possession of Belmina, which the Spartans claimed. The 
Spartans were hard pressed, and escaped only through the 
treachery of the strategus Democritus, who being afterwards 
sentenced to pay a fine of fifty talents, fled from Peloponnesus 
because he was unable to raise the money. He was suc- 
ceeded by Diaeus, an infuriated enemy of the Romans, who 
now interfered in the new disputes. The consul Metellus, 
who in B.C. 148 was engaged in a war against the Pseudo- 
Philip of Macedonia, ordered the Greeks to desist from their 
hostilities, which were to be decided by a Roman commission. 
But when the ambassadors, Orestes and Junius, called upon 
the Achaeans assembled at Corinth to exclude Corinth, 
Argos, Heraclea, at the foot of mount Oeta, and Orcho- 
menos in Arcadia from their confederacy, their demand was 
treated with scorn and indignation. Other envoys sent by 



624 



HISTORY OF GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXVI. 



Metellus were even ill-used, and the Achaeans declared war 
against Rome. 

Thebes and Chalcis immediately joined the Achaeans. 
Metellus, who had just concluded the war against the Pseudo- 
Philip, compelled Macedonia and Thessaly to acknowledge 
the sovereignty of Rome, and in B.C. 147 marched with his 
army into Boeotia. The strategus Critolaus, who had in- 
tended to occupy the pass of Thermopylae, came too late, 
and was put to night in the neighbourhood of Heraclea. 
He fled, but being overtaken by Metellus near Scarpheia in 
Locris, was defeated a second time. He himself perished 
while endeavouring to effect his escape. The progress of 
the Romans was as great as the despair of the Achaeans. 
In the meantime a Roman fleet landed a force in Pelopon- 
nesus, which laid waste the country ; 1000 Arcadians were 
cut to pieces. Diaeus now drew together the last forces of 
the confederacy ; he armed 12,000 slaves, and assembling all 
men capable of bearing arms in the neighbourhood of Corinth, 
he got together an army of 14,000 foot and 600 horse. Me- 
tellus, before advancing any farther, punished the Thebans, 
who had taken part in the war, and from fear had fled 
into the mountains; he destroyed Thebes, leaving only 
the Cadmea uninjured. He then occupied Megara, and 
even now offered terms of peace to the Achaeans. But 
Diaeus, who was thoroughly infatuated, rejected all pro- 
posals, and even ordered the bearers of the proposal, three 
Achaeans, to be seized and put to death. At length in 
b.c. 146, the consul L. Mummius, the successor of Metellus, 
occupied the Isthmus with an army of 23,000 foot and 3500 
horse, and in the ensuing battle of Leucopetra, not far from 
Corinth, decided the fate of Greece. Diaeus, who had fought 
like another Leonidas, with a band of 614 brave men, fled in 
despair to his native city of Megalopolis. He killed his 
wife that she might not become the slave of a Roman, and 
having himself taken poison, he set fire to his house. 



chap, xxxyi. GREECE UNDEK THE ROMANS. 



G25 



Three days after the battle, Mummius entered the de- 
fenceless city of Corinth, and ordered it to be plundered and 
destroyed by fire ; all the male inhabitants were put to the 
sword, and all the women and children as well as the re- 
maining slaves were sold. Many of the numerous works of 
art collected in that wealthy commercial town were destroyed, 
others were carried to Rome, others were given to king 
Attains of Pergamus, to reward him for the assistance he 
had rendered in the war. The ten commissioners of the 
Roman senate now declared the Achaean league and all other 
confederacies of towns in Greece to be dissolved, every- 
where established an oligarchical government, forbade the 
wealthy to acquire landed property in any part of Greece, 
except that in which they resided ; the Corinthian territory 
became domain land (ager publicus), and the country had to 
pay to Rome a heavy tribute. It does not, however, appear 
that Greece was at once constituted as a Roman province 
under the name of Achaia, as is commonly believed ; foi 
there are no distinct traces of such a state of affairs until 
the time of the dictator Sulla. Many of the severe mea- 
sures which were adopted after the fall of Corinth, were 
subsequently withdrawn, such as the imposition of fines 
which some of the towns were condemned to pay, and the 
prohibition respecting landed property. Nay, even the an- 
cient constitutions were revived, and the confederacies among 
several towns were restored under Roman supremacy. Per- 
fect freedom was enjoyed by Athens, Delphi, Thespiae, 
Tanagra, and the country of Laconia ('EXevQepoXaMveQ), to 
which Augustus added Nicopolis. Amphissa and the Ozolian 
Locrians were exempted from taxes ; Corinth, Patrae, Dyme, 
and Megara subsequently became Roman colonies. 

In the distribution of the provinces under Augustus, 
Achaia became a senatorial province, but in the early part 
of the reign of Tiberius it was transferred to the emperor 
until Claudius again changed the legatus Augusti into a pro- 



626 



HISTORY OE GREECE. 



CHAP. XXXVI. 



consul. The absurd fancy of Nero in once more proclaiming 
the freedom of Greece at the Isthmian games, was followed 
by such sad consequences, that Yespasian wisely withdrew 
the untimely gift. Hadrian's favours to the country of art 
and literature were much more substantial ; but the sunbeam 
of his goodwill shone on nothing but ruins, and no festival of 
the Panhellenia could restore the national feeling, which 
existed only in the mouths of philosophers and orators. The 
wars among the Greeks themselves, and still more so those 
with the Romans, had almost changed the country into a 
wilderness ; vast districts were desolate, and infested by 
bands of robbers ; the whole of Greece could scarcely raise an 
armed force of 3000 men. No wonder, therefore, that even 
as early as a.d. 265, Athens was the only Greek city which, 
owing to the strength of its position, was able to resist the 
invasion of the Goths ; 1 30 years later, the treachery and 
cowardice of its Byzantine rulers entirely abandoned it to 
the destructive fury of Alaric, and left to the proconsul of 
eastern Rome the command over nothing but the wrecks of 
bygone greatness.* 

Athens enjoyed many advantages over the other states of 
Greece ; until its participation in the Mithridatic war, into 
which it had been seduced by Aristiom, brought upon it all 
the horrors of the siege and conquest by Sulla in B.C. 88. 
But it still retained its freedom, almost without interruption 
or change, throughout the whole imperial period, except 
that its constitution assumed an aristocratic character through 
the increasing authority of the strategi, and the exalted 
position of the Areopagus. Even its imprudent policy and 
participation in the civil wars of Rome produced no evil 
consequences beyond the fact that Augustus took away 
Eretria and Aegina, which Antony had given to it. It need 
not surprise us that the political life of the Athenians became 



Hermann, Lehrb. der griech. Staatsalterth. § 189. 



chap, xxxvi. GREECE UNDER THE ROMANS. 



627 



a mere hollow form and consisted in trifles, and that the 
people became the flatterers of the great and powerful ; that 
for instance they conferred almost divine honours upon their 
great benefactor Hadrian, as in former times they had done 
in the case of Demetrius and Antigonus. The emperor 
Severus is said to have limited the privileges of Athens, but 
we do not know what privileges are alluded to. The outward 
forms continued, unchanged on the whole, to exist for a long 
time ; and the names of the free institutions do not seem to 
have become extinct until the time of the Byzantine empire. 

Sparta, too, enjoyed as much freedom as a Greek city 
could have under the dominion of Rome. The coast dis- 
tricts of Laconia, however, appear to have remained inde- 
pendent of it. The emperor Augustus fixed the number of 
free townships in Laconia (Eleutherolaconians) at twenty- 
four, and their magistrates bore the title of ephors. At 
Sparta itself, the office of the patronomi, which had been 
instituted by Cleomenes, continued to exist along with the 
ephors and the senate. 

Greece, though conquered by the arms of the Romans, 
subdued them in its turn by its vast superiority in the arts 
and in literature ; the Romans themselves owned that they 
were the humble disciples of Greece ; and that country in 
which we first meet in its full development with all that is 
noble and beautiful in man, is still the perennial spring at 
which we and all future generations may refresh our minds 
and drink intellectual inspiration. 



E E 2 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



B.C. 

Pelasgian aera. 

Cecrops, Danaus, Cadmus, and Pelops. 
The extension of the Helienic nation. 
1400 — 1200. The heroic age. 
Heracles. 
Theseus. 

Minos rules in Crete. 
Jason. The Argonautic expedition. 
1 194 — 1184. The Trojan war ; in the last year of which Troy was taken 

and razed to the ground. 
1124. About this time, extensive migrations took place in various parts 
of Greece, the most important being that of the Dorians. 
Conquest of Peloponnesus by the Heracleids. 
Codrus, king of Attica. 
Dorian colonies established in Crete. 
1104 or 884. The legislation of Lycurgus. The latter date is that 
adopted by most modern writers. 
900 — 800. Age of Homer and Hesiod. 
776. Commencement of the Olympiads. 

War between Sparta and Arcadia. 
743_724. The first Messenian war. 
735. Theocles leads a colony to Sicily. 

734. Syracuse founded by a Corinthian colony under Archias. 

731. Aristodemus chosen king of the Messenians. 

726. Aristodemus defeats the Lacedaemonians at Ithome. 

724. Termination of the war. Conquest of Messenia. 

70S. Tare n turn founded by Lacedaemonian colonists, called Parthenii, 

under the command of Phalanthus. 
690. Gela in Sicily founded by Cretans and Rhodians. 
685 — 668. The second Messenian war. 

Aristomenes, the leader of the Messenians. 
683. First annual archon at Athens. 

Tyrtaeus, a martial poet, sent by the Athenians to Sparta, where 
his poetry revived the sinking courage of the Lacedaemonians. 
682. The Messenians fortify mount Eira. 

668. The war concluded by the capture of Eira, and conquest of Mes- 
senia. 

658. Byzantium founded by a colony from Megara. 

e e 3 



630 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



B.C. 

650. Psammeliclms, king of Egypt, invites the Greeks to settle in that 

country. 
637. Greeks settle in Cyrene. 
629. Selinus in 'Sicily founded. 
624. Draco's legislation at Athens. 

623—612. War between Lydia and Miletus. In the last year a 
treaty of peace and alliance between the two states was con- 
cluded. 

617. Alyattes ascends the throne of Lydia, and delivers Asia from the 

ravages of the Cimmerians. 
612. Conspiracy of Cylon to overturn the government of Athens and 

make himself tyrant. War between Athens and Megara. 
604. Solon recovers Salamis from the Megarians. 
600. Massiiia founded by the Phocaeans. 
597. The partizans of Megacles banished from Athens. 
595. Epimenides, the Cretan, invited by Solon to come to Athens. 
594. Commencement of the Crissean or, first Sacred war, which is said 

to have lasted ten years. 
Solon appointed archon, with power to frame a new constitution 

and code of laws. Institution of the senate of Four Hundred, 

and of the Heliaea. 
Foundation of the Athenian navy. 
582. Agrigentum founded. 

572 — 562. Solon is said to have been absent, from Athens, and to have 

visited Asia Minor, Cyprus and Egypt. 
570. Pythagoras born. 

560. Pisistratus obtains the tyrannis at Athens. 

Croesus ascends the throne of Lydia, and subdues the greater 
part of Asia Minor. 
559. Death of Solon. Pisistratus compelled to quit Athens. 
554. Return of Pisistratus to Athens. 
552. Second expulsion of Pisistratus. 

550. Pherecydes flourished : he is said to have been the first prose 

writer in Greece. 
546. Croesus taken prisoner in Sardis by Cyrus. 

War against the Greeks of Asia Minor begun by Cyrus, who 

ultimately established his sovereignty over the whole country. 
542. Pisistratus returns to Athens, of which he continues to be the 

ruler until his death. 
538. Babylon taken by Cyrus. 

536. Xenophanes, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, 

emigrates to Elea. 
532. Polycrates becomes tyrant of Samos, and engages in a war 

against Miletus. 

529. Cyrus defeated and slain by the Massagetae. He is succeeded by 

his son Cambyses. 
527. Death of Pisistratus. 
525. Egypt conquered by Cambyses. 
522. Death of Polycrates at Sardis. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



631 



B.C. 

521. Death of Cambyses, and accession of Darius, who organised the 
Persian empire. 
Conquest of Samos by the Persians. 
516 ? Revolt of Babylon, and its conquest by Zopyrus. 
514. Conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogeiton against Hippias and 

Hipparchus, the sons of Pisistratus. 
513 or 508. Darius invades Scythia. 
510. Expulsion of Hippias and his family from Athens. 
Destruction of Sybaris by the people of Croton. 
Cleisthenes introduces important changes into the Athenian 
constitution, which increase the power of the people. Ten 
local tribes instituted in place of the four ancient tribes. 
Cleisthenes withdraws from Athens, w-hich is occupied by the 
Spartan king, Cleomenes. 
508. Cleisthenes returns in triumph. 

War between Athens and the Spartans with their allies, the 
Thebans and Chalcidians. 
504. Insurrection of the commonalty of Croton against the govern- 
ment established by Pythagoras, who died soon after this 
event. 

501. Failure of Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus, in his expedition 
against Naxos. 

500. Aristagoras induces the Greek cities in Asia Minor to revolt. 
He applies to Sparta and Athens lor support against the 
Persians. 

499. Sardis burnt by the Athenians and lonians, who were afterwards 

defeated, and returned home. 
498. Second year of the Ionian revolt. The Persians recover Caria 

and Cyprus. 

497. Third year of the Ionian revolt. Fall of several cities of Ionia 

and Aeolis. Death of Aristagoras in Thrace. 
496. Fourth year of the Ionian revolt Histiaeus arrives at Sardis, 

and thence escapes to Chios. 
494. Sixth and last year of the revolt. The lonians defeated in a 

naval battle off Lade, and Miletus taken by the Persians. 
493. The subjugation of Ionia completed. Miltiades quits the Cher- 

sonesus, and settles at Athens 
492. Mardonius invades Europe. The Persian fleet wrecked off 

Mount Athos. Mardonius returns to Asia. 
491. Darius sends heralds to Greece to demand tokens of submission. 

War between Athens and Aegina. Demaratus, king of 

Sparta, being deposed by the intrigues of his colleague, 

Cleomenes, goes to the Persian court. 
490. Second invasion of Greece by the Persians, commanded by Datis 

and Artaphernes. Capture of Naxos, Delos, and Eretria. 

Battle of Marathon, in which the Persians were completely 

defeated by the Athenians under Miltiades, and retreated into 

Asia. 

E E 4 



632 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



B.C. 

48"9. Miltiades attacks Paros, is wounded, and obliged to return to 
Athens ; there he was impeached, condemned, and thrown into 
prison, where he soon afterwards died. 

486. Egypt revolts from the Persian empire. 

485. Death of Darius and accession of Xerxes. 

484. Xerxes subdues Egypt. 

484 — 480. Preparations are made by Xerxes during these four years 
for again invading Greece. A bridge made across the Helles- 
pont ; and a canal cut through the isthmus of Mount Athos- 

483. Aristides sent into exile. Themistocles becomes the leading man 
at Athens. 

480. Xerxes begins his march into Europe. The battles of Ther- 
mopylae and Artemisium. The Persians repulsed from 
Delphi. The Athenians abandon their city, which is occupied 
by the Persians. Battle of Salami s, in which the Persian fleet 
is utterly defeated. Retreat of Xerxes, who leaves Mardo- 
nius to conquer Greece. 
The Carthaginians defeated at Himera in Sicily, on the same 
day as the battle of Salamis was fought, on which, also, Euri- 
pides was born. 

479. Mardonius occupies Athens, which had again been abandoned by 
its inhabitants. He negotiates with the Athenians, but his 
offers are rejected. He retreats into Boeotia, whither he is 
followed by the Greeks under Pausanias, who gains a great 
victory over the Persians at Plataeae. Mardonius slain, and 
succeeded in the command by Artabazus, who at once retreats 
into Asia. 

In the battle of Mycale, said to have been fought on the same 
day as the battle of Plataeae, the Persian fleet was routed by 
that of the Greeks. 
478. Sestos taken by the Athenians. Rebuilding and fortification of 
Athens. Themistocles causes the three harbours of Athens to 
be fortified. 

477. The fleet of the allied Greeks, commanded by Pausanias, takes 
possession of Cyprus and Byzantium. Pausanias offends the 
allies by his tyrannical conduct, and the supremacy is offered 
to the Athenians. Aristides organizes the Grecian con- 
federacy. Pausanias recalled to Sparta. The supremacy of 
Athens lasted seventy-three years, b. c. 477 — 404. 

476. Cimon, the Athenian general, conquers Eion and Scyros. 

471. Themistocles banished, and retires to Argos. 

468. Death of Aristides. 

Sophocles gains the victory with his first play. 

467? Death of Pausanias. 

466. Themistocles flees from Argos to avoid being arrested by the 
Athenians and Spartans ; he goes first to Corcyra and Epirus, 
and thence to the court of Persia. Naxos conquered by the 
Athenians. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



633 



465. Xerxes assassinated. Cimon defeats the naval and military forces 
of the Persians in the battle of Eurymedon. 

464. Revolt of Thasos from the Athenians. Earthquake in Laconia, 
and insurrection of the Heiots and Messenians. Pericles 
takes an active and leading part in public affairs at Athens. 

464—455. The third Messenian war. In the last year Ithome surren- 
dered, and its defenders quitted Peloponnesus. 

463. Cimon subdues Thasos. 

461. Ephialtes carries a law, depriving the Areopagus of a great 
portion of its authority. Cimon banished from Athens. Peri- 
cles succeeds him at the head of affairs. 

460. Inarus in Egypt revolts against the Persians, and is assisted by 
the Athenians. Commencement of the siege of Memphis, 
which lasted five years, and was at last abandoned by the 
Athenians. 

457. War between the Athenians and the Corinthians, assisted by 
other Peloponnesians. 
Myronides, the Athenian general, defeats the Corinthians at 
Megara. The battle of Tanagra, in which the Lacedaemo- 
nians conquer the Athenians. The building of the long walls 
of Athens is vigorously prosecuted. 

456. Myronides gains a brilliant victory over the Thebans at Oeno- 
phyta. Completion of the long walls. Surrender of Aegina. 
Death of Aeschylus. 

455. The Athenians gain several advantages over the Peloponnesians, 
and capture Naupactus. 
Euripides produces his first play- 

454. The Athenians undertake the restoration of Orestes, but are de- 
feated and compelled to retreat from Thessaly. Pericles 
repulsed from Oeniadae. Assassination of Ephialtes. 

453. Cimon recalled to Athens : an armistice for three years, followed 
by a truce for five years. 

449. Death of Cimon at Citium in Cyprus. The Athenian fleet de- 
feats that of the Phoenicians and Cilicians. 

448. War between the Delphians and the Phocians respecting the 
superintendence of the oracle of Apollo. Sparta supports the 
Delphians, Athens the Phocians. 

447. The Athenians under Tolrnides defeated by the Boeotians in the 
battle of Coronea. The ascendency of Athens in Boeotia de- 
stroyed. 

445. Expiration of the five years' truce. Revolt of Euboea and 
Megara. Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Sub- 
jugation of Euboea. A truce for thirty years concluded 
between Athens and Sparta. 

444. Thucydides, the leader of the Athenian aristocracy, sent into 
exile. The power of Pericles at its height. He carries a law 
excluding nearly 5000 persons from the rights of citizenship. 

443. The colony of Thurii established. 

440. The revolt of Samos. Its conquest by Pericles. Byzantium. 



634 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



B.C. 

also taken by the Athenians. The sovereignty of Athens 

over her allies established. 
438. Death of Pindar. Perfection of the Attic drama. 
438 — 432. Pericles adorns Athens by the erection of the Parthenon, 

Propylaea, &c. 

435. A war breaks out between Corinth and Corcyra respecting 
Epidamnus. 

434. The Corey raeans defeat the Corinthians in a naval engagement 
near Actium. 

433. The Athenians conclude a defensive alliance with Corcyra, and 

send a fleet to its assistance. 
432. Battle of Sybota between the Corcyraean and Corinthian fleets. 

Thucydides regards this battle as the first occasion of the war 

between Athens and Corinth. 
Prosecution and death of Phidias. Accusation and acquittal of 

Aspasia. 

War between Perdiccas and the Athenians. Revolt of Potidaea 
and other Chalcidian towns. Defeat of the Corinthians under 
Aristeus by the Athenian general Callias. Meeting of the 
Peloponnesian confederates at Sparta, and declaration of war 
against Athens. This was the commencement of the Pelo- 
ponnesian war. 

431. First year of the Peloponnesian war. The Thebaus attack 
Plataeae, but are repulsed. The Spartan king Archidamus 
invades Attica, and besieges Oenoe. Meantime the Athenians 
land at Methone, from which they are repulsed by Brasidas. 
Aegina aud Cephallenia occupied by the Athenians, who also 
form an alliance with Sitalces, and devastate Megaris. 

430. Second year of the Peloponnesian war. The plague breaks out 
at Athens. Second invasion of Attica. The Athenians 
ravage the coast of Peloponnesus. Surrender of Potidaea. 

429. Third year of the Peloponnesian war. Continuance of the 
plague ; death of Pericles. Commencement of the heroic de- 
fence of Plataeae. The Athenian fleet under Phormio defeats 
that of the Peloponnesians in the Corinthian gulf. The allies 
make an incursion into Sal amis. 

428. Fourth year of the Peloponnesian war. Third invasion of Attica. 
Revolt of Lesbos from the Athenians. First imposition of a 
property tax at Athens. 

427. Fifth year of the Peloponnesian war. Fourth invasion of Attica. 
Surrender of Mytilene, and conquest of Lesbos by Paches. 
First appearance of a Peloponnesian fleet in Asia Minor. 
Surrender and destruction of Plataeae. Cleon appears as a 
leader of the Athenian people. Civil war in Corcyra. 
Nicias takes and fortifies Minoa. The Athenians begin to 
interfere in the affairs of Sicily. The plague breaks out again 
in Attica. 

426. Sixth year of the Peloponnesian war. Earthquakes deter the 
Spartans from entering Attica. The Athenians are successful 
in Boeotia, Locris, Aetolia, Sicily and southern Italy. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



635 



B.C. 

425. Seventh year of the Peloponnesian war. Fifth invasion of Attica. 
The Athenian general Demosthenes takes and fortifies Fylos, 
which is besieged by the Spartans both by land and sea. The 
Athenian fleet arrives and blockades the Spartans in Sphac- 
teria. Negotiations for peace. Cleon takes Spbacteria and 
conveys all the Spartan prisoners to Athens. Nicias lays 
waste the coast of Peloponnesus. 

424. Eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. Continued success of 
the Athenians. Nicias takes possession of the island of Cy- 
thera, and ravages the coast of Peloponnesus. General paci- 
fication of Sicily. Brasidas prevents Megara falling into the 
hands of the Athenians. Battle of Deiiom, in which the 
Boeotians completely defeat the Athenians. Brasidas takes 
Acanthus, Amphipolis, and many other towns in Chaleidice. 

423. Ninth year of the Peloponnesian war. A truce for one year 
concluded. Eevolt of Scione and Mende from Athens. He- 
capture of Mende. * Brasidas repulsed from Potidaea. 

422. Tenth year of the Peloponnesian war. Cleon commands in 
Chaleidice, captures Torone, and lays siege to Amphipolis. 
Battle before Amphipolis, in which Brasidas and Cleon are 
killed, and the Athenians defeated. 

421. Eleventh year of the Peloponnesian war. A peace, commonly 
called the peace of Nicias, concluded for fifty years. An 
offensive and defensive alliance between Athens and Sparta. 
The Argives put themselves at the head of a new confederacy. 
The Spartans conclude a separate treaty with the Boeotians. 

420. Twelfth year of the Peloponnesian war. The Argives form an 
alliance with Athens. Alcibiades takes a prominent part in 
public affairs. The Spartans excluded from the Olympic games. 

419. Thirteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. Hostilities between 
the Argives and the Epidaurians. Peace is formally main- 
tained between Athens and Sparta. 

418. Fourteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. The Lacedaemonians 
invade the Argive territory. The Athenians assist Argos. 
The Argive confederates invade Arcadia. The battle of 
Mantinea, in which the Spartans gain a decisive victory. 
Conclusion of a treaty of alliance for fifty years between Argos 
and Sparta. 

417. Fifteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. The popular party at 
Argos prevails, and renounces the alliance with Sparta. Re- 
newal of the war between the two states. 

416. Sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. Alcibiades being sent 
to Argos, strengthens the popular party by carrying away 
300 of the oligarchs. The Athenians besiege and conquer 
Melos. Ambassadors from the Sicilian town of Egesta come 
to Athens to solicit aid against Selinus. 

415. Seventeenth year of the Peloponnesian war. The Athenians 
resolve to send an expedition to Sicily. The mutilation of the 
Hermae. Charge brought against Alcibiades. Arrival of 
e e 6 



638 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



B.C. 

the fleet in Sicily . Aicibiades recalled to Athens, but escapes 
to Peloponnesus. The Athenians commence the siege of 
Syracuse. Battle of the Anapos. Gylippus sent by the Spar- 
tans to Syracuse. 

414. Eighteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. Siege of Syracuse 
continued. Battle of Epipolae gained by the Athenians. 
Death of Lamachus. The circumvallation of Syracuse com- 
pleted. Arrival of Gylippus at Syracuse. Reverses of the 
Athenian army. Hostilities in Peloponnesus. 

413. Nineteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. The Spartans under 
their king Agis again invade Attica, and establish themselves 
at Decelea. Naval engagements at Syracuse. Demosthenes 
arrives in Sicily from Athens with large reinforcements, but 
is totally defeated by Gylippus. The siege of Syracuse raised. 
The Athenians retreat, but are pursued and compelled to sur- 
render. Nicias and Demosthenes put to death. Conclusion 
of the Sicilian war. Sparta becomes a maritime power. The 
allies of Athens make preparations for revolt. 

412. Twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war. Aicibiades goes with 
a Spartan fleet to Asia Minor. Chios and other Ionian states 
revolt from Athens. First treaty between Persia and Sparta 
concluded. The Athenians recover many of their possessions 
in Asia Minor. Aicibiades deserts the Spartans, and acquires 
great influence over Tissaphernes. He intrigues for the pur- 
pose of procuring his recall to Athens. 

411. Twenty-first year of the Peloponnesian war. Oligarchical go- 
vernment established at Athens. Democratic reaction in the 
Athenian army at Samos, which recalls Aicibiades, and elects 
him its general. The oligarchy at Athens overthrown by the 
people, who send commissioners to recall Aicibiades. Battle 
of Cynossema. The Peloponnesians defeated in the battle of 
Abydos. 

410. Twenty-second year of the Peloponnesian war. The Lacedae- 
monians defeated at Cyzicus by Aicibiades, who recovers 
many places in Asia Minor. Thrasyllus repulses Agis in 
Attica. Siege of Lampsacos. 

409. Twenty-third year of the Peloponnesian war. The Athenians 
gain possession of Byzantium. 

408. Twenty-fourth year of the Peloponnesian war. Aicibiades re- 
turns in triumph to Athens, and conducts his fellow-citizens 
to Eleusis. Goes to Andros and Samos. Lysander appointed 
the Spartan commander in Asia Minor. 

407. Twenty-fifth year of the Peloponnesian war. Siege of Phocaea. 
Battle of Notion, in which the Athenians are defeated. Aici- 
biades deposed from the command, and retires to Chersonesus. 
Conon appointed in his stead. 

406. Twenty-sixth year of the Peloponnesian war. Callicratidas suc- 
ceeds Lysander as Spartan commander, and is killed in the 
battle of Arginusae, in which the Athenians defeat the 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE, 



637 



B.C. 

Lacedaemonians. Six of the Athenian generals put to death. 

Lysander again assumes the chief command. 
405. Twenty-seventh year of the Peloponnesian war. Lysander 

totally defeats the Athenians at Aegospotami, and subdues 

nearly all their possessions in Asia : he then sails to Attica, 

and invests Athens by land and sea. Negotiations for peace, 

the terms of which are finally submitted to by the Athenians. 
404. Lysander enters Athens, and sets up the government of the 

Thirty Tyrants. He takes Samos and returns to Sparta. 

Death of Alcibiades. 
403. Thrasybulus makes himself master of Piraeus. The government 

of the Thirty overthrown, and democracy re-established. 

The Solonian constitution restored and revised. 
401 — 400. Expedition of Cyrus against his brother Artaxerxes, the 

king of Persia ; terminated by the battle of Cunaxa, in which 

Cyrus was killed. Xenophon conducts the retreat of the 

10,000 Greeks. 

399. War in Asia Minor between Persia and Sparta. Dercyllidas 

commands the forces of the latter. 
Trial and execution of Socrates at Athens. 
399 — 398. War between Sparta and Elis : in the second year the 

latter is defeated by Agis and compelled to accept a humiliating 

peace. 

398. Dercyllidas goes to Lampsacos and Chersonesus. Death of king 

Agis, and accession of Agesilaus. 
397. Dercyllidas takes Atarnae, and concludes a truce with the 

Persians. 

396. Conspiracy of Cinadon at Sparta. Agesilaus assumes the com- 
mand in Asia Minor, and winters at Ephesus. 

395. Agesilaus defeats the Persians on the river Paetolus, subdues 
nearly the whole of Asia Minor, and makes preparations for 
penetrating into the interior of the Persian empire. A league 
against Sparta formed in Greece. War between the Locrians 
and Phocians. Lysander killed before Haliartos. The Spartan 
king Pausanias goes into exile. 

394. Agesilaus recalled to Greece. Battle of Corinth. The Spartan 
fleet destroyed in a battle off Cnidos by the combined forces 
of the Athenians and Persians. Agesilaus defeats the con- 
federates at Coroneia. 

393. Massacre at Corinth. The Spartans take possession of Lechaeon, 
Sidos, and Crommyon. Iphicrates introduces various changes 
in the armour of the peltasts. Conon and Pharnabazus ravage 
the coast of Laconia, and take Cythera. Conon goes to 
Athens, and begins the rebuilding of its walls. 

392. Agesilaus is repulsed from Corinth by Iphicrates, who recovers 
most of the places lost the year before. The walls of Athens 
completed. 

391. The Spartans send Antalcidas to negotiate terms of peace with 



638 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



B.C. 

Tiribazus. Agesilaus conducts a successful campaign in 
Acarnania. 

390. The Acarnanians form an alliance with Sparta. Agesipolis in- 
vades Argolis. The Spartan Teieutias defeats an Athenian 
squadron under Philocrates. Thrasybulus gains several suc- 
cesses over the Lacedaemonians, but is slain by the Aspendians. 

389. Iphicrates defeats the Spartan Anaxibius at Abydos. 

388. The Spartans take Aegina and harass the Athenian territory. 

Teieutias surprises Piraeus. Antalcidas again offers terms of 
peace to Tiribazus, and blocks up the Euxine. 

387. The peace of Antalcidas concluded, which sacrifices the freedom 
of the Greek cities in Asia. The Lacedaemonians endeavour 
to obtain supremacy over the whole of Greece. 

386. The restoration of Piataeae. 

385. Mantinea destroyed by Agesipolis. 

384. Phlius compelled by the Lacedaemonians to recall the exiled 
oligarchs. 

383-— 379. The Olynthian wars, in which Sparta assists Acanthos and 
Apollonia against Olynthos. 

382. The Spartan Phoebidas seizes upon the Cadmea at Thebes. 
Death of Ismenias. Pelopidas escapes from Thebes to Athens. 
The Lacedaemonians defeated by the Olynthian s in two engage- 
ments. Teieutias killed. 

381. Agesipolis assumes the command of the Spartan army and 
marches against Olynthos. Agesilaus besieges Phlius. 

380. Death of Agesipolis in Pallene. Phlius surrenders to the 
Spartans. 

379. Polybiades compels the Olynthian s to sue for peace, to conclude 
a treaty with Sparta, and to acknowledge her supremacy. In 
this year the power of the Spartans was at its highest point. 
Pelopidas, assisted by the Athenians, liberates Thebes from 
the dominion of Sparta. 

378. Beginning of the The ban war, which continued till B.C. 362. 

Cleombrotus invades the Theban territory. Sphodrias makes an 
inroad into Attica. The Athenians prepare for war, and form 
an alliance with the Boeotians. A new confederacy formed 
against Sparta. Agesilaus invades Boeotia. Death of Phoe- 
bidas. 

377. Agesilaus again makes an inroad into the territory of Thebes. 
376. Cleombrotus compelled by the Athenians and Thehans to retire 

from Boeotia. The Lacedaemonian fleet defeated by Chabrias 

off Naxos. 

375. The Spartans defeated in a battle near Orchomenos by the 
Thebans, who establish their supremacy in Boeotia. Timotheus 
the Athenian gains many successes over the Spartan?. 

374. Peace concluded between Sparta and Athens. Piataeae, Thespiae, 
and Orchomenos destroyed by the Thebans. Timotheus 
gains over Corcyra to the Athenian confederacy. Renewal 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



639 



B.C. 

of the war between Athens and Sparta. Iphicrates accom- 
panies Pharnabazus to Egypt. 

373. The Lacedaemonians lay siege to Corcyra. Their general 
Mnasippus is slain, and the siege raised. Iphicrates sent to 
take the command in the Ionian sea. 
About this time the custom of employing mercenaries began to 
prevail in Greece. 

371. Peace concluded between Athens and Sparta. Cleombrotus 
invades Boeotia, but is totally defeated by Epaminondas in the 
battle of Leuetra. Mantinea rebuilt. Megalopolis, the capital 
of the Arcadian union, founded. 

370. Unsuccessful expedition of Agesilaus against Megalopolis. Jason, 
the tyrant of Pherae, assassinated. 

369. The Thebans and their allies commanded by Epaminondas and 
Pelopidas invade Peloponnesus. They fail in an attack on 
Sparta, but restore the independence of Messenia. The 
Athenians send Iphicrates to the assistance of the Spartans. 

368. Second expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus. Pie defeats 
the Spartans and Athenians, but is repulsed from Corinth. 
Pelopidas makes two expeditions into Thessaly ; in the 
second of which he was taken prisoner by Alexander of 
Pherae. 

367. The Arcadians defeated by the Spartans under Archidamus in 
the " tearless battle." A Theban force under Epaminondas 
compels Alexander to liberate Pelopidas, who is afterwards 
sent to Susa to conduct negotiations with the king of Persia. 

366. Third expedition of Epaminondas into Peloponnesus. Achaia 
gained over to the cause of Thebes, but soon afterwards lost. 

365. Peace made between the Athenians and Arcadians. War 
breaks out between Arcadia and Eiis. The Arcadians over- 
run Elis. 

364. Archidamus defeated by the Arcadians at Cromnos. The Eleans 
attack the Arcadians and Argives during the Olympic games, 
and defeat them. Pelopidas gains a victory over Alexander 
at Cynoscephalae, but is himself slain. Alexander is compelled 
to enter into an alliance with Thebes. 

363. The Thebans endeavour to arrest the Arcadian leaders at Tegea. 

362. Epaminondas enters Peloponnesus for the fourth and last time. 

Agesilaus repels the Thebans from Sparta. The battle of 
Mantinea, in which each party claims the victory ; but Epami- 
nondas is killed in it. 

361. A general peace concluded. Independence secured to the Mes- 
senians. Sparta alone refuses to agree to the peace. Age- 
silaus conducts an expedition to Egypt, and dies on his return 
home. 

360. Timotheus repulsed by the Olynthians at Amphipolis, which 
falls into their hands. An Athenian fleet defeated by Alex- 
ander of Pherae. 

359. Accession of Philip to the throne of Macedonia, He is opposed 



640 



CHKONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



B.C. 

by the pretender Argaeus, whom the Athenians support. 
Philip defeats them near Methone, and soon afterwards con- 
cludes a peace with Athens. 

358. Philip conducts a successful campaign against the Illyrians ; 
takes Amphipolis and Pydna ; and assigns Potidaea and 
Anthemos to the Olynthians. 

357. Timotheus prevents the revolt of Euboea. Chios and many other 
places throw off the supremacy of Athens, and thus give rise 
to the Social war (b c. 357 — 355). Expedition against Chios 
and death of Chabrias. 

356. Second year of the Social war. Iphicrates and Timotheus deposed 
from the command, which is entrusted to Chares, who forms 
connections with Artabazus. Birth of Alexander the Great. 
Philip interferes in the affairs of Thessaly. 

355. The Social war concluded by a peace, which deprives Athens of 
most of her allies, and of a great part of her revenue. Com- 
mencement of the Sacred war (b.c. 355 — 346), waged in the 
first instance by the Thebans against the Phocians. 

354. The Phocian Philomelus defeats the Locrians and Thebans near 
Delphi. 

353. Defeat of the Phocians at Neon, and death of Philomelus, who 
is succeeded by his brother Onomarchus. Sparta makes war 
against Megalopolis and Argos. 

352. Philip defeats Phayllus ; but is soon afterwards himself defeated 
in two battles by Onomarchus, and retires into Macedonia. 
In a second campaign in Thessaly, Philip gains a complete 
victory at Magnesia over Onomarchus, who is slain. Phayl- 
lus succeeds him as commander in chief of the Phocians. 
Philip repulsed from Thermopylae. 
Demosthenes delivers his first Philippic. 

351. The Phocians continue the war in Boeotia. Death of Phayllus. 

350. Philip establishes tyrants in Euboea Expedition of Phocion to 
Euboea. Philip lands at Marathon. 

349. Philip marches against Olynthos. The Athenians send an army 
to assist the Olynthians. 

347. Olynthos and many other Thracian and Chalcidian towns fall 
into the hands of Philip, who razes them to the ground. 

346. The Phocians defeat the Boeotians at Coroneia. Philip concludes 
a peace with the Athenians and marches into Boeotia. The 
Phocians submit : their towns are destroyed and their country 
laid waste. End of the Sacred war. 

344. Philip begins to interfere in Peloponnesus. The Athenians 
negotiate a peace between the belligerents in Peloponnesus. 
Philip makes a successful expedition into Xllyricum. 
Demosthenes delivers his second Philippic. 

343. Philip continues his conquests. 

342—341. Philip's expedition into Thrace. Selymbria taken. 
340. Philip lays siege to Perinthos and Byzantium. The Athenians 
resolve on war. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



641 



339. Phocion compels Philip to raise the sieges of Perinthos and By- 
zantium. Philip defeated by the Triballians. 

335. Philip appointed commander in chief of the forces of the Am- 

phictions. Commencement of the Amphissian "war. The 
Athenians form an alliance with the Thebans. Battle of 
Chaeronea, in which Philip gains a decisive victory. Peace 
concluded by Philip with Athens and Thebes. Phocion at 
the head of affairs at Athens. 
337. Congress of the Greek states on the Isthmus" of Corinth. Philip 
elected commander in chief of the Greeks to conduct the war 
against Persia, for which great preparations are made. 

336. Festivals celebrated by Philip at Aegae. Assassination of Philip, 

and accession of Alexander the Great, who compels all the 
Greeks except the Spartans to acknowledge his supremacy. 
A permanent congress of deputies appointed to meet at 
Corinth. 

335. Alexander makes expeditions against the Triballi, Getae, and 
Illyrians. In consequence of a report of his death, many 
Greek states revolt. Alexander storms Thebes, which is 
razed to the ground. He accepts the submission of Athens. 

334. Alexander sets out on the expedition against Persia. Battle of 
the Granicus. 

333. Battle of Issus. Agis III. forms a confederacy against Macedonia, 

which the Athenians refuse to join. 
332. Alexander takes Tyre. AJexandria founded. 
331. Alexander enters Babylon. Agis defeated and slain by Antipater 

near Megalopolis. The Spartans submit. 
330—323. Alexander engaged in conquering the East. 
324. Nicanor sent by Alexander to the Olympic games to command 

the restoration of the exiles. Harpalus escapes from Asia 

to Greece, and is slain in Crete. The Harpalian inquisition 

occasions the exile of Demosthenes. 
323. Alexander dies at Babylon. Confederacy of the Greeks against 

Macedonia. Its general Leosthenes defeats the Boeotians and 

Antipater, whose overtures for peace are rejected. Death of 

Leosthenes. 

322. Leonnatus defeated and killed in a battle gained by Antiphilus, 
the successor of Leosthenes. Antipater defeats the confede- 
rates near Crannon, and compels Athens to surrender: the 
Athenian constitution changed. Death of Demosthenes. 

321. Death of Perdiccas, and re-distribution of the countries conquered 
by Alexander. 

318. Death of Antipater, who is succeeded by Polysperchon : he pro- 
claims the independence of Greece. Nicanor takes possession 
of Piraeus. 

317. Death of Phocion. Athens submits to Cassander, who appoints 
Demetrius of Phaleron its governor. His administration lasted 
for ten years (b. c. 318 — 307). 

315. Cassander commands Thebes to be rebuilt. 



642 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



B.C. 

314. Antigonus and his rival Ptolemy declare the Greeks to be free. 

315 — 311. War of the Macedonian generals against Antigonus, con- 
cluded in the last year by a general peace, which divided the 
empire of Alexander among four rulers, and guaranteed the 
independence of Greece. 

312. Demetrius Poliorcetes defeated near Gaza. 

308. Cassander makes terms of agreement with Ptolemy. 

307. Demetrius Poliorcetes becomes the master of Athens, and restores 

to the people its ancient freedom and constitution. Demetrius 
of Phaleron leaves the city. 

308. Demetrius Poliorcetes defeats Ptolemy off Cyprus, and conquers 

the island. The five generals of Alexander assume the title 
of king. 

304. Demetrius lays siege to Rhodes, and compels it to conclude 
a peace : he returns to Greece and overthrows the government 
of Cassander, who had been repulsed from Athens by Demo- 
chares. Demetrius comes to Athens. 

301. Battle of Ipsus, in which Antigonus is defeated and slain. Deme- 
trius refused admission into Athens. 

300. Demetrius allies himself with Seleucus, and is successful in Asia. 

296. Death of Cassander. Athens besieged by Demetrius: its sur- 
render to him. He goes into Peloponnesus and defeats 
Archidamus. 

295. Civil war in Macedonia. 

294. Demetrius kills Alexander, mounts the throne of Macedonia, and 

for seven years exercises sway over nearly all Greece. 
291. Revolt of Thebes. 
290. Subjugation of Thebes by Demetrius. 

287. Demetrius dethroned by Pyrrhus, who becomes king of Mace- 

donia. Athens recovers her freedom. 

288. Pyrrhus expelled from Macedonia by Lysimachus. 

283. Death of Demetrius Poliorcetes and of Demetrius of Phaleron. 
281. Lysimachus defeated and slain in a battle near Sardis gained by 
Seleucus. 

280. Greece invaded by the Celts. Foundation of the Achaean league. 
279. The Celts routed at Delphi. 

278. Antigonus Gonatas ascends the throne of Macedonia. 

274 — 272. Pyrrhus king of Macedonia. In the latter year he is repulsed 

from Sparta, and killed soon afterwards. 
269 — 262. Antigonus besieges Athens, which is at length compelled to 

submit to the Macedonians. 
251. Aratus elected strategus of the Achaean league. 
244. Agis IV. becomes king of Sparta, and endeavours to introduce 

many reforms. 

243. Aratus expels the Macedonian garrison from Corinth, and extends 

the power of the Achaean league. 
241. Agis putto death. 

229- The Macedonian garrison quits Athens. 

226. Aratus strategus of the Achaean league for the eleventh time. 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



643 



B.C. 

Cleomenes carries into effect the measures proposed by Agis. He 
commences war against the Achaean league. The Aeto- 
lians conclude a treaty with Sparta. 

225. Cleomenes takes Metydrion. Accusation of Aratus. 

224. Aratus strategus of the Achaeans, who resolve on war. They 
are defeated in several battles by Cleomenes, and implore the 
aid of Antigonus Doson, to whom they give up Acrocorinthus. 

223. Antigonus enters Arcadia. 

222. Cleomenes takes Megalopolis, and invades Argolis. 

221. Antigonus enters Laconia. Battle of Sellasia, in which the 
Spartans are utterly routed, and Philopoemen distinguishes 
himself. Cleomenes Sees to Egypt. Antigonus takes Sparta 
and restores the ephoralty. 

220. Death of Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and suicide of Cleomenes. 
Lycurgus makes himself sole king of Sparta. An alliance 
formed between the Aetolians and Sparta, which led to the 
second Social war. Aratus defeated by the Aetolians. 

219. Philip V. of Macedonia invades Aetolia, Elis, and Arcadia: the 
Aetolians invade Achaia. 

218. Phiiip again invades Aetolia, and defeats Lycurgus near Sparta. 
The Aetolians take the Panachaicon. 

217. Philip concludes a peace with the Aetolians. End of the Social 
war. 

216. Philip prepares for war with the Romans. 

215. Philip enters into an alliance with Hannibal. 

214. The Roman general Laevinus invades Illyricum and defeats 

Philip. 
213. Death of Aratus. 

211. The Romans enter into a treaty with the Aetolians. Laevinus 
takes Oeniadae and Zacynthos. Death of Lycurgus : Macha- 
nidas becomes first tyrant of Sparta. 

210. Laevinus takes Anticyra. 

208. Philip defeats the Aetolians near Lamia ; but is himself defeated 
in Elis. Fruitless negotiations for peace. Philopoemen be- 
comes strategus of the Achaean league. 

207. Attains of Pergamus takes part in the war. Philopoemen 
defeats Machanidas near Mantinea. 

206. The Romans cease to take part in the war. 

205. The Aetolians make peace with Philip. 

204. Peace concluded between Philip and the Romans. 

202. Philip makes war on the Rhodians and Attalus. 

201. Philip offends the Aetolians by attacking their allies. 

200. Philip invades Attica and lays siege to Athens. Commencement 
of the second Macedonian war. 

199. The consul Villius Tappulus fails in an attempt to invade Mace- 
donia. 

1 98. The consul Flamininus gains successes over the Macedonians, and 
secures the aid of the Achaeans : he concludes a truce with 
Philip, and winters in Phocis and Locris. 



644 



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE. 



197. Flamininus completely defeats Philip in the battle of Cynosee- 
phalae, and compels him to sue for peace. 

196. Peace ratified by the Romans, who reserve to themselves the 
right to occupy Acrocorinthus, Demetrias, and Chalcis. Fla- 
mininus proclaims the freedom of Greece at the Isthmian 
games. 

195. Flamininus makes war on Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, and compels 
him to accept terms of peace. 

194. The Roman garrisons withdrawn from the three fortresses. War 
between Nabis and the Achaeans. 

192. Philopoemen defeats Nabis near Pleiae. Nabis is killed by the 
Aetolians. The Achaean league embraces the whole of 
Peloponnesus. Antiochus of Syria arrives in Greece. 

191. The Romans defeat the Aetolians and Antiochus at Thermopylae. 
The king flees to Asia. 

190. A truce for six months between the Romans and Aetolians. 

189. War recommenced, but finally terminated by the consul M. 
Fulvius Nobilior; the power and influence of the Aetolian 
confederacy annihilated. 

188. The Achaeans declare war against Sparta. Philopoemen con- 
quers the Lacedaemonians and abolishes the constitution of 
Lycurgus. 

182. The Messenians revolt from the Achaean league. Philopoemen 

taken prisoner by the Messenians and put to death. 
181. Sparta again incorporated with the Achaean league. 
179. Death of Philip : his successor Perseus prepares for war with the 

Romans. Callicrates begins his intrigues for the dissolution 

of the Achaean league. 
171. Commencement of the third Macedonian war. 
168. The Romans completely defeat Perseus in the battle of Pydna. 

End of the war. 

167. One thousand of the principal Achaeans, including Polybius, sent 

to Rome ; 550 distinguished Aetolians put to death at Rome. 
155. The Athenians send three ambassadors to Rome. 
151. Return of the Achaean exiles to Greece. 

148. The consul Metellus makes war against the pretender Philip of 
Macedonia. 

147. The Achaeans declare war against Rome. Metellus defeats 
them at Heraclea and Scarpheia, and destroys Thebes. Diaeus 
rejects all proposals of peace. 

146. The consul Mummius defeats the Achaeans in the battle of 
Leucopetra, and takes Corinth. Death of Diaeus. The 
Achaean league dissolved. Henceforth the Romans were 
the virtual rulers of Greece. 



INDEX. 



n stands for note. 



A. 

Abae, 261. 549. 
Abantes. 38. 191. 
Abantidas, 602. 
Abdera, 219. 

Abydos, 250. 269. 455; Battle of, 458. 469. 

509. 512. 613. 
Academy, 303. 
Acanthos, 251. 396. 516. 
Acarnania, 362. 522. 602. 610, 613. 
A carnaii ians. 378, 379. 393. 506. 511. 528. 

556. 609. 611. 613. 
Achaeans, 28. 33-35. 51. 55, 56. 63. 83, 84. 

86—88. 101. 103, 104. 119. 188, 189. 191. 

311. 511. 549. 561. 572.578. 599. 
Achaean league, 599—601. 602—614. 617. 

619—625. 
Achaeus, 28. 33—35. 

Achaia, 8. 11. 34 . 35 . 86. 213 . 252 . 315 . 345. 

384. 414. 525. 532. 535. 558. 600. 609. 625. 
Acharnae, 349. 

Achilles, 25. 34, 35. 56. 61. 77. 

Achradina, 432. 444. 

Acrocorinthus, 605. 607. ^15. 

Acropolis (of Athens), 11 n. 83. 151. 162. 

264. 323. 
Acte, 397. 

Actium, battle off, 324. 
Actium, 619. 

Adeimantus, 264. 339. 467. 469. 

Admetus, 295. 

Adriatic, 200. 

Aeaces, 236. 

Aeacus, 35. 

Aeetes, 50. 

Aegae, 562. 570. 572. 

Aegaleos, Mount, 266. 

Aegean, 9 ; Islands of, 13. 16. 285. 353. 

Aegeus, 44—46. 

Aegialos. 34, 35. 

Aegila, 130. 

Aegimius, 32. 

Aegina, 35. 91. 127. 157. 186, 187. 239-241. 
254. 263. 266, 267. 270. 272. 286. 290. 307, 
308. 326. 342. 350. 424. 470. 512. 521. 577. 
581. 584 . 615 . 626. 



Aeginetans, 340. 350. 339, 390. 
Aegion, 600. 605. 
Aegition, 378. 

Aegospotami, battle of, 469. 489. 

Aegyptus, 19. 

Aeiranestus, 280. 

Aeneas, 55. 

Aenianians, 508. 

Aeolian Islands. 376. 380. 

Aeolians, 28-31. 35. 83. 86. 89. 138, 189, 

198, 199. 218. 
Aeolis, 2H. 83. 189. 235. 501. 
Aeolus, 28—32. 
Aepvtus, 119. 122. 

Aeschines, 536. 543. 551, 552 557. 564. 
Aeschylus, 306. 327. 491. 494. 513. 
Aethra, 44. 
Aetna, Mount, 380 n 

Aetolia, 31. 43. 377, 378. 527. 5S9. 593 . 600 
—602. 609. 

Aetolian league, 601, 602. 6G4, 605. 608— 

612. 615— 6 i9. £22. 
Aetolians, 85, 86. 378. 567. 576. 578, 579, 

580. 582. 
Aetolus, 31. 
Africa, 194, 195. 

Agamemnon, 52, 53. 66. 83. 320. 
I Agariste, 302. 
Agatharchus, 327. 
Agesandridas, 457. 

Agesilaus, 485. 497. .500 72. 502—509. 511. 

513. 5,6. 518. 521, 522. 527. 535—537.570. 
Agesilaus (ephor). 599. 
Agesipolis I., 506. 507. 511. 516. 518. 
Agesiuolis III., 608. 
Agiatis, 599. 605. 
Agis I., 88. 98. 

Agis II., 377. 381. 412, 413. 436. 447. 451. 

454. 461. 470. 473. 502. 
Agis (II.. 571—573. 
Agis IV., 598, 599. 
Agnonides, 583. 
Agoratus, 474. 
Agraeus, 89. 

Agrigentum, 194. 209. 271. 
Agvlia. 219. 

Agvrrhius, 487, 488. 512. 
Alalia, 219. 



646 



INDEX. 



Alaric, 626. 
Alcaeus,41. 177. 206. 
Alcamenes, 88. 121. 

Alcibiades, 354 n. 372. 394 n. 408 — 414. 

417 — 428. 430, 431. 448 — 466. 469. 485. 

489. 493. 506. 587. 
Alcidas, 367.369, 370. 374. 
Alcinous, 78. 
Alcmaeon, 154. 216. 

Alcmaeonids, 174, 175. 181, 182. 184.247. 

342. 
Alcman, 206. 
Alcmena, 41—43. 
Aletes, 89, 90. 
Aleuadae, 248. 251. 544. 
Alexamenus, 617. 

Alexander (son of Amyntas), 229. 256. 273. 

278. 281. 
Alexander (of Macedonia), 531. 
Alexander (of Pherae), 530, 531. 541. 544. 
Alexander the Great, 540. 555. 559. 561 — 

578. 

Alexander (of Epirus), 562. 
Alexander (son of Alexander the Great), 
575. 582. 

Alexander (son of Polysperchon), 583 — 
585. 

Alexander (brother of Philip IV.), 591. 

Alexandria, 574, 575. 596. 606, 607. 

Alope, 350. 

Alos, 29. 50, 51. 

Althaemenes, 91, 92. 191. 

Altis, 140. 

Alyattes, 214, 215. 

Alyzia, 522. 

Amadocus, 512. 

Amasis, 173. 220. 

Amazons, 190. 

Ambracia,379. 435. 555. 618. 

Ambraciots. 333, 334. 355. 361, 362. 379. 506. 

Ameinias, 267. 

Amompharetus, 279. 

Ampe, 237. 

Amphea, 121. 

Amphictionic league, 136—139. 
Amphictions, 298. 545, 546. 552, 553. 556, 

557. 566. 
Amphictvon, 28. 31. 136. 
Amphipolis, 321. 332. 396, 397. 401 — 405. 

407. 426. 507. 541, 542. 551. 567. 570. 
Amphissa, 261. 619. 625. 
Amphissians, 547. 557. 
Amphitryon, 41, 42. 
Amyclae, 88. 91. 131. 
Amyntas (i ), 229. ; (il.) 516. 518. 531. 
Amyrtaeus, 312. 
Anacharsis, 159. 
Anacreon. 206. 222. 
Anactorium, 337. 407. 
Anaea, 191. 
Anaeans, 368. 
Anaideia, 161. 

Anapos, river, 429. 432. 438. 443. 
Anaxagoras, 302. 330, 231. 371. 
Anaxander, 130. 
Anaxibius, 512. 
Anaximander, 2f9, 210. 
Anaximenes, 208. 
Andania, 128—130. 



Andocides, 422. 427. 486. 
Andraemon or Andropompus, 190. 
Androcles (i.), 120.; (li.), 423. 
Androclus, 190. 
Andromache, 64. 
Andronidas, 622. 
Andros, 268—270.321.464. 
Anopaea, 259. 

Antalcidas, 510. 512 ; peace of, 513. 515. 517. 

523. 525. 527. 
Antandros, 458. 
Anthela, 137. 
Antic vra, 611. 
Antigonus. 582. 584—590. 
Antigonus Gonatas, 591. 593—595. 603. 
Antigonus Doson, 604—608. 
Antioch, 596. 
Antiochus, 120. 121. 
Antiochus (Athenian), 465. 
Antiochus II!. (or the Great), 616. 618. 
Antipater, 559. 572, 573. 576—583. 
Antipater (brother of Philip IV.), 591. 
Antiphilus, 579, 580-. 
Antiphon, 454. 457- 564. 
Antissa, 369. 
Antissaeans, 367. 
Antisthenes, 450. 
Antony, 626. 
Anytus, 496. 
Aones, li, 12. 
Aous. river, 615. 
Aphetae, 257. 
Aphidnae, 128, 129. 
Aphidnus. 129. 
Aphytos, 518. 

Apollo, 47, 48. 70,71. 123. 129.138.177.198. 

241. 261. 281. 365. 392. 394. 548. 557. 602. 
Apollonia. 333. 516. 596. 610. 614. 
Apries, 195. 220. 
Apsos, river, 614. 
Aracus, 468. 

Aratus, 595. 600. 602—605, 607-610. 
Arcadia, 11. 15, 16. 31.84.118. 128, 129.133. 

240. 605. 608. 
Arcadians, 84. 123. 133. 527—529. 531— 

535. 561. 567. 572. 577, 578. 603. 
Arcadian league, formation of, 527. 553. 
Areas. 16. 
Archander, 34. 
Archedicus. 588. 
Archestratus, 338. 

Archias (i.), 193.; (n.), 519.; (in.), 581, 582. 
Archidamus 11., 300. 341.346. 348, 349.352. 

358, 359. 365. 371. 377- 
Archidamus III., 526. 531. 533. 537. 546. 571 . 
Archidamus IV. 591. 
Archilochus, 114. 206. 
Archimolius, 181. 
Architeles. 34. 

Arehonship, institution of, and changes 

in, 154—156. 166. 
Ardericca. 248. 

Areopagus, 167. 169, 170. 174 . 286 . 291. 305, 

306. 489. 560. 626. 
Areus, king. 594. 601. 
Argaeus, 592. 
Argilius, 293. 

Arginusae, battle of, 467. 485. 489. 
Argolis, 11. 19. 33,34. 333. 388. 



INDEX. 



647 



Argonautic expedition, 29. 49—52. 54. 

Argos, Amphilochian, 355. 379. 

Argos, 9—11. 19. 21—37. 86, 87. 89. 91. 

118. 127—129. 134. 175. 176. 197. 252. 

254. 275. 294. 301. 326. 345. 354. 403. 405 

—408.410—414. 416. 427. 434. 449, 450. 

475. 502. 505. 508. 510, 511. 513. 515, 516. 

528-531. 533, 534.553,554.561. 603— 

606. 616. 623. 
Ariadne, 45. 47. 
Ariaeus, 498. 
Arion, 206. 
Aristaenus, 614. 
Aristagoras, 228. 230—235. 
Aristarchus, 457, 458. 
Aristeus, 339. 355. 

Aristides. 253. 266, 267. 276. 282. 286—288. 

290—292. 297. 302. 305. 317. 404. 
Aristion, 626. 
Aristocrates, 130. 133. 
Aristodemus (Heracleid), 84. 86. 98. 
Aristodemus (Messenian), 122—124. 128. 
Aristodemus ( Spartan). 507. 
Aristogeiton, 179, ISO. 182. 572. 
Aristogenes, 467. 
Aristomachus, 604. 
Aristomenes, 128—134. 
Ariston, 240. 

Aristophanes, 328, 329. 370—372. 386 n. 

396 n. 468 n. 480. 488. 491—496. 
Aristotle, 25. 103. 483, 484. 489. 492. 565. 
Armenia, 499. 
Arrhibaeus, 395. 399, 400. 
Arrhidaeus, 575. 579. 
Arrian, 567. 
Artabazanes, 248. 
Artabazus, 270. 278. 280,231. 289. 
Artabazus, 544. 

Artaphernes, 230. 233. 235. 238. 241. 
Artaxerxes, 296. 307, 308. 
Artaxerxes II. 497, 498. 500.513. 
Artaxerxes III., 544. 
Artayctes, 285, 286. 

Artemis, Limnatis, 119. 130 ; Asiatic, 190. 

Artemis, 114. 202. 241. 243. 

Artemisia, 265. 267, 268. 

Artemisium, 256 ; battle of, 257, 258. 263. 

Arts in the heroic age, 75 — 81 ; previously 

to the Persian war, 201—203. 
Asclepius, 77. 
Ascra, 204. 
Asia, 9. 

Asia Minor, 9, 10. 12. 21. 86. 89. 173. 189 — 

192. 197, 198. 214—224. 
Asina, 383. 
Asine,33. 118. 124. 
Asopos, 258. 276, 277. 279. 344. 
Aspasia, 330, 331. 352 n. 371, 372. 
Aspendos, 458. 512. 
Assinaros, river, 444. 
Astacos, 350. 363. 
Asterius, 47. 

Astronomy in the heroic age, 74. 
Astyages, 216. 

Astyochus, 449, 450. 454-^456. 
Atalanta, 404. 
Atarnae, 501. 
Athamanes, 29.615. 
Athamas, 29. 51. 



Athera. 9. 19, 20. 128. 148. 162. 175. 186. 

215. '262. ^81. 293. 323. 329. 342. 477. 572. 

587. 589. 
Athenaeon, 604. 
Athenaeus 595. 
Athenagoras 424. 

Athens legends respecting, 9. 20. 44—46 ; 
Aeolians at, 83 ; Epidaurians at. 89 ; be- 
sieged by the Dorians, 90 ; be< omes the 
head of the Attic confederacy, 148. 1.^0, 
151 ; enlarged, 151 ; origin of democracy 
at, 152; abolition of monarchy at, 154; 
archonship instituted, 154, 155 ; first 
written laws of, 156; conspiracy of Cy- 
lon at, 157, 158 ; prevalence of party 
feuds at, 161 ; visited by Epimeuides, ib. ; 
division of its citizen- by Solon into four 
classes. 165 : Council of Four Hundred, 
166, 167; popular assemblies, 167, 168 ; 
popular judicial courts {helinen), 1C8, 
169; foundation of its navy, 171, 172; 
treatment of aliens at, 172: condition of 
slaves at, ib. ; revival of party feuds 
at, 173 ; tyrannis of Pis stratus at, 
173 — 178; adorned by Pisistratus, 177, 
178; pove Tied by Hippias, 178 -181; 
its constitution reformed by Cleis- 
thenes. 182-184 ; Cleomenes at, 184; 
at war with Sparta, Thebes, and Chalcis, 
185 ; with Aegina, 186, 187. 239 : recog- 
nised as the common parent of the Ioni- 
ans. 197 : envoys of Darius put to death 
at, 239 ; its navy increased 254 ; aban- 
doned by its inhabitants, 263 ; taken by 
Xerxes, "264 ; its inhabitants return to it, 
27- ; ; again abandoned by its inhabitants, 
and occupied by Mardonius, 274 ; its 
restoration, 286—288 : obtains the supre- 
macy of Greece, 290. 291 ; changes intro- 
duced into its constitution by Aristides, 
291 ; aristocratic and democratic parties 
at, 303— 306 ; adorned by Cimon, 303; 
changes eff cted by Pericles at, 305, 306 ; 
its long walls completed, 310 ; factious 
spirit of the aristocratic party at. 311 ; a 
congress of the confederates summoned 
to, 313; concludes a truce with Sparta 
for thirty years, 315; Pericles acquires 
the chief power at, 316; becomes the 
sovereign of the confederacy, 320, 321 ; 
adorned by Pericles, 323—325 : state of 
literature at, 326-329; concludes an 
alliance with Corcyra, 336 ; hostilities 
with the Corinthians, 337 — 340 ; its allies 
in the Peloponnesi m war, 346 . plague at, 
352—354 ; effects of the death of Pericles 
on, 357: at war with Lesbos, 365 — 373; 
fii st property-tax at. 368 ; begins to inter- 
fere in Sicily, 375, 376 : plague a second 
time at, ."76; concludes the peace of Nicias, 
404,405 ; enters into alliances with Argos, 
410. 414 ; resolves on sending an expe- 
dition to Sicib, 420 ; mutilation of the 
Hermaeat, anditsconsequences,421 — 423. 
427, her allies revolt, 447—419 ; oligarchy 
established at, 453 — 455 ; democracy re- 
established 457 ; return of Alcibiades 
to, 462, 463 ; invested by the Spartans, 
470, 471 ; surrenders to Lysander, 472 ; 



648 



INDEX; 



under the government of the Thirty Ty- 
rants, 473 — 476 ; their overthrow, and 
the re-establishment of democracy, 476, 
477 ; Solonian constitution restored, 478 ; 
its greatness, 479 ; its political state, 485, 
486 ; changes in its constitution, 489 ; 
state of literature at, during the Pelo- 
ponnesian war, 490—496 : its walls re- 
built, 510 ; forms a confederacy against 
Sparta, and completes its fortifications, 
521 ; forms an alliance with the Arca- 
dians, 532; concludes a peace with Philip, 
542 ; besieged and taken by Antipater, 
580,581 ; democracy overturned at, 581 ; 
submits to Cassander, 584 ; admits De- 
metrius Poliorcetes, 587 ; besieged by 
Cassander, 589 : stormed by Demetrius, 
590, 591 ; besieged and taken by Anti- 
gonus Gonatas, 594. 595 ; besieged by 
Philip V., 613 ; under' the Romans, 625 
—627. 

Athos, Mount, 14. 238. 249. 401. 459. 

Atintania, 613. 

Atlas, 74. 

Atossa, 225. 248. 

Atreus, 52. 86. 

Attaginus, 276. 282. 

Attalus (Macedonian), 561. 565. 

Attalus (King), 611. 613. 615. 625. 

Attic tetrapolis, 33. 38. 

Attic tribes, 36, 37. 148—150. 182. 

Attica, 11. 16. 19, 20. 33-38. 43-46. 52. 83, 
84.86.90 ; its early civil history, 148 — 
151 ; its constitution as settled by The- 
seus, 151 — 156 ; as reformed by Draco, 
156, 157; by Solon, 159—173 ; invaded 
by Cleomenes, 185 ; invaded by the Per- 
sians, 242 — 245 ; a second time, 263, 264 ; 
ravaged by Mardonius, 276 ; invaded by 
the Peloponnesians, 315 ; first invasion 
of, in the Peloponnesian war, 348, 349 ; 
second, 354 ; third, 365 ; fourth, 368 ; 
fifth, 381 ; sixth, 436 ; ravaged by the 
Acarnanians, 613 ; by Philip V., 614. 

Augeas, 42. 

Augustus, 619. 625—627. 
Aulis, 189. 589. 
Automate, 34. 
Autophradates, 571, 572. 
Axius, river, 31. 



B. 

Babylon, 217, 218. 224. 227. 573. 576. 
Bacchylides, 326. 
Barce, 221. 
Bards, 77. 
Barsine, 575. 

Battle, the " tearless," 531, 532. 
Battus, 195. 
Belgius, 593. 
Belmina, 604. 623. 
Bithynia, 462. 501. 621. 
Black Sea, 49. 72. 

Boeotia 11,12. 19,20.28, 29. 42. 83. 188. 
252.- 275, 276. 314. 346. 377, 378. 392—394. 
505—508. 515. 519 522, 523. 525. 566. 585. 
602. 624. 



Boeotians, 89, 90. 273. 349. 392—394. 404. 

407, 408. 427. 438. 458. 503. 511. 516. 521. 

528. 578. 609. 611. 618. 621. 
Boges, 298. 
Boreas, 256. 
Bosporus, 194. 
Bramins, 99. 

Brasidas, 350. 362. 374. 383. 391, 392. 394 — 

404.484. 
Brennus, 593, 594. 
Brygians, 239. 
Bura, 600. 
Butes, 37. 
Byzantians, 610. 

Byzantium, 194. 230. 234, 235. 237. 288, 
289. 292. 320. 456. 462. 470. 512. 521. 534. 
539. 543, 544. 556. 



C. 

Cabiri, 21. 
Cabyla, 552. 

Cadmea, 21. 517. 520. 545. 560. 567—569. 
624. 

Cadmeans, or Thebans, 32. 33. 49. 88. 
Cadmus, 20, 21. 79. 
Cadmus (of Miletus), 207. 
Calaurea, 137. 581. 
Calippus, 594. 

Callias (i.),174. ; (n.), 253. 297. 339. 340.; 

(in.), 549. 
Callibius, 474. 
Calibrates, 621—623. 
Callicratidas, 466, 467. 
Callidromos, 258. 
Callimachus, 243—245. 
Callipeuce, 565. 
Callirhoe, 178. 
Calliste, 194. 
Callistratus, 524. 
Caliixenus, 468. 
Calydon, 31. 379. 511. 
Calydonian boar, 49. 
Catnarina, 193. 375, 376. 426. 430. 
Cambyses, 220—223. 
Cameiros, 191. 
Caphyae, 604. 60S. 
Caranus, 127. 229. 
Cardia, 459. 
Carduchi, 499. 

Caria, '234. 355. 368. 469. 501. 504. 

Carians, 46. 189—191. 200. 219. 

Carneades, 623. 

Carthage, 221. 430, 431. 621. 

Carthaginians, 219. 237. 271. 

Caryae, 130. 

Carystus, 241, 242 . 298. 

Cassander, 575. 582—586. 588—591. 598. 

601. 
Castor, 54. 

Catana. 193. 426. 428-431. 435. 

Cato, 622. 

Caucones, 12. 

Caunos, 220. 

Ceadas, 131. 

Cecropia, 148. 

Cecrops, 19, 20. 34. 148. Cecrops II., 44. 
Cecryphaleia, 307. 



INDEX. 



649 



Ceisus, 89. 

Celts, 567. 593, 594. 598. 601. 621. 
Cephallenia, 334. 350. 362. 378. 407. 522. 

524. 602. 609. 618. 
Cerdylion, 401. 
Cersobleptes, 541. 555. 
Ceryces, 452. 
Cerynea, 600. 

Chabrias, 512. 520. 522. 524. 529. 537. 543. 

579. 
Chaereas, 457. 
Chaeronea, 314. 392, 393. 
Chaeronea, battle of, 559. 561. 
Chalcedon, 230. 237. 461. 470. 
Chalcideus, 448, 449. 
Chalcidians, 407. 413. 506. 
Chalcidice, 193. 338—340. 361. 364, 394— 

405. 516. 

Chalcis, 185. 192, 193. 256. 310. 611. 614, 

615 . 617, 618 . 624. 
Chaones, 10. 362. 

Chares, 532 . 543, 544. 548 . 550. 556 . 558, 
559. 

Charicles, 423. 436. 
Charidemus, 550. 565. 569. 
Charilaus, 99. 101. 118. 
Charilaus (Samian), 226. 
Charminus, 450. 454. 
Charoeades, 376. 380. 
Charon, 519. 
Charondas, 211. 
Cheileos, 255. 
Cbeimerium, 336. 
Cheirisophus, 499. 
Chersicrates, 193. 

Chersonesus, 228. 299. 321. 466. 501. 541. 

550. 555. 590.. 
Chians, 237. 610, 611. 
Chios, 13. 189, 190. 218. 235. 237. 319, 320. 

354. 366. 388. 447—450. 458. 467. 521. 

534. 543. 556. 
Chiron, 77. 

Chremonides, 594, 595. 

Chronology of the history of Greece, 39. 

Chrysopolis, 460. 

Cilicia, 216. 241. 590. 

Cilicians, 257. 267. 

Cimmerians, 214. 

Cimon (i.), 179; (n.), 288. 290. 297—306. 

309. 311—313. 317. 486. 500. 570. 
Cinadon, 485. 502, 503. 
Cineas, 181. 
Cirrha, 557. 
Citium, 312. 
Claudius, 625. 

Clazomenae, 190. 235. 448, 449. 459. 513. 
Cleaenetus, 370. 
Cleandridas, 315. 
Clearidas, 402. 405. 
Cleinias (i.), 408. ; (n.), 602. 
Cleippides, 365. 

Cleisthenes (tyrant of Sicyon), 138. 
Cleisthenes (Athenian), 181.; his reforms, 

182—184. 186. 302. 
Cleitor, 118. 
Cleitus, 580. 

Cleombrotus, 265. 274, 275. 
Cleombrotus I., 518. 520. 522. 525, 526. 
Cleomedes, 415. 



Cleomenes I., 181. 184, 185 . 226. 232, 233. 
239, 240. 

Cleomenes (uncle of Pausanias), 368. 

Cleomenes III., 599. 604—607. 

Cleon, 370—373. 384-387. 391. 396 n. 399. 

401—404. 489. 493, 494. 540. 
Cleonae, 581. 604. 
Cleonymus, 423. 
Cleopatra, 562. 565. 
Cleophon,461. 489.; 
Cleopompus, 354. 
Cnemus, 362,363. 
Cnidos, 192. 219. 459. 508. 
Cnossos, 162. 
Codrus, 90. 154. 189, 190. 
Colchis, 49— 51. 
Collyphus, 557. 
Colonae, 292. 

Colonies, Grecian, 188—201 ; in Lesbos, 
189 ; in Aeolis,?6. ; in Ionia, 189—191 ; in 
Doris, 191 ; in the islands on the coast 
of Asia Minor, 192 ; in Cyprus, ib. ; in 
Sicily and Italy, 192—194 ; in Africa, 
194, 195; their relation to the mother 
states, 195, 196 ; society and govern- 
ment in, 196. 199 ; on the Propontis and 
Euxine, 199, 200 ; on the Adriatic, in 
Spain and Gaul, 200 ; in Egypt, 200, 201 ; 
arts and literature in, 201, 202; Athe- 
nian colonies in Lesbos, 373. 

Colonos, 453. 

Colophon, 190, 191. 209. 215. 370. 
Commerce in the heroic age, 75. 80. 
Conon, 462. 466, 467. 469. 507-510. 579. 
Corcyra, 193. 295. 333—338. 373-375. 381, 

382. 388. 424, 425. 436. 479. 522. 524. 

558. 

Corcyraeans, 251. 332—338. 

Corinth, 30, 31. 52. 89. 91. 201. 276. 283. 

286. 306, 307. 319. 326. 333. 362. 364. 387. 

430. 435. 505. 510. 528, 529. 552. 558, 559. 

561.566. 570. 585, 586. 588. 595.603—605. 

613. 616, 617. 623—625. 
Corinth, Gulf of, 355. 361, 362. 392. 411. 
Corinth, battle of, 507. 
Corinth, congress of, 566. 570. 573. 589. 
Corinthians, 123. 129. 131. 185. 193. 222. 

241 . 307, 308. 332—340. 362. 404. 406, 407. 

410, 411. 448. 471. 505—511. 513. 533. 

561.603. 
Corone, 620. 

Coroneia, first battle of, 314. 
Coroneia, second battle of, 508. 
Coroneia, 549 . 552. 590. 621. 
Coronus, 32. 
Corsica, 219. 

Cos, 192. 452. 465. 543. 556. 
Crannon, 580. 
Crataidas,91. 
Craterus, 579, 580. 582. 
Crenidae, 542. 

Cresphontes, 84. 86, 87. 118, 119. 
Creston, 14. 
Cretans, 190, 191. 

Crete, 9. 32. 45—48.91—96.100. 254. 363. 

572. 577. 614. 
Cretheus, 29. 
Creusa, 33. 

Crissa, or Cirrha, 138, 139. 194. 

F 



650 



INDEX. 



Crissaean Gulf, 355. 362. 

Crissaean. or first sacred war, 138, 139. 

Critias, 473. 475, 476. 

Critolaus, 623, 624. 

Croesus, 135. 173. 215—218. 

Crommyon, 387. 509. 

Crommyon, wild boar of, 44. 

Cromnos, 533. 

Croton, 194. 210-213. 225. 

Cryptia, 105. 

Cuma( Aeolian), 189, 190; (Italian),192. 235. 
Cunaxa, battle of, 498. 
Curetes, 10. 25. 38. 
Curtius, Q., 573. 

Cyclades, 46. 230. 241. 269, 270. 346. 613. 
Cyclopian architecture, 17. 
Cydonia, 222. 
Cyllene, 133. 362. 430. 
Cylon, 157,158. 161. 342. 
Cynosarges, 613. 

Cynoscephalae, first battle of, 531 . 
Cynoscephalae, second battle of, 615. 
Cynossema, battle of, 458. 
Cynuria, 118. 134. 

Cyprus, 9. 23. 173. 192. 234. 267. 288. 299. 

307. 312. 510. 513. 586. 588. 591. 
Cyrene, 195, 197. 221. 307. 577. 
Cyrenaic Pentapolis, 195. 
Cvrupedion, 593. 
Cyrus, 216—220. 224. 

Cyrus (the younger)/ 462. 465. 468. 497, 
498. 500. 

Cythera, 127. 261. 389. 395. 403, 404. 436. 

509. 
Cytinion, 558. 

Cyzicus, 199. 458—461 ; battle of, 460. 



D. 

Daedalus, 48. 
Damagetus, 134. 
Darais, 124. 
Danai, 19. 
Danaids, 19. 
Banaus, 19. 34. 

Dancing, 78 ; pyrrhic dance, 116. 

Darius, 181. 223—248 

Darius II., 497. 

Dascon, 429. 

Dascylion, 507. 

Datis, 241. 

Daurises, 234. 

Debt, law of, at Athens, 162 ; reformed by 

Solon, 164. 
Decelea, 431. 434. 436. 447. 458. 461. 464. 

473. 

Degmenus, 85. 
Deianira, 85. 
Deinocrates, 620. 
Deiphontes, 89. 

Delium, 392 ; battle of, 393, 394. 397. 426, 
Delos, 9. 45. 137. 177. 189. 241. 272. 283. 

290. 320. 380 n. 455. 615. 
Delphi, 30. 71. 86. 100. 134. 137—139. 261, 

262. 270. 278 . 282 . 313, 314 . 508. 545, 

546. 552. 557. 593, 594. 625. 
Delphians, 217. 313. 315. 
Delphic oracle, 25. 90. 99, 100. 122, 123. 128. 



134. 138,139. 157. 181, 182. 186. 197. 215. 

217. 240. 262. 293. 303. 333, 334. 341, 342. 

540. 546. 562. 
Delphinion, 450. 
Delphus, 91 . 

Demades, 156. 540. 559. 564. 569.572. 580- 

582 

Demaratus, 185. 239, 240. 261. 
Demeter, 19. 130. 137. 613. 
Demeter Panachaia, 600. 
Demetrias, 615. 617, 618. 
Demetrius Poliorcetes, 582. 586—592. 598. 
Demetrius (of Phaleron), 584—587. 592. 
595. 

Demetrius II., 608. 
Demetrius (of Pharos), 610. 
Democedes, 225, 226. 
Demochares, 560. 588, 589. 592. 595. 
Democritus, 623. 
Demonax, 197. 
Demonides, 304. 
Demons, 71. 

Demosthenes (general), 378, 379. 381 — 

387. 392—394. 435—445. 
Demosthenes (orator), 487. 524. 539. 543, 

544. 549—560. 562. 564—567. 569. 571. 

577. 580. 581. 
Dercyllidas, 501. 507. 509. 
Derdas, 518. 

Deucalion, 15. 25. 28. 32. 
Diaeus, 623, 624. 
Diasia, 158. 
Dinarchus, 564. 

Diodorus, 461. 473. 526. 536.541. 550. 
Diodotus, 373. 

Diogenes (Macedonian), 595, 603. 
Diogenes (philosopher), 623. 
Diomedon, 449. 452. 454. 467. 
Dion, 397. 

Dionysius (Phocaean), 236, 237. 

Dionysius (of Syracuse), 524. 529. 531. 

Dionysius, 587. 

Dionysus, 45. 328. 518. 

Diopeithes, 555. 

Dioscuri, 128—131. 

Diphilus, 490. 

Dipoenus, 202. 

Dius (Elean), 85. 

Dius (Ephesian), 561. 

Dodona, 7. 10. 71. 

Dolopians, 298. 

Domilus, 431, 432. 

Dorians, 28. 32, 33. 42. 47, 48. 83—96. 98— 
117. 188, 189. 191, 192. 197—199. 205, 206. 
252. 375. 

Doric tribes, 106. 

Doris, 33. 84. 191, 192. 261. 308. 346. 
Doriscos, 250. 251. 
Dorus, 28. 32. 

Draco, 156, 157 ; his laws repealed, 164. 

Dreams, 71. 

Dryopes, 118. 122. 124. 

Dryopis, 32, 33. 

Byrne, 625. 

Dyrrhachiura, 614. 



INDEX. 



651 



E. 

Earthquakes in Greece, 377. 
Ecbatana, 218. 
Echemus, 84. 
Echestratus,98. 118. 
Edonians, 396. 401. 

Education at Sparta, 112—114 ; at Athens, 

170, 171. 
Eetion, 580. 
Eetionea, 457. 
Egesta, 419. 425. 428. 
Egyptian colonies in Greece, 19, 20. 
Egvpt, its influence on the religion of 

Greece, 67. 71. 77. 200—202. 210. 217. 220, 

221. 248, 249. 307. 310. 312. 353. 389. 576. 

583. 596. 
Egyptians, 99. 267. 523, 524. 537. 
Eion, 33. 298. 396, 397. 401. 
Eira, Mount, 130—133. 
Elaeos, 458. 

Elateia, 558. 615, 616. 618. 

Elea or Velia, 209. 219. 

Eleans, 140. 404.406. 410,411.413.603.609. 

611. 618. 
Electryon, 41, 42. 

Eleusis, 124. 149. 276. 323. 349. 464. 476. 477. 
592. 

Eleusis, mysteries of, 20. 422. 464. 592. 
Elis, 30, 31. 85, 86. 100. 128, 129. 134. 346. 

350 . 410. 502 . 515 . 527—529 . 533. 535. 

561. 567. 572. 602. 609. 611. 
Elpinice, 305. 
Elymians, 193. 
Embaton, 369. 
Empedocles, 209. 
Emporiae, 200. 
Enipeus, 28. 
Enneaodos, 300. 

Epaminondas, 490. 517. 520. 523. 525, 526. 

528, 529. 531, 532. 534—536. 538. 545. 591. 
Eparetus, 609. 

Ephesus, 190, 191. 198. 202. 215. 233, 234. 
268. 295. 369. 461. 465. 468. 501. 503, 504. 
618. 

Ephialtes (i.), 260; (n.), 305, 306. 311 ; 

(in.), 567. 
Ephyra, 30. 77. 
Epicles, 459. 
Epidamnus, 332—334. 
Epidaurus, 37. 44. 89. 91. 191, 192.307. 354. 

388, 389. 411—414. 434. 528, 529. 603, 604. 
Epimenides, 161, 162. 
Epipolae, 429. 431—433. 435. 438,439. 444. 
Epirots, 522. 555. 609. 611, 612. 618. 
Epirus, 10. 25. 295. 583.591. 609. 615. 618. 

621. 

Epitades, 382. 384. 
Epitadeus, 484. 

Ephors, 108. 110. 125—127; their power 

increased, 482, 483. 
Ephoraltv abolished, 599 ; revived, 607. 
Ephorus,*343. 
Erae, 449. 
Erasinides, 466. 
Eratosthenes, 473, 474. 476. 
Erechtheus, 20. 33, 34. 37. 43, 44. 46. 
Eressos, 458. 



Eretria, 175, 176. 193. 233. 238. 241, 242. 

248. 457. 626. 
Erginus, 42. 
Erichthonius, 148. 
Erineus, river, 443, 444. 
Eryelos, 432. 

Erythrae, 190, 191. 276, 277. 281. 369.447, 
448. 

Eteonicus, 467, 468. 470. 
Ethiopians, 74. 
Euaenetus, 255. 
Euaephnus, 120. 

Euboeans, 506. 528. 534. 543. 556. 611. 

Euboea, 23. 33. 38. 43. 175. 191. 241, 242. 
257. 314, 315. 348. 367. 436. 447. 455— 
457. 459. 521. 549. 552. 555. 558. 585. 
605. 611. 

Eubulus, 460. 540. 

Eucleidas, 606. 

Eucleides, 477. 489. 

Eucles, 433. 

Eucrates, 371. 

Eudamidas, 517. 

Eudamidas I., 573. 598. 

Eumenes, 582. 616. 

Eumenides, 158. 161. 

Eumolpidae, 452. 

Eumolpus, 43. 

Eunoraus, 98, 99. 101. 

Euphaes, 121—123. 

Euphemus, 430. 

Euphrates, 498, 499. 

Euphron, 530. 

Euripides, 35, 36. 328. 491—494. 
Euripus, 256, 257. 350. 
Europa, 47. 53. 

Eurybiades, 256, 257. 263—265. 269. 
Eurydice, 575. 
Eurylochus, 378, 379. 

Eurymedon, 374. 377. 380—382. 388. 390. 

435, 436. 438—440. 
Eurymedon, battle of, 299. 
Eurypon, 98. 101. 
Euryptolemus, 468. 
Eurysthenes, 86. 88. 98. 100. 
Eurystheus, 42. 52. 84. 
Euthy crates, 550. 

Euxine, 9. 199, 200. 321. 460. 512. 551. 
Evagoras, 469. 511. 
Execestides, 159. 



F. 

Flamininus, T. Quinctius, 614—616. 620. 



G. 

Galatia, 594. 

Galba, P. Sulpicius, 611. 614. 

Galepsos, 401 . 

Gargaphia, 277. 279. 

Gaza, 586. 

Geira, 550. 

Gela, 194. 390. 418. 

Gelo, 254, 255. 271. 

Geographical knowledge in the heroic 
age, 72—74. 



2 



652 



INDEX. 



Geraestos, 503/ 
Geranea, passes of, 309. 
Getae, 567. 
Gillus, 226. 

Glabrio, M\ Acilius, 618.- 
Golden fleece, 50. 
Gongylus, 433. 
Gorgias, 376. 
Gorgidas, 521—523. 
Gorgo, 232. 
Gorgopas, 512. 
Goths, 626. 

Government, among the Pelasgians, 58; 
among the Hellenes, 59 — 61 ; in Crete, 
94; at Sparta, 107—110; in Greece ge- 
nerally, 142—147 ; aristocratic or oli- 
garchic, 144, 145 ; tyrannic, 145, 146 ; 
timocratic, 146 ; government at Athens, 
151—173 ; in the Grecian colonies, 197 
—199. 

Graecus, 7. 

Granicus, battle of the, 571, 572. 

Greece, advantages of the study of its 
history, 1 ; difference between its his- 
tory and that of Rome, 2—4; its in- 
fluence still exists, 5 ; its geographical 
position, 6 ; changes its name, 7, 8 ; 
ancient traditions respecting, 8, 9 ; earli- 
est inhabitants of, 9—17 ; its language, 
14 ; foreign settlers in, 18—23 ; their 
influence, 22, 23 ; religion of Greece, 
ib. ; the chronology of its early his- 
tory uncertain, 39 ; war its habitual 
state, 142 ; general forms of govern- 
ment in, 142—147 ; extension of its ci- 
vilisation, 563 ; invaded by the Celts, 
593, 594 ; its freedom proclaimed by Fla- 
mininus, 616 ; under the Romans, 625 — 
627. 

Greeks ; their religion, 22, 23 ; their ten- 
dency to personification, 24; maritime 
expeditions of, 51 ; their colonies in Asia 
Minor, 53 ; their alphabet, 79. 478 ; their 
migrations, 82 — 92 ; always united by 
their religion and language, 136 ; asso. 
ciations among the various tribes of, 
136—142 ; their colonies, 188—201 ; state 
of the arts, literature, and philosophy 
among, previously to the Persian war, 
201—212; their mode of warfare, 425, 426; 
elect Philip of Macedonia their com- 
mander-in-chief, 561 ; a permanent con- 
gress of, established at Corinth, 566; 
appoint Alexander the Great com- 
mander-in-chief, 566. 

Gryllus, 536. 

Gyges, 215. 

Gylippus, 431 . 433—445. 448. 484. 
Gythion, 310. 528. 606. 616, 617. 619. 



H, 

Hades, 68. 73. 
Hadrian, 626, 627. 
Haemonia, 83. 
Haemus, 567. 593. 
Hagnon, 354. 403. 
Haliae, 307. 354. 388. 528. 
Haliartos, 505. 621. 



Halicarnassus, 191, 192. 198. 
Halonesus, 555. 
Hamilcar, 271. 
Hannibal, 610. 616. 
Harmodius, 179, 180. 182. 572. 
Harmonia, 21 . 
Harpagus, 218, 219. 
Harpalus, 577. 
Hecataeus, 231. 
Hecatombaeon, 604. 
Hectenes, 12. 
Hegesistratus, 177. 
Helen, 52—54. 64. 128—130. 
Hellas, 7, 8. 25, 26. 
Hellen, 7. 24, 25. 

Hellenes, 7. 9. 12. 15. 19. 24, 25. 39. 58. 
62. 

Hellenic nation, its origin, 24, 25 ; its first 
known seats, 26 ; its distinctive features, 
ib. ; its gradual diffusion, 26, 27 ; mar- 
tial character, 27 ; acquires the supre- 
macy in Greece, ib. ; divided into four 
tribes, 28 ; its migrations, ib.; settlement 
in Boeotia and Thessaly, 29, 30 ; in Pelo- 
ponnesus, 30, 31 ; in Macedonia, 32 ; in 
Crete, ib. ; in Peloponnesus, 33, 34 ; 
in Attica, 34. 36—38. 

Hellespont, 9, 10. 13. 228. 249, 250. 268, 
269. 280. 285.457—459. 462. 469. 503. 509. 
512. 544. 556. 614. 

Helli, 10. 

Hellopes, 25. 

Heloros, 429. 443. 

Helos, 88. 528. 

Helots, 88. 103—106. 116. 133. 292. 300. 

342. 385. 403. 407. 484. 528. 
Hephaestus, 75, 78. 
Hera, 43. 51, 52. 56. 202. 279, 280. 
Heraclea, 403. 506. 579. 601. 618. 623, 624. 
Heracleans, 528. 

Heracles, 32. 40—43. 52—56. 71. 84, 85. 
413. 

Heracles (son of Alexander theGreat,)575. 
Heraclidae, 33. 35. 84—92. 214. 
Heraclides, 433. 
Heraclitus, 208. 
Heraea, 605. 

Hermae, 179. 417. 421—423. 427. 
Hermione, 33. 354. 528. 603, 604. 
Hermippus, 330. 
Hermocopidae, 421 — 423. 
Hermocrates, 390. 418. 424 . 429, 430. 433. 
436. 442. 

Herodotus, 14. 19. 21, 22. 32, 33. 36. 53. 

66, 67. 79. 175, 202. 220. 246. 255. 271. 

275. 321. 513. 
Heroes, 71. 

Heroic age of Greece, 39 — 57 ; its chrono- 
logical limits, 39 ; slavery in, 58 ; go- 
vernment in, 59—61 ; punishment of 
criminals, 62 ; intercourse of states, ib. ; 
piracy, *ib. ; condition of women, 63 ; 
marriage, ib. ; treatment of strangers, 
64 ; convivial usages, ib. ; treatment of 
inferiors, 65 ; practices in war, ib. ; 
religion, 66—72 ; priests, 69, 70 ; oracles, 
70, 71 ; worship of heroes, 71 ; geogra- 
phical knowledge, 72—74 ; navigation, 
74 ; commerce and arts, 75, 76 ; war, 



INDEX. 



653 



76 ; the healing art, 77 ; poetry and the 
fine arts, 77—81 ; architecture, 78 j 
sculpture, ib. ; writing, 79, 80, 

Hesiod,3l. 67. 85. 203, 204. 

Hestia, 196. 

Hestiaeotis, 32, 33. 

Hestiodorus, 354. 

Himera, 194. 271. 428. 433. 

Himeraea, 380. 

Hipparchus, 178—180. 

Kippasus, 89. 

Hippias, 175. 178—182. 186, 187. 233. 242— 
245. 

Hippoclus, 181. 
Hippocoon, 42. 

Hippocrates (i.). 392—394 ; (n.), 460.' 

Hippodamus, 288. 

Hippomachus, 476. 

Hippomenes, 154 — 156. 

Hipponax, 206. 

Hipponicus, 377. 

Hippotes, 89. 

Histiaea, 521. 

Histiaeus, 228—231. 234, 235. 

Homer, 19. 21. 28. 34. 39 n. 46. 52. 55—57. 

67. 72. 74, 75. 77—81. 203—205. 214. 
Homeric poems, 58. 61—64. 66, 67. 71, 72, 

74, 75. 77—81. 114. 178, 179. 
Hyacinthia, 274. 
Hyantes, 11, 12. 
Hybla, 194. 
Hybris, 161. 
Hyccara, 428. 
Hyilus, 52. 84, 85. 
Hypata, 602. 
Hyperbolus, 489. 540. 
Hyperides, 559. 564. 578, 579—581. 
Hyria, 30. 
Hyriae, 414. 
Hysiae, 185. 



Ialysos, 134. 191. 
Iasos, 450. 
Ibycus, 207. 222. 
Idas, 54. 

Illyrians, 332, 333. 399, 400. 541, 542. 554, 
555. 561. 567. 579. 607. 610. 613. 

Illyricum, 610, 611. 621. 

Imbros, 13. 230. 243. 513. 543, 544. 587. 615. 

Inarus, 307. 

Inessa, 380. 

Iolcos, 29. 31. 49. 

Ion, 11. 28. 33. 36, 37. 149. 

Ionia, 189—191. 231—238. 283. 457. 

Ionian confederacy, origin and regulation 
of, 290, 291 ; changes in, 299. 317, 318. 
320 321. 

Ionia'ns, 11. 14. 28. 32, 33. 35-38. 84. 86. 

189—191. 197—200. 202. 208. 218, 219. 

267. 272. 284, 285. 289. 369. 375. 
Iphicrates, 509. 512. 524, 525. 529. 544. 
Iphitus, 139. 

Ipsus, battle of, 582, 583. 590. 
Isagoras, 182. 184. 
Ismenias, 476. 506. 517. 531. 



Isocrates, 313. 538. 
Ister, 567. 

Isthmian games, 141 . 616. 628. 

Isthmus of Corinth, 274. 281. 309. 

Istone. 375. 382. 388. 

Italy, 72, 73. 192. 194. 

Ithome, 31. 122—124. 300, 301, 528. 



Jason, 49—51. 

Jason (of Pherae), 526. 530. 
Jews, 220. 
Junius, 623. 
Justin, 490. 538. 594. 



Labdalon, 432. 434. 
Labotas, 98. 

Lacedaemonians. Vide Sparta. 

LcLChcLTGS 590 

Laches, 376. 380. 394 n. 398. 410. 412. 430. 
534. 

Laconia, 34, 35. 42. 47. 52, 53. 87, 88. 91. 

101—104. 118. 121. 300. 354. 389. 509. 609. 
Lade, battle off, 236, 237. 
Laertes, 61. 65. 

Laevinus, M. Valerius, 610, 611. 
Lamachus, 419. 425. 428. 432. 494. 
Lamia, 579, 580. 602. 611. 
Lampsacos, 189. 296. 456. 461. 469. 501. 
Laomedon, 53, 54. 
Lapithae, 32. 

Larissa, 10, 11. 13. 16. 506. 530. 
Larisus, 11. 
Las, 619. 
Lasion, 533. 
Lasthenes, 550. 
Laurion, 254. 304. 354. 487. 
Lebadea, 129. 
Lebedos, 190. 449. 
. Lechaeon, 508, 509. 
Lecythos, 398. 

Leleges, 10—12. 16. 19. 25. 38. 46. 189 — 

191. 
Lelex, 19. 31. 

Lemnos, 13. 47. 243. 318, 319. 513. 543, 544. 

Leocrates. 307. 

Leon (Sicily), 431. 

Leon, 452. 454. 466. 474. 

Leonidas, 258—260. 

Leonidas II., 598, 599. 

Leonnatus, 579, 580. 

Leontiades, 517. 519. 

Leontini, 375, 376. 381. 418. 425, 426. 

Leontium, 193. 

Leosthenes (i.), 541 ; Cn.), 578, 579. 
Leotychides II., 240. "272. 283—285 : III., 
502. 

Lepreum, 129. 411. 

Lesbos, 13. 189. 230. 235. 237. 319, 320. 354. 

365—373. 447. 449, 450. 458. 466, 467. 470. 

501. 512. 
Leucadians, 333, 334. 506. 
Leucas, 346. 362. 378. 433. 435. 524. 558. 
Leucimne. 336, 337. 
F 3 



654 



INDEX. 



Leucopetra, battle of, 624. 
Leuctra, battle of, 525—527. 530. 
Libya, 353. 389. 
Libys, 477. 
Lichas, 450. 452. 
Limera, 389. 434. 
Lindos, 191. 
Locri, 194. 380. 433. 

Locrians, 25. 31. 85. 194. 252. 310. 350. 375. 

378—381. 505, 506. 508. 528. 546, 547. 552. 

557. 611. 625. 
Locris, 350. 377, 378. 527. 558. 585. 601. 615. 
Locrus, 25. 31. 
Lycaeon, 604. 
Lycaon, 16. 
Lycaonia, 9. 
Lyceum, 177. 613. 
Lycia, 192. 198. 216. 219. 355. 
Lycians, 190. 
Lyciscus, 122. 
Lycomedes, 527. 529. 532. 
Lycon, 496. 

Lycophron, 544. 547, 548. 
Lycortas, 621. 

Lycurgus, and his legislation, 97—117. 139. 
620. 

Lycurgus (Athenian), 173 — 176. 
Lycurgus (orator), 539. 560. 567. 569. 
Lycurgus (ephor), 598. 
Lycurgus, sole king of Sparta, 608, 609. 
612. 

Lydia, 214—218. 461. 
Lydiadas, 603, 604. 
Lydians, 190. 
Lygdamis, 176. 
Lyncestis, 395. 
Lynceus, 54. 

Lysander, 391. 447. 464—466. 468—474.477. 

483. 497. 503. 505, 506. 
Lysias, 321. 473, 474. 

Lysicles (i.), 368. 371, 372; (n.), 558— 
560. 

Lysimachus, 582. 588. 590—593. 



M. 



Macarius, 379. 

Macedonia, 229. 305. 338,339. 364. 395. 400. 

459. 480. 516. 540—542. 548. 550—562.564. 

570, 571. 576. 578.581—583. 586, 587. 591. 

593. 604. 607, 608. 624. 
Macedonians, 32, 33. 
Machanidas, 612. 
Maeander, 501. 
Maeandrius, 226. 
Magi, 223, 224. 
Magnesia, 29. 531. 548. 
Magnesia (city), 201. 214. 218. 296. 
Magnetes, 83. 
Malians, 528. 
Mandrocles, 227. 

Mantinea, 410. 412 ; first battle of, 413. 515, 
516. 527. 533, 534 ; second battle of, 535. 
604—606. 612. 

Mantineans.406. 414. 

Marathon, 176. 242 ; battle of, 244—247. 
549. 



Mardonius, 238, 239. 248, 249. 265. 268— 

270. 272—282. 
Marriage in the heroic age, 63 j at Sparta, 

112. 

Masistius, 276, 277. 
Massagetae, 220. 227. 
Massilia, 200. 219. 
Mausolus, 543. 
Mazares, 218. 
Mecyberna, 550. 
Medea, 50—53. 
Medes, 214. 21G. 224. 
Medius, 506. 

Medon, the first archon, 154. 
Megabates, 230, 231. 
Megabazus (i.), 228—230; (n.) 308. 
Megacles (i.), 158. 161. 164; (n.), 173 
—176. 

Megalopolis, 527. 534 . 553. 561. 572, 573. 

584. 603—606. 621. 624. 
Megara, 44. 46. 91. 157.159, 160. 194. 199. 

274. 306—309. 314. 333. 340. 342. 351. 391, 

392. 394. 397. 474, 475. 509. 555. 558. 587. 

624, 625. 
Megara (Fort in Sicily), 429. 
Megarians, 277. 340. 361. 363. 391, 392. 394. 

404. 407. 603. 
Megaris, 375. 
Melanthius, 233. 
Melanthus, 87. 90. 154. 
Melesander, 355. 
Melesippus, 347, 348. 
Melissus, 209. 
Melite, 191. 
Melitus, 496. 
Mellon, 519. 
Melobius, 473, 474. 
Melos, 377. 414, 415. 470. 509. 
Memnon, 571, 572. 
Memphis, 220, 221. 307. 582. 
Menander. 490. 
Mende, 399, 400. 
Menedaeus, 379. 
Menelaus, 52. 53. 87. 
Menestheus, 154. 

Mercenaries, when first employed in Greece, 

525. 538, 539. • 
Mermnadae, 214. 
Mesembria, 237- 

Messana, or Messene (Sicily), 134. 193,194. 
Messene (Peloponnesus), 528. 620, 621. 
Messenia, 31. 87. 118—125. 127—134 . 513. 

528. 532. 534. 536. 553, 554. 561. 608. 620. 
Messenians, 90.119—134. 300, 301. 374.378. 

387. 407. 603. 609. 611. 618. 
Messenian war, first, 119—124; second, 

128—133 ; third, 300, 301. 
Metapontum, 194. 213. 
Metellus, 623, 624. 

Methone, 133. 350. 388. 404. 542. 547. 
Methvdrion, 604. 
Methymna, 365—367. 466, 467. 
Micion, 580. 
Midea, 531. 
Milesians, 284. 

Miletus. 190. 199, 200. 215. 218. 221. 228. 

231 . 235—237. 318. 448, 449—451 . 455. 459 

465, 466. 
Milo, 213. 



INDEX. 



655 



Miltiades, 179 . 228. 237, 238. 243—247. 285. 

Mimnermus, 2Q7. 

Mindarus, 456. 458—460. 465. 

Minoa, 375. 391. 

Minos, 45—48. 92. 95, 96. 99. 

Minotaur, 45. 47. 

Minyans, 29, 30. 42. 51, 52. 88. 91. 190. 195. 
Minyas, 29 ; treasury of, id. 
Mnasippus, 524. 
Mnesiphilus, 264. 
Molossians, 295. 
Molycrion, 362. 

Monarchy in the heroic age, 59—61 ; at 
Sparta, 108—110. 126, 127; causes of its 
abolition, 143; extinction of at Athens, 
154; in the Grecian colonies, 197; at 
Sparta, 597. 

Money among the Spartans, 111. 483. 

Mummius, L., 624, 625. 

Munychia, 288. 476. 581—583. 587. 591. 594, 
595. 

Musaeus, 12. 

Museum (Athens), 591, 592. 594, 595. 

Music, 77 ; at Sparta, 114. 

Mycale, 198; battle of, 283, 284. 455. 

Mycenae, 42. 52. 76. 

Mylae, 380. 

Myonnesus, 369. 

Myrcinians, 401 . 

Myrcinus, 228, 229. 235. 

Myrmidons, 35. 

MyroD, 121. 

Myronides, 308. 310. 

Mytilene, 176, 177. 365-373. 466, 467. 521. 
Myus, 190. 231, 232. 296. 



N. 

Nabis, 612. 614. 616, 617. 619. 
Naryx, 506. 
Naucratis 220. 

Naupactus, 85! 89. 301. 310. 355. 362, 363 

374. 378, 379. 387. 392. 602. 
Nauplians, 133. 
Nausicaa, 63. 

Navigation in the heroic age, 74 
Naxos. 45. 176. 193. 230, 231. 241. 295. 298. 
321. 522. 

Naxos (Sicily), 381. 426. 429, 430. 435. 
Nectanebis, 524. 536. 
Neda, 132. 

Neleus, 30. 42. 87. 189, 190. 
Nemea, 507. 
Nemean games, 141. 
Neodamodeis, 484. 503. 
Neon, 547. 
Nero, 626. 
Nestor, 42. 
Nicaea, 552. 
Nicanor, 576. 583. 
Niceratus, 474. 

Nicias, 372. 375. 377, 378. 385. 387. 389. 391. 

400. 404, 405. 409, 410. 415. 419, 420. 424, 

425. 428—445. 474. 
Nicocles, 603. 
Nicolochus, 522. 
Nicomachus, 478. 
Nicomedes, 309. 

F F 



Nicopolis, 619. 625. 
Nicostratus, 374. 400. 412. 
Niebuhr, 595 

Nisaea, 160. 307. 315. 363. 375. 384. 391, 392. 
404. 

Nobilior, M. Fulvius, 618. 
Notion, 370. 465. 
Nymphodorus, 350. 



O. 

Odeum, 323. 
Odysseus, 61 . 205. 
Oechalia, 31. 
Oeneon, 378. 

Oeniadae, 311. 362, 363. 576. 609. 611. 

Oenoe, 185. 348, 349. 458. 

Oenophyta, battle of, 310. 

Oenus, river, 606. 

Oeta, mount, 32. 

Ogyges, 19. 

Omens, 71. 

Onchestos, 137. 568. 

Onomacles, 449. 

Onomarchus, 547. 

Opus, 310. 611. 

Oracles, 70, 71. 

Orchomenos. 29— 31. 42. 314 . 412. 505. 523. 
527. 547—549. 552. 560. 568. 604. 606, 607. 
623. 

Oreos, 321. 611. 

Orestes (i.), 85. 114. 134; (n.), 623 
Orestes (Thessalian), 310. 
Oricon, 610. 
Orneae, 416. 553. 
Oroetes, 223, 224. 

Oropus, 349. 377. 393, 394. 436. 453. 532. 

559, 560. 622, 623. 
Orpheus, 12. 
Ortygia, 432. 437. 
Ossa, 9. 16. 32. 
Ostracism, 184. 
Otanes, 226. 230. 235. 
Othrys, Mount, 26. 
Olympia, 281. 366. 533. ■ 
Olympiad, first, 39. 139, 140. 
Olympias, 561, 562. 575. 583. 
Olympic games, 127. 134. 139—142. 206. 

502. 533. 576. 
Olympieum (Syracuse), 428, 429. 434= 
Olympus, 9. 32. 74, 606. 
Olvmpiodorus (i.), 277 ; (n.), 589. 592. 594. 
Olynthus, 270. 339, 340. 516—518. 541, 542. 

549—551. 
Oxylus, 85, 86. 



P. 

Paches, 368—370. 373. 
Pactolus, battle of, 504. 
Paeon, 31. 

Paeonians, 31. 228, 229. 542. 
Pagasae, 547. 
Pagasae, Gulf of, 256. 
Pagondas, 393. 
Palaerus, 350. 
Pallantion, 604. 

4 



656 



INDEX. 



Pallene, 333. 340. 398. 
Pamphylians, 190. 
Pan, 243. 
Panachaicon. 609. 
Panacton, 408. 410. 
Panaetolia, 602. 
Panathenaic festival, 179, 180. 
Pandion (i.),37; (ii.), 44. 
Panhellenia, 626. 
Panormos, 449. 
Pantaleon, 215. 
Paphlagonia, 214. 
Paralus, 357. 
Parion, 459. 
Paris, 53. 77. 
Parmenides, 209. 
Parmenio, 561 . 
Parnassus, Mount, 25. 261. 
Paros, 247. 615. 
Parthenii, 125 n. 
Parthenon, 323. 
Parthenope, 200. 
Parthenians, 613. 
Pary satis, 497. 
Pasiphae, 47. 
Patrae, 362. 411.609.625. 
Patroclus, 594. 

Pausanias, 274—283. 288—290. 292—295. 
342. 358. 

Pausanias, king, 368. 470. 477. 505, 506. 
516. 

Pausanias (Macedonian), 562. 
Pausanias (pretender), 542. 
Pausanias (historian), 121. 619. 622. 
Pedasa, 219. 
Pegae, 315. 384. 
Peison, 473. 
Pelasgia, 10, 11. 

Pelasgians, 9; origin of, 10; first dis- 
tinct mention of, ib. ; other design- 
ations of, ib. ; diffusion of, 11, 12; a 
general name, including many tribes, 
12 ; their origin, 13 ; constitute the 
great bulk of the population of Greece, 
ib. ; their language compared, with the 
Hellenic or Greek, 14 ; its transition 
into the Hellenic, 38 ; their settlements 
in Italy, 14; not barbarians, 15 ; their 
pursuits, 16 ; their oldest divinities, ib. ; 
their architecture, 17 ; their migrations, 
22 ; how connected with the Hellenes, 
26 ; comparison between them and the 
Hellenes, 27 ; their connection with the 
Achaeans, 35 ; with the Ionians, 36 — 38 ; 
their government, 58 ; religion, 66. 189. 
214. 298. 

Pelasgus, 15, 16. 

Peleus, 61. 

Pelias, 30. 49. 

Pelion, 16. 

Pella, 550, 551. 554. 

Pellene, 528, 529. 534, 535. 604. 

Pellion, 568. 

Pelopidas, 517. 519, 520. 522, 523. 525. 528. 
531, 532. 536. 

Peloponnesian war : causes and occasions 
of, 332 — 347 ; from its commencement 
till the end of the third year, 348—364 ; 



the fourth and fifth years, 365—376 ; from 
the sixth year to the pacification of 
Sicily, 377—390 ; from the pacification of 
Sicily to the peace of Nicias, 391—405; 
from the peace of Nicias to the conquest 
of Melos, 406 — 416 ; the Sicilian expe- 
dition, 417— 445 ; from the close of that 
expedition to the restoration of Alci- 
biades, 446—463 ; from the return of 
A lcibiades to the end of the war, 464 — 
472 ; its effects on Athens, 480 ; on 
Sparta, 481 . 

Peloponnesus, 6. 11, 12. 18. 21. 30, 33—35. 
37. 83—91. 

Pelops, 8. 21. 35. 

Pelusium, 220. 

Penelope, 63. 

Peneus,9. 28. 83. 251. 

Pentapotamia, 373. 

Peparethos, 541. 

Perdiccas II., 338, 339. 351. 364. 395. 399— 
401.413. 

Perdiccas (general of Alexander the 

Great), 541, 574. 582. 
Pergamus, 596. 611. 616. 
Periander, 177. 

Pericles, 247. 302. 304—306. 308, 309. 311 
—332.342, 343. 346—349. 351,352.354. 
356, 357. 364 . 371. 372 . 396 n. 417. 447. 
479. 486—488. 490. 563. 579. 602. 

Perieres, 31. 

Perinthos, 228. 460. 556. 

Perioeci, 484. 528. 

Periphates, 44. 

Perrhaebians, 10. 83. 

Perseus, 41, 42. 

Perseus (King), 619. 621. 

Persians, 216—224. 244. 

Peteus, 20. 

Phalaecus, 549. 551, 552. 
Phalanthus, 125 n. 
Phalces, 89. 

Phalerum, 181. 265—267. 288. 303. 
Phanomachus, 354. 
Pharae 130. 

Pharnabazus (!.), 448. 458—462. 466. 50©, 

501. 504, 505. 507—509. 524. 
Pharnabazus (n.), 571, 572. 
Pharsalus, 506. 
Phayllus, 547—549. 
Pheax, 418. 
Pheia, 350. 

Pheidon (i.), 27. 229 ; (n.), 476. 
Pherae, 29. 544, 545. 548. 551. 554. 
Pherecydes, 207 . 210. 
Pheres 29. 

Phidias, 323. 329, 330. 371. 564. 
Phidippides, 242, 243. 
Phigalea, 608. 

Philip (brother of Perdiccas), 338. 364. 

Philip (of Macedonia), 490. 

Philip (II. of Macedonia), 531. 540—562. 

Philip IV., 591. 

Philip V., 608—616. 

Philippi, 542. 

Philippides, 588. 

Philippopolis, 552. 

Philippus, 519. 



INDEX. 



657 



Philocles, 467. 469. 
Philocrates (i.) f 511 ; (n.), 551. 
Philomelus, 546, 547. 
Philonomus, 88. 

Philopoemen, 606. 612. 614. 617. 619—621. 
Philosophy, Ionian School of, 208 ; Eleatic, 

209; Pythagorean, 210—212. 
Philoxenus, 577. 
Phlegyans, 30. 

Phlius, 89.414. 516. 518, 519. 529. 532. 
Phocaea, 190. 199, 200. 209. 218, 219. 465. 
Phocians, 30. 189, 190. 252. 258—261. 308, 

309. 313, 314. 505, 506. 534. 545. 553. 568. 

609. 611. 

Phocion, 549. 555, 556. 560. 577—580. 582— 
584. 

Phocis, 12. 263. 280. 315. 346. 378. 527. 558. 

585. 601. 615. 
Phocus, 30. 

Phoebidas, 517. 521. 545. 

Phoenicians, 18. 20, 21. 23. 41. 48. 75. 79, 

80. 193.200. 221. 234. 267. 319. 
Phoenix, 47. 

Phormio, 340. 355. 362, 363. 
Phrixus, 50, 51. - 
Phrygia, 21. 462. 504. 579. 
Phrygians, 55. 

Phrynichus (dramatist), 237. 326, 327. 

Phrynichus (general), 449—452. 454. 457. 

Phrynon, 177. 

Phthia, 32. 34. 

Phthiotis, 28. 32. 531. 

Phya, 175. 

Phyle, 476. 519. 

Phyllidas, 519. 

Pierians, 12. 

Pindar, 205. 326. 568. 

Pindarus, 215. 

Pindus, Mount, 15. 32. 

Piracy in the heroic age, 62. 

Piraeon, 449. 

Piraeus, 288 . 296 . 303 . 323 . 332. 353. 363, 
364. 423. 446. 461. 470—472. 475—477. 
512. 521. 583, 584. 586. 591. 594, 595. 
614. 

Pisa, 86. 134. 

Pisander, 423. 452—454. 457, 458. 
Pisander (brother of Agesilaus), 504. 508. 
Pisatis, 533. 
Pisidians, 497. 

Pisistratus, 160. 173—178. 302. 
Pissuthnes, 369. 
Pittacus, 176. 
Pittheus, 44. 

Plataeae, 263. 274. 277. 279 ; battle 'of, 
279—281. 282. 343—346.358—361. 404. 515. 
520. 523. 552. 561. 569, 570. 

Plataeans, 242, 24a 252. 276. 282.486. 568/ 

Plato, 352 n. 354 n. 394 n. 483. 491. 495. 

Pleiae, 617. 

Pleistarchus (i.), 274.; (n.), 590. 
Pleistoanax, 315. 404. 
Pleistos, river, 138. 
Plemmyrion, 434, 435, 437. 
Pleuron,31 379- 

Plutarch, 102. 246 n. 271. 305. 313. 343. 

357. 446. 464. 483. 535. 569. 603. 607. 
Plutarchus (of Eretria), 549. 
Polemarchus, 474. 



Polichae, 414. 
Pollis, 91. 
Polybiades, 518. 
Polybius, 607. 621,622. 
Polychares, 120. 

Polycrates, 210. 221-223. 225, 226. 

Polydectes, 99. 

Polydeuces, 54. 

Polydorus (i.), 125 ; (n.) 530. 

Polyphron, 530. 

Polysperchon, 575. 582—586. 589. 598. 
Poseidon, 9. 31. 37. 44 n. 45. 55. 198. 270. 

281. 293. 362. 581. 
Posidonia, 194. 

Potidaea, 270. 332. 338—340. 342. 354, 355 . 

361. 367, 368. 399—401. 517. 542. 
Prasiae, 354 434. 
Praxitas, 509. 
Priam, 53. 55. 
Priene, 190. 218. 
Priests in the heroic age, 69, 70. 
Procles (i.). 86. 88. 98. 100 ; (n)., 378. 
Proconnesus, 459—461. 
Propontis, 9, 10. 14. 194. 199 . 234. 459. 

461. 

Propylaea, 323, 324. 
Prosopitis, 307. 
Protagoras, 330. 
Protomachus, 467. 
Proxenus, 557. 
Prusias, 611. 612. 
Psammenitus, 220, 221. 
Psammetichus, 200, 201. 
Psammetichus (Libyan), 322. 
Pseudo-Philip, 623, 624. 
Psophis, 609. 
Psyttaleia, 266, 267. 
Ptblemy Ceraunus, 593. 
Ptolemaeus, 582. 583—593. 
Ptolemy Philadelphus, 594, 595. 
Ptolemy, III., 606. 

Ptolemy Philopator, 606, 607. 610, 611. 
Ptolemy Epiphanes, 613. 
Pydna, 339. 542. 575 ; battle of, 621. 
Pylos, 30. 42. 87. 133. 382—387. 395. 403, 

404 . 407, 408 . 410, 411. 416. 436. 
Pyrrha, 25. 
Pyrrhias, 611. 
Pyrrhus, 591, 592. 594. 598. 
Pythagoras, 210—213. 
Pythian games, 139. 141. 552. 553. 
Pythodorus, 380. 390. 



R. 

Religion of the Pelasgians, 16.; of the 
Greeks, how far derived from that of 
Egypt, 22; from that of the Phoeni- 
cians, 23: in the heroic age, 66—72; 
taught by Socrates, 495. 

Rhamnus, 580. 

Rhapsodists, 81. 

Rhegium, 133. 193. 219. 376. 381. 425. 
Rhegnidas, 89. 
Rheneos, 604. 
Rhianus, 121. 
Rhion, 362. 363. 411. 



658 



INDEX. 



Rhode or Rhodos, 200. 

Rhodes, 9. 19. 91, 92. 134. 191, 192. 200.450. 

452. 511. 512. 521. 534. 543. 556. 589. 596. 
Rhodians. 610, 611. 613.614. 
Rhone, 200. 

Romans, 596. 602. 608. 610—627. 
Roxana, 575. 



S. 

Sacians, 244. 

Sacrifices, human, 69. 161. 
Sadyattes, 215. 
Sagalassos, 192. 
Salaethus, 368. 370. 

Salamis, 159, 160. 263, 264 ; battle of, 266 

—268. 270. 274. 297. 364. 367. 470. 584. 
Salmoneus, 30. 
Samians, 236. 284. 317. 369. 
Samos, 129. 189. 191. 198. 202. 210. 221 — 

223. 226. 241. 272. 283. 318-320. 332. 

449—458. 461. 464—467. 470. 473. 543, 

544. 559. 576. 583. 
Samothrace, 21. 191. 
Sane, 397. 
Sappho, 207. 

Sardis, 216, 217. 224 . 228 . 230. 233 . 235. 

249— 251. 459.498.504. 
Satyrus, 475. 
Scaea, 34. 
Scandeia, 389. 
Scarpheia, 629. 
Sciathos, 256. 
Scione, 398—401. 404. 
Scipio, 622. 
Sciron, 44. 
Scironides, 449. 454. 
Scotussa, 615. 

Sculpture, 78, 79. 202, 203. 564. 596. 
Scyllis, 202. 

Scyros, 298. 513. 544. 615. 
Scythians, 214. 226—228. 
Segesta, 431. 

Seleucus, 588. 590. 592, 593. 
Selge, 192. 

Selinus, 194. 419J425. 433. 

Seilasia, 470. 528 ; battle of, 606, 607. 

Selli, 7. 10. 

Selymbria, 460. 555. 556. 
Sempronius, 612. 
Sepias, Cape, 256. 

Sestos, 250. 285. 459. 461. 469. 509. 570. 

Seuthes, 499. 512. 

Sever us, 627. 

Sicanians, 193. 

Siceliots, 418 n. 433. 435. 

Sicels, 193. 

Sicily, 46. 48. 72, 73. 192-194. 237. 271. 

335, 336. 375, 376. 380, 381. 390. 417—421. 

424—445. 
Siculi, 418 n. 435. 

Sicyon, 89. 129. 310. 311. 326. 334. 394.411. 

414. 508. 528—530. 553. 585, 586. 588,589. 

595. 602, 603. 605. 
Sicyonians, 362. 622, 623. 
Sidos, 509. 

Sigeum, 176, 177. 181. 186, 187. 
Simonides, 326. 



Sinis, 44. 
Sinope, 200. 321. 
Siphae, 392, 393. 
Siphnos, 572. 
Sisyphus, 30. 

Sitalces, 350. 355. 364. 499. 

Slavery in the heroic age, 58 ; in Crete, 

93 ; at Athens, 162. 172. 
Smyrna, 191. 215. 

Socrates, 354 n. 394 n. 468. 473. 491, 494 

—496.564. 
Sollion, 350. 407. 

Solon, 138. 140. 159—162; his legislation, 
163—173 ; his death, 174 ; his laws main- 
tained by Pisistratus, 177. 216. 

Solygeia, 387. 

Sophocles (general), 380—382. 388. 390. 
Sophocles (poet), 327, 328. 491—494. 496. 
Sosicles, 186, 187. 
Sosthenes, 593. 
Sous, 118. 
Spain, 200. 

Sparta becomes the capital of the Hera- 
cleids, 88 ; colonizes Crete, 91 ; its in- 
stitutions in connection with those of 
Crete, 92—96 ; the chief Dorian state in 
Peloponnesus, 97 ; its institutions as set- 
tled by Lycurgus, 97 — 117; results pro- 
duced by its conquest of Messenia, 124— 
127 ; advances towards the supremacy 
of Greece, 134 ; forms an alliance with 
Croesus, 135; opposed to tyrannies, 
146 ; acts as umpire between the Athe- 
nians and Megarians, 160 ; sends an 
army to expel Hippias from Athens, 
181; makes war on Athens, 184, 185; 
poetry and music encouraged at, 206 ; 
sends an embassy to Cyrus, 218 ; ho- 
noured by Amasis, 220 ; assists the Sa- 
mians, 222 ; refuses to assist Aristagoras, 
232 ; envoys of Darius put to death at, 
239 ; conduct of, in the first Persian in- 
vasion, 243. 246 ; in the second, 273— 
275 ; conduct of, towards Athens after 
the battle of Plataeae, 286, 287 ; loses 
the supremacy of Greece, 290 ; earth- 
quake and insurrection of the Helots at, 
300 ; Megabazus sent to, 308 ; sends an 
army to Delphi, 313 ; concludes a truce 
with Athens for thirty years, 315 ; con- 
gresses held at, in which war against 
Athens is resolved on, 340—342; its 
allies in the Peloponnesian war, 345, 
346 ; conduct of, towards Plataeae, 358— 
361 ; the Athenians advance to the 
neighbourhood of, 367 assists the 
Lesbians, ib. ; its first fleet in Asia 
Minor, 368—370 ; makes proposals of 
peace to the Athenians, 384 ; concludes 
the peace of Nicias, 404, 405 ; sends an 
embassy to Athens, 410 ; concludes a 
treaty of alliance with Argos, 413; 
Alcibiades at, 430, 431 ; becomes amari- 
tim'e power, 447 ; concludes its first 
treaty with Persia, 448, 449 ; how af- 
fected by the Peloponnesian war, 481, 

482 ; coined money first introduced at, 

483 ; changes in the constitution of, 
484, 485 ; new league formed against, 



INDEX. 



659 



505, 506 ; attacked by Epaminondas, 528; 
concludes a treaty with Athens, 529 ; 
submits to Philip, 561 ; forms a league 
against Macedonia, 571, 572 ; Demetrius 
appears before it, 591 ; changes in its 
constitution, 597 — 599 ; taken by Antigo- 
nus Doson,607 ; taken by Philopoemen, 
617 ; v/ho remodels its constitution, 619, 
620 ; unde the Romans, 627. 

Spartolos, 361. 

Sphacteria, 382— S87. 403. 

Sphodrias, 520, 521. 

Stagiros, 396. 401. 

Stenycleros, 119. 122. 128. 129. 

Stesichorus. 206. 

Stesicles, 524. 

Sthenelaidas, 341. 

Sthenelus, 42. 52. 

Strabo, 35. 394 n. 

Stratocies, 588, 589. 

Stratos, 362. 

Strombichides, 448. 455. 

Struthas, 510. 

Strymon, river, 269. 321 . 

Sulla, 626. 

Sulmone, 30. 

Sunium, 436. 448. 457. 

Susa, 225. 230. 572. 

Sybaris, 194. 200. 212, 213. 

Sybarites, 321, 322. 

Sybota, 336 ; battle of, 337, 338. 

Syke, or Tyche, 432. 

Syloson, 226. 

Syracosius, 493. 

Syracusans, 460 .461. 

Syracuse, 193, 194. 375, 376. 380, 381. 417 — 
419. 424—426. 428-444. 512. 

Syria, 576. 583. 586. 588. 592. 596. 613. 621. 



T. 

Tachus, 536, 537. 

Taenarus, 293. 342. 577, 578. 

Tanagra, 30 ; battle of, 309, 310. 377. 625. 

Taphians, 10. 41. 

Tappulus, P. Villius, 614. 

Tarentum, 125. 194.424. 610. 

Tartarus, 73. 

Taitessus, 200. 

Taulantians, 332. 

Taygetus, Mount, 113. 

Tegea, 118. 134, 135. 240. 255. 258. 271. 412, 

413. 505, 506. 527. 534, 535 . 561. 599. 604, 

605. 

Tegeatans, 277. 407. 
Telamon, 53. 
Telchines, 23. 
Teleboans, 10. 
Teleclus, 119, 120. 
Teleutias, 511, 512. 518. 
Tellias, 433. 
Telys, 212. 213. 
Temenites, 429. 438. 
Temenus, 84. 86, 87. 89. 91. 229. 
Temmices, 11, 12. 
Tempe, 9. 251. 255. 615. 
Tenedos, 237. 369, 370. 
Tenos, 241. 



Teos, 190. 219. 448, 449. 
Terillus, 271. 

Teutamus, or Tectamus, 47. 
Teutiaplus, 369. 
Thales, 159. 208, 209. 
Thamyris, 12. 
Thapsacus, 498. 
Thapsos, 432. 

Thasos, 23. 238. 299, 300. 456. 459. 
Theagenes (I.), 157, 158 ; (n.), 569.. 
Thebans, 185, 186. 260. 280. 282, 283. 404, 

471. 475, 476. 505—508. 510. 513—536. 545 

—553. 557—560. 576. 
Thebes, 21. 41 , 42. 49. 79. 88. 176. 197. 239. 

252. 275. 280. 282, 283. 343—346. 359— 

361. 392. 410. 517. 519—536. 560. 566—569. 

585. 587. 624. 
Themison, 532. 

Themistocles, 252—255. 257. 262—266. 269 
—271. 286—288. 294—296. 298. 302. 487. 
570. 

Theocles (i.), 129. 132, 133; (ii.), 193. 

Theodorus, 202. 

Theognis, 473. 

Theomestor, 283. 

Theopompus, 123. 125. 

Theramenes, 454. 457. 460. 468. 471. 473. 

475. 489. 
Theras, 195. 
Therme, 251. 256. 351. 
Thermopylae, 256; battle of, 258— 261. 548. 

551. 565—567. 579. 594. 601, 602. 605. 618. 

624. 

Thermos, 602. 609. 
Theron, 271. 
Thera, 195. 

Theseus, 43 — 47. 54; his legislation, 150— 
154. 298 n. 

Thespiae, 263. 276. 520, 521. 523. 552. 568. 

570. 625. 
Thespians, 252. 258. 260. 393. 
Thespis, 206. 
Thesprotians, 43.' 334. 
Thessalians, 83. 138. 181. 252. 255. 261. 273. 

309. 507. 534. 546—548. 552. 565. 611. 
Thessalus (i.), 7; (n.), 178. 
Thessaly, 7. 10. 16. 25. 28—30. 33, 34. 36. 

43. 47. 240. 269, 270. 309. 395. 403. 531. 

544. 550. 554. 565. 579, 580. 590. 602. 609. 

611. 615. 618. 621. 624. 
Thimbron, 500. 501. 510. 
Thrace. 47. 219. 228. 338. 394, 395. 398. 462. 

466. 470. 541, 542. 555. 5/2. 581. 583. 594. 

611. 613. 621. 
Thracians, 12. 55. 83. 281. 300. 501. 579. 
Thrasybulus, 454. 456. 458, 459. 462. 465. 

474. 476, 477. 489. 512. 
Thrasycles, 448. 

Thrasyllus, 454—456. 458. 459. 461. 
Thrasymelides, 383. 
Thronion, 350. 547. 

Thucydides, 21. 105. 179. 309, 312. 331, 332. 

338. 340. 343. 352. 361 . 370—373. 375. 379. 

391. 396 n. 396, 397. 403 n. 404. 406. 408, 409. 

42.2, 423. 445. 450. 458, 459 n. Alb. 479, 

480. 486. 491. 563. 
Thucydides (son of Milesias), 316. 
Thurium, or Thurii, 321, 322. 332. 427. 
Thyestes, 52. 



660 



INDEX. 



Thymoetes, 90. 154. 
Thyrea, 350. 389. 390. 
Tiberius, 625. 
Tigranes, 284. 
Tigris, 498. 
Timagenidas, 283. 
Timocleia, 569. 

Timocrates (or Hermocrates), 505. 
Timotheus, 522. 524. 541. 543, 544. 
Tiribazus, 510. 512, 513. 
Tiryns, 52. 
Tisamenus, 85, 86. 
Tisamenus (soothsayer), 278. 
Tissaphernes, 233. 447—456. 458—462. 465. 

498—504. 
Tithraustes, 504, 505. 
Tlepolemus, 191. 
Tolmides, 310. 314. 
Torone, 397—401. 404. 550. 
Trachinians, 506. 
Tragedy, Attic, 206. 326-329. 
Trapezus, 499. 
Treres, 214. 
Triballians, 556. 567. 
Tricca, 31. 
Trisparadeisos, 582. 
Triphylia, 89. 129, 130. 502. 533. 
Troezen, 8, 9. 37. 44, 45. 89. 191. 263. 315. 

354. 384. 388. 528, 529. 577. 603, 604. 
Trogilos, 433. 
Trojans, 13. 

Trojan War, 13. 52—57. 62. 82. 

Trophonius, 129. 

Troy, 53—55. 

Tyndareus, 42. 52. 

Tyrrhenians, 219. 237. 430. 432. 440. 

Tyrtaeus, 114. 124. 128, 129. 131. 205. 



V. 

Vespasian, 626. 

Volcanic agency, traces of, in Greece, 8, 9 
W. 

Women, their condition in the heroic age 
63; at Sparta, 112; at Athens, 171; in 
Persia, 224. 

Writing, art of, 79-81. 

X. 

Xanthippus, 247. 272. 285. 
Xanthos, 219, 220. 
Xenocrates, 581. 
Xenon, 622. 
Xenophanes, 209. 

Xenophon, 354. 394 n. 473, 474 n> 477. 

491. 495. 498—500. .502. 508. 511. 516. 

519 n. 522. 524. 526, 527. 529. 532. 536. 
Xerxes, 248—270. 274. 281. 283. 289. 296. 
Xuthus, 11. 28. 33. 43. 

Z. 

Zacynthians, 336. 

Zacynthus, 355. 362. 378. 382, 383. 524 611. 
Zaleucus, 211. 
Zama, battle of, 613. 
Zancle, 134. 

Zeno (i.), 209. 330; (n.), 595. 

Zeus, 10. 25. 35. 43. 47, 48. 50. 64. 66. 70. 

71. 73. 109. 123. 131. 139. 158. 177. 262. 

281. 282. 502. 587. 
Zeus Homagyrios, 600. 



LIST 

OF GREEK WOEDS AND PHRASES EXPLAINED. 



A. 

Aegicores, 149. 

151 n. 
'O 'A&jva? "^viQos, 169. 
'Av§^s7«, or av^/«, 95. 
'H km fiovkv), 168 n. 
'A&oxXviTOt, 602. 
Argades, 149. 
Argos, 10 n. 
' A^/Aoo-TOii, 483. 
"A%%u», 154. 
jAf^av ^xa-iXivg, 155. 
A*£*jv txojwfjuos, 155 w. 
Autochthones, 13. 
Axeinus, 49. 
"A%ons, 172 ». 



B. 

BauAvj, 94. 166. 



r. 

Geleontes, or Gedeontes, 149. 

Tiv/i, 59. 152. 

rsvvr,rctt, 152. 

rs^oiKr/at, 106. 

Tiguvtct, 94. 

Ts4;/CA0gw, 152. 

T^a^^fljTSy?, 600. 



A. 

Ati/xx^os, 183. 

A*)^/ oy^o/, 152. 600. 

Avfjioi, 182. 

A/a/T^Ta/, 169. 

Atkxgiot, or vtrzgoLxgioi, 163. 

AiotfMurri'yinffis, 113. 

To hizourrizov, 324. 



E. 

Etzoffrr,, 447 ». 
E<«oo-ToXoy«, 447 n. 



Hecatomphonia, 131. 

'EAsy0s§/«, 282. 
'EAsy0s>o<r, 282. 
Helot, 104 w. 
'Evv&kxgouvos, 178. 
'EjT/jttsA^T^, 584. 
'E^c-roAsT?, 483. 
'EsnCToAsvV , 468. 
r O iiruvvftbs, 155 w. 
'E rotation, 488 «. 

EvXKTgidtZl, 152. 

Euxeine, 49. 
'E<?st«,, 157. 



Z. 

Z£yy7rac;, 165. 



H. 

'HA/#/«, 168. 
Hero, 39 n. 
'H^cJov, 71. 

0. 

©ifff&odirxi, 155. 
®i<rju,o(, 155 n. 
To 8iupxdv> 324. 487. 
©ja/^o/, 587. 
©ijrs?, 59. 165. 



I. 

Jlg^oV 522. 
"'Ijnrotg;^, 600. 
'lnrr,i or <Ws<y, 165. 



K. 

KA^o/, 69. 
KAojgoy^/oM, 487. 
KA^ou^o/, 486. 
Kotr/xos, 94. 
KvxXixei, 204. 
Ky§£s/ ? , 172 w. 



662 



INDEX OF GREEK WORDS. 



AipZo!, 610. 

Avi%ioizx i tx.ov <y^6if^fAotn?ov, 171. 
M. 

Ms^vo?, 165 n. 

Mzrotxsov, 172. 

Msrotxoi, 172. ' 

'H fjbm^cc IxxX^criot, 125. 

UltffQhs ftxetrrtzos, 324. 488. 

Mi/rObs ixxhYitriourrixbs , 325. 487. 

Mvmm, 93. 

Morea, 6. 

Myrmidons, 35. 



N. 



Necuagxot, 483. 

NotUXPOLgiOtt, 171. 

^oju,6u£TKi, 169. 
Noftot, 155 re. 
Ne^T-a;, 55 ». 



" 0,0.0;$/, 125. 
*OvU£o<£o\ot, 71. 
Hopletes, 149. 



n. 

Ueudov6fAo$, 113. 
IlagatAe/, 163. 
n£5/«7<5/, or jrsd/eT-S, 162. 
Utvia'rai, 83. 
IXsvTfltafOir/O/a.s^-a.vo/, 165. 
UzgiOixof, 93. 
Ti6kiuM%xo$, 155. 
Polity, 145. 
Tl^oZovKiO^c&rcty 167. 



TIgVTOlVilOV, 167- 
II|VTavS<£, 167. 



P. 



f PijT£<*/, 99. 

2. 

luffuxBita,, 164. 
2yve/«/«, 151 w. 
'Svvojfjcoff'iMt, 488 W. 
"Sr^ocrviyoi, 1 OO.'l 
'^ivtra'iTtotf 95. 115. 



Teleontes, 149. 
TifjLivos, 69. 
Timocracy, 144. 
Tvgcavos, 145. 

T. 

'TiTfl^e/tfve?, 125. 
f Tjrf3«rT§a4T^yo?, 600. 

$§«Tg/i», OY $griTVl£, 152 W. 

182.^ 
$vA;>6aff7Ae7£, 152. 



X. 

Xttqorovtot, 168. 
Xgyfl'aivjjTW, 93. 



'OS*/, 106. 



THE END. 



